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This	  dissertation	  examines	  the	  landmark	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education	  case	  on	  the	  
occasion	  of	  its	  fiftieth	  anniversary	  with	  emphasis	  on	  its	  civic	  and	  social	  rhetorical	  
functions.	  The	  analysis	  focuses	  on	  the	  two	  week	  period	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  fiftieth	  
anniversary	  and	  the	  dedication	  of	  the	  Brown	  v	  Board	  of	  Education	  National	  Historic	  
Site	  in	  Topeka.	  Data	  was	  gathered	  from	  various	  web	  sites	  related	  to	  the	  National	  
Historic	  Site	  and	  the	  events	  in	  Topeka	  on	  the	  weekend	  it	  was	  dedicated,	  and	  from	  
database	  records	  of	  national	  and	  international	  news	  sources.	  These	  materials	  were	  
analyzed	  in	  three	  categories	  beginning	  with	  the	  Site	  itself	  and	  moving	  outward	  from	  
Topeka	  to	  the	  national	  media	  response.	  The	  author	  argues	  that	  Brown	  functions	  in	  
two	  ways	  that	  rival	  its	  function	  as	  law:	  first,	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  statecraft,	  a	  symbolic	  
representation	  of	  America’s	  highest	  ideals	  around	  which	  community	  is	  built	  through	  
epideictic	  performances;	  and	  second	  as	  a	  dialectic,	  a	  proposition	  around	  which	  
there	  continues	  to	  be	  an	  asynchronous	  conversation	  on	  how	  to	  achieve,	  or	  continue	  
to	  move	  toward,	  the	  promise	  of	  Brown.	  Understanding	  the	  reconstruction	  of	  Brown	  
at	  its	  fiftieth	  anniversary	  and	  the	  continued	  need	  for	  rhetorical	  efforts	  to	  bring	  about	  
its	  promises	  underscores	  the	  value	  of	  studying	  judicial	  rhetoric	  from	  a	  rhetorical	  
perspective,	  both	  to	  understand	  its	  civic	  and	  social	  function	  and	  to	  recognize	  the	  
limits	  of	  law	  to	  achieve	  social	  change.	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“For	  the	  Better	  and	  Forever”:	  Brown	  Turns	  50	  
	  
On	  Monday,	  May	  17,	  2004,	  President	  George	  W.	  Bush	  traveled	  to	  Topeka,	  Kansas,	  
the	  first	  time	  a	  sitting	  president	  had	  visited	  the	  city	  in	  a	  decade.	  Although	  it	  was	  an	  election	  
year,	  Bush	  was	  not	  making	  a	  campaign	  stop.	  He	  was	  there	  to	  speak	  at	  the	  opening	  and	  
dedication	  of	  the	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education	  National	  Historic	  Site,	  an	  event	  that	  drew	  
many	  national	  leaders	  as	  well	  as	  thousands	  of	  visitors.	  Earlier	  in	  the	  day,	  Kansas	  governor	  
Kathleen	  Sebilius	  held	  a	  proclamation	  ceremony	  on	  the	  steps	  of	  the	  Kansas	  Statehouse,	  
with	  Senator	  John	  Kerry,	  then	  the	  presumptive	  Democratic	  candidate	  for	  president,	  
speaking	  after	  her.	  This	  marked	  the	  first	  time	  presidential	  candidates	  from	  both	  major	  
political	  parties	  had	  ever	  visited	  Topeka	  during	  an	  election	  year,	  let	  alone	  on	  the	  same	  day.	  
Many	  other	  national	  political	  and	  civil	  rights	  leaders	  were	  present,	  along	  with	  thousands	  of	  
visitors	  and	  resident	  spectators,	  for	  a	  day	  of	  commemorative	  ceremonies	  all	  focused	  on	  the	  
landmark	  decision	  known	  as	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education	  of	  Topeka.	  	  	  
The	  dedication	  of	  the	  Brown	  v	  Board	  of	  Education	  National	  Historic	  Site	  was	  timed	  
to	  coincide	  nearly	  to	  the	  minute	  with	  the	  fiftieth	  anniversary	  of	  the	  decision’s	  
announcement	  in	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  1954.	  It	  constituted	  the	  high	  point	  of	  a	  year-­‐long	  
series	  of	  events	  commemorating	  the	  original	  decision	  and	  sparking	  a	  widespread	  
conversation	  about	  the	  decision,	  its	  legacy,	  and	  its	  meaning	  for	  the	  future	  in	  both	  academic	  
and	  public	  forums.	  One	  such	  event	  took	  place	  at	  Syracuse	  University	  in	  April,	  just	  a	  month	  
before	  the	  dedication	  weekend	  in	  Topeka.	  Throughout	  the	  daylong	  conference,	  panels	  and	  
discussion	  groups	  focused	  on	  the	  historical	  events	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  original	  decision,	  the	  
role	  of	  the	  attorneys	  and	  social	  scientists	  in	  the	  case,	  the	  progress	  made	  toward	  equality	  in	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education	  and	  racial	  justice	  at	  all	  levels	  of	  American	  society,	  and	  individual	  experiences	  in	  
the	  post-­‐Brown	  society.	  The	  keynote	  address	  featured	  Linda	  Brown	  and	  Cheryl	  Brown	  
Henderson,	  daughters	  of	  Oliver	  L.	  Brown,	  who	  became	  the	  lead	  and	  named	  plaintiff	  in	  the	  
Brown	  case.	  The	  Brown	  sisters	  visited	  many	  events	  that	  year,	  both	  to	  discuss	  the	  impact	  of	  
the	  decision	  on	  their	  family	  and	  to	  further	  the	  mission	  of	  The	  Brown	  Foundation	  for	  
Educational	  Equity,	  Excellence	  and	  Research,	  which	  they	  helped	  establish	  as	  a	  “living	  
tribute”	  to	  the	  plaintiffs	  and	  attorneys	  in	  the	  Brown	  decision	  (About).	  	  
The	  conference	  events	  at	  Syracuse	  read	  as	  a	  microcosm	  of	  the	  hundreds	  of	  
newspaper	  articles,	  historical	  displays,	  re-­‐enactments	  and	  other	  events	  that	  took	  place	  that	  
spring.	  Earlier	  in	  the	  year,	  Bush	  had	  declared	  the	  theme	  of	  National	  Law	  Day	  for	  2004	  to	  be	  
“To	  Win	  Equality	  by	  Law:	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education	  at	  50,”	  and	  bar	  association	  
luncheons	  across	  the	  country	  featured	  a	  range	  of	  speakers	  from	  members	  of	  the	  original	  
legal	  team	  to	  contemporary	  judges	  to	  the	  Brown	  sisters	  discussing	  the	  history	  and	  impact	  
of	  the	  Brown	  decision.	  The	  Library	  of	  Congress	  opened	  a	  special	  six-­‐month	  long	  
commemorative	  exhibition	  called	  “With	  An	  Even	  Hand:	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  at	  50.”	  The	  opening	  
included	  a	  series	  of	  lectures,	  concerts	  and	  films	  focused	  not	  just	  on	  the	  Brown	  decision,	  but	  
also	  on	  the	  civil	  rights	  movement	  as	  a	  whole.	  The	  AARP,	  one	  of	  the	  sponsors	  of	  the	  exhibit,	  
marked	  the	  year	  with	  its	  “Voices	  of	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Project,”	  an	  oral	  history	  project	  that	  
would	  become	  a	  permanent	  part	  of	  the	  Library	  of	  Congress	  collection	  on	  its	  completion.	  
NPR	  radio	  host	  Tavis	  Smiley	  broadcast	  his	  show	  live	  from	  the	  Turpin	  Lamb	  Theater	  at	  
Morgan	  State	  University	  in	  Maryland,	  interviewing	  members	  of	  the	  original	  legal	  team,	  
contemporary	  legal	  scholars	  and	  other	  civil	  rights	  activists.	  Law	  schools	  held	  conferences	  
to	  assess	  the	  progress	  made	  toward	  equality	  in	  education	  and	  racial	  justice	  at	  all	  levels	  of	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American	  society.	  Surviving	  members	  of	  the	  original	  legal	  team	  published	  memoirs,	  while	  
contemporary	  legal	  scholars	  convened	  to	  re-­‐write	  the	  Opinion	  to	  what	  they	  thought	  it	  
should	  have	  said.	  In	  the	  composition	  and	  rhetoric	  field,	  Catherine	  Prendergast	  won	  a	  
national	  book	  award	  for	  her	  analysis	  of	  Brown	  and	  its	  role	  in	  literacy	  achievement,	  while	  
another	  group	  of	  rhetoric	  scholars	  led	  by	  Clarke	  Rountree	  published	  a	  collection	  of	  essays	  
discussing	  the	  role	  rhetoric	  played	  in	  Brown,	  from	  its	  roots	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  
decision	  in	  Plessy	  v.	  Ferguson	  through	  the	  1957	  decision	  in	  Cooper	  v.	  Aaron.	  In	  the	  week	  
before	  the	  anniversary	  date,	  major	  newspapers	  across	  the	  country	  carried	  special	  sections	  
detailing	  the	  history	  of	  the	  case	  and	  offering	  contemporary	  opinions	  on	  the	  state	  of	  
education	  and	  racial	  equality.	  	  
Not	  all	  of	  the	  publicity	  was	  positive.	  A	  New	  Yorker	  article	  asked	  “Did	  Brown	  Matter?”	  
(Sunsten).	  	  A	  series	  of	  books	  published	  that	  year	  carried	  titles	  expressing	  disappointment	  
with	  the	  outcome	  of	  Brown,	  using	  phrases	  like	  “unfinished	  agenda”	  (Anderson	  and	  Byrne),	  
“unfinished	  legacy”	  (Rhode	  and	  Ogletree),	  “troubled	  legacy”	  (Patterson)	  and	  “unfulfilled	  
hope”	  (Bell).	  Many	  writers	  decried	  the	  degree	  of	  segregation	  that	  existed,	  although	  not	  by	  
force	  of	  law,	  in	  schools	  all	  through	  the	  country.	  Some	  newspapers	  ran	  extensive	  feature	  
stories	  describing	  the	  challenges	  and	  inequalities	  still	  existing	  long	  after	  Brown	  was	  
decided.	  Others	  took	  the	  occasion	  to	  remark	  on	  social	  and	  economic	  inequality	  in	  America,	  
and	  many	  walked	  the	  fine	  line	  between	  recognition	  for	  the	  great	  promises	  of	  Brown	  and	  the	  
lack	  of	  achievement	  toward	  those	  goals.	  Even	  in	  the	  speeches	  in	  Topeka,	  these	  phrases	  are	  
often	  repeated	  as	  the	  speakers	  differentiated	  between	  the	  achievement	  the	  decision	  
represents	  and	  the	  actualization	  of	  that	  achievement.	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This	  project	  took	  shape	  in	  response	  to	  the	  disparity	  in	  these	  responses	  to	  Brown’s	  
fiftieth	  anniversary.	  It	  began	  late	  in	  2002,	  when	  the	  College	  of	  Law	  at	  Syracuse	  University	  
invited	  Bell	  to	  give	  a	  lecture	  based	  on	  his	  forthcoming	  book.	  In	  his	  lecture	  that	  day,	  titled	  
“The	  Mesmerizing	  Effects	  of	  Racial	  Landmark	  Cases,”	  Bell	  explained	  why	  he	  had	  come	  to	  
believe	  that	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education	  had	  been	  wrongly	  decided,	  how	  his	  thinking	  had	  
changed	  from	  his	  early	  career	  as	  a	  civil	  rights	  lawyer.	  He	  said	  the	  problem	  with	  decisions	  
such	  as	  Brown	  was	  they	  mesmerized	  people	  into	  believing	  that	  because	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  
had	  ruled,	  the	  problem	  was	  solved;	  an	  assessment	  that	  Brown’s	  first	  fifty	  years	  clearly	  
showed,	  by	  his	  reckoning,	  to	  be	  incorrect.	  By	  the	  spring	  of	  2004,	  Bell’s	  disappointment	  was	  
being	  echoed	  in	  several	  places,	  including	  remarks	  made	  during	  Syracuse	  University’s	  
commemorative	  day,	  when	  Professors	  Linda	  Carty	  and	  Paula	  Johnson	  offered	  their	  
reflections	  on	  the	  decision	  and	  its	  history,	  concluding	  that	  they	  were	  “less	  inclined	  to	  
celebrate	  this	  50th	  anniversary	  of	  the	  decision,	  than	  to	  commemorate	  the	  significance	  of	  
what	  it	  could	  still	  mean	  for	  this	  society.”	  	  Initially,	  I	  wanted	  to	  understand	  this	  
disappointment,	  to	  see	  why	  so	  many	  believed	  Brown	  had	  fallen	  short.	  Eventually,	  this	  led	  to	  
the	  larger	  question	  of	  why	  anyone	  expected	  Brown,	  or	  any	  other	  Supreme	  Court	  decision,	  
to	  accomplish	  so	  much	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  social	  change.	  The	  decision	  was	  a	  necessary	  step	  for	  
the	  elimination	  of	  formal	  segregation	  in	  education	  and	  all	  other	  arenas,	  but	  the	  Court	  
offered	  no	  specific	  action	  to	  be	  taken,	  no	  specific	  deadline,	  and	  no	  penalty	  for	  non-­‐
compliance.	  The	  Opinion	  made	  a	  declarative	  statement,	  but	  offered	  little	  that	  could	  be	  seen	  
as	  persuasive.	  If	  it	  was,	  as	  Ann	  Gill	  argues,	  “a	  necessary	  but	  not	  sufficient	  condition	  for	  
social	  change,”	  what	  would	  be	  sufficient?	  (145).	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In	  response	  to	  that	  question,	  this	  project	  seeks	  to	  accomplish	  two	  related	  tasks:	  to	  
analyze	  the	  events	  and	  discourse	  of	  the	  fiftieth	  anniversary	  to	  show	  how	  Brown	  has	  
functioned	  epideictically,	  to	  determine	  what	  values	  were	  being	  celebrated,	  how	  those	  
values	  were	  being	  presented,	  the	  kind	  of	  consensus	  they	  were	  attempting	  to	  build	  and	  in	  
what	  audiences;	  and	  to	  analyze	  the	  larger	  implications	  of	  Brown	  in	  understanding	  law	  as	  a	  
social	  construction,	  and	  judicial	  reasoning	  as	  a	  product	  of	  the	  evolving	  values	  of	  the	  society	  
from	  which	  it	  emerges.	  I’ll	  argue	  that	  Brown	  has	  functioned,	  and	  continues	  to	  function	  in	  
two	  very	  different	  but	  equally	  important	  ways:	  first,	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  statecraft,	  as	  the	  symbolic	  
representation	  of	  a	  nation	  continually	  striving	  to	  achieve	  its	  own	  founding	  ideals,	  and	  as	  
the	  unifying	  standard	  by	  which	  no	  one	  can	  claim	  membership	  in	  the	  community	  without	  
giving	  assent	  to	  its	  goals;	  and	  second	  as	  a	  dialectic,	  a	  national	  asynchronous	  conversation	  
about	  how	  to	  move	  from	  the	  general	  ideals	  espoused	  in	  our	  founding	  documents	  to	  the	  
specific	  ways	  of	  being	  in	  the	  world	  together	  that	  would	  actualize	  those	  ideals.	  I’ll	  argue	  that	  
the	  Brown	  v	  Board	  of	  Education	  National	  Historic	  Site	  provides	  an	  important	  means	  for	  
preserving	  the	  darker	  images	  of	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  era,	  that	  by	  enrobing	  these	  images	  in	  an	  
educative	  function	  and	  in	  celebrating	  those	  who	  overcame	  the	  violence	  to	  prevail	  in	  
achieving	  the	  legal	  victory,	  the	  Site	  plays	  an	  important	  part	  in	  both	  the	  statecraft	  and	  
dialectical	  functions.	  I’ll	  argue	  also	  that	  however	  significant	  the	  legal	  victory,	  there	  is	  a	  gap	  
between	  the	  declaring	  of	  a	  law	  and	  the	  realization	  of	  it,	  and	  that	  this	  gap	  is,	  to	  paraphrase	  
Gerald	  Hauser,	  a	  civic	  need	  that	  rhetoric,	  and	  epideictic	  rhetoric	  in	  particular,	  can	  fill	  (6).	  	  
And	  finally,	  I’ll	  argue	  that	  scholars	  and	  teachers	  in	  composition	  and	  rhetoric	  can	  and	  should	  
reclaim	  judicial	  rhetoric,	  and	  specifically	  the	  texts	  that	  are	  judicial	  opinions,	  as	  a	  proper	  
subject	  of	  their	  consideration,	  and	  that	  in	  so	  doing	  help	  to	  demystify	  the	  law,	  to	  help	  return	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the	  law	  to	  the	  people	  in	  the	  communities	  it	  represents	  by	  providing	  them	  with	  the	  means	  to	  
first	  see	  the	  values	  being	  promoted	  within	  the	  legal	  discourse,	  and	  to	  participate	  in	  both	  the	  
legal	  process	  and	  policy	  making	  more	  effectively	  by	  engaging	  with	  the	  statecraft	  and	  	  
dialectical	  processes	  of	  their	  own	  communities.	  This	  first	  chapter	  provides	  some	  context	  
and	  framing	  for	  the	  chapters	  that	  follow,	  first	  by	  providing	  a	  bit	  of	  background	  for	  the	  
original	  Brown	  decision,	  its	  early	  reception,	  and	  connections	  to	  the	  fiftieth	  anniversary	  
discourse;	  then	  by	  discussing	  the	  corpus	  and	  methodology	  of	  study;	  and	  finally	  by	  
reviewing	  the	  literature	  informing	  my	  analysis.	  The	  final	  portion	  of	  this	  chapter	  introduces	  
the	  key	  elements	  of	  those	  that	  follow.	  	  
The	  Brown	  decision	  was	  a	  roll-­‐up	  of	  five	  separate	  cases:	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education	  
of	  Topeka,	  from	  Kansas;	  Briggs	  v.	  Elliott,	  from	  South	  Carolina;	  Davis	  v.	  County	  School	  Board	  
of	  Prince	  Edward	  County,	  from	  Virginia;	  Gebhart	  v.	  Belton,	  from	  Delaware;	  and	  Bolling	  v.	  
Sharpe	  from	  the	  District	  of	  Columbia;	  each	  focused	  on	  a	  different	  aspect	  of	  inequality	  in	  the	  
school	  systems	  there.	  Originally	  known	  as	  the	  Consolidated	  School	  Segregation	  cases,	  the	  
combined	  case	  was	  named	  for	  the	  lead	  plaintiff	  in	  the	  case	  emerging	  from	  Kansas,	  that	  of	  
Oliver	  L.	  Brown,	  et	  al.,	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education	  of	  Topeka.	  The	  Kansas	  case	  was	  unique	  in	  that	  it	  
was	  the	  only	  case	  where	  the	  segregated	  schools	  had	  met	  the	  test	  of	  being	  substantially	  
equal,	  the	  key	  element	  of	  the	  “separate	  but	  equal”	  law	  that	  was	  being	  challenged.	  The	  
“separate	  but	  equal”	  standard	  had	  come	  from	  the	  1868	  ruling	  in	  Plessy	  v.	  Ferguson,	  in	  which	  
the	  Court	  had	  ruled	  that	  segregated	  facilities	  did	  not	  violate	  the	  Constitution	  as	  long	  as	  
those	  facilities	  were	  provided	  on	  equal	  terms.	  This	  was	  the	  claim	  that	  Brown	  refuted,	  or	  
rather	  set	  aside,	  as	  the	  justices	  unanimously	  ruled	  that	  state-­‐mandated	  segregation	  in	  
public	  schools	  was	  unconstitutional.	  The	  two	  parts	  of	  the	  ruling	  were	  issued	  a	  full	  year	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apart.	  The	  first	  and	  more	  famous	  part	  was	  the	  declarative	  ruling	  that	  offered	  the	  key	  phrase	  
“we	  conclude	  that	  in	  the	  field	  of	  public	  education,	  the	  doctrine	  of	  ‘separate	  but	  equal’	  has	  
no	  place.	  Separate	  educational	  facilities	  are	  inherently	  unequal”	  (Brown	  483).	  The	  second	  
part,	  known	  as	  Brown	  II,	  came	  after	  a	  new	  round	  of	  arguments	  before	  the	  Court	  about	  
potential	  remedies.	  Chief	  Justice	  Earl	  Warren	  was	  careful	  to	  separate	  the	  remedy	  portion	  of	  
the	  ruling	  from	  the	  declarative	  portion,	  and	  set	  aside	  the	  need	  to	  persuade	  the	  audience	  
that	  the	  Plessy	  ruling	  was	  in	  error	  by	  simply	  stating,	  “we	  cannot	  turn	  back	  the	  clock”	  but	  
rather	  “must	  consider	  public	  education	  in	  the	  light	  of	  its	  full	  development	  and	  its	  present	  
place	  in	  American	  life”	  (Brown	  492).	  	  After	  the	  second	  ruling,	  in	  which	  the	  Court	  provided	  
the	  standard	  of	  “all	  deliberate	  speed,”	  some	  school	  districts	  began	  the	  process	  of	  
dismantling	  their	  segregated	  structure	  while	  others	  simply	  ignored	  the	  directive,	  using	  the	  
phrase	  “all	  deliberate	  speed”	  as	  a	  license	  to	  contemplate	  more	  than	  act.	  	  
Controversy	  over	  the	  Brown	  decision	  began	  almost	  as	  the	  second	  opinion	  was	  
published.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  decision	  was	  hailed	  as	  the	  defeat	  of	  Jim	  Crow	  and	  legalized	  
state-­‐imposed	  segregation.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  legal	  scholars	  challenged	  its	  validity	  as	  law,	  
the	  use	  of	  the	  social	  science	  evidence	  was	  heavily	  criticized	  both	  in	  legal	  circles	  and	  the	  
popular	  press,	  and	  southern	  political	  leaders	  denounced	  the	  Court	  for	  overstepping	  its	  
authority.	  Senator	  James	  Eastland	  said	  the	  decision	  was	  “based	  on	  the	  writings	  and	  
teachings	  of	  pro-­‐communist	  agitators	  and	  other	  enemies	  of	  the	  American	  form	  of	  
government”	  (Patterson	  88).	  Southern	  senators,	  led	  by	  Strom	  Thurmond	  of	  South	  Carolina	  
and	  Harry	  Byrd	  of	  Virginia,	  produced	  the	  petition	  of	  Massive	  Resistance	  in	  the	  United	  
States	  Senate,	  denouncing	  the	  decision	  as	  a	  “clear	  abuse	  of	  judicial	  power”	  and	  promising	  
to	  resist	  its	  implementation	  (Patterson	  88,	  Kluger	  752).	  As	  Virginia	  moved	  to	  participate	  in	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the	  Massive	  Resistance,	  the	  Board	  of	  Supervisors	  in	  the	  Prince	  Edward	  School	  District,	  one	  
of	  the	  named	  districts	  in	  the	  Brown	  decision,	  closed	  their	  public	  schools	  to	  avoid	  
integration,	  a	  closure	  that	  would	  last	  five	  years.	  Herbert	  Wechsler,	  a	  nationally	  top-­‐ranking	  
professor	  at	  Columbia	  Law	  School	  and	  early	  admirer	  of	  Charles	  Hamilton	  Houston,	  the	  first	  
architect	  of	  the	  NAACP’s	  legal	  efforts	  culminating	  in	  Brown,	  claimed	  the	  decision	  violated	  
the	  legal	  standard	  of	  neutral	  principles.	  Governors	  such	  as	  Orval	  Fabus	  of	  Arkansas	  and	  
George	  Wallace	  in	  Alabama	  found	  political	  gain	  in	  opposing	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  
Brown	  decision.	  	  
The	  Supreme	  Court	  also	  struggled	  with	  the	  implications	  of	  its	  ruling	  in	  Brown	  II.	  In	  
ruling	  on	  what	  was	  and	  was	  not	  acceptable	  in	  terms	  of	  compliance	  strategies,	  the	  Court	  
allowed	  for	  plans	  such	  as	  the	  mandatory	  school	  busing	  programs	  that	  caused	  social	  
upheaval	  in	  Boston	  and	  other	  cities	  (Swann	  v.	  Mecklenberg),	  but	  ruled	  that	  inner	  city	  school	  
districts	  could	  not	  be	  joined	  to	  suburban	  school	  districts	  for	  purposes	  of	  evaluating	  
compliance	  with	  the	  ruling	  (Milliken	  v.	  Bradley).	  Affirmative	  Action	  programs	  were	  initially	  
approved	  by	  the	  Court	  (Regents	  of	  the	  University	  of	  California	  v.	  Bakke),	  but	  in	  2003,	  Justice	  
Sandra	  Day	  O’Connor,	  writing	  for	  the	  fractured	  Court	  in	  the	  Michigan	  Affirmative	  Action	  
cases,	  expressed	  optimism	  that	  within	  twenty-­‐five	  years	  affirmative	  action	  programs	  
would	  no	  longer	  be	  needed	  to	  establish	  equality	  in	  education.	  Even	  in	  the	  Court,	  competing	  
narratives	  of	  how	  to	  best	  achieve	  Brown’s	  ideals	  continued.	  	  
Despite	  the	  historical	  tensions	  and	  the	  uneasiness	  over	  its	  effectiveness,	  the	  answer	  
to	  The	  New	  Yorker’s	  question	  is	  clearly	  yes,	  Brown	  mattered.	  That	  there	  was	  a	  public	  
recognition	  of	  its	  50th	  anniversary,	  a	  unique	  recognition	  for	  a	  legal	  decision,	  is	  itself	  proof	  
that	  the	  decision	  had	  resonance	  beyond	  its	  function	  in	  law:	  not	  just	  as	  legal	  precedent,	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though	  it	  is	  that;	  not	  just	  as	  successful	  argument,	  though	  it	  is	  that,	  too;	  and	  not	  just	  as	  a	  
measure	  for	  educational	  equality,	  though	  measure	  by	  its	  promise	  we	  surely	  do.	  What	  the	  
fiftieth	  anniversary	  captured	  was	  the	  essence	  of	  Brown	  as	  an	  idea,	  a	  concept,	  a	  
representation	  of	  the	  highest	  of	  American	  ideals	  and	  values.	  To	  invoke	  Brown	  is	  to	  
encapsulate	  in	  a	  single	  word	  the	  struggle	  for	  racial	  equality,	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Movement	  and	  
all	  the	  energy,	  activism,	  violence	  and	  hope	  that	  was	  part	  of	  it,	  the	  ongoing	  efforts	  to	  achieve	  
equality	  in	  education,	  and	  the	  continuing	  quest	  for	  the	  just	  society	  envisioned	  in	  America’s	  
founding	  ideals.	  
The	  link	  between	  the	  Brown	  decision	  and	  the	  civil	  rights	  movement	  is	  a	  significant	  
measure	  of	  its	  overall	  function.	  Some	  scholars	  have	  argued	  that	  Brown	  had	  no	  direct	  
connection	  to	  the	  later	  activities	  of	  the	  civil	  rights	  movement.	  But	  Catherine	  Prendergast	  
stated	  the	  sentiment	  shared	  by	  many	  other	  scholars,	  that	  “as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  civil	  rights	  
movement,	  literacy	  and	  racial	  justice	  have	  been	  intertwined	  in	  the	  American	  imagination”	  
and	  that	  “it	  was	  the	  Brown	  decision	  that	  fixed	  the	  notion	  of	  education	  as	  a	  path	  to	  equal	  
opportunity	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  Americans”	  (2).	  These	  overlapping	  and	  intertwined	  ideas	  are	  
the	  foundation	  of	  Brown’s	  promise,	  the	  hope-­‐filled	  standard	  by	  which	  education	  equality	  
and	  racial	  justice	  are	  measured.	  This	  measurement,	  the	  standards	  by	  which	  we	  assess	  the	  
success	  or	  failure	  of	  equality	  efforts,	  shifts	  over	  time.	  As	  Justice	  David	  Souter	  expressed	  in	  
his	  commencement	  address	  at	  Harvard	  in	  2010,	  the	  measure	  of	  success	  in	  1954	  was	  
different	  than	  the	  measure	  in	  2004,	  in	  part	  because	  of	  the	  time	  that	  had	  elapsed	  and	  the	  
expectations	  for	  progress	  that	  accompany	  that	  time	  span,	  but	  also	  because	  each	  level	  of	  
achievement	  changes	  the	  standard	  for	  the	  measure.	  Souter	  observed	  “the	  judges	  of	  1954	  
found	  a	  meaning	  in	  segregating	  the	  races	  by	  law	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  their	  predecessors	  in	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1896	  did	  not	  see.”	  Similarly,	  the	  judges	  of	  2003,	  in	  the	  Michigan	  cases,	  saw	  a	  standard	  for	  
racial	  consideration	  in	  school	  admission	  that	  could	  not	  have	  been	  contemplated	  by	  the	  
judges	  of	  1954.	  Americans	  who	  are	  not	  old	  enough	  to	  remember	  the	  years	  of	  Jim	  Crow	  
segregation	  have	  a	  different	  frame	  of	  reference	  for	  the	  ruling	  in	  Brown	  and	  the	  initiatives	  
created	  to	  fulfill	  its	  promise	  than	  do	  those	  who	  lived	  through	  those	  years.	  	  
So	  the	  public	  ceremonies	  throughout	  the	  anniversary	  year,	  and	  particularly	  those	  in	  
Topeka,	  worked	  to	  build	  a	  common	  sense	  of	  what	  Brown	  means	  going	  forward,	  setting	  the	  
boundaries	  of	  virtuous	  citizenship	  through	  praise	  and	  blame	  elements	  and	  the	  recognition	  
of	  honorable	  and	  shameful	  deeds	  and	  events.	  	  President	  Bush	  spoke	  for	  only	  about	  eleven	  
minutes,	  but	  in	  that	  time	  he	  covered	  the	  history	  of	  race	  relations	  in	  America	  leading	  up	  to	  
the	  Brown	  decision,	  beginning	  with	  a	  reference	  to	  slavery,	  moving	  through	  the	  “sorry	  
structure”	  of	  Jim	  Crow	  segregation,	  and	  on	  to	  the	  courage	  of	  the	  plaintiffs	  and	  attorneys	  in	  
the	  Brown	  case,	  the	  “good	  souls”	  who	  worked	  to	  overturn	  the	  “great	  wrong”	  that	  had	  
allowed	  segregation.	  In	  this	  movement	  between	  praise	  and	  blame,	  Bush	  spoke	  to	  the	  
common	  understanding	  of	  his	  audience,	  some	  of	  whom	  had	  lived	  in	  the	  Jim	  Crow	  era,	  and	  
some	  of	  whom	  had	  been	  the	  children	  who	  first	  integrated	  their	  local	  school	  systems.	  The	  
speech	  married	  two	  forms	  of	  epideictic	  rhetoric,	  the	  panegyric	  or	  festival	  speech,	  and	  the	  
eulogy	  or	  funeral	  speech.	  The	  festival	  aspect	  of	  the	  speech	  fit	  the	  circumstances,	  with	  the	  
ceremonies	  taking	  place	  both	  in	  Topeka	  and	  across	  the	  country	  to	  commemorate	  Brown’s	  
anniversary,	  and	  with	  the	  new	  site	  being	  dedicated,	  being	  occasions	  for	  ritual	  and	  speeches	  
celebrating	  the	  state	  and	  its	  leaders.	  The	  eulogistic	  element	  came	  from	  acknowledging	  the	  
efforts	  of	  those	  now	  dead,	  the	  “heroes,”	  such	  as	  Thurgood	  Marshall	  and	  Charles	  Hamilton	  
Houston,	  who	  worked	  to	  end	  the	  “system	  of	  racial	  oppression,”	  heroes	  that	  Bush	  set	  up	  as	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the	  victors	  over	  “cruel	  and	  petty	  men.”	  These	  themes	  met	  with	  approval	  from	  Bush’s	  
immediate	  audience	  because	  they	  already	  shared	  this	  vision	  of	  the	  Brown	  decision.	  This	  
was	  true	  throughout	  Topeka	  as	  other	  speakers	  spoke	  to	  that	  same	  audience,	  and	  to	  other	  
groups	  at	  other	  events	  throughout	  the	  city.	  And	  in	  the	  discourse	  surrounding	  the	  
anniversary,	  the	  many	  books	  and	  hundreds	  of	  newspaper	  articles	  discussing	  its	  history	  and	  
its	  aftermath,	  only	  one	  voice,	  Derrick	  Bell’s,	  openly	  declared	  that	  Brown	  had	  been	  wrongly	  
decided.	  This	  was	  a	  considerable	  departure	  from	  the	  reception	  to	  the	  original	  decision,	  
when	  political	  leaders	  did	  not	  hesitate	  to	  condemn	  the	  decision	  or	  the	  reasoning	  behind	  it.	  
This	  shift	  shows	  how	  the	  Brown	  decision	  has	  moved	  into	  the	  position	  Dr.	  Whately	  
called	  “Presumption,”	  the	  side	  of	  a	  case	  that	  is	  already	  accepted,	  and	  against	  which	  any	  
proposed	  alternative	  bears	  the	  “burden	  of	  proof”	  (73-­‐4,	  76).	  When	  Brown	  was	  decided,	  
Plessy	  v.	  Ferguson	  held	  the	  position	  of	  Presumption1	  and	  therefore	  Brown	  bore	  the	  “burden	  
of	  proof”	  that	  the	  existing	  structure	  should	  no	  longer	  exist.	  Part	  of	  Brown’s	  significance	  was	  
and	  is	  due	  to	  it	  overturning	  that	  decision.	  The	  significance	  of	  overturning	  an	  existing	  
Supreme	  Court	  ruling	  comes	  from	  the	  long	  accepted	  legal	  principle	  of	  stare	  decisis,	  meaning	  
“to	  abide	  by,	  or	  adhere	  to,	  decided	  cases”	  (Black	  978).	  This	  principle	  gives	  the	  law	  stability	  
and	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  efficiency	  over	  time,	  as	  courts	  respect	  and	  rely	  upon	  decisions	  
made	  by	  earlier	  courts	  when	  faced	  with	  similar	  legal	  questions,	  and	  it	  is	  similar	  to	  Dr.	  
Whately’s	  notion	  of	  Presumption.	  In	  the	  Brown	  case,	  meeting	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  in	  Court	  
proved	  easier	  than	  meeting	  the	  same	  test	  in	  society,	  because	  the	  communities	  involved	  had	  
achieved	  “communion,”	  Chaim	  Perelman	  and	  Lucy	  Olbrechts-­‐Tyteca’s	  term	  for	  a	  
“community’s	  agreement	  on	  questions	  of	  value,”	  on	  the	  values	  and	  social	  structures	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  The	  capitalization	  is	  retained	  in	  keeping	  with	  Dr.	  Whately’s	  reference.	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emerging	  from	  the	  formal	  system	  of	  segregation	  (Graff	  and	  Winn	  46).	  	  The	  values	  in	  the	  
segregated	  states	  came	  into	  direct	  conflict	  with	  the	  values	  held	  by	  the	  advocates	  in	  the	  
Brown	  cases.	  Historian	  James	  Cobb	  described	  Brown	  as	  a	  competition	  between	  “folkways”	  
and	  “stateways,”	  where	  the	  stateways,	  or	  the	  initial	  ruling	  and	  later	  efforts	  to	  force	  
integration,	  got	  ahead	  of	  the	  folkways,	  or	  the	  acceptance	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  the	  affected	  
citizens	  of	  the	  ruling	  and	  its	  implementation	  (8).	  In	  some	  ways,	  that	  distinction	  can	  be	  seen	  
in	  the	  two-­‐part	  nature	  of	  the	  decision,	  where	  the	  first	  part	  met	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  state,	  the	  
nation,	  and	  its	  audience	  at	  the	  time,	  while	  the	  second	  anticipated	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  “folk,”	  the	  
separate	  states,	  school	  systems	  and	  individuals	  responsible	  for	  carrying	  out	  the	  decision.	  
The	  Plessy	  decision	  quickly	  fueled	  segregation	  laws	  and	  practices	  throughout	  the	  South,	  
because	  it	  added	  the	  imprimatur	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  to	  existing	  social	  tendencies	  and	  the	  
desires	  of	  the	  dominant	  white	  population	  throughout	  the	  South.	  Compliance	  with	  the	  
Brown	  decision	  was	  delayed	  by	  a	  decade	  or	  more	  in	  many	  places	  because	  it	  faced	  the	  uphill	  
struggle	  of	  dismantling	  social	  custom	  and	  practice.	  Brown	  was	  without	  question	  a	  pivotal	  
moment	  in	  the	  history	  of	  education	  and	  civil	  rights,	  but	  it	  was	  also	  a	  proclamation	  that	  
demanded	  enormous	  social	  change	  from	  a	  large	  portion	  of	  the	  country.	  	  
In	  the	  speeches	  given	  at	  Brown’s	  fiftieth	  anniversary,	  the	  audiences	  were	  presented	  
with	  praise	  and	  blame	  for	  particular	  individuals	  and	  situations	  that	  worked	  to	  increase	  the	  
sense	  of	  “communion”	  around	  the	  values	  put	  forth	  in	  the	  Brown	  decision.	  The	  were	  not	  
asked	  to	  judge	  or	  to	  make	  a	  decision	  about	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  decision;	  rather	  the	  
events	  presented	  the	  decision	  to	  the	  public	  as	  significant,	  as	  good	  for	  all	  America,	  and	  as	  a	  
reaffirmation	  of	  America’s	  ideals.	  The	  speeches	  show	  that	  over	  its	  first	  fifty	  years,	  Brown	  
has	  grown	  from	  being	  a	  landmark	  legal	  case	  to	  an	  ideograph,	  the	  term	  Michael	  Calvin	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McGee	  uses	  to	  describe	  a	  one-­‐word	  term	  that	  captures	  an	  entire	  ideology	  and	  functions	  as	  
both	  a	  symbol	  and	  carrier	  of	  that	  ideology.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Brown,	  we	  might	  name	  these	  
symbols	  as	  equality,	  justice,	  and	  freedom.	  The	  rhetorical	  efforts	  to	  increase	  the	  audience’s	  
mental	  adherence	  to	  these	  values	  was	  necessary	  because	  although	  the	  legal	  balance	  of	  the	  
burden	  had	  shifted,	  and	  the	  terms	  had	  changed,	  the	  conflict	  remained:	  even	  within	  the	  
framework	  of	  accepting	  the	  decision	  as	  right,	  there	  are	  still	  competing	  narratives	  as	  to	  
what	  it	  means	  and	  how	  to	  best	  achieve	  its	  promises.	  
The	  Brown	  v	  Board	  of	  Education	  National	  Historic	  Site	  invites	  its	  visitors	  to	  
participate	  in	  the	  ongoing	  conversation	  about	  how	  to	  achieve	  those	  promises	  in	  several	  
ways,	  and	  provides	  the	  entry	  point	  for	  this	  analysis.	  The	  Brown	  Foundation’s	  founders	  
wanted	  to	  create	  a	  living	  memorial,	  one	  that	  would	  educate	  visitors	  about	  the	  complexities	  
and	  details	  of	  the	  Brown	  cases,	  and	  one	  that	  would	  reach	  out	  to	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  publics,	  
inviting	  them	  to	  be	  a	  part	  of	  the	  ongoing	  achievement	  of	  Brown’s	  ideals.	  The	  physical	  site	  
does	  this	  through	  galleries	  that	  include	  more	  than	  just	  the	  legal	  process;	  they	  set	  that	  
process	  in	  the	  larger	  social	  factors	  at	  work	  both	  before	  and	  after	  the	  decision.	  The	  Brown	  
Foundation	  also	  provides	  a	  detailed	  online	  tour	  for	  those	  who	  haven’t	  yet	  made	  the	  journey	  
to	  the	  physical	  location.	  The	  online	  tour	  provides	  images	  from	  all	  of	  the	  galleries,	  a	  detailed	  
floor	  plan,	  explanations	  and	  photographs	  for	  the	  restoration	  process	  and	  a	  history	  of	  how	  
the	  property	  became	  a	  National	  Historic	  Site	  and	  a	  National	  Park.	  The	  online	  tour	  provided	  
the	  basis	  for	  the	  analysis	  in	  this	  project.	  In	  either	  the	  physical	  or	  online	  presentation,	  the	  
images	  and	  artifacts	  displayed	  help	  a	  contemporary	  visitor	  experience	  a	  bit	  of	  “how	  it	  was	  
then,”	  but	  they	  also	  carefully	  construct	  the	  limits	  of	  discussion	  about	  the	  decision’s	  legacy	  
to	  match	  the	  state	  of	  Presumption	  it	  has	  assumed.	  Under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  National	  Park	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Service,	  the	  information	  presented	  in	  the	  Site’s	  galleries	  takes	  on	  the	  mantle	  of	  the	  “official	  
history,”	  and	  establishes	  the	  way	  the	  decision	  will	  be	  recounted	  and	  set	  in	  public	  memory.	  
Carol	  Blair	  argued	  that	  public	  memory	  sites	  are	  among	  the	  most	  rhetorical	  of	  all	  
public	  places,	  that	  such	  sites	  are	  “destinations	  of	  historical	  significance	  and	  civic	  
socialization,	  summoning	  tourists	  as	  citizen	  pilgrims	  to	  partake	  of	  their	  typically	  
inspirational	  messages”	  (2).	  The	  inspirational	  messages	  within	  the	  Brown	  v	  Board	  of	  
Education	  National	  Historic	  Site	  come	  in	  mixed	  form,	  with	  artifacts	  that	  proclaim	  the	  
victory	  in	  the	  Court’s	  ruling	  and	  more	  chilling	  displays	  related	  to	  carrying	  out	  that	  ruling,	  
including	  the	  Tunnel	  of	  Courage,	  where	  visitors	  hear	  the	  kinds	  of	  racial	  slurs	  and	  angry	  
epithets	  that	  are	  largely	  absent	  from	  contemporary	  discourse	  about	  racial	  issues.	  Keeping	  
these	  harsher	  images	  in	  public	  memory	  is	  one	  of	  the	  key	  functions	  of	  this	  Site,	  an	  effort	  to	  
avoid	  what	  Stephen	  Browne	  argued	  was	  the	  potentially	  fatal	  error	  of	  erasing	  the	  past.	  
Browne,	  along	  with	  Kendall	  Phillips	  and	  others,	  also	  argued	  that	  a	  “healthy	  and	  functioning	  
public”	  requires	  a	  capacity	  for	  “remembrance	  together”	  (Phillips	  2).	  Phillips	  argued	  that	  the	  
notion	  of	  public	  memory	  is	  both	  “the	  memory	  of	  publics”	  and	  the	  “publicness	  of	  memory”	  
and	  each	  of	  these	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  National	  Historic	  Site.	  Within	  its	  
galleries	  are	  the	  memories	  of	  various	  publics,	  as	  the	  exhibits	  carefully	  present	  individuals	  
and	  events	  related	  to	  the	  Brown	  decision	  and	  its	  aftermath.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  visitors	  to	  the	  
galleries	  are	  encouraged	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  publicness	  of	  those	  memories,	  which	  may	  
include	  their	  own	  recollections	  of	  the	  Brown	  era	  or	  related	  events	  that	  might	  be	  shared	  in	  
the	  Reflections	  gallery.	  	  
While	  Phillips	  argues	  that	  memory	  is	  “conceived	  in	  terms	  of	  multiple,	  diverse,	  
mutable,	  and	  competing	  accounts	  of	  past	  events,”	  the	  galleries	  in	  this	  public	  memory	  space	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offer	  a	  fairly	  unified	  narrative	  of	  history.	  Thus,	  the	  site	  defines	  the	  limits	  of	  acceptable	  
discourse	  about	  the	  decision	  and	  how	  to	  achieve	  its	  ideals,	  in	  part	  by	  omitting	  exhibits	  
related	  to	  those	  individuals	  who	  argued	  the	  various	  cases	  to	  uphold	  the	  existing	  law	  of	  the	  
land.	  The	  Site	  houses	  the	  Brown	  that	  “we,	  the	  State”	  want	  to	  remember,	  that	  “we,	  the	  State”	  
authorize,	  so	  that	  the	  public	  in	  this	  particular	  public	  memory	  site	  is	  first	  the	  public	  of	  the	  
collective	  “we”	  that	  is	  America.	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  anniversary	  speeches	  as	  well,	  where	  
the	  plural	  first	  person	  voice	  become	  a	  unifying	  theme	  enfolding	  hearers	  in	  their	  identity	  as	  
Americans	  before	  anything	  else,	  so	  that	  the	  theme	  of	  community	  building	  and	  adherence	  to	  
the	  idea	  of	  Brown	  as	  a	  national	  good	  are	  amplified	  by	  repetition.	  	  
The	  speeches	  given	  by	  political	  leaders,	  including	  the	  president,	  in	  Topeka	  provide	  
the	  next	  set	  of	  texts	  for	  this	  study.	  The	  selected	  speeches	  were	  chosen	  for	  the	  status	  of	  the	  
speaker,	  who	  by	  rank	  or	  reputation	  carried	  the	  authority	  to	  speak	  for	  “the	  state”	  or	  a	  
significant	  constituency	  in	  it,	  an	  authority	  indicated	  in	  part	  by	  the	  availability	  of	  their	  
speeches	  in	  either	  written	  or	  video	  form	  three	  years	  after	  the	  speeches	  were	  given.	  
President	  Bush’s	  speech	  was	  published	  by	  the	  Federal	  Document	  Clearing	  House	  and	  
appeared	  in	  several	  newspapers	  throughout	  the	  country,	  thus	  appearing	  in	  the	  corpus	  of	  
article	  discussed	  below.	  His	  speech	  is	  also	  preserved	  in	  video	  segments	  in	  a	  special	  in-­‐
depth	  section	  of	  the	  Topeka	  Capitol-­‐Journal’s	  website.	  Portions	  of	  other	  speeches	  given	  that	  
day,	  including	  Governor	  Kathleen	  Sebilius’s	  remarks	  at	  the	  dedication	  ceremony,	  also	  
appear	  on	  that	  site.	  Her	  remarks	  at	  the	  proclamation	  ceremony	  earlier	  in	  the	  day,	  a	  
ceremony	  honoring	  the	  decision	  and	  taking	  place	  on	  the	  steps	  of	  the	  Kansas	  Statehouse,	  
were	  not	  available	  in	  original	  text	  but	  were	  extensively	  reported	  on.	  The	  speech	  given	  by	  
Senator	  Kerry	  at	  the	  proclamation	  ceremony	  earlier	  in	  the	  day	  was	  originally	  published	  on	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his	  official	  website,	  but	  has	  since	  moved	  to	  The	  American	  Presidency	  Project	  website.	  The	  
Reverend	  Jesse	  Jackson’s	  remarks	  were	  also	  taken	  from	  the	  reporting	  on	  his	  sermon	  and	  
prayer	  breakfast	  remarks	  rather	  than	  from	  original	  texts.	  Each	  of	  these	  speakers	  carried	  
political	  rank	  and	  authority	  suited	  to	  the	  occasion,	  and	  their	  remarks	  indicate	  the	  state	  
view	  of	  Brown’s	  meaning	  at	  its	  fiftieth	  anniversary,	  while	  simultaneously	  calling	  on	  “the	  
people”	  to	  continue	  to	  work	  to	  achieve	  its	  promises.	  
The	  conversation	  of	  the	  people	  provides	  the	  final	  focal	  point	  for	  this	  analysis.	  Having	  
run	  across	  The	  New	  Yorker	  article	  noted	  above	  in	  ordinary	  reading,	  I	  wanted	  to	  examine	  
other	  mass	  media	  publications	  to	  see	  how	  Brown	  was	  being	  discussed	  outside	  of	  legal	  
scholarship	  and	  other	  academic	  publications.	  To	  maintain	  focus	  on	  the	  fiftieth	  anniversary	  
of	  the	  decision,	  but	  allow	  for	  the	  breadth	  of	  media	  anticipation	  of	  that	  specific	  date,	  I	  
limited	  the	  news	  article	  search	  to	  the	  two-­‐week	  period	  from	  May	  1	  through	  May	  17,	  2004.	  I	  
chose	  the	  LexisNexis	  Academic	  database	  in	  a	  search	  of	  all	  U.S.	  Newspapers	  and	  Wires	  
(rather	  than	  major	  newspapers	  or	  other	  narrower	  term)	  with	  the	  search	  term	  “Brown	  v.	  
Board”	  (quotation	  marks	  included).	  This	  search	  returned	  a	  total	  of	  1038	  articles.	  These	  
were	  saved	  in	  chronological	  order	  in	  Word	  documents	  and	  read	  through	  several	  times	  to	  
detect	  duplications	  (of	  which	  there	  were	  several).	  Notifications	  or	  event	  announcements	  
were	  dismissed	  from	  further	  review.	  The	  remaining	  articles	  were	  annotated	  based	  on	  their	  
focus.	  Generally,	  articles	  that	  discussed	  the	  history	  of	  the	  decision	  in	  general	  terms,	  or	  the	  
history	  of	  educational	  change	  (or	  lack	  of)	  in	  a	  particular	  location	  were	  set	  aside	  in	  favor	  of	  
articles	  that	  discussed	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  decision	  or	  its	  significance	  or	  the	  prospects	  for	  
the	  future	  of	  equality	  in	  education	  or	  society	  more	  broadly.	  Articles	  that	  discussed	  the	  
anniversary	  weekend	  events	  in	  Topeka,	  whether	  in	  Topeka	  based	  publications	  or	  not,	  were	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marked	  for	  consideration	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  major	  speeches	  given	  that	  day.	  The	  remaining	  
articles	  were	  considered	  as	  representative	  of	  the	  ongoing	  national	  conversation,	  the	  
dialectical	  function	  Brown	  offers.	  Many	  of	  these	  articles,	  especially	  editorials	  or	  syndicated	  
columns,	  displayed	  an	  epideictic	  quality	  as	  they	  offered	  praise	  for	  the	  decision	  or	  those	  
involved	  in	  it.	  To	  facilitate	  the	  selection	  and	  classification	  process,	  searches	  within	  the	  
retrieved	  articles	  were	  conducted	  looking	  for	  such	  terms	  as	  “transform”	  or	  “success”	  or	  
“promise.”	  These	  terms	  did	  not	  prove	  particularly	  helpful	  in	  understanding	  the	  national	  
discussion	  or	  in	  understanding	  what	  Brown	  has	  come	  to	  mean	  over	  its	  first	  fifty	  years,	  and	  
ultimately	  the	  claims	  made	  about	  them	  emerge	  from	  highlighting	  and	  notations	  made	  over	  
multiple	  readings	  of	  the	  material.	  	  
The	  analysis	  that	  follows	  is	  based	  on	  three	  primary	  areas	  of	  scholarship:	  public	  
memory,	  a	  relatively	  new	  field	  of	  study	  with	  an	  interdisciplinary	  perspective;	  epideictic	  
rhetoric	  and	  its	  civic	  function;	  and	  articles	  and	  books	  by	  rhetoric	  scholars	  focusing	  on	  the	  
Brown	  decision	  specifically,	  and	  judicial	  rhetoric	  more	  broadly.	  The	  starting	  point	  for	  the	  
public	  memory	  analysis	  was	  the	  Carrol	  C.	  Arnold	  lecture	  at	  the	  2006	  National	  
Communication	  Association	  conference,	  where	  Carole	  Blair	  presented	  her	  study	  of	  the	  Civil	  
Rights	  Memorial	  Center	  in	  Birmingham,	  Alabama.	  Her	  lecture,	  titled	  “Civil	  Rights/Civil	  
Sites:	  ‘…Until	  Justice	  Rolls	  Down	  Like	  Waters,’”	  was	  subsequently	  published	  and	  provided	  
both	  an	  inspiration	  and	  guide	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  Brown	  v	  Board	  of	  Education	  National	  
Historic	  Site.	  In	  that	  lecture,	  she	  mentioned	  a	  forthcoming	  book	  that	  turned	  out	  to	  not	  get	  
published.	  However,	  the	  search	  for	  it	  led	  to	  a	  collection	  of	  public	  memory	  essays	  she	  co-­‐
edited,	  titled	  Places	  of	  Public	  Memory:	  The	  Rhetoric	  of	  Museums	  and	  Memorials.	  This	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collection,	  along	  with	  one	  edited	  by	  Kendall	  Phillips	  titled	  Framing	  Public	  Memory	  provided	  
additional	  perspectives	  and	  guides	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  historic	  site.	  	  
For	  scholarship	  on	  epideictic	  rhetoric,	  I	  began	  with	  Aristotle	  and	  his	  classical	  
division	  of	  rhetoric	  into	  its	  three	  parts,	  deliberative,	  forensic	  or	  judicial,	  and	  epideictic.	  In	  
this	  classification,	  Aristotle	  associates	  epideictic	  with	  praise	  and	  blame,	  speeches	  that	  
would	  identify	  that	  which	  was	  honorable	  or	  shameful,	  and	  promote	  virtue	  through	  public	  
displays	  of	  honorable	  deeds	  and	  subjects.	  Such	  speeches	  encouraged	  civic	  virtue	  by	  
praising	  noble	  deeds	  done	  in	  the	  service	  of	  the	  state.	  In	  the	  Nicomachean	  Ethics,	  Aristotle	  
argues	  that	  virtue	  is	  not	  natural,	  that	  it	  requires	  “habituation”	  and	  that	  legislators	  should	  
urge	  people	  toward	  virtue,	  exhorting	  them	  to	  what	  is	  “fine”	  (33,	  293).	  The	  epideictic	  
occasion,	  whether	  a	  funeral	  oration	  venerating	  the	  dead	  for	  their	  sacrifice	  for	  the	  state	  or	  
the	  encomium	  praising	  the	  deeds	  of	  a	  particular	  person,	  provided	  a	  means	  for	  moving	  the	  
audience	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  virtuous	  behavior	  being	  praised	  by	  reinforcing	  the	  notion	  
of	  what	  civic	  virtue	  is.	  	  
George	  Kennedy	  argues	  that	  Aristotle’s	  classification	  of	  the	  audience	  for	  an	  
epideictic	  speech	  as	  that	  of	  spectator,	  with	  no	  action	  to	  be	  taken,	  led	  to	  the	  epideictic	  
becoming	  a	  catch-­‐all	  term	  for	  “all	  forms	  of	  discourse	  that	  are	  not	  specifically	  deliberative	  or	  
judicial”	  (Rhetoric	  48	  n77).	  The	  later	  led	  to	  epideictic	  being	  associated	  with	  poetry	  and	  
other	  art	  forms,	  separating	  this	  category	  of	  rhetoric	  from	  its	  deliberative	  and	  judicial	  
counterparts.	  	  In	  The	  New	  Rhetoric,	  Chaim	  Perelman	  and	  Lucy	  Olbrechts-­‐Tyteca	  argue	  that	  
this	  dismissal	  of	  epideictic’s	  civic	  value	  was	  an	  error,	  and	  that	  epideictic	  is	  a	  significant	  
factor	  in	  building	  community	  and	  public	  life.	  They	  argued	  that	  such	  speeches	  tend	  to	  
“appeal	  to	  a	  universal	  order,	  to	  a	  nature,	  or	  a	  god	  that	  would	  vouch	  for	  the	  unquestioned,	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and	  supposedly	  unquestionable,	  values,”	  and	  this	  appeal	  helps	  to	  “establish	  a	  sense	  of	  
communion	  centered	  around	  particular	  values	  recognized	  by	  the	  audience”	  (52,	  51).	  The	  
epideictic	  speech	  takes	  on	  an	  educational	  quality,	  and	  the	  speaker,	  having	  already	  been	  
commissioned	  by	  the	  audience	  to	  speak,	  becomes	  an	  educator	  (52).	  Perelman	  argues	  
elsewhere	  that	  epideictic	  rhetoric	  is	  essential	  to	  public	  life	  because	  of	  its	  role	  in	  “bringing	  
about	  a	  consensus	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  the	  audience	  regarding	  the	  values	  that	  are	  celebrated”	  
(1388).	  This	  new	  perspective	  on	  epideictic’s	  public	  function	  led	  to	  a	  wave	  of	  scholarship	  
examining	  various	  ways	  epideictic	  performances	  function	  and	  offering	  analyses	  of	  several	  
well-­‐known	  public	  events	  in	  support	  of	  these	  arguments.	  	  
For	  Perelman	  and	  Olbrechts-­‐Tyteca,	  the	  key	  element	  of	  community	  building	  is	  the	  
shared	  values	  around	  which	  communion	  can	  be	  established.	  For	  Kenneth	  Burke,	  the	  key	  
terms	  are	  identification	  and	  consubstantiality.	  Burke	  argues,	  “A	  is	  identified	  with	  B”	  to	  the	  
degree	  their	  interests	  are	  joined	  (Rhetoric	  20,	  emphasis	  in	  the	  original).	  A	  may	  need	  to	  be	  
persuaded	  that	  their	  interests	  are	  joined,	  and	  that	  opens	  the	  opportunity	  for	  rhetoric.	  
While	  A	  and	  B	  remain	  independent	  entities,	  their	  identification	  with	  one	  another	  makes	  
them	  “substantially	  one,”	  and	  acting	  together	  in	  the	  world	  makes	  them	  “consubstantial”	  
through	  “common	  sensations,	  concepts,	  images,	  ideas,	  [and]	  attitudes”	  (Burke	  Rhetoric	  21).	  
Epideictic	  rhetoric	  here	  performs	  a	  similar	  function	  to	  building	  communion	  as	  it	  offers	  the	  
terms	  on	  which	  A	  and	  B	  can	  identify.	  It	  also	  provides	  the	  framework	  for	  the	  values,	  
attitudes	  and	  ideas	  that	  govern	  the	  ways	  individuals	  act	  together	  in	  their	  particular	  
communities.	  Burke	  argues	  that	  “identification	  is	  affirmed…precisely	  because	  there	  is	  
division,”	  and	  that	  rhetoricians	  “proclaim…unity”	  because	  men	  are	  apart	  (Rhetoric	  22).	  This	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argument	  informs	  both	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  speeches	  in	  Topeka	  and	  the	  news	  articles	  
published	  at	  the	  anniversary.	  
Shared	  values	  and	  community	  building	  are	  common	  themes	  in	  a	  series	  of	  scholarly	  
articles	  on	  the	  civic	  function	  of	  epideictic	  rhetoric.	  Among	  the	  key	  points	  made	  in	  these	  
articles,	  Gerald	  Hauser	  argues	  that	  the	  ceremonial	  occasion	  offers	  the	  means	  to	  “exhibit	  
knowledge”	  of	  shared	  values,	  while	  offering	  “images	  of	  civic	  virtue	  through	  comparison	  
with	  traits	  of	  known	  actors	  and	  rival	  ways	  of	  life”	  (Hauser	  16).	  Michael	  Carter	  argues	  that	  
epideictic	  is	  most	  successful	  when	  it	  achieves	  the	  qualities	  of	  ritual,	  and	  indeed	  the	  events	  
most	  noted	  for	  epideictic	  speeches	  tend	  to	  be	  ritualistic	  in	  nature,	  as	  they	  clearly	  were	  on	  
the	  occasion	  of	  Brown’s	  fiftieth	  anniversary.	  Cynthia	  Miecznikowski	  Sheard	  claims	  that	  
Perelman’s	  notions	  of	  building	  community	  are	  similar	  to	  Kenneth	  Burke’s	  notion	  of	  
“bridging	  our	  ‘divisions’	  through	  ‘identification,’”	  and	  argued	  that	  “epideictic…[is]	  a	  
rhetoric	  of	  identification	  and	  conformity	  whose	  function	  is	  to	  confirm	  and	  promote	  
adherence	  to	  the	  commonly	  held	  values	  of	  a	  community	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  sustaining	  that	  
community”	  (766).	  Richard	  Graff	  and	  Wendy	  Winn	  build	  on	  Perelman	  and	  Olbrechts-­‐
Tyteca’s	  notion	  of	  “communion”	  to	  argue	  that	  “the	  values	  lauded	  in	  any	  particular	  
epideictic	  speech	  are	  presumed	  to	  command	  the	  assent	  of	  the	  audience,”	  and	  by	  doing	  so	  
lay	  the	  groundwork	  “for	  future	  appeals	  to	  action”	  (51).	  They	  also	  draw	  attention	  to	  the	  
power	  of	  “value	  terms…or	  what	  Kenneth	  Burke	  might	  call	  a	  culture’s	  ‘god-­‐terms’”	  (55).	  
Whether	  such	  terms	  are	  invoked	  in	  a	  speech	  or	  proclaimed	  from	  a	  banner	  hanging	  from	  a	  
statehouse	  column,	  they	  have	  to	  power	  to	  unify	  to	  the	  degree	  that	  the	  audience	  members	  
feel	  a	  part	  of	  the	  culture.	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While	  American	  culture	  finds	  many	  connections	  to	  the	  Athenian	  state	  in	  Aristotle’s	  
time,	  there	  are	  some	  notable	  differences	  having	  to	  do	  with	  law	  and	  governance.	  In	  ancient	  
Athens,	  citizenship	  was	  restricted	  to	  males	  born	  to	  Athenian	  parents.	  The	  governing	  
structure	  was	  a	  democracy	  where	  every	  citizen,	  as	  defined,	  	  was	  expected	  to	  participate	  in	  
the	  Agora,	  the	  deliberative	  body	  that	  among	  other	  things	  debated	  the	  ideas	  that	  would	  
become	  policies	  and	  laws.	  When	  disputes	  arose	  over	  those	  policies,	  or	  someone	  stood	  
accused	  of	  breaking	  the	  law,	  a	  selected	  group	  of	  citizens	  formed	  a	  jury	  and	  applied	  the	  
forensic	  elements	  of	  rhetoric	  to	  determine	  guilt	  and	  the	  appropriate	  punishment.	  There	  
were	  no	  professional	  lawyers	  or	  judges;	  litigants	  represented	  themselves.	  Schools	  like	  
Aristotle’s	  trained	  students	  in	  the	  art	  of	  persuasive	  speaking,	  with	  emphasis	  on	  structures	  
suitable	  to	  legal	  proceedings.	  Citizens	  had	  a	  direct	  connection	  to	  the	  law	  and	  a	  more	  
common	  understanding	  of	  it	  because	  of	  their	  direct	  participation	  in	  creating	  it.	  The	  laws	  
they	  made	  were,	  of	  course,	  imposed	  on	  those	  who	  did	  not	  count	  as	  citizens	  with	  little	  or	  no	  
input	  from	  them.	  
In	  the	  American	  form	  of	  democracy,	  citizens	  do	  not	  participate	  directly	  in	  either	  the	  
deliberative	  or	  forensic	  processes.	  Instead,	  representatives	  elected	  by	  the	  people	  gather	  in	  
a	  range	  of	  assemblies	  from	  local	  to	  federal	  to	  create	  the	  laws	  and	  polices	  from	  which	  court	  
cases	  develop.	  The	  American	  legal	  system	  is	  a	  complex	  layering	  of	  local,	  state	  and	  federal	  
laws	  and	  courts,	  and	  litigants	  seldom	  represent	  themselves	  except	  in	  the	  most	  basic	  and	  
minor	  of	  cases.	  And	  while	  this	  complexity	  might	  suggest	  a	  fragmented	  or	  disjointed	  legal	  
field	  laying	  traps	  for	  citizens,	  the	  entire	  system	  does	  have	  cohesion,	  guided	  and	  unified	  by	  
the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  For	  Americans,	  the	  “universal	  order”	  is	  provided	  by	  
the	  Constitution,	  the	  document	  that	  has	  been	  called	  “America’s	  civil	  religion”	  (Bellah).	  The	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establishment	  of	  the	  Brown	  v	  Board	  of	  Education	  National	  Historic	  Site	  was	  partly	  the	  
result	  of	  a	  desire	  to	  establish	  public	  memorials	  of	  significant	  Constitutional	  events	  in	  
history.	  The	  Brown	  anniversary	  events,	  beginning	  with	  the	  theme	  of	  National	  Law	  Day,	  all	  
focus	  on	  the	  Constitution,	  which	  was	  fitting	  considering	  the	  Brown	  case,	  like	  the	  Plessy	  case	  
it	  overturned,	  called	  a	  question	  of	  Constitutional	  right.	  Whichever	  side	  of	  the	  argument	  one	  
considers,	  the	  advocates	  believed	  they	  were	  fighting	  for	  a	  Constitutional	  right;	  that	  the	  
Constitution	  supported	  their	  view	  of	  how	  things	  should	  be.	  Legal	  scholar	  Jack	  Balkin	  
contends	  that	  Brown	  became	  a	  “beloved	  political	  and	  legal	  icon”	  because	  it	  represented	  the	  
“good	  Constitution”,	  and	  the	  steady	  development	  of	  American	  ideals	  in	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  
“Great	  Progressive	  Narrative”	  (4,	  5).	  This	  narrative,	  Balkin	  explains,	  presents	  
America	  as	  continually	  striving	  for	  democratic	  ideals	  from	  its	  founding	  and	  
eventually	  realizing	  democracy	  through	  its	  historical	  development.	  
According	  to	  the	  Great	  Progressive	  Narrative,	  the	  Constitution	  reflects	  
America’s	  deepest	  ideals,	  which	  are	  gradually	  realized	  through	  historical	  
struggle	  and	  acts	  of	  great	  political	  courage.	  The	  basic	  ideals	  of	  America	  and	  
the	  American	  people	  are	  good,	  even	  if	  America	  and	  Americans	  sometimes	  act	  
unjustly,	  and	  even	  if	  people	  acting	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  Constitution	  sometimes	  
perpetrate	  terrible	  injustices.	  The	  basic	  ideals	  of	  Americans	  and	  their	  
Constitution	  are	  promises	  for	  the	  future,	  promises	  that	  the	  country	  
eventually	  will	  live	  up	  to,	  and,	  in	  so	  doing,	  confirm	  the	  country’s	  deep	  
commitments	  to	  liberty	  and	  equality	  (5).	  
This	  narrative	  can	  be	  seen	  most	  clearly	  in	  President	  Bush’s	  speech,	  but	  the	  themes	  
are	  present	  in	  many	  other	  speeches	  give	  through	  the	  anniversary	  year.	  This	  interpretation	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of	  how	  Brown	  has	  functioned	  doesn’t	  hold	  up	  as	  cleanly	  as	  Balkin	  suggests,	  because	  even	  
with	  all	  of	  the	  repetition	  on	  this	  theme	  in	  the	  commemorations	  of	  the	  decision,	  there	  are	  
also	  a	  range	  of	  articles	  from	  the	  anniversary	  month	  that	  show	  good	  people	  with	  good	  
reasons	  equally	  committed	  to	  such	  values	  as	  liberty	  and	  equality	  and	  still	  convinced	  that	  
Brown	  didn’t,	  and	  perhaps	  couldn’t	  help	  change	  their	  culture.	  The	  anniversary	  presented	  
an	  opportunity	  for	  the	  kinds	  of	  ritual	  events	  that	  call	  for	  epideictic	  speeches,	  those	  that	  
could	  meet	  the	  need	  to	  increase	  the	  minds’	  adherence	  to	  ideas	  in	  Brown	  to	  help	  get	  
folkways	  to	  align	  with	  stateways,	  and	  thus	  to	  shape	  public	  opinion	  and	  ultimately	  policy	  
actions.	  
This	  folkways/stateways	  disparity	  represents	  “the	  rhetorical	  boundaries	  of	  legal	  
practice,”	  a	  boundary	  discussed	  by	  Marouf	  Hasian,	  Celeste	  Condit	  and	  John	  Lucaites	  in	  their	  
analysis	  of	  the	  Brown	  decision	  (323).	  They	  analyzed	  the	  “separate	  but	  equal”	  doctrine	  to	  
claim	  that	  law	  is	  “an	  active	  and	  protean	  component	  of	  a	  hegemonically	  crafted	  rhetorical	  
culture,”	  which	  is	  to	  say	  that	  law	  tends	  to	  fit	  with	  the	  commonly	  held	  values	  of	  its	  
community	  (323).	  	  Hasian,	  Condit	  and	  Lucaites	  view	  judicial	  opinions	  as	  examples	  of	  
language-­‐in-­‐action,	  a	  term	  proposed	  by	  Lucaites	  in	  his	  1990	  article	  calling	  on	  rhetoric	  
scholars	  to	  take	  up	  the	  study	  of	  judicial	  rhetoric.	  In	  their	  1996	  article	  Hasian,	  Condit,	  
Lucaites,	  analyze	  the	  “separate	  but	  equal”	  doctrine	  as	  an	  example	  of	  their	  “conception	  of	  
the	  rhetorical	  boundaries	  of	  legal	  practice”	  (323).	  They	  argue	  that	  	  
in	  practice,	  law	  is	  neither	  a	  rationally	  constructed	  discourse	  nor	  simply	  a	  
dominant	  ideology,	  but	  rather	  an	  active	  and	  protean	  component	  of	  a	  
hegemonically	  crafted	  rhetorical	  culture.	  Through	  legal	  argumentation	  and	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debate,	  various	  partisan	  communities	  make	  compromises	  that	  function	  as	  
the	  boundaries	  within	  which	  the	  law	  takes	  on	  public	  meaning.	  (323)	  
Taking	  their	  position	  as	  a	  third	  way	  between	  legal	  formalism	  and	  the	  “equally	  
complex	  language	  of	  literary	  and	  philosophical	  poststructuralism,”	  Lucaites,	  Hasian	  and	  
Condit	  argue	  that	  “the	  law	  exists	  as	  part	  of	  an	  evolving	  rhetorical	  culture”	  that	  “evolve	  by	  
adapting	  to	  changing	  social,	  political,	  and	  economic	  exigencies”	  (326).	  They	  argue	  that	  the	  
Supreme	  Court	  must	  produce	  decisions	  that	  “are	  concordant	  to	  many	  disparate	  interests”	  
while	  simultaneously	  “bounded	  by	  the	  limits	  of	  an	  historically	  particular	  rhetorical	  culture”	  
(338).	  Understanding	  that	  the	  law	  and	  judicial	  opinion	  rise	  from	  rhetorical	  culture,	  which	  is	  
in	  turn	  a	  product	  of	  multiple	  voices	  competing	  and	  compromising	  within	  society,	  they	  
characterize	  law	  as	  a	  “consensual	  product	  of	  the	  rhetorical	  efforts	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  public	  
agents”	  (338).	  In	  other	  words,	  law	  emerges	  from	  discursive	  processes	  as	  good	  reasons	  
offered	  in	  support	  of	  a	  particular	  point	  of	  view	  become	  accepted	  by	  others.	  
This	  perspective	  on	  law	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  view	  taken	  by	  James	  Boyd	  White,	  who	  
argues	  in	  several	  places	  that	  law	  should	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  branch	  of	  rhetoric.	  In	  Heracles’	  Bow,	  
for	  example,	  White	  argues	  that	  law	  is	  “a	  social	  and	  cultural	  activity…something	  we	  do	  with	  
our	  minds,	  with	  language,	  and	  with	  each	  other”	  (x).	  He	  argues	  that	  law	  is	  “must	  usefully	  
and	  completely	  seen	  as	  a	  branch	  of	  rhetoric,”	  where	  rhetoric	  is	  a	  “the	  central	  art	  by	  which	  
culture	  and	  community	  are	  established,”	  a	  “constitutive	  rhetoric”	  that	  “has	  justice	  as	  its	  
ultimate	  subject”	  (28).	  	  White	  includes	  dialectic,	  in	  the	  Platonic	  sense,	  as	  a	  form	  of	  rhetoric,	  
since	  “it	  is	  the	  establishment	  of	  community	  and	  culture	  in	  language”	  (39).	  In	  his	  later	  work,	  
Justice	  as	  Translation,	  White	  offers	  three	  perspectives	  on	  what	  law	  is:	  “a	  set	  of	  rules	  issuing	  
from	  a	  political	  sovereign,”	  such	  as	  those	  “passed	  by	  the	  legislature	  or	  articulated	  in	  judicial	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opinions”;	  as	  an	  “exercise	  of	  power	  by	  one	  group	  in	  a	  society	  over	  others”;	  or	  as	  a	  “culture	  
of	  argument…a	  language,	  a	  set	  of	  ways	  of	  making	  sense	  of	  things	  and	  acting	  in	  the	  world…a	  
set	  of	  ways	  of	  thinking	  and	  talking”	  (xii-­‐xiii).	  He	  suggests	  reading	  judicial	  opinions	  as	  
“cultural	  and	  rhetorical	  texts…with	  an	  eye	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  political	  and	  ethical	  community	  
they	  build	  with	  their	  readers”	  (xvi).	  Viewed	  in	  this	  way,	  judicial	  opinions	  are	  not	  just	  logical	  
texts	  for	  study	  by	  law	  students,	  they	  are	  texts	  for	  study	  by	  scholars	  concerned	  with	  
language	  and	  community	  –	  rhetoric	  scholars.	  
Stanley	  Fish	  also	  writes	  about	  the	  rhetorical	  elements	  in	  law	  and	  literary	  studies	  
and	  the	  intersections	  between	  the	  two.	  Fish	  observes	  “deciding	  hard	  cases	  at	  law	  is	  rather	  
like	  [a]	  strange	  literary	  exercise,”	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  judges	  being	  bound	  by	  precedent	  as	  
similar	  to	  a	  chain	  novel	  (92).	  	  Fish	  explores	  the	  Critical	  Legal	  Theory	  movement,	  those	  who	  
hold	  White’s	  second	  perspective	  on	  law,	  and	  cites	  an	  important	  question	  for	  understanding	  
the	  ongoing	  debate	  over	  Brown:	  “how,	  in	  a	  democratic	  system,	  can	  one	  justify	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  
group	  of	  men	  and	  women,	  who	  are	  appointed	  for	  life,	  pass	  judgment	  on	  the	  validity	  of	  
legislation	  enacted	  by	  the	  elected	  representatives	  of	  the	  people?”	  (338).	  This	  is	  the	  
question	  of	  agency	  in	  Kenneth	  Burke’s	  dramatistic	  pentad,	  the	  question	  of	  the	  means	  for	  
achieving	  the	  agent’s	  purpose.	  The	  pentad	  presents	  one	  additional	  way	  of	  analyzing	  judicial	  
opinion	  and	  asking	  what	  kind	  of	  community	  is	  being	  constituted	  within	  it.	  
With	  these	  different	  perspectives	  available,	  it	  would	  seem	  logical	  to	  expect	  law	  and	  
judicial	  rhetoric	  to	  have	  become	  a	  popular	  focus	  of	  study	  for	  rhetoric	  scholars,	  but	  this	  is	  
not	  the	  case.	  While	  there	  are	  a	  handful	  of	  articles	  on	  the	  Brown	  decision	  over	  the	  past	  40-­‐
plus	  years	  and	  another	  handful	  related	  to	  law	  or	  judicial	  rhetoric	  more	  generally,	  these	  
subjects	  have	  not	  received	  the	  kind	  of	  attention	  Lucaites	  called	  for	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  when	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he	  noted	  the	  gap.	  Rountree	  comments	  in	  the	  introduction	  to	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  at	  50	  that	  
while	  there	  had	  been	  a	  lack	  of	  rhetoric	  scholarship	  in	  the	  area	  of	  judicial	  rhetoric	  over	  the	  
years,	  recent	  years	  had	  shown	  more	  scholars,	  many	  sporting	  law	  degrees,	  were	  taking	  up	  
this	  study	  (xii-­‐xiii,	  emphasis	  added).	  While	  this	  trend	  does	  bode	  well	  for	  rhetoric	  scholars	  
interested	  in	  analyzing	  law	  and	  judicial	  rhetoric,	  it	  also	  compounds	  the	  notion	  that	  one	  
must	  be	  educated	  in	  the	  law	  as	  well	  as	  in	  rhetoric	  to	  contribute	  to	  this	  field,	  a	  notion	  the	  
project	  will	  argue	  is	  inaccurate.	  Judicial	  opinions	  are,	  after	  all,	  texts;	  texts	  that	  emerge	  in	  
response	  to	  a	  series	  of	  other	  texts	  and	  oral	  defenses	  of	  those	  texts.	  While	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  
the	  nomenclature	  of	  the	  law	  is	  somewhat	  unique,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  this	  language	  and	  its	  
interpretation	  is	  reserved	  only	  to	  the	  legal	  initiate.	  Several	  articles	  written	  over	  the	  first	  
fifty	  years	  of	  Brown’s	  existence	  demonstrate	  a	  number	  of	  ways	  judicial	  opinions	  can	  be	  
studied.	  These	  articles	  can	  be	  classified	  in	  four	  broad	  categories:	  analysis	  of	  the	  arguments	  
leading	  to	  the	  text,	  the	  judicial	  opinion	  (Souther,	  Dickens	  and	  Schwartz,	  Diamondstone,	  
Rountree);	  analysis	  of	  the	  text	  itself,	  both	  stand-­‐alone	  and	  as	  part	  of	  a	  continuum	  of	  judicial	  
opinion	  (Bartness,	  Bellman,	  Hasian,	  Burnett,	  Mangis,	  Gill);	  analysis	  of	  the	  text	  as	  an	  
example	  of	  a	  rhetorical	  practice	  (Droge,	  Hasian	  and	  Klinger,	  Dunbar	  and	  Cooper,	  
Rountree);	  and	  as	  a	  case	  study	  in	  a	  larger	  field	  of	  analysis	  (Hunsacker,	  Prendergast).	  
The	  chapters	  that	  follow	  incorporate	  these	  theoretical	  perspectives	  and	  examples	  to	  
analyze	  the	  three	  main	  points	  of	  study	  described	  above.	  I	  begin	  in	  Chapter	  2	  with	  an	  
analysis	  of	  the	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education	  National	  Historic	  Site.	  The	  authorization	  for	  the	  
Site	  set	  in	  motion	  the	  chain	  of	  events,	  commemorations	  and	  writings	  that	  culminated	  in	  the	  
fiftieth	  anniversary	  ceremonies,	  but	  getting	  that	  authorization	  also	  took	  a	  coordinated	  
rhetorical	  effort.	  I	  examine	  the	  Site	  from	  both	  perspectives,	  beginning	  with	  the	  efforts	  to	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create	  it.	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  Site	  came	  about	  due	  to	  the	  efforts	  of	  a	  small	  group	  of	  citizens	  
using	  the	  available	  means	  of	  persuasion	  to	  generate	  interest	  and	  funding	  for	  the	  site,	  but	  
also	  that	  those	  efforts	  became	  successful	  only	  when	  they	  intersected	  with	  the	  interests	  of	  
the	  State.	  Then	  I	  move	  on	  to	  the	  function	  of	  the	  Site	  itself,	  with	  emphasis	  primarily	  on	  its	  
function	  as	  a	  public	  memory	  site,	  to	  argue	  that	  it	  serves	  to	  reconstruct	  the	  Brown	  decision	  
from	  a	  controversial	  and	  divisive	  decision	  to	  a	  national	  social	  good.	  The	  chapter	  calls	  
attention	  to	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  Site’s	  establishment	  as	  a	  public	  memorial,	  as	  well	  as	  its	  
location	  under	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  National	  Park	  Service	  and	  draws	  from	  the	  work	  of	  
several	  scholars	  on	  public	  memory	  and	  epideictic’s	  civic	  function.	  I	  also	  discuss	  the	  Site’s	  
role	  in	  the	  ongoing	  dialectic	  that	  Brown	  has	  become,	  showing	  how	  the	  contents	  of	  its	  
galleries	  not	  only	  present	  a	  particular	  view	  of	  the	  decision	  but	  also	  encourage	  active	  visitor	  
participation	  in	  the	  ongoing	  efforts	  to	  achieve	  the	  promises	  showcased	  in	  those	  galleries.	  	  
Chapter	  3	  focuses	  on	  the	  events	  in	  Topeka	  on	  the	  weekend	  the	  Site	  was	  dedicated.	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  dedication	  speech	  by	  President	  Bush,	  I	  analyze	  a	  sermon	  given	  by	  the	  
Rev.	  Jesse	  L.	  Jackson	  on	  Sunday,	  two	  speeches	  given	  by	  Kansas	  Governor	  Kathleen	  Sebelius	  
–	  one	  at	  the	  proclamation	  ceremony	  at	  the	  Kansas	  Statehouse	  and	  one	  at	  the	  dedication	  
ceremony,	  and	  one	  given	  by	  Senator	  John	  F.	  Kerry	  at	  the	  proclamation	  ceremony.	  These	  
five	  speeches,	  given	  by	  the	  highest	  national	  and	  state	  leaders	  and	  a	  leading	  figure	  in	  the	  
Civil	  rights	  movement,	  offer	  remarkably	  similar	  themes,	  demonstrating	  that	  Brown,	  while	  
still	  political,	  is	  not	  partisan.	  Praise	  for	  Brown	  at	  its	  fiftieth	  anniversary	  transcends	  party	  
affiliations	  and	  racial	  boundaries.	  I	  argue	  that	  these	  speeches	  show	  Brown	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  
statecraft,	  a	  symbol	  of	  the	  best	  of	  America’s	  founding	  ideals	  employed	  to	  present	  America	  
as	  a	  nation	  of	  justice	  and	  equality	  both	  to	  its	  citizens	  and	  to	  other	  nations	  of	  the	  world	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presented	  with	  the	  presumption	  of	  communal	  agreement.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  I	  argue	  that	  
these	  speeches	  highlight	  the	  dialectical	  function	  Brown	  has	  achieved.	  Each	  of	  the	  four	  
speakers,	  despite	  very	  different	  political	  party	  platforms	  and	  views	  of	  how	  government	  and	  
society	  should	  be	  structured,	  claimed	  unequivocally	  that	  Brown	  was	  good	  for	  the	  country,	  
that	  America	  was	  a	  better	  place	  because	  of	  it.	  After	  these	  similarities,	  the	  speeches	  branch	  
out	  and	  present	  differing	  view	  of	  how	  to	  achieve	  that	  promise,	  and	  it	  is	  these	  differences	  
within	  agreement	  that	  comprise	  the	  dialectic.	  The	  chapter	  begins	  with	  an	  examination	  of	  
the	  changing	  view	  of	  epideictic’s	  civic	  value	  from	  Aristotle	  to	  Perelman	  and	  Olbrechts-­‐
Tyteca.	  This	  is	  followed	  by	  a	  discussion	  of	  scholarship	  on	  the	  civic	  or	  public	  function	  of	  
epideictic	  rhetoric	  by	  scholars	  who	  built	  on	  the	  new	  theory	  Perelman	  and	  Olbrechts-­‐Tyteca	  
offered.	  Each	  of	  the	  five	  speeches	  is	  then	  discussed	  in	  light	  of	  its	  epideictic	  civil	  function,	  
and	  the	  chapter	  concludes	  with	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  two-­‐part	  function	  of	  Brown	  in	  
contemporary	  society.	  	  	  
Chapter	  4	  moves	  beyond	  Topeka	  to	  analyze	  a	  wide-­‐range	  of	  news	  articles	  published	  
throughout	  the	  country	  in	  the	  month	  leading	  to	  the	  fiftieth	  anniversary.	  These	  articles	  
show	  how	  Brown’s	  anniversary	  was	  being	  received	  by	  ordinary	  people,	  which	  in	  turn	  
shows	  how	  Brown	  has	  functioned	  over	  time	  at	  the	  “folk”	  level.	  Many	  of	  the	  articles	  are	  
epideictic	  in	  nature,	  some	  from	  national	  leaders	  and	  some	  from	  journalists,	  all	  sharing	  the	  
same	  similar	  theme	  as	  the	  speeches	  in	  Topeka,	  with	  Brown	  presented	  as	  a	  good	  decision	  
that	  made	  America	  better.	  But	  these	  articles,	  which	  include	  interviews	  with	  local	  leaders	  in	  
some	  of	  the	  other	  cities	  that	  were	  part	  of	  Brown	  and	  include	  profiles	  of	  towns	  and	  school	  
districts	  where	  the	  struggle	  for	  equal	  school	  continues,	  are	  more	  reflective	  of	  the	  dialectical	  
element	  of	  Brown,	  showing	  the	  many	  differences	  both	  in	  how	  the	  decision	  is	  perceived	  and	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what	  it	  did	  or	  didn’t	  accomplish,	  and	  the	  many	  different	  views	  of	  what	  is	  necessary	  to	  
achieve	  its	  promises.	  Drawing	  on	  Sheard’s	  argument	  that	  epideictic	  occasions	  in	  our	  
culture	  give	  occasion	  for	  re-­‐examining	  and	  sometimes	  “shuffling”	  values,	  I’ll	  argue	  that	  the	  
fiftieth	  anniversary	  provided	  a	  uniquely	  powerful	  opportunity	  for	  this	  re-­‐examination,	  and	  
that	  the	  range	  and	  depth	  of	  the	  critique	  of	  “the	  disparity	  between	  existing	  and	  desired	  
conditions”	  laid	  the	  groundwork	  for	  an	  ongoing,	  active	  discourse	  on	  how	  to	  achieve	  those	  
desired	  conditions.	  I’ll	  argue	  that	  the	  significance	  of	  this	  anniversary	  sparked	  the	  kind	  of	  
“vibrant	  public	  realm”	  that	  Gerald	  Hauser	  claimed	  epideictic	  could	  produce	  and	  that	  the	  
state	  of	  Presumption	  held	  by	  Brown	  provides	  the	  particular	  view	  of	  morality	  that	  governs	  
the	  whole	  of	  the	  discourse.	  The	  anniversary	  offered	  an	  opportunity	  to	  consider	  the	  ideals,	  
values	  and	  goals	  of	  Brown	  as	  social	  conditions	  to	  be	  resolved	  through	  public	  debate	  
without	  the	  intervention	  of	  the	  formal	  legal	  structure.	  	  
In	  Chapter	  5,	  I	  conclude	  this	  analysis	  of	  the	  Brown	  anniversary	  events	  with	  an	  
examination	  of	  agency.	  I’ll	  argue	  that	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Brown	  v	  Board	  of	  Education	  
National	  Historic	  Site	  and	  the	  many	  tributes	  offered	  by	  national	  leaders	  were	  necessary	  in	  
part	  because	  state	  institutional	  actors,	  such	  as	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  lack	  the	  agency	  to	  bring	  
about	  the	  change	  in	  “folkways”	  needed	  to	  resolve	  social	  problems.	  Thus,	  by	  amplifying	  and	  
reinforcing	  the	  values	  and	  ideals	  in	  the	  decision	  and	  presenting	  it	  to	  the	  audience	  with	  the	  
presumption	  of	  communal	  agreement,	  state	  leaders	  worked	  to	  produce,	  through	  epideictic	  
means,	  the	  mental	  assent	  that	  would	  lead	  to	  individual	  actions	  and	  decisions	  to	  bring	  
society	  more	  closely	  in	  line	  with	  Brown’s	  promises.	  I	  then	  move	  to	  connect	  this	  case	  study	  
to	  earlier	  work	  by	  John	  Lucaites,	  Clarke	  Rountree,	  and	  others	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  
studying	  judicial	  rhetoric	  as	  a	  topic	  of	  inquiry.	  Jesse	  Jackson	  called	  on	  his	  congregation	  in	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Topeka	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  democractic	  process	  by	  voting,	  yet	  citizens	  who	  believe	  law	  
and	  governmental	  processes	  are	  somehow	  complex	  or	  mysterious	  or	  otherwise	  
inaccessible	  have	  difficulty	  participating	  in	  them.	  Similarly,	  public	  discourse	  on	  difficult	  
topics	  such	  as	  racial	  justice	  or	  educational	  equality	  often	  suffers	  from	  a	  lack	  of	  shared	  
vocabulary	  with	  which	  to	  engage	  the	  topic,	  and	  thus	  it	  becomes	  easier	  to	  leave	  the	  issues	  to	  
the	  courts.	  As	  Hauser	  argues,	  “before	  citizens	  can	  imagine	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  vibrant	  public	  
realm,	  they	  require	  a	  vocabulary	  capable	  of	  expressing	  public	  issues	  and	  experiences	  of	  
publicness,	  which	  are	  civic	  needs…that	  epideictic	  addresses”	  (6).	  Understanding	  the	  
persuasive	  value	  of	  epideictic,	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  epideictic	  events	  shape	  communal	  
values	  that	  lead	  to	  deliberative	  and	  forensic	  rhetorical	  practices	  is	  one	  way	  of	  making	  the	  
specialized	  language	  of	  law	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  legal	  decisions	  more	  accessible	  to	  both	  the	  





A	  Landmark	  for	  the	  Landmark	  Case:	  	  
The	  Brown	  v	  Board	  of	  Education	  National	  Historic	  Site	  
	  
	   As	  others	  have	  previously	  demonstrated,	  the	  Brown	  v	  Board	  of	  Education	  of	  Topeka	  
decision	  offers	  many	  layers	  for	  rhetorical	  study,	  whether	  as	  a	  sustained	  prospective	  
argument	  (Rountree),	  a	  necessary	  but	  not	  sufficient	  condition	  for	  achieving	  racial	  equality	  
(Gill),	  en	  example	  of	  successful	  style	  adaptation	  by	  a	  skilled	  rhetor	  (Diamondstone),	  or	  a	  
model	  of	  social	  protest	  (Hunsaker).	  This	  landmark	  decision	  came	  about	  as	  the	  result	  of	  a	  
series	  of	  carefully	  selected	  cases	  with	  equally	  carefully	  prepared	  arguments	  and	  a	  lengthy	  
process	  of	  lower	  court	  battles,	  all	  building	  prospectively	  toward	  the	  final	  argument	  before	  
the	  Supreme	  Court.	  These	  efforts	  were	  aided	  by	  a	  changing	  political	  climate	  and	  post-­‐
World	  War	  II	  national	  interests.	  	  Like	  its	  namesake,	  the	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education	  
National	  Historic	  Site	  also	  benefitted	  from	  the	  confluence	  of	  individual	  efforts	  and	  
governmental	  interests	  for	  which	  the	  project	  was	  well	  suited.	  And	  while	  The	  Reverend	  
Jesse	  L.	  Jackson	  claimed	  that	  “only	  God	  could	  have	  chosen	  Topeka,”	  for	  the	  site,	  the	  reality	  
is	  more	  earthbound	  and	  rhetorically	  situated	  (Anderson	  and	  Carpenter).	  The	  creation	  of	  
the	  site	  emerged	  from	  the	  efforts	  of	  a	  small	  group	  of	  committed	  citizens	  working	  with	  the	  
available	  means	  of	  persuasion	  to	  generate	  interest	  in	  and	  funding	  for	  the	  project.	  	  
This	  analysis	  of	  the	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education	  National	  Historic	  Site	  begins	  with	  
the	  seemingly	  obvious	  point	  that	  it	  exists.	  This	  particular	  project	  became	  not	  only	  a	  
National	  Historic	  Site	  but	  also	  a	  National	  Park	  when	  many	  other	  proposed	  memorials	  are	  
routinely	  set	  aside.	  Greg	  Dickinson,	  Carol	  Blair,	  and	  Brian	  Ott	  point	  out	  that	  “the	  files	  of	  
government	  agencies	  bulge	  with	  plans	  for	  museums,	  memorials,	  and	  historic	  preservation	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programs	  proposed	  but	  never	  constructed”	  (27-­‐8).	  Kendall	  Phillips	  observes	  that	  public	  
memory	  spaces	  tend	  to	  be	  “partial,	  partisan,	  and	  thus	  frequently	  contested,”	  which	  helps	  
explain	  why	  comparatively	  few	  of	  such	  proposed	  sites	  get	  the	  funding	  or	  sanction	  to	  
become	  realized	  (9).	  So	  the	  existence	  of	  this	  site	  isn’t	  to	  be	  taken	  for	  granted,	  despite	  the	  
notoriety	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  decision	  for	  which	  it	  is	  named.	  This	  recognition	  presents	  
one	  of	  two	  paths	  for	  studying	  the	  rhetorical	  aspects	  of	  this	  site,	  the	  rhetorical	  efforts	  to	  
establish	  and	  fund	  it.	  The	  second	  path	  concerns	  the	  functions	  of	  the	  site	  itself:	  the	  
rhetorical	  framing	  of	  the	  decision	  for	  the	  public	  that	  reflects	  the	  interests	  of	  its	  sponsors,	  an	  
argument	  for	  how	  the	  Brown	  decision	  should,	  and	  arguably	  will,	  be	  remembered,	  and	  a	  
situated	  place	  that	  works	  to	  construct	  a	  particular	  sense	  of	  community	  in	  its	  visitors.	  	  
This	  chapter	  will	  travel	  both	  of	  these	  paths	  to	  show	  how	  the	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  
Education	  National	  Historic	  Site	  functions	  to	  reconstruct	  the	  decision	  for	  which	  it	  is	  named	  
from	  a	  divisive	  and	  controversial	  legal	  decision	  to	  a	  national	  social	  good.	  	  By	  presenting	  the	  
case	  with	  emphasis	  on	  the	  individuals	  involved,	  the	  lawyers,	  the	  plaintiffs,	  the	  families	  that	  
made	  up	  each	  of	  the	  cases,	  and	  by	  building	  the	  history	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  decision	  as	  well	  as	  
recounting	  significant	  moments	  of	  the	  struggle	  to	  implement	  that	  decision,	  the	  site	  
constructs	  the	  case	  as	  part	  of	  the	  national	  narrative	  of	  perseverance	  –	  not	  just	  the	  cold	  logic	  
of	  legal	  argument,	  but	  the	  appeal	  of	  individual	  experience,	  suffering	  and	  triumph.	  	  The	  
darker	  images	  from	  the	  civil	  rights	  era,	  cast	  as	  they	  are	  within	  this	  construction	  of	  
perseverance	  and	  the	  overall	  educative	  function	  of	  the	  site	  become	  more	  palatable,	  more	  of	  
a	  reminder	  to	  current	  and	  future	  generations	  of	  a	  past	  not	  to	  be	  repeated.	  
This	  humanizing—personalizing—of	  the	  decision	  and	  its	  process	  serves	  to	  create	  a	  
community	  around	  it,	  a	  community	  of	  everyday	  citizens	  and	  not	  just	  those	  with	  a	  particular	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grievance	  or	  those	  with	  the	  legal	  training	  to	  share	  the	  emotion	  and	  experience	  of	  the	  
process	  of	  the	  decision	  and	  its	  legacy.	  It	  invites	  visitors	  to	  discuss,	  to	  reflect,	  and	  to	  
deliberate	  the	  future,	  because	  the	  items	  preserved	  and	  presented	  provide	  a	  common	  
foundation,	  while	  the	  absence	  of	  other	  elements,	  such	  as	  the	  opposing	  attorneys,	  directs	  
the	  focus	  of	  those	  deliberations.	  I	  will	  argue,	  therefore,	  that	  the	  site	  also	  memorializes,	  
explicates,	  and	  in	  some	  ways	  perpetuates	  the	  ongoing	  dialectic	  of	  potential	  and	  realized	  
achievement	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  educational	  equality	  and	  racial	  equality.	  I	  begin	  with	  an	  
overview	  of	  public	  memory	  studies	  and	  the	  connections	  to	  rhetoric,	  followed	  by	  a	  
discussion	  of	  the	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education	  National	  Historic	  Site.	  A	  description	  of	  the	  
site	  and	  its	  interior	  galleries	  is	  followed	  by	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  rhetorical	  efforts	  to	  bring	  the	  
site	  into	  being	  and	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  site	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  public	  memory	  and	  
rhetoric	  scholarship,	  particularly	  the	  scholarship	  related	  to	  memory	  places	  and	  the	  means	  
by	  which	  these	  spaces	  work	  to	  create	  particular	  communities.	  Finally,	  I	  discuss	  the	  effect	  of	  
this	  site	  as	  both	  a	  centering	  of	  the	  Brown	  decision	  and	  its	  legacy	  and	  as	  a	  means	  to	  hold	  that	  
decision	  and	  its	  significance	  at	  the	  periphery	  of	  most	  American’s	  lives.	  
In	  his	  introduction	  to	  Framing	  Public	  Memory,	  Kendall	  Phillips	  reports	  that	  while	  
public	  memory	  studies	  can	  be	  found	  from	  ancient	  times	  on,	  the	  late	  twentieth	  century	  saw	  
a	  surge	  in	  such	  studies	  on	  an	  interdisciplinary	  basis.	  Phillips	  cites	  the	  “increasing	  mistrust	  
of	  ‘official	  history’”	  as	  the	  catalyst	  for	  this	  growth	  spurt	  and	  explains,	  
this	  sense	  of	  “living”	  memory	  is	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  a	  sense	  of	  a	  fixed,	  
singular	  history,	  suggesting	  that	  societies	  are	  both	  constituted	  by	  their	  
memories	  and,	  in	  the	  daily	  interactions,	  rituals,	  and	  exchanges,	  constitute	  
these	  memories.	  As	  well,	  this	  sense	  of	  memory	  highlights	  the	  extent	  to	  which	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these	  constituted	  and	  constituting	  memories	  are	  open	  to	  contest,	  revision,	  
and	  rejection.	  Thus,	  in	  a	  very	  real	  sense,	  to	  speak	  of	  memory	  in	  this	  way	  is	  to	  
speak	  of	  a	  highly	  rhetorical	  process.	  Indeed,	  the	  study	  of	  memory	  is	  largely	  
one	  of	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  memories	  (2).	  
The	  strong	  relationship	  Phillips	  claims	  between	  memory	  and	  rhetoric	  emphasizes	  the	  
“cultural”	  aspect	  of	  cultural	  rhetoric,	  and	  provides	  a	  means	  to	  explore	  how	  a	  particular	  
memory	  place,	  in	  this	  case	  the	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education	  National	  Historic	  Site,	  is	  both	  
the	  product	  of	  and	  the	  purveyor	  of	  rhetorical	  processes.	  The	  malleability	  of	  memory,	  the	  
way	  it	  can	  be	  revised	  or	  rejected,	  for	  example,	  suggests	  the	  need	  for	  some	  stabilizing	  force	  
to	  make	  memory,	  particularly	  public	  memory,	  trustworthy	  at	  all.	  
Edward	  Casey	  argues	  in	  “Public	  Memory	  in	  Place	  and	  Time”	  that	  this	  is	  precisely	  
what	  is	  needed,	  that	  “public	  memory	  needs	  a	  place	  of	  enactment,	  a	  scene	  of	  instantiation”	  
(38).	  	  Casey	  argues	  that	  because	  memory	  is	  mutable,	  public	  memory	  needs	  a	  location,	  
“what	  the	  Romans	  called	  stabilitas	  loci,	  stability	  of	  place,	  in	  which	  to	  arise	  and	  last”	  and	  to	  
“ground	  and	  collect	  social	  as	  well	  as	  collective	  memories”	  (39).	  	  Thus,	  many	  public	  memory	  
studies	  focus	  on	  sites	  of	  memory,	  both	  their	  creation	  and	  their	  function.	  For	  this	  discussion,	  
Carole	  Blair’s	  study	  of	  The	  Civil	  Rights	  Memorial	  in	  Birmingham,	  Alabama	  proved	  most	  
useful	  and	  provided	  the	  model	  for	  the	  analysis	  that	  follows.	  Other	  recent	  sites	  of	  study	  
include	  the	  National	  Jazz	  Museum	  in	  Harlem	  (Clark),	  the	  National	  Civil	  Rights	  Museum	  in	  
Memphis	  (Armada),	  the	  Monument	  to	  Joe	  Louis	  in	  Detroit	  (Gallagher	  and	  LaWare),	  and	  the	  
World	  War	  II	  Memorial	  on	  the	  Mall	  in	  Washington,	  D.	  C.	  (Biesecker).	  These	  studies	  appear	  
in	  collection	  edited	  by	  Greg	  Dickinson,	  Carole	  Blair,	  and	  Brian	  L.	  Ott	  titled	  Places	  of	  Public	  
Memory:	  The	  Rhetoric	  of	  Museums	  and	  Memorials.	  Dickinson,	  Blair,	  and	  Ott	  began	  their	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collection	  with	  the	  assumption	  that	  “memory	  is	  rhetorical	  and	  public	  memory	  places	  are	  
especially	  powerful	  rhetorically”	  (2).	  	  They	  quote	  the	  story	  of	  Simonides	  of	  Ceos	  from	  
Cicero’s	  De	  oratore,	  which	  they	  call	  “a	  founding	  legend	  of	  the	  rhetorical	  art	  of	  memory”	  (1).	  
As	  Simonides	  was	  able	  to	  identify	  the	  dead	  in	  a	  collapsed	  banquet	  hall	  by	  remembering	  
where	  each	  person	  sat,	  so	  Blair,	  Dickinson	  and	  Ott	  wish	  to	  reclaim	  the	  notion	  of	  place	  as	  an	  
organizing	  principle	  for	  memory,	  and	  to	  explore	  the	  relations	  between	  place,	  memory	  and	  
rhetoric.	  	  They	  argue	  that	  understanding	  these	  relationships	  “is	  of	  crucial	  importance	  to	  
understanding	  contemporary	  public	  culture”	  (1).	  Bradford	  Vivian,	  whose	  essay	  “A	  Timeless	  
Now:	  Memory	  and	  Repetition”	  appeared	  in	  Framing	  Public	  Memory,	  further	  explains	  this	  
relationship	  with	  an	  emphasis	  on	  civic	  spaces.	  He	  writes,	  “public	  memory	  scholars	  have	  
long	  recognized	  the	  fundamental	  relationships	  among	  place,	  historical	  memory,	  and	  the	  
maintenance	  of	  community.	  In	  a	  Western	  frame,	  communities	  cohere	  around	  the	  formation	  
of	  a	  civic	  domain,	  and	  their	  history	  unfolds	  according	  to	  its	  maintenance”	  (Vivian	  191).	  	  
Even	  though	  public	  memory	  studies	  gained	  traction	  from	  academic	  unease	  with	  official	  
histories,	  it	  is	  true	  that	  history	  is	  often	  constructed	  from	  the	  memories	  of	  those	  with	  the	  
authority	  and	  the	  longevity	  to	  promote	  and	  ultimately	  persuade	  others	  to	  view	  past	  events	  
according	  to	  their	  perspective.	  
Phillips	  offers	  two	  “frames”	  for	  understanding	  and	  classifying	  public	  memory	  
studies:	  the	  memory	  of	  publics,	  and	  the	  publicness	  of	  memory	  (3).	  Within	  these	  frames	  he	  
was	  able	  to	  extract	  some	  common	  themes	  from	  a	  series	  of	  interdisciplinary	  articles	  on	  the	  
subject.	  Within	  the	  memory	  of	  publics,	  Phillips	  argued	  that	  the	  common	  theme	  is	  that	  
“some	  entity	  that	  can	  be	  labeled	  a	  public	  exists	  and,	  further,	  that	  these	  entities	  have	  
memories”	  (4).	  The	  dimensions	  of	  this	  frame	  include	  a	  series	  of	  interrelated	  pairs:	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“remembering/forgetting;	  authority/resistance;	  responsibility/absolution”	  (Philips	  6).	  
Within	  the	  publicness	  of	  memory,	  the	  notion	  of	  memory	  appearing	  in	  view	  of	  others,	  
Phillips	  offers	  the	  interrelated	  pairings	  of	  “appearance/loss,	  repetition/mutation,	  [and]	  
hegemony/instability”	  (10).	  Dickinson,	  Blair	  and	  Ott	  identified	  some	  common	  assumptions	  
that	  run	  through	  most	  of	  the	  scholarship	  on	  public	  memory,	  including	  Phillips’	  notion	  that	  
it	  is	  “partial,	  partisan,	  and	  thus	  often	  contested,”	  that	  “memory	  is	  activated	  by	  present	  
concerns,	  issues,	  or	  anxieties,”	  and	  is	  “animated	  by	  affect,”	  that	  memory	  “narrates	  shared	  
identifies,”	  and	  that	  it	  relies	  on	  “material	  and/or	  symbolic	  supports”	  (6).	  
Vivian’s	  argument	  that	  “communities	  cohere	  around	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  civic	  
domain”	  is	  especially	  helpful	  in	  understanding	  the	  rhetorical	  effects	  of	  this	  particular	  public	  
memory	  site,	  since	  its	  incarnation	  as	  such	  a	  site	  is	  owed	  to	  its	  role	  in	  a	  major	  civic	  event	  
emerging	  from	  the	  central	  text	  of	  American	  civic	  life,	  the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  
It	  was	  this	  Constitutional	  element	  that	  led	  federal	  officials	  to	  adopt	  this	  site	  for	  its	  current	  
use	  as	  a	  National	  Historic	  Site	  and	  National	  park.	  The	  decision	  it	  commemorates	  has	  
frequently	  been	  identified	  as	  the	  most	  significant	  legal	  landmark	  case	  of	  the	  twentieth	  
century,	  and	  has	  even	  been	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  “beloved	  legal	  and	  political	  icon”	  (Balkin	  4).	  It	  
has	  been	  referred	  to	  by	  civil	  rights	  scholars	  as	  “the	  Holy	  Grail	  of	  racial	  justice”	  in	  part	  
because	  the	  Constitution	  is	  deemed	  to	  be	  “America’s	  civil	  religion”	  	  (Bell	  3).	  But	  many	  who	  
have	  studied	  the	  Brown	  decision,	  including	  rhetoric	  scholars,	  have	  noted	  the	  controversy	  
that	  followed	  that	  decision	  from	  the	  moment	  it	  was	  announced.	  How,	  then,	  do	  we	  account	  
for	  the	  virtually	  uncontested	  establishment	  of	  this	  national	  site?	  	  
Arguably,	  it	  is	  precisely	  because	  of	  the	  kinds	  of	  references	  noted	  here.	  For	  better	  or	  
worse,	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  decision	  and	  its	  legacy	  merits	  a	  site	  where	  individuals	  can	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connect	  to	  the	  past,	  to	  try	  to	  understand	  it,	  to	  provide	  “a	  specific	  kind	  of	  relationship	  
between	  past	  and	  present	  that	  may	  offer	  a	  sense	  of	  sustained	  and	  sustaining	  communal	  
identification.	  By	  bringing	  the	  visitor	  into	  contact	  with	  a	  significant	  past,	  the	  visitor	  may	  be	  
led	  to	  understand	  the	  present	  as	  part	  of	  an	  enduring,	  stable	  tradition”	  (Dickinson,	  Blair	  and	  
Ott	  27).	  At	  the	  point	  of	  Brown’s	  fiftieth	  anniversary,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  find	  anyone	  who	  argues	  
that	  the	  country	  is	  worse	  off	  for	  the	  decision,	  but	  there	  are	  a	  few	  who	  believe	  the	  decision	  
hurt	  some	  of	  the	  very	  people	  it	  was	  trying	  to	  help	  (see	  Chapter	  4).	  Those	  dissenting	  voices	  
are	  also	  part	  of	  this	  tradition,	  its	  stability	  grounded	  in	  changes	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  
freedom	  to	  engage	  in	  public	  disagreement	  over	  laws	  and	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  discourse	  that	  
brings	  continuing	  progress	  toward	  realizing	  the	  founding	  ideals	  of	  the	  nation.	  Public	  
memory	  scholars	  cite	  Pierre	  Nora	  and	  his	  “notion	  of	  ‘lieux	  de	  memoire,’	  or	  ‘sites	  of	  
memory,’	  [that]	  has	  helped	  demonstrate	  the	  linkage	  between	  the	  ability	  to	  remember	  and	  
the	  places—conceptual	  and	  physical—where	  memory	  is	  lodged”	  (Zelizer	  157).	  Looking	  
back	  now,	  from	  the	  post-­‐fiftieth-­‐anniversary	  vantage	  point,	  it	  might	  seem	  like	  everyone	  
remembers	  this	  case	  and	  the	  events	  surrounding	  it,	  that	  as	  significant	  as	  it	  was	  it	  would	  be	  
(or	  is)	  a	  staple	  of	  American	  education	  and	  understanding	  of	  our	  civic	  history.	  But	  such	  was	  
not	  the	  case	  when	  the	  work	  to	  establish	  the	  site	  began.	  
The	  online	  tour	  provided	  by	  the	  Brown	  Foundation	  for	  Educational	  Equity,	  
Excellence,	  and	  Research	  (hereafter	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  online	  tour)	  is	  the	  primary	  source	  for	  
the	  descriptions	  of	  the	  site	  and	  its	  interior	  spaces	  that	  follow.	  The	  information	  given	  in	  the	  
online	  tour	  is	  supplemented	  by	  images	  and	  descriptions	  at	  the	  National	  Park	  Service	  
website	  for	  this	  National	  Park	  and	  National	  Historic	  Site	  (hereafter	  referred	  to	  as	  NPS	  site).	  
The	  NPS	  site	  is	  consistent	  with	  other	  National	  Park	  Service	  park	  online	  sites,	  replicating	  the	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print	  brochure	  in	  online	  format	  with	  some	  interactive	  options	  added.	  	  The	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  
of	  Education	  National	  Historic	  Site’s	  web	  presence	  is	  an	  important	  addition	  to	  the	  physical	  
location.	  It	  is	  a	  commonplace	  now	  for	  any	  public	  or	  commercial	  location	  to	  have	  a	  web	  site,	  
and	  for	  many	  researchers,	  the	  web	  is	  an	  efficient	  tool	  for	  getting	  an	  overview	  of	  a	  research	  
site	  and	  its	  history	  or	  current	  content.	  For	  younger	  researchers,	  particularly	  school-­‐age	  
children,	  an	  online	  encounter	  may	  be	  the	  only	  feasible	  encounter,	  and	  thus	  a	  web	  presence	  
expands	  the	  site’s	  visitor	  capacity	  and	  breadth.	  For	  the	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education	  
National	  Historic	  Site	  in	  particular,	  the	  ability	  to	  reach	  school-­‐age	  children	  and	  other	  non-­‐
traveling	  researchers	  is	  consistent	  with	  and	  important	  to	  the	  Foundation’s	  overall	  goals	  for	  
the	  site	  to	  reach	  multiple	  audiences,	  and	  to	  bring	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  National	  Historic	  
Site	  to	  all	  those	  to	  whom	  it	  belongs,	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  can	  visit	  in	  person.	  	  
The	  online	  tour	  is	  carefully	  constructed	  to	  provide	  the	  virtual	  visitor	  with	  a	  detailed	  
sense	  of	  the	  physical	  site’s	  layout,	  interior	  displays,	  and	  goals	  without	  being	  so	  detailed	  that	  
the	  virtual	  visitor	  sees	  no	  reason	  to	  visit	  the	  physical	  site.	  Some	  material	  is	  hidden	  from	  
view	  in	  the	  online	  tour	  photographs,	  and	  there	  are	  no	  audio	  clips	  to	  accompany	  any	  of	  the	  
images.	  Additionally,	  the	  online	  tour	  site	  does	  not	  allow	  for	  any	  visitor	  feedback	  or	  review	  
of	  any	  previous	  visitor	  comments.	  	  The	  online	  tour	  thus	  mediates	  both	  its	  subject	  and	  the	  
site	  by	  providing	  useful	  information	  about	  both,	  while	  inviting	  the	  viewer	  to	  a	  more	  
interactive	  and	  engaging	  encounter	  through	  a	  visit	  to	  the	  park	  in	  Topeka.	  My	  perspective	  
on	  these	  online	  resources	  is	  shaped	  by	  my	  research	  into	  the	  decision	  and	  my	  ability	  to	  fill	  in	  
some	  of	  the	  details	  that	  aren’t	  completely	  clear	  in	  the	  images.	  My	  reading	  of	  the	  online	  tour	  
might	  therefore	  be	  more	  generous	  than	  that	  of	  a	  visitor	  less	  familiar	  with	  the	  decision	  and	  
its	  history,	  but	  also	  more	  critical	  in	  being	  able	  to	  see	  what	  is	  clearly	  not	  presented	  in	  the	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images	  or	  descriptions.	  The	  description	  that	  follows	  represents	  my	  interpretation	  of	  the	  
site	  from	  the	  online	  tour	  and	  NPS	  site	  information.	  
The	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education	  National	  Historic	  Site	  is	  anchored	  by	  the	  building	  
that	  was	  Monroe	  Elementary,	  with	  the	  surrounding	  grounds	  developed	  into	  a	  picturesque	  
setting	  that	  belies	  its	  urban	  location.	  Visitors	  enter	  the	  building	  in	  the	  center,	  go	  up	  a	  small	  
flight	  of	  stairs	  and	  through	  an	  entry	  hall	  just	  as	  students	  did	  in	  the	  building’s	  former	  life.	  
Above	  the	  large	  double	  doors	  that	  open	  to	  the	  galleries	  are	  the	  two	  iconic	  signs	  of	  the	  Jim	  
Crow	  era:	  “White”	  and	  “Colored.”	  No	  interpretation	  is	  offered,	  making	  it	  appear	  as	  if	  
visitors	  must	  select	  the	  door	  that	  most	  accurately	  describes	  them.	  Like	  other	  aspects	  of	  the	  
interactive	  exhibits,	  these	  identifying	  signs	  invite	  visitors	  to	  experience	  “what	  it	  was	  like,”	  
to	  try	  to	  feel	  the	  emotion	  and	  sense	  of	  living	  in	  this	  social	  structure.	  Inside	  the	  doors,	  
visitors	  choose	  one	  of	  four	  main	  galleries	  to	  begin	  their	  visit.	  	  The	  galleries	  are	  set	  up	  to	  
encourage	  a	  particular	  path	  through	  them,	  one	  that	  begins	  with	  the	  gallery	  directly	  across	  
from	  the	  entry	  hall,	  called	  “Race	  and	  The	  American	  Creed.”	  This	  is	  the	  largest	  of	  the	  four	  
galleries	  and	  features	  a	  looping	  film	  of	  the	  same	  name.	  The	  film	  is	  linked	  to	  icons	  in	  the	  
gallery,	  which	  light	  up	  as	  they	  are	  discussed	  in	  the	  film’s	  narrative.	  	  From	  here,	  visitors	  are	  
encouraged	  to,	  but	  notably	  not	  required	  to,	  proceed	  to	  the	  “Education	  and	  Justice”	  gallery	  
across	  the	  hall.	  	  
The	  “Education	  and	  Justice”	  galley	  features	  a	  timeline	  of	  segregation	  in	  the	  United	  
States,	  along	  with	  exhibits	  that	  cover	  periods	  and	  important	  figures	  in	  that	  history.	  On	  the	  
other	  side	  of	  the	  gallery	  are	  exhibits	  related	  to	  the	  five	  cases	  that	  eventually	  made	  up	  the	  
consolidated	  Brown	  decision.	  Each	  part	  of	  the	  gallery	  has	  small	  videos	  as	  well	  as	  
photographs,	  maps,	  and	  interactive	  features	  for	  visitors	  to	  test	  their	  knowledge	  of	  the	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events	  discussed	  in	  the	  gallery.	  This	  gallery’s	  central	  exhibit	  is	  its	  most	  dramatic	  and	  the	  
most	  likely	  to	  put	  the	  visitor	  into	  the	  conditions	  that	  existed	  during	  the	  era	  around	  the	  
Brown	  decision.	  Named	  the	  Tunnel	  of	  Courage,	  this	  exhibit	  surrounds	  the	  visitor	  with	  
images	  and	  sounds	  from	  significant	  confrontations	  of	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Era.	  At	  each	  end	  of	  
the	  hall	  is	  a	  full	  size	  image	  of	  Elizabeth	  Eckford,	  one	  of	  the	  Little	  Rock	  Nine,	  as	  she	  was	  
being	  pursued	  by	  an	  angry	  group	  of	  whites	  after	  trying	  to	  attend	  Central	  High	  School.	  The	  
Tunnel	  of	  Courage	  comes	  with	  a	  warning	  about	  the	  harsh	  language	  and	  the	  images.	  Parents	  
are	  advised	  to	  preview	  the	  hall	  prior	  to	  taking	  children	  through.	  In	  this	  gallery,	  one	  sees	  the	  
hegemonizing	  force	  of	  a	  public	  memory	  site,	  as	  various	  elements	  such	  as	  the	  timelines	  
along	  the	  wall	  suggest	  that	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Brown	  case	  followed	  a	  stable	  and	  
predictable	  path,	  as	  if	  this	  was	  the	  only	  way	  the	  events	  could	  have	  unfolded.	  Visitors	  see	  the	  
events	  presented	  but	  unless	  they	  bring	  prior	  research	  or	  personal	  memory	  to	  the	  site,	  they	  
don’t	  see	  the	  elements	  not	  presented,	  such	  as	  the	  arguments	  for	  the	  opposing	  lawyers	  
(discussed	  below)	  or	  mementoes	  of	  protest	  documents	  such	  as	  the	  petition	  of	  Massive	  
Resistance.	  	  
The	  first	  two	  galleries	  give	  visitors	  a	  sense	  of	  history,	  which	  prepares	  them	  for	  a	  
better	  understanding	  of	  the	  third	  gallery	  on	  the	  tour,	  titled	  “The	  Legacy	  of	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  
of	  Education”.	  This	  gallery	  features	  exhibits	  that	  discuss	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  decision	  in	  terms	  
of	  both	  the	  efforts	  to	  implement	  it	  and	  the	  larger	  civil	  rights	  era	  actions,	  important	  persons,	  
and	  legislation	  that	  came	  after	  Brown.	  Here	  visitors	  find	  artifacts	  of	  those	  efforts	  in	  both	  
open	  displays	  and	  pull-­‐out	  drawers.	  These	  exhibits	  include	  items	  such	  as	  law	  enforcement	  
night	  sticks,	  or	  batons,	  accompanied	  by	  photographs	  of	  encounters	  between	  police	  and	  civil	  
rights	  protestors	  and	  images	  from	  the	  slavery	  era	  alongside	  the	  manacles	  used	  bind	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Africans	  brought	  to	  America	  as	  slaves.	  Other	  displays	  feature	  copies	  of	  briefs	  and	  
newspaper	  pages	  from	  the	  Brown	  era.	  Interactive	  exhibits	  provide	  information	  about	  key	  
individuals	  in	  the	  civil	  rights	  struggle,	  as	  well	  as	  profiling	  African	  American	  writers	  and	  
sampling	  protest	  music.	  One	  interactive	  exhibit	  called	  The	  Road	  to	  Justice,	  which	  is	  also	  
featured	  on	  the	  National	  Park	  Service	  website,	  asks	  visitors	  to	  put	  themselves	  in	  the	  place	  
of	  a	  teenager	  in	  the	  1950s,	  making	  choices	  about	  what	  to	  do	  in	  the	  face	  of	  discriminatory	  
educational	  systems.	  The	  short	  film	  Pass	  It	  On	  encourages	  viewers	  to	  see	  civil	  rights	  as	  an	  
attitude,	  a	  mindset,	  rather	  than	  a	  set	  of	  laws.	  This	  film,	  like	  the	  others	  in	  the	  galleries	  or	  the	  
interactive	  exhibits	  found	  there,	  can	  be	  experienced	  only	  in	  the	  physical	  site,	  so	  that	  the	  
physical	  site	  visit	  provides	  a	  distinctly	  different	  experience	  than	  the	  online	  tour.	  In	  both	  
places,	  this	  hall	  invites	  visitors	  to	  see	  the	  efforts	  to	  achieve	  racial	  equality	  as	  a	  continuing	  
effort,	  one	  of	  which	  they	  are	  an	  important	  part.	  Unlike	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Memorial	  in	  
Birmingham,	  there	  is	  no	  direct	  conscription	  effort,	  no	  pledge	  to	  sign	  or	  wall	  on	  which	  to	  
have	  one’s	  name	  appear.	  There	  is,	  however,	  an	  invitation,	  an	  encouragement	  to	  understand	  
the	  struggle	  as	  ongoing	  and	  to	  engage	  in	  the	  efforts	  to	  promote	  democracy,	  justice	  and	  
equality	  both	  domestically	  and	  globally.	  	  
This	  encouragement	  is	  extended	  through	  the	  final	  gallery,	  called	  Expressions	  and	  
Reflections,	  where	  there	  are	  paintings	  on	  the	  wall	  and	  a	  few	  exhibits,	  but	  mostly	  open	  
space	  with	  seating	  to	  allow	  visitors	  to	  reflect	  on	  what	  they’ve	  learned	  during	  their	  visit.	  
There	  is	  a	  magnetic	  board	  for	  visitors	  to	  leave	  messages,	  messages	  that	  are	  necessarily	  
temporary	  as	  the	  letters	  are	  used	  and	  re-­‐used	  by	  future	  visitors,	  but	  one	  that	  has	  visitors	  
engaging	  in	  reflection	  and	  memory	  in	  the	  same	  space,	  if	  in	  asynchronous	  time.	  Expression	  
Stations	  allow	  visitors	  to	  record	  their	  responses	  in	  a	  several	  mediums,	  from	  artistic	  to	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verbal	  to	  textual.	  These	  tools	  of	  common	  reflection	  and	  communication	  are	  another	  part	  of	  
the	  physical	  location’s	  function	  that	  is	  absent	  from	  the	  online	  tour.	  Finally,	  the	  site	  includes	  
a	  bookstore,	  situated	  at	  the	  opposite	  end	  of	  the	  building	  from	  the	  Expressions	  and	  
Reflections	  gallery,	  making	  it	  a	  deliberate	  destination	  rather	  than	  the	  end	  of	  the	  directed	  
tour.	  	  
The	  directional	  efforts	  of	  the	  site	  are	  not	  unusual,	  as	  public	  places	  have	  “particular	  
paths	  of	  entry,	  traversal,	  and	  exit”	  (Dickinson,	  Blair,	  and	  Ott	  29).	  	  The	  site	  offers	  visitors	  
choices	  with	  directional	  indicators,	  with	  each	  gallery	  requiring	  a	  return	  to	  the	  main	  
hallway,	  just	  as	  a	  school	  classroom	  returns	  a	  student	  to	  the	  main	  area	  of	  interaction	  with	  
others	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  class	  period.	  	  The	  visitor	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  these	  choices,	  since	  no	  
two	  galleries	  are	  directly	  connected.	  This	  continual	  return	  to	  the	  main	  hallway	  reinforces	  
the	  original	  purpose	  of	  the	  site;	  the	  visitor	  is	  continually	  reminded	  that	  this	  is	  a	  school,	  and	  
that	  education	  was	  the	  central	  focus	  of	  the	  Brown	  decision.	  The	  contemporary	  site	  is	  now	  
many	  things:	  a	  National	  Park,	  a	  museum,	  a	  former	  all-­‐black	  elementary	  school,	  a	  restored	  
historic	  building,	  a	  memorial,	  a	  place	  of	  memory	  and	  remembrance,	  a	  “physical	  [place]	  
where	  shared	  memory	  is	  lodged”	  (Zelizer	  157).	  	  
With	  all	  of	  these	  artifacts	  representing	  so	  much	  activity	  over	  time,	  it	  can	  be	  difficult	  
now	  to	  imagine	  any	  American	  not	  being	  familiar	  with	  the	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education	  
decision	  and	  its	  details.	  Yet	  that	  was	  exactly	  the	  case	  when	  a	  small	  group	  of	  people	  in	  
Topeka,	  Kansas,	  first	  began	  the	  work	  of	  creating	  the	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  Foundation	  for	  
Educational	  Excellence,	  Equity,	  and	  Research.	  In	  this	  town	  where	  the	  lead	  plaintiff	  in	  the	  
famous	  consolidated	  case	  lived,	  little	  was	  being	  done	  to	  commemorate	  the	  thirtieth	  
anniversary	  of	  the	  decision.	  The	  owner	  of	  the	  school	  that	  became	  the	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	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Education	  National	  Historic	  Site	  didn’t	  know	  it	  was	  connected	  to	  the	  decision.	  The	  
coordinator	  of	  the	  granting	  agency	  that	  funded	  the	  site	  didn’t	  know	  the	  details	  of	  the	  
Brown	  cases.	  So	  what	  began	  as	  a	  desire	  to	  educate	  people	  about	  the	  decision,	  to	  ensure	  its	  
continued	  importance	  to	  future	  generations,	  and	  to	  build	  on	  and	  pay	  tribute	  to	  the	  work	  of	  
the	  attorneys	  and	  plaintiffs	  in	  the	  case,	  grew	  into	  a	  campaign	  to	  create	  a	  public	  memorial,	  a	  
campaign	  that	  in	  turn	  created	  a	  kairotic	  moment	  for	  all	  of	  the	  writing	  and	  events	  that	  were	  
produced	  for	  the	  fiftieth	  anniversary	  of	  the	  decision.	  	  By	  the	  time	  it	  was	  dedicated	  on	  May	  
17,	  2004,	  the	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education	  National	  Historic	  Site	  had	  been	  a	  fourteen	  year	  
long	  project,	  one	  that	  demonstrated	  for	  its	  founders	  the	  success	  of	  the	  democratic	  process	  
in	  American	  government.	  The	  campaign	  to	  establish	  the	  site	  also	  demonstrated	  the	  power	  
of	  a	  carefully	  and	  purposefully	  constructed	  argument,	  an	  effort	  that	  parallels	  the	  decision	  it	  
memorializes	  in	  many	  ways.	  	  	  
The	  genesis	  for	  the	  Brown	  Foundation,	  and	  in	  turn	  the	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education	  
National	  Historic	  Site,	  was	  a	  routine	  conversation	  between	  Cheryl	  Brown	  Henderson,	  the	  
youngest	  daughter	  of	  lead	  plaintiff	  Oliver	  L.	  Brown,	  and	  a	  colleague,	  Jerry	  Jones,	  as	  the	  two	  
of	  them	  prepared	  to	  attend	  a	  commemorative	  event	  for	  Dr.	  Martin	  Luther	  King,	  Jr.	  in	  
January	  1988.	  	  A	  new	  resident	  in	  Topeka	  at	  that	  time,	  Jones	  asked	  what	  was	  being	  done	  to	  
commemorate	  the	  anniversary	  of	  the	  Brown	  decision.	  Henderson’s	  response	  of	  “not	  much”	  
triggered	  a	  series	  of	  conversations	  that	  led	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Brown	  Foundation	  
for	  Educational	  Excellence,	  Equity,	  and	  Research	  in	  October	  of	  the	  same	  year.	  The	  mission	  
for	  the	  foundation	  was	  to	  “resurrect	  and	  share	  the	  Brown	  story”	  and	  to	  do	  so	  in	  a	  way	  that	  
went	  beyond	  “commemorating	  dates	  and	  places”	  (Henderson).	  For	  Henderson	  and	  Jones,	  
learning	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  abbreviated	  media	  constructed	  version	  of	  Brown	  had	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eclipsed	  the	  complexity	  and	  the	  multiple	  individual	  stories	  that	  made	  up	  its	  history	  was	  
daunting,	  but	  renewed	  their	  commitment	  to	  publishing	  –	  making	  public	  –	  the	  contributions	  
of	  the	  individuals	  who	  made	  up	  the	  cases,	  the	  attorneys,	  the	  many	  plaintiffs	  beyond	  Oliver	  
Brown	  and	  his	  daughter	  Linda.	  The	  mission	  expanded	  to	  include	  “using	  public	  history	  to	  
heal	  old	  wounds”	  and	  to	  change	  the	  perception	  of	  Brown	  within	  the	  city	  of	  Topeka,	  and	  
ultimately	  the	  others	  cities	  represented	  in	  the	  decision	  (Henderson).	  	  Henderson	  explains	  
that	  Topeka,	  “like	  other	  cities	  that	  have	  a	  historic	  legacy	  of	  national	  significance,”	  preferred	  
to	  bury	  “this	  aspect	  of	  its	  past,”	  with	  many	  Topekans	  believing	  that	  the	  decision	  cast	  
Topeka	  in	  a	  negative	  light	  because	  of	  the	  history	  of	  racial	  strife	  that	  followed	  it.	  The	  
Foundation,	  then,	  had	  multiple	  rhetorical	  goals,	  most	  of	  them	  focused	  on	  reconstructing	  the	  
image	  of	  Brown	  and	  reversing	  decades	  of	  mis-­‐information	  about	  it.	  
The	  pursuit	  of	  these	  goals	  shifted	  when	  the	  former	  Monroe	  Elementary	  School	  
became	  available	  for	  sale	  in	  1990.	  Monroe	  was	  the	  school	  Oliver	  Brown’s	  children	  
attended,	  one	  of	  four	  all-­‐black	  elementary	  schools	  in	  Topeka	  in	  the	  early	  1950s.	  Henderson,	  
Jones,	  and	  a	  group	  of	  community	  volunteers	  began	  a	  letter	  writing	  campaign2	  in	  an	  attempt	  
to	  find	  a	  wealthy	  patron	  who	  could	  buy	  the	  property	  and	  sell	  it	  to	  the	  foundation	  with	  
payments	  over	  time.	  This	  campaign	  was	  not	  successful,	  indicating	  that	  the	  national	  
significance	  of	  the	  Brown	  decision	  was	  not	  yet	  established	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  campaign,	  and	  
that	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  Brown	  Foundation’s	  founders	  were	  more	  local	  and	  personal	  than	  
representative	  of	  larger	  interests.	  It	  also	  suggests	  that	  the	  letters	  lacked	  the	  persuasive	  
force	  that	  more	  personal	  contact	  might	  have	  afforded.	  What	  is	  significant	  is	  that	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  When	  consulted	  for	  this	  project,	  Cheryl	  Brown	  Henderson	  advised	  that	  the	  records	  
pertaining	  to	  the	  letter	  writing	  campaign	  have	  been	  archived,	  and	  therefore	  were	  not	  
readily	  available.	  Analysis	  of	  these	  letters	  will	  be	  the	  subject	  of	  future	  research.	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volunteers	  didn’t	  give	  up.	  A	  second	  letter-­‐writing	  campaign,	  this	  time	  to	  Congressional	  
representatives	  and	  other	  federal	  government	  agencies,	  ensued.	  These	  arguments	  focused	  
on	  the	  civic	  function	  of	  the	  Brown	  decision	  and	  the	  potential	  of	  a	  national	  memorial	  site.	  
Letters	  to	  the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  the	  Interior,	  the	  National	  Park	  Service,	  and	  Congress,	  
argued	  that	  “interpreting	  the	  Brown	  story	  was	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  American	  people	  
regardless	  of	  race,	  gender,	  or	  ethnicity”	  (Henderson).	  	  
But	  as	  noted	  above,	  public	  memorial	  selection	  is	  highly	  partial,	  and	  given	  the	  
divisive	  history	  of	  the	  Brown	  decision,	  there	  was	  reason	  to	  doubt	  that	  these	  efforts	  would	  
be	  successful.	  	  As	  David	  Jacobson	  argues,	  “because	  such	  symbols	  and	  monuments	  arrange	  
‘place,’	  locating	  and	  orienting	  peoples	  spatially	  and	  temporally,	  and	  are	  critical	  in	  binding	  
and	  mediating	  the	  body	  politic…they	  determine	  who	  ‘belongs’	  to	  the	  nation	  and	  on	  what	  
terms’”	  (qtd	  in	  Blair,	  Dickinson,	  and	  Ott	  28).	  In	  the	  original	  decision,	  the	  Kansas	  case	  played	  
a	  unique	  role	  in	  that	  it	  was	  the	  only	  one	  of	  the	  five	  districts	  involved	  that	  could	  claim	  its	  
separated	  facilities	  were	  substantially	  equal3.	  This	  case	  gave	  the	  1953	  Court	  the	  keystone	  
for	  its	  finding	  that	  separate	  cannot	  be	  equal,	  despite	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  facilities	  involved.	  
Kansas	  was	  also	  a	  “border”	  state,	  one	  not	  located	  in	  the	  former	  Confederacy,	  a	  factor	  
important	  to	  both	  the	  Court	  and	  the	  attorneys	  building	  the	  case.	  For	  the	  site,	  these	  
distinctions	  also	  meant	  that	  the	  location	  might	  be	  more	  warmly	  embraced	  by	  a	  national	  
audience	  than	  would	  its	  location	  in	  one	  of	  the	  other	  original	  cities.	  	  
Barbara	  Biesecker	  has	  argued	  that	  some	  projects	  sail	  through	  even	  the	  toughest	  
approval	  hurdles	  because	  they	  memorialize	  events	  that	  are	  “central	  to	  our	  history,	  central	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Determination	  of	  equality	  in	  segregated	  schools	  was	  based	  on	  such	  characteristics	  as	  
facilities,	  curriculum,	  teacher	  training,	  per-­‐pupil	  expenditures,	  length	  of	  school	  year,	  
transportation,	  and	  quality	  of	  teaching	  materials.	  See	  Wilson	  (92-­‐93),	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to	  our	  view	  of	  our	  role	  in	  the	  world,	  central	  to	  our	  values”	  and	  that	  they	  function,	  or	  are	  
intended	  to	  function,	  to	  unify	  a	  divided	  civic	  populous	  (215-­‐216).	  By	  the	  time	  the	  Monroe	  
School	  became	  available,	  the	  Brown	  decision	  had	  been	  tested	  in	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  many	  
times,	  but	  still	  reigned	  as	  arguably	  its	  most	  significant	  decision	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  
Establishing	  the	  historical	  site	  in	  Kansas,	  in	  the	  heartland	  of	  America,	  served	  to	  place	  the	  
Brown	  decision	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  America,	  to	  make	  it,	  or	  at	  least	  attempt	  to	  make	  it,	  belong	  to	  
every	  American,	  just	  as	  the	  Brown	  Foundation	  campaign	  had	  argued.	  The	  site	  provides	  the	  
means	  for	  sharing	  the	  legacy	  of	  the	  decision	  in	  the	  company	  of	  others	  from	  other	  places	  
around	  the	  country,	  of	  remembering	  the	  decision	  and	  all	  of	  its	  complexity	  together	  in	  
public,	  to	  construct	  a	  public	  of	  all,	  to	  insist	  that	  to	  be	  American	  is	  to	  claim	  a	  share	  in	  the	  
remembering	  of	  the	  Brown	  decision,	  its	  actors,	  and	  its	  legacy.	  	  
The	  timing	  of	  the	  Brown	  Foundation	  letter-­‐writing	  campaign	  was	  fortuitous.	  In	  
1985,	  former	  Chief	  Justice	  Warren	  Burger	  had	  called	  for	  a	  survey	  of	  properties	  associated	  
with	  the	  Constitution,	  with	  an	  eye	  to	  preserving	  these	  sites	  under	  the	  National	  Park	  
Service.	  The	  survey	  was	  published	  in	  1987,	  in	  honor	  of	  the	  200th	  anniversary	  of	  the	  
Constitution.	  Dr.	  Harry	  Butowsky	  led	  the	  survey	  project.	  He	  consulted	  constitutional	  
scholars	  and	  federal	  judges,	  and	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education	  was	  a	  case	  consistently	  
appearing	  in	  the	  recommendations.	  	  A	  search	  of	  related	  properties	  was	  undertaken,	  but	  the	  
Monroe	  school	  was	  not	  among	  them.	  This	  was	  in	  part	  because	  the	  property	  owner	  was	  
unaware	  of	  its	  relationship	  to	  the	  Brown	  case.	  When	  the	  property	  owner	  put	  the	  school	  up	  
for	  auction,	  the	  Brown	  Foundation	  acted.	  	  Through	  its	  letter	  writing	  campaign	  to	  
Congressional	  Representatives,	  the	  Foundation	  was	  put	  in	  contact	  with	  the	  Afro-­‐American	  
Institute	  for	  Historic	  Preservation	  and	  Community	  Development	  in	  Washington,	  D.C.	  At	  the	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same	  time,	  Dr.	  Bukowsky	  was	  contacted	  with	  the	  suggestion	  that	  he	  re-­‐open	  his	  survey	  and	  
consider	  the	  Monroe	  School.	  Bukowsky	  had	  been	  unaware	  of	  the	  details	  of	  the	  Brown	  
decision	  or	  the	  individuals	  and	  places	  involved.	  His	  new	  awareness	  of	  the	  site	  and	  his	  
decision	  to	  consider	  it	  led	  to	  the	  property	  being	  designated	  for	  preservation	  as	  a	  National	  
Historic	  Landmark.	  
This	  was	  not	  the	  end	  of	  the	  persuasive	  effort	  for	  the	  Brown	  Foundation	  volunteers.	  
Accomplishing	  the	  restoration	  and	  site	  construction	  required	  more	  than	  just	  the	  Park	  
Service	  being	  on	  board.	  The	  Foundation	  members	  organized	  a	  community	  for	  
“brainstorming,	  letter	  writing,	  and	  moral	  support”	  making	  contact	  with	  individuals	  and	  
organizations	  at	  every	  level	  of	  society,	  from	  the	  Brown	  plaintiffs	  to	  the	  city	  leadership,	  from	  
civic	  and	  social	  clubs	  to	  fraternities	  and	  sororities,	  from	  local	  preservation	  societies	  to	  the	  
state	  legislature	  (“Preservation”).	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  Brown	  Foundation	  members	  were	  
working	  to	  generate	  federal	  legislation	  that	  would	  designate	  the	  site	  as	  a	  National	  Historic	  
Site,	  a	  designation	  that	  had	  already	  been	  given	  to	  the	  Sumner	  school,	  the	  formerly	  all-­‐white	  
school	  where	  Oliver	  Brown	  had	  tried	  to	  enroll	  his	  daughter,	  and	  whose	  rejection	  of	  that	  
enrollment	  application	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  the	  Topeka	  case.	  The	  effort	  expended	  to	  raise	  
support	  for	  the	  site	  and	  begin	  the	  work	  of	  renovating	  and	  reconstructing	  it	  as	  public	  
memorial	  site	  was	  an	  enactment	  of	  the	  Brown	  Foundation’s	  goal	  not	  only	  to	  educate	  the	  
public	  about	  the	  complexities	  and	  details	  of	  the	  Brown	  decision,	  but	  also	  to	  create	  a	  site	  
that	  could	  belong	  to	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  publics.	  	  
The	  “public”	  constituted	  by	  Cheryl	  Brown	  Henderson	  and	  her	  colleagues	  rejected	  
the	  kind	  of	  reductive	  history	  of	  the	  decision	  they	  were	  finding	  in	  the	  media.	  But	  they	  were	  
not	  a	  sufficient	  public	  in	  themselves	  to	  authorize	  the	  complex	  view	  they	  wished	  to	  present;	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they	  lacked	  the	  capacity	  on	  their	  own.	  Their	  attempts	  to	  draw	  in	  wealthy	  individual	  citizens	  
to	  assist	  with	  the	  purchase	  of	  the	  Monroe	  School	  did	  not	  succeed,	  indicating	  that	  their	  
interests	  were	  insufficient	  to	  cultivate	  those	  individuals	  into	  their	  understanding	  of	  the	  
importance	  or	  significance	  of	  the	  site.	  Only	  when	  representatives	  of	  the	  federal	  government	  
got	  involved	  did	  the	  process	  of	  authorizing	  the	  site	  and	  its	  incarnation	  of	  the	  decision	  
through	  its	  selected	  exhibits	  gather	  sufficient	  authority	  to	  move.	  With	  that	  authority	  came	  
the	  “horizon	  within	  which	  publics	  emerge[d]	  and	  constitute[d]	  themselves,”	  a	  community	  
of	  those	  who	  wanted	  their	  memories,	  their	  experiences,	  presented	  and	  preserved	  (Phillips	  
4).	  	  
What	  is	  significant	  about	  the	  success	  of	  this	  effort	  for	  Henderson	  is	  that	  it	  
demonstrated	  that	  “our	  system	  of	  government	  works	  exactly	  as	  intended,	  we	  have	  only	  to	  
insist	  that	  it	  respond.”	  From	  a	  rhetorical	  standpoint,	  the	  efforts	  expended	  to	  create	  the	  site	  
demonstrate	  the	  value	  of	  pursuing	  a	  clearly	  defined	  purpose	  with	  a	  focused	  argument.	  The	  
Brown	  Foundation	  was	  established	  two	  years	  prior	  to	  the	  availability	  of	  the	  school	  
property.	  Because	  their	  mission,	  “to	  keep	  the	  tenets	  and	  ideals	  of	  Brown	  relevant	  for	  future	  
generations,”	  was	  clear,	  and	  their	  vision	  refined	  and	  expanded	  through	  a	  series	  of	  
conversations,	  they	  were	  able	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  opportunity	  the	  site	  availability	  presented	  
(Brown	  Foundation).	  	  Looking	  to	  the	  national	  significance	  of	  the	  decision	  and	  the	  site	  
widened	  the	  audience	  for	  establishing	  and	  promoting	  the	  site.	  Establishing	  connections	  and	  
cultivating	  support	  through	  community	  organizing,	  letter	  writing	  and	  participation	  in	  
federal	  hearing	  and	  other	  due	  diligence	  processes	  employed	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  persuasive	  
means	  to	  accomplish	  the	  goal	  of	  creating	  the	  site	  that	  would	  locate	  and	  enhance	  the	  
Foundation’s	  goals.	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Warren	  Burger’s	  proposal	  to	  give	  national	  recognition	  to	  sites	  associated	  with	  the	  
Constitution,	  to	  make	  Constitutional	  memorial	  places,	  reflects	  Edward	  Casey’s	  claim	  that	  
“public	  memory	  needs	  a	  place	  of	  enactment”	  (38).	  	  	  But	  Burger’s	  proposal	  in	  itself	  could	  
only	  provide	  for	  a	  place,	  and	  not	  the	  particular	  memories	  that	  would	  be	  instantiated	  there.	  	  
Casey’s	  work	  is	  helpful	  in	  understanding	  some	  of	  the	  distinctions	  that	  inform	  such	  choices.	  
He	  distinguishes	  “social	  memory”	  from	  “collective	  memory,”	  where	  “social	  memory”	  is	  “the	  
memory	  held	  in	  common	  by	  those	  who	  are	  affiliated	  by	  kinship…people	  already	  related	  to	  
each	  other”	  (Casey	  21).	  So,	  for	  example,	  the	  Brown	  sisters	  and	  their	  colleagues,	  family,	  
friends,	  co-­‐plaintiffs,	  have	  social	  memory.	  Each	  group	  related	  to	  each	  of	  the	  separate	  cases	  
has	  social	  memory	  as	  well	  and	  each	  of	  these	  is	  different.	  	  “Collective	  memory”	  occurs	  when	  
different	  persons	  not	  known	  to	  each	  other	  recall	  the	  same	  event.	  Collective	  memory	  is	  
distributed	  over	  a	  given	  population	  (Casey	  23).	  Each	  contributes	  (along	  with	  individual	  
memory)	  to	  public	  memory.	  Examples	  of	  collective	  memory	  triggers,	  or	  “flashbulb	  
memories,”	  are	  typically	  based	  on	  tragedy	  or	  disaster,	  moments	  when	  virtually	  everyone	  
can	  remember	  where	  they	  were	  and	  how	  they	  felt	  when	  the	  learned	  of	  the	  event,	  such	  as	  
the	  assassination	  of	  John	  F.	  Kennedy,	  the	  Challenger	  explosion,	  or	  the	  attacks	  on	  9/11.	  The	  
Brown	  decision	  was	  this	  type	  of	  trigger,	  for	  some	  a	  moment	  of	  celebration	  and	  for	  others	  a	  
disaster	  of	  epic	  proportion	  (see,	  as	  one	  example,	  the	  Southern	  Manifesto	  issued	  shortly	  
after	  Brown	  II	  was	  announced).	  And	  yet,	  like	  other	  collective	  memory	  triggers,	  the	  initial	  
public	  response	  faded,	  and	  the	  decision,	  while	  remembered	  and	  acted	  on	  in	  various	  places	  
at	  varying	  degrees	  of	  speed	  and	  while	  studied	  by	  attorneys	  and	  providing	  precedent	  for	  
legal	  decisions,	  faded	  to	  the	  periphery	  of	  public	  attention.	  For	  most	  visitors	  to	  the	  Brown	  v.	  
Board	  of	  Education	  National	  Historic	  Site,	  the	  Brown	  decision	  predates	  personal	  memory,	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and	  is	  more	  likely	  an	  event	  learned	  from	  a	  history	  or	  social	  studies	  class	  in	  school,	  precisely	  
the	  truncated	  versions	  of	  the	  story	  Henderson	  and	  her	  colleagues	  were	  determined	  to	  
unpack.	  And	  because	  the	  site	  is	  dedicated	  to	  a	  Supreme	  Court	  decision,	  one	  need	  not	  be	  
thinking	  of	  the	  individuals	  involved	  in	  the	  cases	  to	  be	  engaged	  in	  the	  commemoration.	  	  
The	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education	  National	  Historic	  Site	  offers	  both	  aspects	  of	  public	  
memory	  that	  Kendall	  Phillips	  argues	  scholars	  interested	  in	  public	  memory	  should	  attend	  
to:	  the	  memory	  of	  publics,	  and	  the	  publicness	  of	  memory	  (3).	  Phillips	  defines	  “the	  memory	  
of	  publics”	  as	  the	  way	  that	  memories	  affect	  and	  are	  effected	  by	  various	  publics.	  (3),	  and	  
argues	  that	  it	  is	  “more	  than	  many	  individuals	  remembering	  the	  same	  thing.	  It	  is…	  a	  
remembrance	  together,	  indeed,	  of	  remembrance	  together	  as	  a	  crucial	  aspect	  of	  our	  
togetherness,	  our	  existence	  as	  a	  public”	  (4).	  All	  three	  dimensional	  pairings	  associated	  with	  
this	  definition,	  “remembrance/	  forgetting;	  authority/resistance;	  responsibility/absolution”	  
are	  part	  of	  the	  site,	  with	  the	  most	  significant	  being	  the	  pairing	  of	  remembrance	  and	  
forgetting	  (Phillips	  6).	  Barbie	  Zelizer	  and	  other	  public	  memory	  scholars	  built	  on	  Pierre	  
Nora’s	  notion	  of	  memory	  being	  “subject	  to	  the	  dialectic	  of	  remembering	  and	  forgetting,”	  a	  
notion	  which	  Andreas	  Huyssen	  attributed	  to	  Freud	  and	  his	  claim	  that	  “memory	  and	  
forgetting	  are	  indissolubly	  linked”	  (Dickinson,	  Blair	  and	  Ott	  8-­‐9).	  In	  attempting	  to	  
remember	  the	  decision	  and	  the	  individual	  actors	  comprising	  it,	  the	  site	  deflects	  other	  
memories	  of	  individuals	  who	  were	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  each	  decision.	  In	  the	  process	  of	  
remembering	  the	  attorneys	  who	  fought	  for	  the	  plaintiffs,	  the	  site	  virtually	  erases	  those	  who	  
argued	  for	  the	  laws	  as	  they	  existed.	  Men	  such	  as	  John	  W.	  Davis,	  a	  highly	  respected	  attorney	  
who	  had	  argued	  and	  won	  numerous	  cases	  before	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  defending	  what	  he	  
called	  “a	  way	  of	  life;”	  or	  Paul	  Wilson,	  the	  young	  attorney	  from	  Kansas	  who	  was	  sent	  to	  
51	  
argue	  that	  state’s	  law	  before	  the	  Court;	  men	  who	  claimed	  then	  and	  after	  that	  they	  were	  
defending	  the	  law	  and	  with	  it	  the	  existing	  legal	  structure	  by	  arguing	  against	  Brown,	  are	  not	  
celebrated	  in	  this	  tribute	  to	  law	  and	  the	  legal	  process.	  While	  attempting	  to	  remind	  the	  
visitors	  “what	  it	  was	  like”	  in	  the	  Brown	  era	  in	  its	  most	  notorious	  incidents,	  the	  site	  
diminishes	  memories	  of	  places	  such	  as	  Baltimore,	  Louisville	  or	  St.	  Louis	  where	  segregation	  
ended	  peacefully	  (Kluger	  720).	  While	  insisting	  on	  Brown’s	  significance,	  the	  site	  glosses	  over	  
the	  erosion	  of	  Brown’s	  principles	  in	  later	  Court	  cases,	  including	  the	  Michigan	  Affirmative	  
Action	  cases	  decided	  just	  the	  year	  before	  its	  opening.	  The	  elements	  have	  not	  disappeared	  
from	  the	  public	  discourse	  on	  education	  and	  racial	  equality,	  a	  conversation	  discussed	  in	  
more	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  4.	  	  
Phillips’	  second	  aspect	  of	  public	  memory,	  “the	  publicness	  of	  memory”	  is	  defined	  as	  
memories	  that	  have	  been	  visible	  to	  many,	  that	  have	  appeared	  in	  view	  of	  others	  (Phillips	  6).	  	  
Phillips	  notes,	  however,	  that	  this	  is	  not	  a	  “mutually	  exclusive”	  concept,	  “since	  the	  memory	  
of	  a	  public	  would	  necessarily	  manifest	  itself	  publicly”	  (6).	  As	  a	  National	  Park,	  the	  Site	  
belongs	  to	  all	  Americans,	  it	  is	  a	  public	  place	  where	  the	  public	  is	  invited	  to	  remember	  
together,	  to	  bring	  whatever	  remembrances	  each	  visitor	  has	  of	  the	  events	  displayed	  and	  
recounted	  in	  the	  galleries	  and	  to	  leave	  some	  of	  those	  behind,	  contributing	  to	  the	  shared	  
remembrance	  for	  future	  visitors.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  site	  fosters	  memory	  that	  occurs	  “out	  in	  
the	  open…where	  discussion	  with	  others	  is	  possible”	  (Casey	  25).	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  site	  
functions	  to	  house	  the	  remembrance	  of	  diverse	  collectives,	  to	  display	  memory	  in	  public,	  
and	  to	  shape	  and	  stabilize	  the	  memories	  associated	  with	  the	  Brown	  decision.	  But	  as	  with	  
most	  public	  memory	  sites,	  what	  is	  manifest	  is	  highly	  deliberate,	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  views	  
and	  values	  of	  the	  sponsoring	  entity,	  so	  that	  while	  visitors	  are	  encouraged	  to	  share	  and	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create	  memories	  of	  and	  about	  the	  Brown	  decision	  and	  its	  surrounding	  culture,	  the	  site	  
houses	  the	  “official	  memory,”	  and	  that	  memory	  defines	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  agon	  –	  the	  limits	  of	  
the	  discourse	  (Casey	  31).	  It	  functions,	  then,	  in	  the	  way	  that	  public	  memory	  “embraces	  
events,	  people,	  objects,	  and	  places	  that	  it	  deems	  worthy	  of	  preservation,	  based	  on	  some	  
kind	  of	  emotional	  attachment”	  (Dickinson,	  Blair,	  and	  Ott	  7).	  In	  this	  sense,	  it	  also	  functions	  
epideictically,	  presenting	  honorable	  deeds	  and	  noble	  qualities	  of	  historical	  figures,	  
displaying	  “lives	  of	  important	  public	  individuals	  and	  …	  consequential	  events	  that	  provide	  
building	  blocks	  for	  the	  community’s	  story”	  (Hauser	  15).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  presents	  
shameful	  deeds,	  ignoble	  actions	  and	  figures,	  performing	  praise	  and	  blame	  in	  the	  same	  
space,	  each	  aspect	  enhanced	  by	  direct	  comparison	  to	  the	  other.	  
These	  building	  blocks	  function	  similarly	  to	  those	  in	  several	  late-­‐twentieth	  century	  
speeches	  analyzed	  by	  Cynthia	  Sheard	  in	  her	  work	  on	  epideictic’s	  multi-­‐layered	  public	  
value.	  Referring	  to	  Mario	  Cuomo’s	  nomination	  speech	  for	  Bill	  Clinton,	  Clinton’s	  inaugural	  
address,	  and	  Maya	  Angelou’s	  inaugural	  poem,	  “On	  The	  Pulse	  of	  the	  Morning,”	  Sheard	  
claimed	  that	  these	  speeches	  drew	  upon	  “praise	  and	  blame	  topoi	  for	  their	  exigencies,”	  and	  
that	  these	  “discourses	  urge[d]	  change	  in	  the	  world	  by	  first	  urging	  on	  listeners	  a	  particular	  
way	  of	  seeing	  that	  can	  illuminate	  and	  justify	  change	  and	  then	  appeal[ed]	  to	  a	  set	  of	  positive	  
values	  assumed	  to	  be	  held	  in	  common	  [to]	  guide	  such	  change”	  (781).	  	  The	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  
of	  Education	  National	  Historic	  site	  functions	  in	  a	  similar	  way,	  by	  presenting	  the	  actions	  of	  
many	  individuals	  who	  strove	  for	  the	  nation’s	  commonly	  agreed	  values:	  equality,	  justice,	  
and	  freedom.	  To	  be	  American	  is	  to	  embrace	  these	  values,	  and	  therefore	  to	  be	  American	  
means	  to	  embrace	  the	  actions	  of	  those	  who	  fought	  the	  Brown	  fight	  in	  the	  name	  of	  those	  
values.	  The	  representations	  in	  the	  galleries	  of	  how	  life	  was	  in	  the	  Brown	  era	  present	  for	  the	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contemporary	  visitor	  sights	  and	  sounds	  that	  both	  “illuminate	  and	  justify	  change.”	  The	  
challenge	  then,	  is	  to	  connect	  that	  sense	  of	  need	  for	  change	  to	  a	  common	  discourse	  of	  what	  
that	  change	  should	  look	  like,	  and	  therein	  lies	  the	  space	  of	  the	  unfulfilled	  promise	  that	  
emerges	  in	  most	  public	  reflection	  on	  the	  Brown	  decision.	  	  
Sheard’s	  argument,	  however,	  extends	  beyond	  epideictic	  rhetoric	  presenting	  a	  “way	  
of	  seeing.”	  She	  claims	  that	  such	  discourse	  “alters	  the	  reality	  in	  which	  it	  participates	  by	  
making	  its	  vision	  a	  reality	  for	  its	  audience	  and	  instilling	  a	  belief	  that	  the	  power	  for	  realizing	  
the	  vision	  lies	  with	  them”	  (781).	  This	  is	  clearly	  one	  of	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  site’s	  founders	  in	  The	  
Brown	  Foundation,	  just	  as	  it	  is	  for	  the	  Foundation	  itself.	  The	  Foundation’s	  website	  explains	  
that	  the	  goal	  was	  to	  be	  more	  than	  a	  “commemorative	  organization,”	  to	  be	  also	  “a	  crucible	  
for	  public	  discourse	  around	  the	  ongoing	  impact	  and	  significance	  of	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  
Education”	  (“About”).	  This	  goal	  predated	  the	  opportunity	  to	  create	  the	  memorial	  site	  by	  
several	  years.	  The	  Foundation’s	  earlier	  efforts,	  which	  are	  ongoing,	  include	  scholarships,	  
conferences	  and	  educational	  programs	  on	  equal	  education	  opportunity,	  civic	  engagement	  
and	  diversity,	  all	  designed	  to	  fulfill	  the	  Foundation’s	  goal	  to	  “continue	  the	  quest	  for	  
educational	  equity	  began	  by	  the	  Brown	  decision”	  	  (Henderson).	  Once	  the	  site	  was	  
established,	  it	  became	  an	  extension	  of	  those	  efforts.	  By	  telling	  the	  story	  of	  the	  decision,	  by	  
giving	  it	  depth	  and	  individual	  faces	  and	  names,	  the	  site	  brings	  its	  visitors	  into	  that	  reality,	  if	  
only	  briefly,	  and	  provides	  them	  a	  space	  to	  consider	  how	  to	  take	  that	  lesson	  back	  with	  them	  
to	  their	  home	  locations	  and	  work	  to	  fulfill	  the	  goals	  that	  the	  Brown	  decision	  represents.	  It	  
invites	  them	  into	  that	  public	  discourse.	  Thus,	  it	  “brings	  together	  the	  interests	  of	  individual	  
and	  communities”	  through	  a	  “rhetoric	  of	  opportunity	  and	  possibility	  that	  invites	  critical	  
thinking	  and	  participates	  in	  the	  kind	  of	  ‘rhetoric	  of	  pluralism’	  which	  Miller	  envisions	  as	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capable	  of	  building	  a	  ‘community’	  in	  the	  post-­‐modern	  era”	  (Sheard	  790).	  Because	  the	  site	  is	  
grounded	  in	  education,	  because	  education	  is	  central	  to	  the	  Brown	  decision’s	  reasoning	  for	  
striking	  down	  segregation,	  and	  because	  education	  continues	  to	  be	  a	  locally	  governed	  
element	  of	  society,	  the	  visitor	  is	  encouraged	  to	  think	  of	  positive	  possibilities	  for	  
involvement	  and	  change.	  
In	  The	  New	  Rhetoric,	  Chaim	  Perelman	  and	  Lucy	  Olbrechts-­‐Tyteca	  likened	  epideictic	  
discourse	  to	  educational	  discourse,	  arguing	  that	  both	  worked	  to	  “creat[e]…a	  certain	  
disposition	  in	  those	  who	  hear	  it,”	  a	  “disposition	  toward	  action”	  that	  comes	  about	  through	  
”increasing	  the	  intensity	  of	  adherence	  to	  the	  values	  held	  in	  common	  by	  the	  audience	  and	  
the	  speaker”	  (50,	  54).	  The	  site’s	  emphasis	  on	  the	  pursuit	  of	  justice	  through	  the	  legal	  system	  
presumes	  the	  visitor’s	  agreement	  with	  both	  the	  end	  and	  means	  of	  that	  pursuit.	  But	  rather	  
than	  calling	  for	  any	  direct	  action	  on	  the	  visitor’s	  part,	  the	  site’s	  visual	  and	  textual	  artifacts	  
ask	  the	  visitor	  to	  consider	  how	  the	  attitudes	  and	  behaviors	  that	  led	  to	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  
Brown	  era	  are	  still	  enacted	  in	  contemporary	  society,	  and	  how	  the	  visitor	  might	  be	  
instrumental	  in	  bringing	  about	  some	  aspect	  of	  change	  toward	  achieving	  fulfillment	  of	  
Brown’s	  promise.	  Each	  visitor	  is	  encouraged	  to	  understand	  the	  struggle	  for	  civil	  rights	  for	  
all	  Americans	  as	  an	  ongoing	  one	  in	  which	  he	  or	  she	  is	  a	  part.	  
As	  a	  Civil	  Rights	  monument,	  the	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education	  National	  Historic	  Site	  
is	  a	  latecomer.	  It	  functions	  differently	  from	  other	  sites	  that	  are	  linked	  to	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  
Era,	  primarily	  because	  it	  is	  designed	  to	  function	  as	  a	  living	  tribute	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  
commemoration	  to	  the	  martyrs	  of	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Movement.	  The	  first	  such	  site	  was	  the	  
Civil	  Rights	  Memorial	  Center	  in	  Montgomery,	  Alabama,	  sponsored	  by	  the	  Southern	  Poverty	  
Law	  Association.	  Its	  central	  granite	  circular	  tableau	  pays	  tribute	  to	  40	  individuals	  who	  died	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in	  civil	  rights	  movement	  activities	  between	  the	  passing	  of	  the	  Brown	  decision	  in	  1954,	  the	  
beginning	  of	  the	  era	  according	  to	  this	  and	  other	  civil	  rights	  timelines,	  and	  the	  death	  of	  
Martin	  Luther	  King,	  Jr.	  in	  1968,	  generally	  regarded	  as	  the	  end	  of	  that	  era.	  The	  Civil	  Rights	  
monument	  in	  Memphis,	  Tennessee	  is	  also	  defined	  by	  its	  tribute	  to	  a	  fallen	  civil	  rights	  
leader,	  being	  established	  at	  the	  Lorraine	  Motel	  where	  Martin	  Luther	  King,	  Jr.	  was	  
assassinated	  in	  April	  1968.	  In	  contrast	  to	  these	  two	  public	  memory	  sites,	  the	  Brown	  v.	  
Board	  of	  Education	  National	  Historic	  Site	  focuses	  intently	  on	  education,	  the	  triumph	  of	  the	  
legal	  system,	  and	  ultimately	  the	  power	  of	  sustained	  persuasive	  efforts	  to	  achieve	  justice	  in	  
that	  system.	  	  
In	  her	  study	  of	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Memorial,	  which	  became	  the	  Carroll	  C.	  Arnold	  
Distinguished	  Lecture	  at	  the	  2006	  National	  Communication	  Association	  conference	  where	  
the	  theme	  was	  “Creating	  Sites	  for	  Connection	  and	  Action,”	  Carole	  Blair	  invited	  her	  audience	  
to	  consider	  all	  sites,	  all	  “setting[s]	  for	  an	  event”	  not	  just	  as	  places	  where	  communication	  
happens,	  but	  also	  “as	  themselves	  communicative,	  and	  more	  specifically	  as	  rhetorical”	  (1).	  
Of	  all	  possible	  sites,	  Blair	  argued	  that	  commemorative	  sites	  “are	  perhaps	  the	  most	  
obviously	  rhetorical…destinations	  of	  historical	  significance	  and	  civic	  socialization,	  
summoning	  tourists	  as	  citizen	  pilgrims	  to	  partake	  of	  their	  typically	  inspirational	  messages”	  
(2).	  	  Blair	  claimed	  that	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Memorial	  site	  functioned	  in	  four	  important	  ways:	  to	  
“commend,	  confront,	  conscript,	  and	  commission”	  its	  visitors	  (2).	  The	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  
Education	  National	  Historic	  Site	  functions	  differently,	  but	  no	  less	  rhetorically.	  We	  might,	  
argue,	  a	  la	  Blair,	  that	  the	  site	  educates,	  engages,	  and	  encourages	  its	  visitors	  as	  its	  galleries	  
work	  to	  acquaint	  them	  with	  the	  details	  of	  the	  Brown	  cases	  histories,	  to	  demythologize	  the	  
decision,	  and	  to	  promote	  continued	  effort	  toward	  realizing	  the	  promise	  of	  Brown.	  The	  site’s	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primary	  goal	  is	  to	  pay	  tribute	  to	  the	  plaintiffs	  in	  the	  five	  consolidated	  cases	  that	  made	  up	  
the	  Brown	  decision,	  along	  with	  the	  attorneys	  who	  represented	  them.	  That	  goal	  is	  
intertwined	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  educating	  visitors	  who	  may	  not	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  complexity	  or	  
the	  scope	  of	  the	  case,	  the	  struggles	  that	  followed	  the	  decision	  as	  its	  terms	  were	  enacted,	  
and	  the	  lingering	  challenges	  to	  achieving	  the	  promise	  of	  the	  Brown	  decision	  for	  true	  
equality	  in	  education	  and	  racial	  justice	  through	  society.	  By	  inviting	  its	  visitors	  not	  just	  to	  
see	  but	  to	  interact	  with	  the	  images,	  sounds	  and	  artifacts	  of	  those	  earlier	  times,	  the	  site	  also	  
works	  to	  create	  those	  visitors	  as	  a	  community	  with	  the	  shared	  values	  of	  equality	  and	  
justice.	  
The	  galleries	  of	  the	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education	  National	  Historic	  Site	  carry	  out	  the	  
intentions	  of	  its	  sponsoring	  organization	  in	  terms	  of	  educating	  visitors	  about	  the	  
complexity	  and	  scope	  of	  the	  Brown	  decision.	  They	  also	  demonstrate	  one	  of	  the	  common	  
themes	  of	  public	  memory	  studies	  concerning	  collective	  and	  memory	  spaces:	  that	  they	  are	  
partisan,	  partial,	  and	  often	  contested.	  This	  particular	  site	  is	  clearly	  partial	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  
representation	  of	  the	  Brown	  decision.	  And	  yet	  it	  was	  not	  a	  particularly	  contested	  site,	  nor	  
was	  it	  the	  subject	  of	  dissent	  or	  protest	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  portrayal	  of	  events	  chosen	  for	  display.	  
The	  authority	  of	  its	  construction	  of	  these	  particular	  public	  memories	  remains	  virtually	  
uncontested.	  This	  is	  more	  a	  function	  of	  is	  second	  sponsor,	  the	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  
the	  Interior	  and	  the	  National	  Park	  Service,	  than	  it	  is	  about	  The	  Brown	  Foundation.	  The	  
latter	  could	  create	  a	  primarily	  local	  site	  around	  a	  limited	  set	  of	  shared	  experiences	  and	  
memories.	  The	  former	  provided	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  nation,	  and	  thus	  the	  representations	  
within	  the	  site	  carry	  that	  authority	  as	  well.	  Phillips	  argues	  that	  the	  “notion	  that	  publics	  
have	  the	  capacity	  to	  authorize	  (or	  reject)	  certain	  memories”	  carries	  implicitly	  the	  “sense	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that	  publics	  have	  a	  responsibility	  to	  remember	  certain	  things”	  (5).	  The	  convergence	  of	  the	  
interest	  to	  promote	  sites	  related	  to	  the	  Constitution	  and	  the	  more	  local	  desire	  to	  tell	  the	  
story	  of	  the	  Brown	  decision	  in	  larger	  and	  more	  complex	  terms	  than	  had	  survived	  to	  that	  
point	  gave	  the	  site	  authority	  for	  multiple	  publics	  –	  not	  only	  those	  whose	  primary	  interest	  is	  
education,	  but	  also	  those	  whose	  interests	  include	  the	  Constitution	  or	  race	  relations	  in	  
America	  more	  generally.	  
While	  the	  site	  works	  to	  construct	  communities	  from	  its	  visitors	  and	  reflects	  
particular	  publics	  in	  its	  arrangement,	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  a	  site	  fixed	  in	  a	  single	  location	  has	  an	  
impact	  on	  who	  its	  audience	  can	  be.	  The	  site	  was	  not	  built	  just	  for	  residents	  of	  Topeka,	  
though	  clearly	  they	  were	  in	  the	  mind	  of	  the	  founding	  planners	  when	  they	  began	  their	  
discussion.	  The	  site	  was	  built	  with	  all	  Americans	  in	  mind,	  which	  gives	  it	  a	  tourist	  element	  
and	  has	  an	  effect	  on	  how	  it	  functions	  and	  who	  it	  can	  reach.	  As	  Dickinson,	  Blair	  and	  Ott	  
relate,	  	  
because	  it	  is	  not	  transportable,	  it	  necessitates	  a	  particular	  set	  of	  
performances	  on	  the	  part	  of	  people	  who	  would	  seek	  to	  be	  its	  audience.	  Thus	  
is	  created	  a	  unique	  context	  for	  understanding	  the	  past,	  one	  that	  is	  rooted	  in	  
touristic	  practices.	  To	  a	  degree	  exceeding	  the	  products	  of	  many	  other	  
memory	  techne,	  one’s	  experience	  of	  memory	  places	  may	  involve	  planning	  
(where	  and	  when	  to	  go,	  making	  reservations),	  financial	  resources	  (plane	  fare,	  
lodging,	  gas,	  admission	  fees),	  and	  time	  to	  travel	  (vacation	  or	  time	  off	  from	  
work).	  (26)	  
This	  performative	  element	  requires	  a	  desire	  to	  see	  the	  place,	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  memory	  
on	  display,	  	  “enthymematically	  prefiguring	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  place—at	  the	  very	  least—as	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worthy	  of	  attention,	  investment,	  and	  effort”	  (Dickinson,	  Blair	  and	  Ott	  26).	  It	  also	  requires	  
the	  place	  to	  prepare	  for	  its	  audience,	  one	  of	  the	  many	  benefits	  of	  having	  the	  site	  established	  
as	  a	  National	  Park.	  The	  establishment	  of	  the	  site	  meant	  renovation	  for	  surrounding	  Topeka	  
neighborhoods	  and	  provides	  an	  ongoing	  motivation	  for	  the	  upkeep	  of	  those	  surrounding	  
areas.	  	  This	  in	  turn	  increases	  the	  site’s	  desirability	  as	  a	  destination.	  	  
The	  desirability	  is	  important,	  since,	  as	  noted	  above,	  the	  place	  of	  public	  memory’s	  
enactment	  provides	  stability	  and	  grounds	  the	  memory.	  However,	  just	  as	  Casey	  argued	  for	  
this	  need,	  he	  also	  argued	  that	  “a	  large	  part	  of	  the	  very	  power	  of	  public	  memory	  resides	  in	  
its	  capacity	  to	  be	  for	  the	  most	  part	  located	  at	  the	  edge	  of	  our	  lives,	  hovering,	  ready	  to	  be	  
invoked	  or	  revised,	  acted	  upon	  or	  merely	  contemplated,	  inspiring	  us	  or	  boring	  us:	  in	  every	  
case,	  public	  memory	  is	  integral	  to	  what	  I	  have	  called	  ‘public	  presence.’”	  (37).	  	  While	  the	  
name	  of	  Brown	  is	  frequently	  invoked	  and	  often	  contemplated	  by	  scholars,	  educators	  and	  
social	  commentators,	  the	  lessons	  presented	  in	  the	  National	  Historic	  Site’s	  galleries	  are	  “out	  
there,”	  in	  a	  known	  place,	  but	  one	  that	  is	  not	  a	  central	  part	  of	  most	  people’s	  lives	  or	  thinking.	  
It	  must	  be	  visited,	  and	  even	  for	  those	  who	  feel	  the	  compulsion	  or	  interest	  to	  visit,	  it	  is	  
peripheral	  to	  daily	  life.	  Thus,	  by	  giving	  the	  Brown	  decision	  and	  its	  legacy	  a	  single	  physical	  
place,	  one	  centrally	  located	  in	  its	  named	  city	  and	  affiliated	  with	  its	  named	  family,	  and	  one	  
designated	  as	  belonging	  to	  all	  Americans,	  the	  site	  in	  some	  ways	  works	  against	  the	  goal	  of	  
keeping	  the	  decision	  living	  and	  having	  it	  motivate	  local	  action	  to	  promote	  equality	  in	  
education	  or	  other	  parts	  of	  society.	  Furthermore,	  the	  creation	  of	  this	  fixed	  site,	  and	  the	  high	  
and	  broad	  reception	  it	  was	  given,	  in	  some	  ways	  foreclosed	  one	  of	  the	  goals	  of	  its	  founders,	  
which	  was	  to	  establish	  a	  series	  of	  sites	  that	  would	  tell	  the	  many	  stories	  related	  to	  Brown	  in	  
the	  several	  regions	  included	  in	  that	  decision.	  It	  gives	  a	  sense	  of	  conclusion	  to	  the	  decision	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and	  its	  trajectory,	  suggesting	  that,	  despite	  the	  contents	  of	  the	  galleries,	  Brown	  is	  now	  a	  truly	  
historical	  event	  and	  not	  an	  ongoing	  engagement.	  This	  further	  serves	  to	  place	  Brown	  at	  the	  
periphery	  of	  most	  American	  lives,	  just	  as	  Casey	  argued.	  	  The	  online	  tour	  brings	  the	  site	  
closer	  by	  placing	  it	  in	  the	  space	  of	  a	  personal	  computer	  or	  other	  internet	  enabled	  device,	  
but	  even	  the	  online	  tour	  requires	  a	  deliberate	  decision	  to	  locate	  and	  view	  the	  site	  and	  
therefore	  at	  least	  some	  awareness	  of	  its	  existence	  and	  significance.	  
But	  if	  this	  site	  constructs	  its	  would	  be	  audience	  in	  a	  touristic	  mode,	  it	  also	  constructs	  
the	  question	  of	  educational	  equality	  as	  a	  central	  and	  national	  concern,	  and	  it	  provides	  a	  
common	  language	  through	  which	  these	  discussions	  can	  continue	  to	  take	  place.	  Casey	  
argues	  that	  public	  memory	  is	  formed	  “through	  ongoing	  interchange	  of	  ideas	  and	  thoughts,	  
opinions	  and	  beliefs”	  (30).	  Public	  memory,	  he	  continues,	  “is	  the	  very	  condition	  for	  all	  such	  
interchange,	  which	  could	  not	  take	  place	  without	  it”	  (Casey	  30).	  However	  peripheral	  the	  
place	  or	  the	  idea	  that	  Brown	  has	  come	  to	  symbolically	  represent,	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  site	  
and	  the	  efforts	  that	  produced	  it	  gave	  rise	  to	  a	  new	  public	  discourse	  about	  its	  meaning,	  a	  
new	  body	  of	  works	  in	  both	  the	  scholarly	  and	  mass	  market	  publication	  realms,	  and	  scores	  of	  
commemorative	  events,	  displays	  and	  films	  examining	  its	  legacy.	  	  
All	  of	  this	  has	  led	  to	  a	  new	  vocabulary	  for	  discussing	  Brown	  and	  the	  means	  for	  
fulfilling	  its	  promise,	  an	  achievement	  that	  Gerald	  Hauser	  would	  classify	  as	  a	  civic	  need	  that	  
epideictic	  rhetoric	  provides.	  Hauser’s	  work	  on	  the	  civic	  function	  of	  epideictic	  rhetoric	  built	  
on	  the	  earlier	  work	  of	  Robert	  Bellah	  and	  others,	  who	  argued	  that	  “before	  citizens	  can	  
imagine	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  vibrant	  public	  realm,	  they	  require	  a	  vocabulary	  capable	  of	  
expressing	  public	  issues	  and	  experiences	  of	  publicness”	  (6).	  	  Such	  epideictic	  efforts	  are,	  in	  
Perelman	  and	  Olbrechts-­‐Tyteca’s	  view,	  efforts	  to	  “establish	  a	  sense	  of	  communion”	  in	  an	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audience,	  and	  thus	  play	  an	  important	  part	  in	  civic	  life	  by	  providing	  a	  “foundation	  [upon	  
which]	  deliberative	  and	  legal	  speeches	  [could]	  rest”	  (51).	  The	  full	  civic	  circle	  contemplated	  
in	  these	  arguments	  is	  present	  in	  the	  site,	  as	  social	  attitudes	  and	  values	  first	  created	  a	  law,	  
then	  worked	  to	  overturn	  that	  law,	  and	  have	  subsequently	  been	  adjusting	  and	  negotiating	  
the	  enactment	  of	  the	  values	  represented	  in	  that	  new	  law.	  The	  audience,	  the	  visitor	  to	  the	  
site,	  is	  enfolded	  in	  this	  circle	  and	  encouraged	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  ongoing	  discussion.	  	  
Within	  the	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education	  National	  Historic	  Site,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  
determine	  the	  deeds	  that	  are	  noble	  and	  good	  through	  the	  display	  of	  the	  various	  figures	  who	  
enacted	  those	  deeds.	  Hauser	  argued	  that	  the	  historical	  actors	  who	  become	  societies’	  
heroes,	  role	  models,	  and	  teachers	  of	  good	  citizenship	  do	  so	  in	  “the	  encomiast’s	  gaze”	  and	  in	  
the	  way	  “their	  deeds	  are	  narrated”	  (Hauser	  15).	  The	  site	  makes	  these	  role	  models	  and	  
teachers	  clear	  not	  for	  who	  they	  were,	  but	  for	  their	  deeds.	  Fighting	  within	  the	  boundaries	  
and	  procedures	  of	  the	  legal	  system	  for	  racial	  justice	  is	  clearly	  noble	  and	  honorable,	  angrily	  
pursuing	  a	  lone	  student	  away	  from	  an	  institution	  of	  public	  education	  is	  clearly	  not	  
honorable	  or	  noble.	  Standing	  up	  to	  and	  continuing	  to	  fight	  for	  rights	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  
violence	  and	  fear	  is	  noble,	  perpetuating	  the	  violence	  and	  fear	  is	  not.	  Becoming	  educated,	  
writing	  books,	  pursuing	  a	  successful	  career	  in	  law	  or	  business	  or	  receiving	  awards	  are	  
honorable	  deeds	  that	  result	  from	  the	  struggle	  to	  achieve	  equality	  in	  education,	  just	  as	  
creating	  music	  to	  protest	  conditions	  of	  inequality	  or	  oppression	  is.	  Hauser	  claims	  “the	  
mimetic	  function	  of	  the	  encomiast	  provides	  the	  moral	  story	  of	  the	  community”	  (16).	  In	  this	  
historic	  site,	  we	  see	  the	  work	  of	  the	  encomiast(s),	  as	  the	  displays	  celebrate	  those	  who	  
fought	  to	  change	  the	  system,	  rather	  than	  those	  who	  fought	  to	  keep	  it.	  The	  deeds	  presented	  
are	  told	  to	  honor	  those	  people,	  and	  thus	  provide	  examples	  of	  what	  this	  site	  and	  its	  dual	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authorities	  would	  have	  honorable	  citizens	  do	  and	  be.	  Hauser	  refers	  to	  Aristotle’s	  
construction	  of	  the	  individual	  as	  zoon	  politikon,	  one	  whose	  virtue	  in	  the	  community	  is	  “to	  
know	  how	  to	  apply	  the	  laws	  and	  live	  within	  them”	  (16).	  In	  American	  society,	  those	  laws	  
include	  the	  means	  for	  overturning	  outdated	  or	  unjust	  laws	  without	  resorting	  to	  the	  kinds	  of	  
open	  violence	  and	  revolt	  present	  in	  countries	  where	  such	  rights	  are	  not	  guaranteed.	  It	  is	  
the	  virtue	  of	  this	  system	  and	  those	  who	  navigated	  it	  in	  the	  Brown	  decision	  and	  after	  that	  
this	  site	  honors	  most.	  	  
As	  the	  site	  demonstrates	  in	  its	  galleries,	  education	  does	  not	  stand	  alone	  and	  
separate	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  a	  community’s	  social	  fabric.	  The	  site	  reminds	  its	  visitors	  that	  to	  
achieve	  educational	  equality,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  achieve	  racial	  equality	  on	  a	  broader	  scale.	  
The	  site,	  the	  memory	  place,	  makes	  a	  visual	  argument	  for	  what	  was	  and	  for	  what	  is	  true,	  for	  
how	  to	  see,	  experience,	  and	  feel	  what	  was	  and	  to	  see	  the	  Brown	  decision	  in	  light	  of	  that	  
portrayed	  experience.	  	  It	  also	  draws	  its	  visitors	  into	  the	  civic	  space	  that	  is	  ruled	  by	  the	  
Constitution,	  the	  “civil	  religion”	  that	  is	  continually	  interpreted	  as	  American	  society	  grows	  
and	  changes.	  Cheryl	  Brown	  Henderson	  and	  her	  colleagues	  were	  disturbed	  by	  the	  way	  the	  
history	  of	  the	  Brown	  decision	  had	  been	  reduced,	  normatized	  and	  fixed,	  omitting	  the	  
complexities	  in	  the	  decision	  and	  its	  aftermath.	  The	  site	  they	  worked	  to	  create	  itself	  now	  
fixes	  the	  record	  of	  Brown	  in	  a	  particular	  way.	  In	  so	  doing,	  it	  also	  constructs	  an	  identity	  for	  
determin[ing]	  who	  ‘belongs’	  to	  the	  nation’”	  as	  they	  take	  in	  the	  presented	  narrative	  and	  
identify	  with	  its	  claims	  (qtd.	  in	  Dickinson,	  Blair	  and	  Ott	  28).	  Logically,	  not	  all	  visitors	  would	  
accept	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  argument	  the	  site	  makes,	  yet	  it	  allows	  for	  this	  as	  it	  encourages	  
visitors	  to	  deliberate	  the	  future	  within	  the	  common	  language	  provided	  by	  its	  exhibits.	  Thus	  
the	  site	  performs	  an	  important	  rhetorical	  function,	  one	  that	  is	  arguably	  epideictic	  in	  nature,	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as	  it	  presents	  actors	  and	  acts	  worthy	  of	  praise	  to	  set	  an	  example	  of	  how	  citizens	  in	  the	  
society	  it	  represents	  can	  be	  honorable	  and	  worthy	  citizens.	  	  
The	  declining	  recognition	  of	  the	  details	  of	  the	  Brown	  decision	  at	  the	  time	  The	  Brown	  
Foundation	  members	  began	  their	  work	  demonstrates	  that	  no	  matter	  how	  significant	  the	  
event,	  memory,	  and	  particularly	  public	  memory,	  is	  “inherently	  transitory,”	  and	  because	  of	  
this,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  “identify	  cultural	  forces	  employed	  to	  stabilize	  and	  unify	  these	  
memories”	  (Phillips	  9).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education	  National	  Historic	  
Site,	  it	  is	  easier	  to	  identify	  these	  forces	  than	  it	  is	  in	  most	  such	  places,	  because	  of	  the	  unique	  
dual	  sponsorship	  the	  site	  enjoys.	  The	  Brown	  Foundation’s	  mark	  is	  on	  the	  site	  not	  just	  in	  the	  
displays	  and	  arrangement,	  but	  literally	  in	  the	  signage.	  The	  twin	  forces	  of	  The	  Brown	  
Foundation	  and	  The	  National	  Park	  Service,	  and	  the	  goals	  for	  each	  in	  establishing	  and	  
promoting	  the	  site	  are	  the	  kinds	  of	  “hegemonic	  forces	  seek[ing]	  to	  craft	  the	  appearance	  of	  
memories,	  to	  create	  in	  them	  a	  sense	  of	  permanency	  and	  normalcy”	  (Phillips	  9).	  	  And	  while	  
these	  forces	  do	  restrict	  or	  defer	  other	  interpretations	  of	  the	  Brown	  decision,	  providing	  the	  
“crucible	  of	  collective	  remembering	  and	  forgetting,”	  they	  can	  also	  provide	  the	  means	  for	  
presenting	  a	  tumultuous	  and	  conflicted	  past	  and	  “a	  condition	  of	  ethical	  and	  political	  
possibility	  for	  the	  present	  and	  future”	  (Vivian	  208,	  emphasis	  in	  the	  original).	  	  The	  site	  
reminds	  us	  to	  remember	  the	  violence	  of	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  era	  not	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  martyrs,	  as	  
other	  civil	  rights	  memorials	  do,	  but	  as	  a	  triumph	  for	  education	  and	  for	  progress	  toward	  the	  
promise	  of	  racial	  equality.	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  the	  original	  arguments	  for	  the	  site’s	  existence	  were	  
being	  made	  in	  1990,	  when	  recognition	  of	  Brown	  was	  sparse	  and	  truncated.	  The	  events	  of	  
the	  fiftieth	  anniversary,	  discussed	  in	  the	  following	  chapters,	  are	  a	  testament	  to	  the	  degree	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to	  which	  the	  argument	  succeeded,	  at	  least	  in	  Topeka	  and	  the	  federal	  imagination.	  At	  the	  
same	  time,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  recognize	  that	  the	  founders’	  original	  idea	  to	  build	  similar	  sites	  
in	  the	  other	  cities	  of	  the	  consolidated	  decision	  –	  to	  make	  a	  coordinated	  effort	  to	  tell	  the	  
stories	  of	  the	  people	  in	  each	  of	  the	  places	  -­‐	  has	  yet	  to	  materialize.	  Some	  of	  the	  reasons	  for	  
this	  are	  also	  discussed	  in	  the	  chapters	  ahead.	  It	  seems	  clear,	  however,	  that	  this	  particular	  
public	  memory	  site	  gained	  its	  existence	  in	  this	  particular	  place	  because	  of	  the	  rhetorical	  
efforts	  of	  a	  committed	  group	  of	  citizens,	  who	  worked	  with	  both	  private	  and	  government	  
authorities	  to	  achieve	  their	  goals.	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Chapter	  Three:	  
	  
Praising	  Athenians	  in	  Topeka	  
	  
The	  opening	  of	  the	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education	  National	  Historic	  Site	  was	  
accompanied	  by	  a	  full	  weekend	  of	  pomp	  and	  ceremony,	  the	  very	  sort	  of	  events	  for	  which	  
Aristotle	  claimed	  that	  epideictic	  rhetoric	  was	  well	  suited.	  Clarke	  Rountree	  describes	  the	  
examples	  of	  epideictic	  given	  by	  Aristotle	  as	  those	  that	  “find	  their	  homes	  at	  festivals,	  at	  state	  
ceremonies	  honoring	  those	  fallen	  in	  battle,	  and	  in	  pamphlets,”	  and	  the	  official	  events	  held	  
in	  Topeka	  at	  the	  Site’s	  opening	  provided	  such	  a	  home,	  one	  that	  can	  be	  read	  as	  both	  a	  
festival	  and	  a	  state	  ceremony	  honoring	  those	  who,	  if	  not	  fallen	  in	  battle,	  are	  clearly	  
characterized	  as	  warriors	  in	  a	  long	  struggle	  (“Blameless”	  296).	  Throughout	  the	  weekend	  
leading	  up	  to	  the	  Monday	  dedication	  ceremony,	  Topeka	  hosted	  multiple	  events	  related	  to	  
the	  Brown	  decision,	  including	  a	  march	  and	  an	  NAACP	  banquet.	  Topeka	  was	  also	  celebrating	  
its	  sesquicentennial	  and	  organized	  events	  related	  to	  that	  anniversary	  for	  the	  same	  
weekend	  as	  the	  dedication	  ceremony.	  Anticipating	  its	  many	  visitors,	  the	  city	  had	  been	  
spruced	  up,	  with	  new	  sod	  laid	  and	  porches	  repaired	  in	  the	  neighborhoods	  bordering	  the	  
event	  sites.	  	  
The	  National	  Park	  Service	  estimated	  the	  crowd	  at	  the	  dedication	  ceremony	  to	  be	  
approximately	  5000.	  A	  similarly	  large	  crowd	  was	  on	  hand	  at	  the	  Kansas	  statehouse	  earlier	  
in	  the	  day	  for	  the	  proclamation	  ceremony.	  	  For	  the	  first	  time,	  Topeka	  was	  a	  stop	  on	  the	  
campaign	  trail	  for	  the	  presidential	  candidates	  from	  both	  major	  political	  parties.	  One	  
observer	  quipped,	  “everybody	  that’s	  somebody	  is	  here”	  (Goering).	  The	  event	  attracted	  
dignitaries	  from	  political,	  spiritual	  and	  civil	  rights	  spheres,	  including	  President	  George	  W.	  
Bush;	  two	  members	  of	  his	  cabinet;	  Senator	  John	  Kerry,	  the	  presumptive	  Democratic	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nominee	  for	  president;	  Julian	  Bond	  of	  the	  NAACP;	  Rev.	  Fred	  Shuttlesworth;	  the	  better-­‐
known	  civil	  rights	  leader	  and	  former	  presidential	  candidate,	  Rev.	  Jesse	  Jackson;	  Supreme	  
Court	  Associate	  Justice	  Steven	  Breyer,	  and	  many	  other	  state,	  local	  and	  national	  figures.	  The	  
dedication	  had	  become	  part	  of	  a	  long	  celebration	  of	  America’s	  most	  cherished	  values	  –	  
equality,	  justice,	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  -­‐	  and	  the	  efforts	  of	  those	  individuals	  engaged	  in	  the	  struggle	  
to	  achieve	  those	  ideals	  for	  all	  Americans.	  President	  Bush	  had	  designated	  the	  theme	  for	  
National	  Law	  Day	  as	  “To	  Win	  Equality	  by	  Law,”	  a	  tribute	  to	  the	  Brown	  decision	  marked	  by	  
American	  Bar	  Association	  chapters	  across	  the	  country.	  Commemorations	  of	  the	  decision	  
also	  happened	  across	  the	  country,	  but	  nowhere	  was	  there	  more	  media	  attention,	  more	  
spectators	  or	  more	  collected	  leadership	  than	  in	  Topeka.	  
Many	  speeches	  were	  offered	  throughout	  the	  weekend,	  and	  particularly	  on	  Monday,	  
May	  17.	  Like	  many	  of	  the	  books	  and	  other	  writings	  prepared	  in	  anticipation	  of	  this	  
anniversary	  event,	  most	  of	  the	  speeches	  in	  Topeka	  extolled	  the	  promise	  of	  the	  Brown	  
decision,	  even	  as	  they	  lamented	  the	  failure	  to	  achieve	  or	  fully	  realize	  that	  promise,	  and	  
called	  for	  renewed	  commitment	  to	  see	  that	  promise	  fulfilled.	  	  Like	  the	  panegyric	  speeches	  
of	  ancient	  Greece	  or	  Rome,	  these	  speeches	  offered	  praise	  for	  the	  state,	  and	  like	  the	  funeral	  
orations	  from	  that	  same	  period	  they	  praised	  individuals	  who	  had	  contributed	  to	  the	  
decision,	  lamented	  the	  lack	  of	  progress	  toward	  its	  promise	  and	  offered	  consolations	  that	  
the	  cause	  was	  not	  lost.	  	  While	  there	  are	  many	  similarities	  across	  all	  the	  speeches	  and	  their	  
audiences,	  there	  are	  notable	  points	  of	  divergence	  that	  illustrate	  the	  ongoing	  dialectical	  
process	  that	  has	  characterized	  Brown	  since	  the	  Court	  returned	  the	  implementation	  phase	  
to	  the	  affected	  school	  districts	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  decision.	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For	  an	  epideictic	  performance	  to	  have	  a	  significant	  contribution	  to	  statecraft,	  the	  
speaker	  needs	  to	  be	  of	  sufficient	  rank,	  station	  or	  reputation	  to	  be	  able	  to	  represent	  the	  state	  
and	  its	  ideals.	  Nichole	  Loraux	  cites	  Thucydides	  and	  his	  description	  of	  such	  an	  orator:	  one	  “	  
‘chosen	  by	  the	  city…who	  is	  considered	  not	  to	  be	  lacking	  in	  intellectual	  distinction,	  and	  who	  
enjoys	  considerable	  esteem’	  ([whose]	  prestige	  has	  placed	  him	  in	  the	  forefront	  of	  the	  
political	  scene)”	  (8).	  The	  roll	  of	  speakers	  throughout	  the	  dedication	  events	  for	  the	  Brown	  v	  
Board	  of	  Education	  National	  Historic	  Site	  fit	  this	  category	  to	  varying	  degrees.	  All	  were	  well-­‐
known	  by	  at	  least	  some	  part	  of	  the	  audience,	  most	  had	  national	  rank	  or	  prominence,	  and	  
several,	  including	  the	  four	  speakers	  profiled	  here,	  had	  status	  that	  allowed	  them	  to	  speak	  
with	  authority	  as	  a	  representative	  of	  “the	  state.”	  	  	  
This	  chapter	  will	  focus	  primarily	  on	  five	  speeches	  given	  in	  three	  locations	  over	  two	  
days	  of	  the	  dedication	  weekend:	  those	  of	  Governor	  Kathleen	  Sebelius	  and	  Senator	  John	  
Kerry,	  each	  speaking	  at	  the	  Proclamation	  Ceremony	  at	  the	  Kansas	  statehouse	  on	  the	  
morning	  of	  May	  17,	  2004;	  Sebelius’s	  later	  remarks	  at	  the	  dedication	  ceremony;	  President	  
George	  W.	  Bush’s	  remarks	  at	  the	  dedication	  ceremony;	  and	  Rev.	  Jesse	  L.	  Jackson’s	  sermon	  
at	  the	  Mt.	  Carmel	  Baptist	  Church	  the	  day	  before.	  	  Each	  speech	  contained	  remarks	  
representative	  of	  many	  others,	  and	  the	  speakers	  each	  carry	  the	  rank	  or	  reputation	  to	  speak	  
with	  authority	  for	  the	  state	  or	  for	  a	  significant	  constituency	  within	  the	  state.	  	  Drawing	  on	  
several	  scholars’	  work	  on	  epideictic’s	  role	  in	  building	  community	  and	  increasing	  adherence	  
to	  shared	  values	  in	  a	  community,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  these	  speeches	  show	  that	  Brown	  decision	  
has	  come	  to	  function	  in	  two	  ways:	  first,	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  statecraft,	  a	  means	  for	  presenting	  the	  
good	  and	  noble	  America,	  constantly	  striving	  toward	  the	  highest	  ideals	  of	  equality,	  freedom,	  
and	  justice;	  and	  second,	  as	  the	  dialectical	  framework	  for	  public	  discourse	  on	  the	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challenging	  issues	  of	  constructing	  a	  just	  society,	  a	  framework	  that	  simultaneously	  allows	  
for	  a	  common	  vocabulary	  and	  a	  difference	  of	  opinion,	  one	  that	  first	  presumes	  that	  the	  
Brown	  decision	  was	  both	  right	  and	  good,	  and	  then	  recognizes	  that	  the	  solutions,	  the	  means	  
of	  implementing	  the	  promises	  of	  Brown,	  are	  frequently	  contested.	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  
speeches	  given	  by	  state	  leaders	  moved	  beyond	  providing	  affirmation	  and	  validation	  for	  the	  
Brown	  v	  Board	  of	  Education	  National	  Historic	  Site	  and	  its	  location	  in	  Topeka	  to	  articulating	  
the	  reconstruction	  of	  the	  Brown	  decision,	  giving	  it	  the	  presumption	  of	  communal	  
agreement	  while	  validating	  the	  ongoing	  struggle	  to	  achieve	  its	  promise.	  I	  begin	  with	  a	  
discussion	  of	  the	  scholarship	  on	  the	  public	  function	  of	  epideictic	  rhetoric	  and	  how	  it	  relates	  
to	  statecraft,	  followed	  by	  an	  overview	  of	  each	  speech	  and	  its	  audience,	  after	  which	  I	  analyze	  
those	  speeches	  to	  show	  how	  the	  Brown	  decision	  functioned	  at	  the	  point	  of	  its	  fiftieth	  
anniversary.	  
The	  relationship	  between	  epideictic	  rhetoric	  and	  statecraft	  comes	  in	  multiple	  forms,	  
with	  the	  panegyric	  being	  the	  most	  obvious.	  In	  ancient	  Greece,	  these	  orations,	  according	  to	  
George	  Kennedy,	  focused	  almost	  entirely	  on	  praise	  “of	  the	  god	  associated	  with	  the	  festival,	  
praise	  of	  the	  city	  in	  which	  the	  festival	  is	  held,	  praise	  of	  the	  contest	  itself	  and	  of	  the	  crown	  
awarded,	  and	  finally,	  praise	  of	  the	  king	  or	  officials	  in	  charge”	  (Art	  167).	  	  The	  types	  of	  
festivals	  Kennedy	  describes	  are	  formulaic,	  or	  ritualistic,	  and	  the	  audience	  for	  such	  an	  event	  
expects	  the	  tone	  to	  be	  optimistic,	  positive,	  and/or	  celebratory,	  and	  as	  such	  they	  present	  
some	  constraints	  on	  the	  speaker(s).	  A	  state	  festival	  would	  not,	  for	  example,	  be	  a	  place	  for	  
recognition	  of	  the	  state’s	  shortcomings,	  or	  a	  place	  to	  debate	  the	  appropriate	  public	  policy	  
for	  the	  future.	  Nor	  would	  it	  be	  a	  place	  to	  criticize	  the	  government	  or	  lament	  the	  losses	  
caused	  by	  that	  state’s	  policies.	  However,	  the	  values	  presented	  in	  the	  speeches	  praising	  the	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city,	  its	  gods,	  or	  its	  leaders	  would	  influence	  the	  audience,	  who	  might	  draw	  upon	  those	  
values	  in	  future	  deliberative	  or	  forensic	  processes.	  This	  potential,	  according	  to	  Chaim	  
Perelman	  and	  Lucy	  Olbrechts-­‐Tyteca,	  is	  the	  significant	  feature	  of	  epideictic	  rhetoric.	  They	  
argue	  that	  by	  increasing	  adherence	  to	  communal	  values,	  such	  speeches	  shape	  the	  potential	  
for	  future	  action	  as	  the	  audience	  members	  are	  drawn	  into	  identification	  with	  the	  state	  and	  
its	  values.	  The	  panegyric	  form	  presents	  the	  state	  or	  its	  leaders	  through	  praise,	  and	  so	  
invites	  the	  audience	  to	  attain	  similar	  qualities	  to	  also	  be	  worthy	  of	  praise.	  But	  other	  
epideictic	  forms,	  most	  notably	  the	  funeral	  oration	  or	  eulogy,	  can	  be	  more	  effective	  in	  
building	  this	  sense	  of	  identification	  through	  their	  focus	  on	  more	  ordinary	  members	  of	  the	  
community.	  
Nichole	  Loraux	  made	  perhaps	  the	  most	  extensive	  argument	  linking	  epideictic	  
rhetoric	  and	  statecraft	  in	  her	  book	  Invention	  of	  Athens:	  the	  Funeral	  Oration	  in	  the	  Classical	  
City.	  Loraux	  argued	  that	  the	  annual	  recitation	  of	  funeral	  orations	  for	  the	  dead	  created,	  or	  
invented,	  the	  city-­‐state	  of	  Athens	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  the	  Athenian	  audience.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  
these	  orations,	  “through…appeals	  to	  civic	  ideals,	  served	  not	  only	  to	  eulogize	  the	  dead	  but	  to	  
guide	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  living”	  (Sheard	  770).	  Similarly,	  George	  Kennedy	  argued	  that	  
Pericles	  used	  his	  famous	  funeral	  oration	  as	  an	  opportunity	  “for	  a	  magnificent	  presentation	  
of	  Athenian	  ideals,”	  and	  that	  this	  speech	  followed	  a	  format	  that	  was	  already	  expected	  by	  his	  
audience	  (Art	  155).	  This	  format,	  a	  “threefold”	  structure	  of	  “praise,	  lament	  [and]	  
consolation,”	  presented	  the	  noble	  deeds	  of	  the	  deceased,	  including	  ancestors	  of	  the	  dead,	  
and	  proceeded	  through	  a	  general	  greatness	  of	  the	  country	  (Art	  155).	  As	  these	  orations	  
were	  repeated	  annually,	  the	  greatness	  of	  the	  country	  and	  the	  ideals	  of	  that	  country	  became	  
established	  as	  part	  of	  the	  shared	  public	  understanding	  for	  the	  audience.	  Richard	  Lockwood	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further	  argued	  that	  “the	  presentation	  of	  the	  city	  to	  itself,	  Athens	  to	  Athens,	  makes	  of	  
epideictic	  a	  profoundly	  political	  or	  ideological	  discourse”	  (102).	  	  The	  funeral	  oration	  thus	  
functioned	  differently	  than	  other	  forms	  of	  epideictic	  rhetoric,	  such	  as	  the	  encomium,	  
because	  even	  though	  it	  was	  still	  intended	  for	  an	  audience	  of	  spectators	  rather	  than	  judges,	  
it	  presented	  ideas	  and	  values	  which	  could	  and	  would	  influence	  those	  same	  spectators	  when	  
they	  were	  cast	  into	  the	  civic	  role	  of	  policy	  or	  judicial	  deliberation.	  
This	  potential,	  Lockwood	  claims,	  caused	  Plato	  to	  criticize	  epideictic	  for	  its	  political	  
consequences	  (102),	  a	  critique	  that	  appears	  in	  an	  almost	  parody	  form	  in	  the	  Menexenus,	  
where	  Socrates	  claims	  to	  have	  been	  so	  carried	  away	  by	  the	  intensity	  of	  a	  funeral	  oration	  
that	  he	  was	  in	  a	  stupor	  for	  three	  days.	  In	  his	  analysis	  of	  this	  dialog,	  Lockwood	  argues:	  
the	  most	  important	  effect	  [of	  epideictic]	  is	  the	  desire	  to	  see	  ourselves	  in	  the	  
offered	  images,	  the	  funeral	  oration	  has	  the	  power	  to	  change	  our	  very	  
conception	  of	  ourselves.	  Judicial	  and	  political	  rhetoric	  may	  have	  the	  power	  to	  
persuade,	  but	  that	  power	  pales	  beside	  the	  power	  of	  epideictic	  to	  confer	  
immortality	  and	  convert	  the	  listener	  into	  another	  being.	  The	  epideictic	  
shapes	  our	  souls	  –	  structures	  our	  subjectivity	  –	  in	  a	  way	  that	  only	  a	  powerful	  
and	  lengthy	  exercise	  of	  unforgetting,	  a	  dialectic,	  an	  analysis,	  a	  self-­‐
examination,	  can	  undo.	  For	  Socrates,	  the	  illusion	  of	  self	  is	  the	  real	  stakes	  of	  
the	  epideictic.	  (127).	  
Some	  of	  this	  power	  comes	  from	  the	  formulaic	  nature	  of	  the	  funeral	  oration,	  a	  formula	  that	  
Kennedy	  argues	  the	  funeral	  oration	  achieved	  much	  more	  quickly	  than	  other	  epideictic	  
forms	  (Art	  154).	  This	  formulaic	  structure,	  coupled	  with	  the	  religious	  aspects	  of	  the	  
occasion,	  and	  further	  combined	  with	  the	  elements	  of	  praise	  for	  the	  decedents	  and	  their	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devotion	  to	  the	  ideals	  and	  greatness	  of	  the	  state,	  clearly	  put	  this	  epideictic	  form	  into	  the	  
category	  of	  ritual.	  
	   Michael	  Carter	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  when	  epideictic	  rhetoric	  achieves	  the	  form	  of	  ritual	  
that	  is	  has	  its	  greatest	  effect,	  and	  uses	  the	  example	  of	  Socrates’	  funeral	  oration	  in	  the	  
Menexenus	  to	  demonstrate	  this	  point.	  	  Carter	  chose	  ritual	  theory	  in	  part	  because	  it	  was	  a	  
more	  developed	  field	  of	  scholarship	  and	  because	  it	  “reveals	  a	  power	  of	  language”	  that	  he	  
claims	  rhetoric	  scholars	  at	  that	  time	  often	  ignored,	  an	  extraordinary	  discourse	  that	  
generates	  a	  knowledge	  out	  of	  the	  ordinary	  and	  gives	  epideictic	  its	  role	  above	  mere	  display	  
(211-­‐212).	  	  Carter	  claims	  that,	  like	  ritual,	  epideictic	  accomplishes	  three	  things	  that	  
“ordinary,	  pragmatic	  discourse”	  does	  not	  (212).	  First,	  it	  generates	  extraordinary	  
knowledge,	  that	  “connects	  participants	  to	  the	  cosmos	  or	  to	  a	  more	  transcendent	  principle,”	  
or,	  in	  other	  words,	  provides	  an	  “intelligible	  order”	  to	  events	  outside	  of	  everyday	  existence;	  
it	  “takes	  participants	  out	  of	  ordinary	  time,”	  a	  feature	  that	  in	  ritual	  theory	  is	  described	  as	  
“sacralizing	  time;”	  and	  “create[s]	  harmony	  among…apparent	  contradictions”	  (Carter	  213-­‐
214).	  Secondly,	  it	  “constitutes	  and	  promotes	  community”	  (213).	  Finally,	  epideictic	  serves	  to	  
educate	  the	  audience,	  to	  provide	  through	  its	  mechanisms	  of	  praise	  and	  blame	  and	  its	  
technique	  of	  amplification	  (rather	  than	  the	  enthymeme)	  the	  models	  and	  exemplars	  of	  the	  
way	  to	  live	  in	  the	  society	  and	  the	  actions	  to	  be	  taken	  (213,	  228-­‐229).	  Like	  Lockwood,	  Carter	  
calls	  out	  Plato’s	  concern	  over	  the	  moving	  power	  of	  such	  oratory,	  saying	  Plato	  either	  
“misunderstood—or	  understood	  all	  too	  well—the	  power	  of	  epideictic	  speech	  to	  guide	  the	  
behavior	  of	  the	  audience”	  (228).	  But	  it	  isn’t	  just	  the	  audience’s	  behavior	  that	  gives	  
epideictic	  its	  power;	  it’s	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  their	  minds	  adhere	  to	  the	  ideals	  and	  values	  
presented	  in	  those	  speeches.	  This	  was	  also	  part	  of	  Plato’s	  concerns.	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In	  the	  Gorgias,	  Socrates	  expresses	  his	  concern	  that	  Gorgias,	  as	  a	  teacher	  of	  rhetoric,	  
causes	  his	  students	  to	  “carry	  conviction	  to	  the	  crowd	  on	  all	  subjects,	  not	  by	  teaching	  them,	  
but	  by	  persuading,”	  and	  that	  by	  such	  persuasion	  the	  “orator	  will	  be	  more	  convincing	  than	  
the	  doctor”	  (94).	  The	  point	  for	  Socrates	  is	  that	  when	  the	  audience,	  “the	  crowd,”	  in	  not	  
knowledgeable	  on	  the	  subject	  presented,	  the	  orator’s	  delivery	  will	  be	  more	  pleasant	  than	  
the	  knowledgeable	  doctor,	  and	  the	  audience	  will	  therefore	  accept	  what	  the	  orator	  says	  
without	  questioning	  its	  truth.	  In	  this	  way,	  “the	  crowd”	  can	  be	  led	  to	  believe	  things	  that	  are	  
not	  “the	  best”	  either	  for	  them	  individually	  or	  for	  the	  community	  at	  large.	  Socrates	  also	  
argues	  that	  rhetoric	  is	  only	  useful	  to	  those	  with	  intent	  of	  doing	  wrong	  or	  avoiding	  penalties,	  
that	  “the	  good	  man,	  intent	  on	  the	  best”	  would	  not	  wish	  to	  avoid	  the	  consequences	  of	  his	  
actions,	  including	  his	  speech,	  and	  therefore	  would	  not	  need	  the	  persuasive	  power	  of	  
rhetoric.	  Socrates	  is	  concerned	  not	  only	  with	  what	  is	  just	  and	  unjust	  in	  the	  legal	  sense,	  but	  
also	  in	  the	  moral	  sense,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  an	  individual	  striving	  to	  be	  and	  do	  good.	  Thus	  he	  
looks	  to	  states	  leaders	  and	  teachers	  to	  be	  knowledgeable	  of	  the	  good	  so	  that	  the	  good	  is	  
what	  they	  impart	  to	  others	  in	  the	  community,	  and	  this	  in	  turn	  leads	  to	  a	  just	  society.	  
The	  points	  of	  community	  building	  and	  education	  are	  two	  where	  Carter’s	  work,	  as	  
well	  as	  Lockwood’s	  and	  Loraux’s,	  intersects	  with	  that	  of	  Chaim	  Perelman	  and	  Lucy	  
Olbrechts-­‐Tyteca	  and	  their	  re-­‐invigorating	  look	  at	  the	  function	  of	  epideictic	  rhetoric.	  
Perelman	  and	  Olbrechts-­‐Tyteca	  bemoan	  the	  devaluing	  of	  epideictic	  over	  time	  and	  argued	  
that	  it	  “forms	  a	  central	  part	  of	  the	  art	  of	  persuasion”	  (49).	  Specifically,	  they	  argue	  that	  
epideictic	  “strengthens	  the	  disposition	  toward	  action	  by	  increasing	  adherence	  to	  the	  values	  
it	  lauds”	  (50).	  Moreover,	  they	  call	  attention	  to	  those	  values	  “which	  might	  not	  be	  contested	  
when	  considered	  on	  their	  own	  but	  may	  nevertheless	  not	  prevail	  against	  other	  values	  that	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might	  come	  into	  conflict	  with	  them”	  (51).	  They	  claim	  that	  this	  kind	  of	  oratory	  is	  practiced	  
by	  those	  who	  “defend	  the	  traditional	  and	  accepted	  values”	  of	  a	  society,	  and	  not	  “the	  new	  
and	  revolutionary,”	  and	  that	  such	  speeches	  tend	  to	  “appeal	  to	  a	  universal	  order,	  to	  a	  nature,	  
or	  a	  god	  that	  would	  vouch	  for	  the	  unquestioned,	  and	  supposedly	  unquestionable,	  values”	  
(52).	  All	  of	  these	  lead	  to	  a	  “disposition	  toward	  action”	  and	  “strengthening	  adherence	  to	  
what	  is	  already	  accepted”	  (54).	  Finally,	  they	  argue	  that	  “any	  society	  prizing	  its	  own	  values	  
is	  therefore	  bound	  to	  promote	  opportunities	  for	  epideictic	  speeches	  to	  be	  delivered	  at	  
regular	  intervals,”	  and	  include	  among	  the	  exemplary	  occasions	  “ceremonies	  
commemorating	  past	  events	  of	  national	  concern”	  that	  might	  “foster	  a	  communion	  of	  
minds”	  (55).	  This	  communion	  gets	  a	  boost	  from	  the	  prior	  acceptance	  of	  the	  audience	  
toward	  the	  values	  presented.	  The	  Menexenus	  also	  makes	  this	  point	  in	  its	  well-­‐known	  claim	  
about	  praising	  Athens	  to	  Athenians,	  as	  Socrates	  argues,	  “when	  one	  performs	  before	  the	  
very	  people	  he	  is	  praising,	  it	  is	  perhaps	  no	  great	  thing	  to	  appear	  to	  speak	  well”	  (quoted	  in	  
Carter	  225).	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  speaker’s	  effort	  when	  praising	  Athens	  to	  Athenians	  is	  
facilitated	  by	  their	  already	  accepted	  understanding	  of	  or	  predisposition	  toward	  the	  values	  
being	  presented	  in	  the	  speech.	  
	   Cynthia	  Miecznikowski	  Sheard	  summarizes	  the	  value	  of	  epideictic	  over	  the	  
centuries	  as	  “a	  rhetoric	  of	  identification	  and	  conformity	  whose	  function	  is	  to	  confirm	  and	  
promote	  adherence	  to	  the	  commonly	  held	  values	  of	  a	  community	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  
sustaining	  that	  community”	  (766).	  	  She	  further	  argues	  that	  this	  expression	  of	  commonly	  
held	  ideas	  casts	  epideictic	  as	  “a	  vehicle	  through	  which	  communities	  can	  imagine	  and	  bring	  
about	  change”	  (771).	  This	  point	  echoes	  Gerald	  Hauser’s	  claim	  that	  epideictic	  provides	  the	  
framework	  for	  a	  “vibrant	  public	  realm”	  (6).	  The	  notion	  of	  community	  building	  also	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provides	  the	  foundation	  for	  a	  shared	  sense	  of	  morality,	  and	  right	  behavior	  in	  both	  the	  
personal	  and	  civic	  realms.	  Hauser	  argues	  that	  democracy	  requires	  “a	  trustworthy	  neighbor	  
who	  can	  be	  relied	  upon	  to	  participate	  responsibly	  in	  resolving	  public	  issues”	  (6).	  To	  
establish	  this	  trust,	  there	  has	  to	  be	  some	  common	  ground	  of	  accepted	  values	  and	  ideals	  
upon	  which	  to	  build	  public	  policy.	  Like	  Carter,	  Sheard,	  and	  others,	  Hauser	  builds	  on	  the	  
work	  of	  Perelman	  and	  Olbrechts-­‐Tyteca	  to	  show	  how	  epideictic	  performs	  an	  educative	  
function	  that	  facilitates	  this	  kind	  of	  self-­‐governance.	  The	  individuals	  and	  actions	  singled	  out	  
for	  public	  praise	  (or	  blame)	  signal	  to	  the	  audience	  what	  kind	  of	  actions,	  behaviors	  and	  
deeds	  are	  honorable	  in	  that	  society.	  Deeds	  worthy	  of	  praise	  are	  preferred,	  and	  thus	  build	  
the	  communal	  bases	  for	  making	  choices	  about	  those	  preferred	  deeds.	  Hauser	  argues	  that	  
by	  witnessing	  an	  epideictic	  performance,	  “citizens	  experience	  the	  golden	  mean	  as	  it	  is	  lived	  
in	  their	  community”	  which	  then	  allows	  them	  to	  “participate	  responsibly	  in	  a	  deliberative	  
and	  forensic	  rhetoric	  whose	  very	  proofs	  require	  shared	  assumptions	  of	  civic	  norms	  on	  
which	  enthymemes	  ultimately	  rest”	  (17).	  The	  golden	  mean,	  Aristotle’s	  term	  for	  the	  balance	  
between	  the	  vices	  of	  excess	  and	  defect,	  provides	  the	  basis	  for	  an	  orderly	  civic	  life	  and	  a	  
vibrant	  public	  sphere	  built	  on	  a	  common	  language	  of	  virtue.	  Part	  of	  this	  emerges	  from	  
critique	  of	  existing	  circumstances.	  This	  critique,	  Sheard	  argues,	  “leads	  to	  a	  vision	  that	  the	  
audience	  is	  not	  only	  invited	  to	  share,	  but	  exhorted	  to	  help	  actualize”	  (780).	  The	  audience	  
becomes	  inclined	  to	  believe	  they	  can	  effect	  change	  as	  they	  are	  drawn	  into	  the	  message	  of	  
the	  epideictic	  speech	  and	  the	  power	  of	  its	  vision	  expressed	  in	  language.	  
	   In	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America,	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  “state”	  carries	  multiple	  meanings,	  
and	  to	  better	  place	  the	  speakers	  it	  is	  helpful	  to	  articulate	  the	  two	  that	  are	  at	  the	  center	  of	  
the	  tension	  of	  the	  original	  Brown	  decision.	  First,	  the	  state	  is	  the	  nation	  as	  a	  whole,	  the	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federal	  “state”	  or	  the	  singular	  body	  of	  all	  fifty	  states	  and	  the	  commonwealths	  that	  comprise	  
the	  republic.	  “The	  state”	  also	  refers	  to	  the	  subdivisions	  within	  the	  larger	  republic,	  like	  
Kansas,	  each	  of	  which	  has	  its	  own	  governing	  structure.	  Under	  the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  United	  
States,	  each	  individual	  state	  is	  a	  sovereign	  body	  with	  authority	  to	  govern	  itself	  within	  the	  
larger	  framework	  of	  federal	  authority.	  The	  delineation	  of	  these	  powers	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  
of	  this	  project,	  but	  is	  worth	  mentioning	  because	  the	  question	  of	  state	  authority	  is	  so	  central	  
to	  the	  Brown	  decision,	  its	  history	  and	  its	  legacy.	  	  
On	  the	  day	  of	  the	  Brown	  v	  Board	  of	  Education	  National	  Historic	  Site	  dedication	  
ceremony,	  Kansas	  Governor	  Katherine	  Sebelius’s	  embodied	  the	  state	  within	  the	  state	  
dynamic,	  offering	  two	  very	  different	  speeches	  in	  two	  different	  ceremonies,	  one	  a	  state	  
function	  where	  she	  issued	  a	  proclamation	  in	  honor	  of	  the	  50th	  anniversary	  of	  the	  Brown	  
decision,	  and	  one	  as	  the	  representative	  of	  the	  host	  state	  at	  the	  dedication	  ceremony	  for	  the	  
National	  Historic	  Site.	  On	  the	  steps	  of	  the	  Kansas	  Statehouse,	  with	  the	  columned	  building	  
creating	  a	  suitable	  backdrop	  for	  the	  history	  and	  tradition	  being	  marked,	  Sebelius	  focused	  
her	  remarks	  on	  Kansas	  and	  its	  contribution	  to	  the	  struggle	  for	  racial	  equality	  in	  American	  
history.	  Banners	  with	  the	  words	  “Equal,”	  “Education”	  and	  “Opportunity”	  gave	  a	  visual	  
reminder	  that	  education	  was	  the	  core	  of	  the	  Brown	  decision,	  along	  with	  the	  belief	  that	  
education	  could	  change	  the	  rest	  of	  society.	  The	  audience	  at	  the	  Statehouse	  included	  state	  
employees,	  who	  had	  been	  given	  time	  off	  to	  attend	  the	  event,	  and	  individuals	  recruited	  
through	  a	  phoning	  campaign	  using	  the	  state’s	  Democrat	  voting	  list	  (Moon).	  Sebelius,	  who	  is	  
a	  Democrat,	  insisted	  that	  neither	  the	  time	  off	  nor	  the	  phone	  campaign	  were	  partisan,	  but	  
the	  result	  still	  meant	  she	  was	  speaking	  to	  an	  audience	  who	  already	  shared	  several	  common	  
values,	  including	  political	  party	  affiliation	  or	  notions	  of	  state	  civic	  pride.	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   As	  might	  be	  expected,	  and	  in	  keeping	  with	  the	  events	  of	  the	  weekend	  in	  Topeka,	  the	  
proclamation	  itself	  “honored	  the	  nation’s	  civil	  rights	  leaders	  and	  the	  plaintiffs	  and	  
attorneys”	  in	  the	  Brown	  case,	  noting	  that	  it	  “began	  with	  the	  filing	  of	  a	  federal	  lawsuit	  in	  
Topeka	  in	  1951”	  (Hollingsworth).	  But	  the	  proclamation	  further	  declared	  “that	  because	  the	  
promise	  of	  the	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education	  decision	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  realized,	  ‘we	  recommit	  
ourselves	  to	  the	  principles	  of	  an	  equal	  education	  and	  opportunity	  for	  all’"	  (Hollingsworth).	  
The	  proclamation	  and	  the	  two	  speeches	  Sebelius	  gave	  followed	  a	  similar	  pattern	  of	  praise	  
for	  the	  decision	  and	  those	  who	  worked	  to	  achieve	  it,	  acknowledgment	  of	  shortcomings	  in	  
achieving	  equality	  without	  any	  direct	  blame,	  and	  a	  call	  for	  renewed	  commitment	  to	  the	  
principles	  represented	  by	  the	  Brown	  decision.	  Though	  there	  are	  variations	  in	  the	  examples	  
used	  and	  the	  scope	  of	  her	  focus,	  the	  structure	  of	  each,	  and	  particularly	  the	  call	  for	  
commitment	  in	  the	  conclusion,	  was	  similar.	  Each	  of	  the	  speeches	  appealed	  to	  the	  
audience’s	  sense	  of	  history	  and	  tradition,	  and	  to	  their	  presumed	  belief	  in	  equal	  opportunity	  
and	  the	  value	  of	  education	  in	  achieving	  success.	  	  
In	  her	  proclamation	  remarks,	  Sebelius	  referred	  to	  Kansas	  entering	  the	  Union	  during	  
the	  Civil	  War	  as	  a	  “free	  state,”	  calling	  that	  event	  a	  “fire	  bell	  in	  the	  night”	  that	  “challenged	  all	  
Americans	  to	  resolve	  the	  question	  of	  freedom	  once	  and	  for	  all.”	  She	  further	  claimed	  that	  
“our	  nation	  took	  another	  step	  on	  its	  long	  path	  toward	  human	  freedom	  here	  in	  Kansas”	  in	  
the	  Brown	  decision.	  She	  called	  the	  decision	  “a	  revolution	  in	  American	  legal	  thought”	  and	  
said	  “it	  embodies	  the	  principles	  of	  American	  civil	  rights	  law.”	  In	  what	  would	  become	  a	  
recurring	  them	  throughout	  the	  day,	  she	  also	  observed	  that	  “our	  search	  for	  true	  equality	  is	  
not	  complete,”	  and	  that	  “just	  as	  we	  celebrate	  how	  far	  we	  have	  come,	  we	  must	  acknowledge	  
how	  far	  we	  still	  have	  to	  go.”	  She	  called	  the	  “principles	  of	  Brown”	  a	  “guide…along	  that	  path,”	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and	  called	  out	  the	  role	  models	  “who	  made	  Brown	  a	  reality,”	  specifically	  “a	  caring	  parent,	  
Oliver	  Brown,	  a	  young	  solicitor,	  Thurgood	  Marshall,	  and	  a	  new	  appointed	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  
the	  Supreme	  Court,	  Earl	  Warren.”	  In	  the	  closing	  comments	  of	  her	  short	  address,	  she	  called	  
on	  the	  audience,	  “as	  Kansans	  and	  as	  Americans”	  to	  “reflect	  again	  on	  the	  sacrifices…	  
remember	  that	  we	  are	  the	  beneficiaries…and…recommit	  ourselves	  to	  walking	  that	  path,	  for	  
it	  is	  our	  inheritance	  and,	  God	  willing,	  will	  be	  our	  legacy.”	  The	  speech	  followed	  the	  “praise,	  
lament,	  consolation”	  form,	  carefully	  constructing	  the	  decision	  and	  its	  role	  models	  as	  
products	  of	  Kansas	  efforts,	  and	  giving	  her	  state	  a	  prominent	  place	  in	  the	  history	  being	  
celebrated.	  But	  it	  is	  also	  the	  most	  panegyric	  of	  the	  five,	  with	  its	  emphasis	  on	  praise	  for	  the	  
state	  and	  the	  accomplishments	  it	  fostered.	  
	   At	  the	  dedication	  ceremony,	  Sebeluis	  took	  a	  broader	  view,	  one	  that	  focused	  more	  
specifically	  on	  the	  decision	  and	  its	  meaning.	  She	  began	  by	  inviting	  the	  audience	  to	  
“Imagine.”	  In	  a	  medical	  emergency	  calling	  for	  immediate	  surgery,	  she	  asked	  “does	  it	  matter	  
whether	  the	  hand	  that	  holds	  the	  scalpel	  is	  black,	  white,	  or	  brown?”	  After	  a	  few	  more	  such	  
examples,	  Sebelius	  claimed	  “this	  was	  the	  vision	  of	  Brown	  v	  Board	  of	  Education	  –	  
opportunity	  for	  all,	  regardless	  of	  the	  color	  of	  your	  skin.	  Opportunity	  for	  all.	  Through	  
education	  for	  all.”	  Sebelius	  turned	  back	  to	  the	  language	  of	  the	  original	  Brown	  decision,	  
noting	  the	  contemporary	  sound	  of	  the	  remarks	  emphasizing	  education	  as	  the	  “foundation	  
of	  good	  citizenship”	  and	  the	  “most	  important	  function	  of	  state	  and	  local	  governments.”	  In	  a	  
format	  similar	  to	  the	  proclamation	  speech,	  Sebelius	  next	  focused	  on	  the	  “gap”	  and	  focused	  
on	  Kansas	  her	  examples.	  She	  noted	  that	  “even	  here…in	  the	  very	  community	  whose	  name	  
symbolized	  the	  quest	  for	  equality…we	  do	  not	  yet	  provide	  all	  of	  our	  students	  with	  an	  equal	  
opportunity	  for	  a	  quality	  education.”	  Doing	  so,	  she	  claimed,	  was	  “our	  obligation”	  and	  said	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“it	  is	  fitting	  that	  we	  renew	  our	  commitment	  to	  that	  obligation	  today…in	  this	  place.”	  
Bringing	  the	  history	  of	  the	  state	  back	  into	  play,	  she	  named	  “Topeka	  abolitionist	  John	  
Ritchie”	  as	  one	  of	  the	  “voices”	  whose	  call	  must	  be	  answered.	  She	  referred	  to	  the	  need	  for	  
“every	  child	  in	  Kansas	  –	  and,	  indeed,	  across	  America”	  to	  have	  “equal	  access	  to	  the	  
transforming	  power	  of	  education,”	  and	  concluded	  by	  noting	  that	  it	  was	  the	  “enduring	  
dream	  of	  quality”	  that	  was	  being	  celebrated.	  The	  governor	  gave	  Kansas	  pride	  of	  place	  in	  her	  
remarks,	  but	  she	  did	  so	  with	  recognition	  that	  this	  audience	  included	  national	  dignitaries	  
and	  visitors	  from	  beyond	  Kansas’s	  borders.	  Her	  emphasis	  was	  much	  more	  on	  education	  
than	  on	  overall	  racial	  equality,	  and	  her	  examples	  more	  specifically	  tied	  to	  Topeka,	  aligning	  
her	  focus	  with	  the	  present	  audience.	  Echoing	  the	  words	  of	  Earl	  Warren	  in	  the	  original	  
decision	  gave	  her	  remarks	  a	  transcendence	  through	  time	  and	  a	  direct	  connection	  to	  the	  
dedication,	  while	  limiting	  her	  comments	  to	  examples	  from	  Kansas	  kept	  her	  within	  the	  
bounds	  of	  her	  particular	  authority.	  
	   	  Sebelius	  made	  her	  proclamation	  speech	  with	  “the	  would	  be	  president”	  at	  her	  side,	  
and	  many	  of	  those	  present	  for	  that	  ceremony	  carried	  signs	  in	  favor	  of	  Senator	  John	  F.	  
Kerry’s	  candidacy	  (Moon).	  Senator	  Kerry	  focused	  on	  similar	  themes	  about	  racial	  equality	  in	  
his	  remarks	  following	  Sebelius’s	  at	  the	  Proclamation	  Ceremony.	  And	  like	  Sebelius	  he	  also	  
called	  for	  a	  renewed	  commitment.	  But	  with	  his	  position	  as	  a	  presidential	  candidate	  and	  
speaking	  for	  that	  larger	  political	  community,	  Kerry	  began	  with	  remarks	  that	  clearly	  linked	  
Brown	  to	  America’s	  greatness.	  He	  claimed	  the	  decision	  “forever	  changed	  our	  country	  and	  
our	  lives,”	  that	  it	  set	  “forth	  a	  vision	  of	  equality	  that	  continues	  to	  inspire	  freedom	  lovers	  and	  
freedom	  movements	  here	  in	  America	  and	  around	  the	  globe.”	  In	  a	  nod	  to	  the	  local	  nature	  of	  
his	  audience	  he	  also	  remarked	  that	  “it	  started	  here	  in	  Topeka,”	  which	  “has	  always	  been	  a	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place	  for	  making	  history.”	  Kerry	  hailed	  the	  Brown	  decision,	  saying	  it	  “summoned	  our	  
country	  to	  make	  real	  the	  ideal	  of	  one	  nation	  and	  one	  people.”	  He	  built	  on	  that	  idea	  of	  unity	  
claiming	  that	  “all	  of	  America	  is	  a	  better	  place	  because	  of	  Brown.”	  But	  while	  his	  speech	  
supported	  the	  goals	  and	  values	  espoused	  by	  other	  speakers,	  Kerry	  was	  critical	  of	  his	  
political	  opponent,	  President	  Bush,	  and	  his	  methods	  of	  addressing	  the	  inequities	  in	  
education	  and	  American	  social	  and	  economic	  structure.	  	  
	   Kerry’s	  comments	  highlighted	  an	  important	  aspect	  of	  the	  role	  of	  law	  in	  American	  
society.	  James	  Boyd	  White	  observes	  that	  “the	  law	  is	  a	  way	  of	  creating	  a	  rhetorical	  
community	  over	  time,”	  that	  it	  
is	  a	  language	  in	  which	  our	  perceptions	  of	  the	  natural	  universe	  are	  
constructed	  and	  related,	  in	  which	  our	  values	  and	  motives	  are	  defined,	  in	  
which	  our	  methods	  of	  reasoning	  are	  elaborated	  and	  enacted;	  and	  it	  gives	  us	  
our	  terms	  of	  reconstructing	  a	  social	  universe	  by	  defining	  roles	  and	  actors	  and	  
by	  establishing	  expectations	  as	  to	  the	  propriety	  of	  speech	  and	  conduct	  
(Heracles	  36,	  98)	  .	  
With	  respect	  to	  the	  Constitution,	  the	  foundation	  of	  civil	  rights	  and	  therefore	  civil	  rights	  law	  
in	  America,	  Stanley	  Fish	  notes	  that	  when	  there	  are	  disputes	  over	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  
Constitution,	  the	  	  “means	  of	  settling	  them	  are	  political,	  social,	  and	  institutional,	  in	  a	  mix	  that	  
is	  itself	  subject	  to	  modification	  and	  change”	  (130).	  Kerry	  looked	  to	  the	  Constitution’s	  
promise	  of	  equality	  in	  his	  positive	  claims	  about	  Brown	  and	  its	  role	  in	  American	  society,	  but	  
he	  looked	  to	  contemporary	  definitions	  of	  equality	  in	  society	  and	  contemporary	  values	  for	  
his	  critiques	  of	  current	  conditions	  and	  political	  leadership.	  Like	  the	  calls	  for	  renewed	  
commitment	  to	  Brown’s	  promises,	  Kerry	  was	  really	  also	  calling	  for	  active	  engagement	  in	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defining	  what	  the	  Constitution	  and	  the	  promises	  of	  equality	  mean	  for	  our	  current	  society	  
and	  its	  institutions.	  
Kerry	  noted	  that	  “we	  have	  to	  defend	  the	  progress	  that	  has	  been	  made,	  but	  we	  also	  
have	  to	  move	  the	  cause	  forward”	  and	  to	  “renew	  our	  commitment	  to	  one	  America.”	  The	  next	  
part	  of	  the	  speech	  turned	  from	  praise	  of	  the	  nation	  and	  focused	  on	  specific	  points,	  and	  here	  
there	  was	  amplification	  through	  repetition	  on	  two	  key	  phrases,	  “we	  have	  more	  to	  do,”	  and	  
“we	  have	  not	  met	  the	  promise	  of	  Brown.”	  Kerry	  cited	  several	  specific	  instances	  of	  change	  
and	  positive	  developments	  toward	  equality,	  mostly	  in	  achievements	  by	  African	  Americans,	  
including	  the	  first	  African	  American	  mayor	  of	  Topeka,	  James	  McClinton.	  He	  concluded	  each	  
example	  with	  “but	  we	  have	  more	  to	  do.”	  	  After	  calling	  out	  President	  Truman’s	  integration	  of	  
the	  military	  and	  his	  own	  observations	  while	  in	  military	  service,	  Kerry	  claimed	  “we’re	  all	  
Americans	  sacrificing	  for	  the	  same	  country	  and	  praying	  to	  the	  same	  God.”	  Calling	  for	  a	  
renewed	  “commitment	  to	  one	  America,”	  Kerry	  charged	  that	  there	  were	  those	  working	  
against	  Brown	  and	  the	  civil	  rights	  gains	  that	  followed	  it.	  He	  did	  not	  name	  names,	  but	  there	  
was	  a	  distinct	  tone	  of	  blame	  and	  certainly	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  shameful	  in	  his	  claim	  that	  “we	  
should	  not	  delude	  ourselves	  that	  the	  work	  of	  Brown	  is	  done”	  when	  there	  are	  those	  who	  
want	  to	  “roll	  back	  affirmative	  action,	  to	  restrict	  equal	  rights	  and	  to	  undermine	  the	  promise	  
of	  our	  Constitution”	  (Kerry).	  He	  cited	  a	  number	  of	  specific	  statistics	  about	  poverty	  and	  the	  
related	  lack	  of	  jobs,	  health	  care	  or	  reading	  skill,	  each	  preceded	  by	  the	  phrase	  “we	  have	  not	  
met	  the	  promise	  of	  Brown	  when.”	  	  	  
Kerry	  cited	  Dr.	  King	  early	  in	  his	  speech,	  and	  the	  repetitive	  cadence	  of	  the	  middle	  
section	  would	  likely	  have	  invoked	  Dr.	  King’s	  “I	  Have	  a	  Dream	  Speech”	  for	  the	  audience,	  
bringing	  the	  whole	  weight	  of	  the	  civil	  rights	  movement	  and	  King’s	  calls	  for	  equality	  into	  the	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message	  and	  minds	  hearing	  it.	  In	  his	  conclusion,	  Kerry	  called	  for	  renewed	  commitment,	  
citing	  a	  poem	  from	  Langston	  Hughes	  as	  an	  example	  of	  how	  to	  “honor	  the	  legacy	  of	  Brown,”	  
and	  returned	  again	  to	  the	  military,	  this	  time	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  veterans	  who,	  having	  
served	  equally,	  returned	  to	  “brutal	  inequality	  at	  home.”	  He	  connected	  the	  service	  of	  “all	  
these	  patriots”	  to	  current	  service	  men	  and	  women,	  and	  linked	  both	  to	  the	  Brown	  decision,	  
saying	  they	  “[call]	  us	  again	  to	  the	  America	  we	  must	  become.”	  	  
Service	  to	  the	  state,	  and	  the	  nobility	  of	  giving	  one’s	  life—or	  giving	  a	  family	  member’s	  
life—in	  such	  service	  was	  a	  prominent	  feature	  of	  the	  famous	  funeral	  oration	  given	  by	  
Pericles	  and	  discussed	  in	  the	  Menexenus.	  Here	  the	  service	  may	  not	  be	  military,	  and	  the	  
audiences	  Kerry	  and	  others	  were	  addressing	  in	  Topeka	  were	  not	  being	  asked	  to	  lay	  down	  
their	  lives	  to	  further	  Brown’s	  promises,	  but	  were	  called	  rather	  to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  discussion,	  
to	  engage	  in	  the	  process	  of	  determining	  the	  kind	  of	  society	  “we,	  the	  people”	  would	  create	  to	  
fulfill	  those	  promises.	  Kerry’s	  speech	  linked	  this	  participation	  with	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  
nobility	  as	  military	  service,	  because	  it	  is	  through	  creating	  the	  equal	  and	  just	  society,	  one	  
filled	  with	  the	  particular	  features	  he	  indicates	  we	  had	  fallen	  short	  of,	  that	  gives	  honor	  to	  
those	  who	  do	  serve	  in	  the	  military,	  and	  allows	  an	  individual	  to	  claim	  a	  share	  of	  that	  honor.	  
	   Kerry’s	  reference	  to	  the	  “promise	  of	  our	  Constitution”	  rather	  than	  the	  more	  common	  
reference	  to	  the	  “promise	  of	  Brown”	  accomplished	  two	  things.	  First,	  it	  tied	  the	  two	  together	  
as	  interchangeable,	  giving	  a	  clarity	  to	  the	  “promise	  of	  Brown”	  that	  is	  more	  elusive	  in	  other	  
references;	  implied	  certainly,	  but	  seldom	  directly	  stated.	  The	  Constitution	  has	  been	  called	  
“America’s	  civil	  religion,”	  the	  text	  that	  holds	  the	  guidance,	  values,	  and	  ideals	  of	  this	  country	  
(Bellah).	  However,	  it	  is	  also	  a	  document	  that	  is	  “is	  always	  an	  already-­‐interpreted	  object,”	  
where	  the	  interpreters	  are	  “are	  already	  situated	  within	  the	  enterprise,	  and	  the	  ways	  of	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disputing	  and	  the	  versions	  of	  the	  Constitution	  produced	  by	  those	  ways	  are	  “enterprise-­‐
specific’”	  (Fish	  130).	  So	  while	  Kerry	  invoked	  the	  “promise	  of	  the	  Constitution”	  as	  the	  
promise	  that	  those	  values,	  ideals,	  guaranteed	  rights	  and	  protections	  belong	  to	  all	  of	  
America’s	  citizens,	  those	  he	  called	  out	  as	  oppositional	  are	  also	  acting	  to	  interpret	  that	  
promise.	  In	  the	  undermining	  efforts	  Kerry	  described,	  the	  very	  rationale	  that	  “our	  
Constitution	  is	  color-­‐blind”	  had	  been	  used	  in	  recent	  Supreme	  Court	  decisions	  to	  override	  
particular	  affirmative	  action	  cases	  in	  the	  education	  arena.	  This	  give	  and	  take,	  this	  differing	  
on	  interpretation	  and	  application	  of	  Brown’s	  terms,	  constitutes	  the	  national	  dialectical	  
exchange	  that	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  chapter	  four.	  In	  Topeka	  on	  that	  Sunday	  morning,	  the	  view	  
that	  there	  was	  one	  good	  interpretation	  was	  prominent.	  	  In	  his	  remarks	  at	  a	  prayer	  
breakfast	  for	  the	  NAACP	  education	  summit	  on	  Sunday,	  Jesse	  Jackson	  foreshadowed	  these	  
remarks,	  stating	  that	  “this	  (current)	  Supreme	  Court	  would	  not	  have	  passed	  Brown”,	  and	  
this	  meant	  that	  “the	  1954	  promise	  is	  in	  jeopardy”	  (Anderson	  and	  Carpenter).	  Jackson	  was	  
preaching	  to	  the	  choir	  when	  he	  made	  his	  comments,	  but	  Kerry	  had	  a	  more	  diverse	  
audience,	  albeit	  one	  significantly	  composed	  of	  his	  supporters.	  It	  is	  perhaps	  the	  friendliness	  
of	  the	  audience	  that	  allowed	  Kerry’s	  comments	  to	  be	  sharper	  and	  more	  pointed	  that	  the	  
remarks	  made	  in	  the	  more	  widely	  cast	  speeches	  at	  the	  dedication	  ceremony.	  	  
	   Jackson	  was	  present	  at	  both	  the	  proclamation	  ceremony	  and	  the	  dedication,	  but	  his	  
primary	  contributions	  to	  the	  weekend’s	  events	  came	  in	  his	  first	  forum,	  the	  church.	  The	  civil	  
rights	  struggle	  has	  always	  been	  linked	  to	  notions	  of	  freedom,	  the	  emancipation	  of	  slaves	  in	  
the	  nineteenth	  century	  and	  the	  biblical	  exodus	  of	  the	  Hebrews	  from	  bondage	  in	  Egypt.	  	  
Jackson,	  a	  figure	  both	  in	  the	  civil	  rights	  movement	  and	  in	  the	  political	  arena,	  was	  uniquely	  
situated	  to	  unite	  the	  two	  arenas,	  and	  his	  sermon	  at	  the	  Mt.	  Carmel	  Church	  did	  weave	  both	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narratives	  together,	  the	  spiritual	  quest	  for	  freedom	  and	  justice	  first	  promised	  by	  God	  and	  
from	  which	  contemporary	  notions	  of	  natural	  rights	  emerge,	  along	  with	  the	  more	  political	  
quest	  for	  action	  to	  protect	  the	  rights	  guaranteed	  by	  the	  secular	  religion	  of	  the	  Constitution.	  
Jackson	  had	  more	  freedom	  for	  his	  rhetorical	  moves	  because	  of	  his	  venue;	  the	  church	  was	  
not	  part	  of	  the	  state	  ceremonies	  and	  not	  subject	  to	  the	  same	  audience	  expectations,	  and	  
Jackson	  was	  not	  speaking	  as	  a	  state	  official.	  Rather,	  Jackson	  spoke	  from	  his	  position	  as	  a	  
civil	  rights	  leader,	  a	  former	  presidential	  candidate,	  chairman	  of	  the	  Rainbow	  Coalition,	  and	  
a	  Baptist	  preacher.	  On	  this	  occasion,	  that	  renown	  filled	  the	  Mt.	  Carmel	  Church	  to	  
overflowing,	  with	  an	  estimated	  crowd	  of	  850	  rather	  than	  the	  normal	  attendance	  of	  250-­‐300	  
people.	  	  
Jackson	  began	  with	  a	  claim	  that	  Brown	  was	  “the	  start	  of	  a	  new	  America,”	  and	  
continued	  with	  praise	  for	  the	  city,	  claiming	  “only	  God	  could	  have	  chosen	  Topeka	  for	  the	  
national	  historic	  site”	  (Anderson	  and	  Carpenter).	  	  In	  reality,	  divine	  guidance	  was	  less	  
helpful	  than	  the	  efforts	  of	  Cheryl	  Brown	  Henderson	  and	  her	  associates,	  but	  Jackson’s	  
modifying	  comment	  was	  more	  earthbound.	  The	  historic	  site,	  he	  said,	  was	  “a	  museum	  of	  
precious	  memories”	  among	  “great	  landmarks”	  that	  “didn’t	  come	  from	  the	  big	  cities,”	  that	  
the	  “heroes	  weren’t	  the	  rich	  and	  the	  powerful”	  (Anderson	  and	  Carpenter).	  Jackson	  cited	  
Linda	  Brown	  and	  Rosa	  Parks	  as	  the	  movers	  of	  the	  success,	  and	  pulling	  that	  equation	  of	  
common	  people	  back	  to	  his	  audience	  in	  Topeka,	  went	  on	  the	  say	  the	  city	  “	  is	  on	  the	  map,	  
not	  because	  of	  the	  richest	  family	  in	  Topeka”	  but	  rather	  it	  was	  “Linda	  Brown’s	  name,	  and	  her	  
father’s	  name,	  [that]	  will	  live	  eternally”	  (Anderson	  and	  Carpenter).	  Earlier	  in	  his	  sermon,	  
Jackson	  claimed	  that	  “looking	  back	  [as	  if	  the	  civil	  rights	  days	  are	  over]	  requires	  no	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  
courage—just	  memory,”	  an	  indication	  that	  the	  true	  challenge	  was	  to	  look	  forward	  and	  to	  
act	  to	  see	  the	  promise	  of	  the	  decision.	  
	   Jackson	  is	  known	  for	  mixing	  politics	  and	  the	  pulpit,	  and	  on	  this	  occasion	  he	  not	  only	  
made	  pointed	  comments	  about	  the	  Bush	  administration,	  he	  called	  on	  his	  audience	  to	  
exercise	  their	  rights	  within	  the	  political	  system	  by	  voting.	  He	  called	  for	  those	  17	  and	  older	  
who	  were	  not	  registered	  to	  vote	  to	  stand,	  and	  then	  to	  come	  down	  to	  the	  front	  of	  the	  church	  
and	  fill	  out	  voter	  registration	  cards	  (Anderson	  and	  Carpenter)	  This	  move	  worked	  only	  
because	  of	  the	  audience	  and	  the	  setting	  from	  which	  he	  was	  speaking.	  He	  invoked	  those	  who	  
had	  given	  their	  lives	  and/or	  been	  incarcerated	  for	  their	  efforts	  to	  secure	  the	  right	  for	  these	  
African-­‐American	  citizens	  of	  the	  United	  States	  to	  vote,	  and	  cast	  the	  shaming	  eye	  on	  those	  
who	  had	  not	  honored	  those	  efforts.	  The	  roll	  call	  he	  offered	  aligned	  the	  entire	  culture	  of	  
Brown	  with	  the	  fallen,	  the	  embattled,	  and	  the	  imprisoned	  warriors	  of	  the	  civil	  rights	  
movement.	  Jackson	  called	  them	  out	  as	  if	  they	  were	  living	  monuments	  in	  the	  church:	  
“Mandela	  stayed	  in	  jail	  27	  years	  for	  this…Dr.	  King	  was	  killed	  for	  this.	  Medgar	  Evers	  was	  
killed	  for	  this”	  (Anderson	  and	  Carpenter).	  	  This	  recitation	  encouraged	  his	  hearers	  to	  align	  
themselves	  with	  these	  leaders	  they	  admired,	  to	  be	  part	  of	  a	  community	  with	  them,	  to	  
demonstrate	  their	  adherences	  to	  the	  values	  they	  represented	  by	  participating	  in	  the	  rights	  
and	  the	  process	  they	  had	  died	  for.	  He	  cautioned	  that	  “the	  struggle	  is	  not	  over,”	  that	  “Brown	  
must	  not	  be	  underestimated	  or	  overcelebrated”	  (Anderson	  and	  Carpenter).	  Jackson’s	  
remarks	  were	  not	  only	  more	  pointed	  that	  the	  others	  in	  Topeka,	  but	  they	  most	  directly	  tied	  
the	  events	  related	  to	  Brown	  to	  a	  concept	  of	  struggle,	  war	  and	  sacrifice.	  
	   The	  references	  to	  those	  who	  had	  died	  or	  been	  imprisoned	  for	  the	  promises	  offered	  
by	  the	  Constitution,	  especially	  the	  right	  to	  vote,	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  governance	  of	  the	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country	  through	  the	  election	  of	  its	  decision-­‐makers,	  linked	  the	  past	  to	  the	  future	  in	  the	  
present,	  charging	  the	  auditors	  of	  Jackson’s	  message	  with	  the	  responsibility	  to	  honor	  those	  
who	  sacrificed	  and	  fought	  in	  the	  past	  by	  participating	  and	  making	  effort	  in	  the	  future	  –	  the	  
effort	  of	  being	  directly	  engaged	  in	  the	  democratic	  process.	  In	  keeping	  with	  his	  setting,	  
Jackson	  was	  able	  to	  make	  this	  a	  spiritual	  issue.	  He	  told	  those	  who	  stood	  in	  response	  to	  his	  
call	  that	  “If	  you	  do	  not	  use	  the	  blessing	  that	  God	  gives	  you	  to	  work	  with,	  it’s	  a	  sin”	  
(Anderson	  and	  Carpenter).	  Here	  Jackson	  raised	  the	  plane	  of	  the	  dialogue	  beyond,	  or	  above,	  
race	  relations	  in	  America	  to	  a	  higher	  authority	  for	  which	  the	  members	  of	  his	  audience	  
might	  have	  more	  unquestioned	  respect.	  	  
Jackson’s	  remarks	  did	  not	  resonate	  with	  everyone	  in	  his	  audience.	  The	  Rev.	  Eric	  
Snell	  expressed	  annoyance	  that	  Jackson	  had	  “talked	  politics”	  instead	  of	  preaching,	  and	  
stated	  that	  “all	  of	  us	  do	  not	  agree	  with…his	  opinion…his	  side’s	  not	  always	  right,	  and	  in	  my	  
opinion	  he’s	  never	  right,	  particularly	  for	  African	  Americans”	  (Anderson	  and	  Carpenter).	  
Video	  records	  from	  the	  days	  events	  show	  that	  Jackson	  was	  particularly	  targeted	  by	  
protestors,	  though	  it	  is	  unclear	  in	  either	  Snell’s	  comments	  or	  the	  signage	  of	  the	  protest	  
group	  what	  specific	  aspects	  of	  Jackson’s	  comments,	  person,	  or	  politics	  were	  troubling.	  Still,	  
it	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  of	  the	  four	  speakers	  reviewed	  here,	  the	  media	  records	  only	  the	  
protests	  against	  Jackson	  in	  a	  direct	  way.	  There	  are	  references	  to	  protest	  groups	  being	  kept	  
away	  from	  the	  dedication	  ceremony	  site,	  but	  no	  specific	  references	  about	  the	  groups	  or	  the	  
nature	  of	  their	  protests	  is	  recorded.	  This	  omission	  indicates	  the	  significance	  of	  this	  
occasion	  as	  a	  unifying	  agent,	  and	  the	  importance	  to	  many	  different	  communities	  of	  it	  being	  
presented	  as	  a	  good.	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Jackson	  referred	  to	  the	  renovation	  efforts	  Topeka	  had	  made	  in	  a	  more	  direct	  way	  
than	  any	  other	  speaker.	  After	  calling	  out	  “disparities	  in	  income,	  education,	  health	  care	  and	  
incarceration	  between	  blacks	  and	  whites,”	  Jackson	  quipped	  “I	  observed	  porches	  that	  had	  
been	  fixed	  up	  because	  the	  president’s	  coming	  to	  town”	  (Anderson	  and	  Carpenter).	  The	  city	  
fathers	  would	  argue	  that	  the	  town	  had	  been	  fixed	  up	  not	  because	  of	  the	  president’s	  visit,	  
but	  because	  of	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  site	  being	  dedicated	  and	  the	  international	  spotlight	  
that	  shone	  on	  it.	  	  	  But	  the	  president	  was	  in	  fact	  coming	  to	  town,	  the	  first	  sitting	  president	  to	  
do	  so	  in	  a	  decade.	  One	  editorial	  remarked	  that	  for	  President	  Bush	  it	  was	  a	  “no-­‐win”	  
situation,	  since	  he	  didn’t	  need	  to	  come	  to	  carry	  the	  Kansas	  vote,	  but	  he	  couldn’t	  not	  come	  
without	  being	  labeled	  “insensitive	  to	  [black	  voters]”	  (“Welcome”).	  So	  his	  visit	  added	  clout	  
to	  the	  dedication	  ceremony,	  bringing	  the	  figurative	  support	  of	  America,	  the	  state,	  and	  all	  
that	  it	  stands	  for.	  The	  occasion	  called	  for	  the	  kind	  of	  state-­‐building	  or	  state-­‐celebrating	  
speech	  that	  “transcends	  partisan	  actions	  and	  selfish	  interests”	  (Hauser	  15),	  a	  speech	  that	  
provides	  individuals	  in	  its	  audience	  with	  an	  understanding	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  live	  
virtuously	  in	  the	  community,	  to	  “be	  virtuous”	  by	  “know[ing]	  the	  laws	  and	  liv[ing]	  within	  
them,”	  and	  by	  having	  a	  commitment	  to	  “ethical	  bonds	  and	  moral	  rectitude”	  (Hauser	  15-­‐16).	  
Though	  President	  Bush	  spoke	  for	  only	  a	  brief	  eleven	  minutes,	  his	  speech	  more	  than	  any	  
other	  needed	  to	  include	  these	  elements	  because	  he	  spoke	  is	  his	  role	  as	  the	  head	  of	  state.	  
Bush	  met	  both	  the	  expectations	  of	  the	  audience	  and	  the	  elements	  of	  epideictic	  form	  
through	  his	  offering	  of	  praise	  and	  blame,	  and	  recounting	  deeds	  and	  actions	  of	  the	  past	  to	  
those	  in	  the	  present	  with	  a	  view	  toward	  the	  future.	  	  
	   As	  Kerry’s	  presence	  with	  Governor	  Sebelius	  had	  been	  significant	  for	  that	  audience,	  
so	  President	  Bush’s	  entrance	  to	  the	  stage	  at	  the	  dedication	  ceremony	  alongside	  Cheryl	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Brown	  Henderson	  was	  a	  visual	  symbol	  of	  the	  commitment	  to	  the	  efforts	  that	  make	  up	  the	  
Brown	  decision	  both	  before	  and	  since	  the	  case	  was	  decided.	  Henderson	  spoke	  only	  to	  
introduce	  the	  president,	  who	  in	  turn	  claimed	  both	  the	  stage	  and	  the	  event	  as	  his	  own	  in	  his	  
opening	  greetings.	  Acknowledging	  several	  dignitaries	  in	  the	  audience,	  he	  specifically	  
acknowledged	  Governor	  Sebelius,	  saying	  she	  “is	  with	  us	  today”	  and	  directly	  to	  her,	  
“Governor,	  thank	  you	  for	  being	  here”	  (FDCH).	  One	  could	  read	  this	  as	  an	  acknowledgment	  of	  
the	  national	  character	  of	  the	  historic	  site	  and	  the	  secondary	  role	  the	  state	  location	  had	  in	  
that	  moment,	  or	  one	  could	  say	  that	  this	  was	  an	  acknowledgment	  of	  the	  political	  party	  
differences	  that	  might	  have	  kept	  the	  proclamation	  ceremony	  a	  Democratic	  event	  and	  the	  
dedication	  a	  Republican	  one.	  In	  either	  case,	  the	  president	  thanked	  only	  two	  of	  the	  12	  
individuals	  he	  named,	  the	  governor	  and	  Congressman	  Elijah	  Cummings,	  to	  whom	  he	  added	  
the	  phrase	  “proud	  you’re	  here”	  after	  thanking	  him	  for	  his	  presence.	  
	   Bush	  began	  with	  a	  direct	  reference	  to	  the	  Brown	  decision,	  one	  “that	  changed	  
America	  for	  the	  better	  and	  forever”	  (FDCH).	  He	  returned	  frequently	  to	  the	  significance	  of	  
the	  law,	  the	  courts	  and	  the	  litigants	  who	  had	  fought	  throughout	  America’s	  history	  for	  
equality,	  particular	  in	  education.	  He	  made	  reference	  to	  the	  1849	  case	  in	  Boston,	  the	  first	  
Supreme	  Court	  case	  involving	  a	  question	  of	  school	  segregation.	  He	  referred	  to	  “several	  
cases	  between	  1881	  and	  1949”	  that	  had	  been	  brought	  in	  Kansas,	  and	  noted	  that	  the	  “words	  
and	  warnings”	  of	  those	  cases	  had	  “spoken	  across	  the	  years”	  (FDCH).	  He	  made	  particular	  
note	  of	  Justice	  John	  Harlan’s	  now	  famous	  comment	  in	  his	  dissent	  in	  the	  Plessy	  case,	  when	  
Harlan	  invoked	  the	  Constitution	  as	  having	  a	  view	  in	  which	  “’the	  humblest	  is	  the	  peer	  of	  the	  
most	  powerful,”	  with	  the	  law	  “tak[ing]	  no	  account	  of	  [man’s]	  surroundings,	  or	  of	  his	  color’”	  
(FDCH).	  It	  was	  this	  language	  from	  Harlan’s	  dissent	  that	  underscored	  the	  arguments	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  
Brown	  cases,	  and	  reflects	  the	  ideal	  that	  the	  civil	  rights	  movement	  is	  tied	  to,	  the	  notion	  that	  
the	  law	  is	  “color-­‐blind”	  and	  that	  all	  Americans	  are	  entitled	  to	  equal	  rights,	  privileges	  and	  
functions	  in	  the	  community.	  Bush	  emphasized	  that	  the	  justices	  in	  the	  Brown	  decision	  had	  
based	  their	  opinion	  on	  the	  Constitution,	  where	  they	  found	  “no	  justification	  for	  the	  
segregation	  and	  humiliation	  of	  an	  entire	  race”	  (FDCH).	  	  He	  referred	  to	  the	  “earnest	  and	  
tenacious	  lawyers”	  who	  had	  to	  work	  to	  achieve	  Harlan’s	  vision,	  and	  their	  strategy	  to	  “bring	  
down	  the	  whole	  sorry	  structure	  of	  segregation,	  case	  by	  case”	  (FDCH).	  After	  recounting	  the	  
decision	  itself,	  Bush	  quickly	  shifted	  to	  the	  reality	  that	  the	  decision	  “did	  not	  end	  all	  
segregation”	  but	  just	  as	  quickly	  turned	  the	  focus	  back	  to	  the	  honorable	  efforts	  required	  of	  
virtuous	  citizens,	  continuing	  the	  effort	  to	  see	  the	  decision	  fully	  implemented,	  the	  “rising	  
demand	  for	  justice	  [that]	  would	  not	  be	  denied”	  (FDCH).	  Those	  who	  worked	  toward	  this	  
justice	  he	  called	  the	  “other	  heroes,	  cases	  and	  laws”	  of	  the	  civil	  rights	  movement.	  	  
	   The	  message	  in	  this	  part	  of	  the	  speech	  is	  clear:	  those	  who	  fought	  for	  the	  promises	  of	  
the	  Constitution	  within	  the	  system	  of	  laws	  and	  legal	  procedures	  established	  by	  that	  
Constitution	  were	  heroes,	  fighting	  valiantly	  for	  justice,	  one	  of	  America’s	  bedrock	  values.	  	  So	  
clear	  was	  this	  idea	  that	  despite	  the	  controversies	  after	  Brown	  was	  decided,	  its	  
implementation	  was	  supported	  by	  “presidential	  orders,	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  federal	  troops	  
and	  marshals.”	  But	  in	  Bush’s	  portrayal	  of	  the	  heroes	  of	  this	  effort,	  the	  “courage	  of	  children”	  
supersedes	  these	  official	  participants.	  Bush	  called	  out	  one	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  Little	  Rock	  Nine,	  
Melba	  Patillo,	  who	  had	  been	  the	  first	  students	  to	  integrate	  Central	  High	  School	  in	  Little	  
Rock,	  Arkansas.	  The	  Central	  High	  School	  situation	  is	  perhaps	  the	  best	  known	  of	  all	  the	  
events	  that	  followed	  the	  Brown	  decision,	  and	  the	  images	  of	  Elizabeth	  Eckford,	  another	  of	  
the	  Little	  Rock	  Nine	  whose	  image	  looms	  over	  either	  end	  of	  the	  Tunnel	  of	  Courage	  in	  the	  site	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being	  dedicated,	  are	  among	  the	  most	  iconic	  of	  the	  entire	  civil	  rights	  era.	  Bush	  cited	  not	  only	  
the	  incidents	  of	  physical	  abuse	  Ms.	  Patillo	  had	  endured	  at	  Central	  High,	  he	  also	  quoted	  her	  
offering	  the	  motivation	  for	  standing	  up	  to	  these	  conditions.	  “She	  says,”	  Bush	  told	  his	  
audience,	  “’I	  went	  in	  not	  through	  the	  side	  doors,	  but	  up	  the	  front	  stairs,	  and	  there	  was	  a	  
feeling	  of	  pride	  and	  hope	  that,	  yes,	  this	  is	  the	  United	  States;	  yes,	  there	  is	  a	  reason	  I	  salute	  
the	  flag;	  and	  it’s	  going	  to	  be	  okay’”	  (FDCH).	  Her	  words	  lent	  to	  his	  emphasis	  on	  Brown	  as	  
good	  for	  America.	  
	   This	  was	  an	  important	  strategy	  for	  Bush	  to	  employ,	  because	  as	  the	  son	  of	  a	  white	  
wealthy	  family	  he	  could	  not	  be	  identified	  with	  the	  struggles	  of	  either	  the	  African-­‐American	  
students	  or	  the	  civil	  rights	  lawyers	  or	  many,	  like	  the	  Freedom	  Riders	  and	  the	  lunch	  counter	  
sit-­‐in	  participants,	  who	  faced	  the	  daily	  challenges	  and	  dangers	  of	  ending	  segregation	  in	  the	  
civil	  rights	  era.	  By	  giving	  these	  important	  words	  about	  pride	  and	  patriotism	  to	  the	  African-­‐
American	  front-­‐line	  student,	  Bush	  allowed	  the	  entire	  African-­‐American	  community	  to	  claim	  
these	  sentiments	  as	  their	  own,	  thus	  owning	  and	  identifying	  with	  the	  promises	  of	  Brown	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  rights	  and	  privileges	  of	  the	  Constitution	  as	  their	  own.	  In	  this	  way,	  Bush	  provided	  
a	  means	  for	  transcending,	  if	  only	  for	  that	  moment,	  the	  divisions	  and	  competing	  interests	  
that	  even	  he	  acknowledged	  continued	  to	  exist.	  Simultaneously,	  by	  appropriating	  the	  words	  
of	  this	  African-­‐American	  woman	  rather	  than	  sharing	  the	  platform	  with	  her,	  Bush	  kept	  the	  
location	  of	  the	  speech	  at	  the	  state	  level,	  and	  made	  the	  individual	  story	  part	  of	  the	  state-­‐
crafting	  effect	  of	  the	  speech.	  
	   Bush	  summarized	  the	  history	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  Brown	  decision	  in	  a	  few	  paragraphs,	  
including	  the	  slave	  ships,	  civil	  war,	  and	  Jim	  Crow	  segregation.	  His	  descriptors	  for	  these	  
events,	  and	  particularly	  for	  those	  who	  supported	  them,	  clearly	  indicated	  the	  degree	  to	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which	  these	  practices	  were	  contrary	  to	  American	  ideals.	  He	  referred	  to	  the	  “cruel	  and	  petty	  
men”	  who	  “supervised”	  every	  aspect	  of	  African	  American	  life	  under	  Jim	  Crow,	  and	  the	  
“codified	  cruelty,	  at	  the	  service	  of	  racism”	  that	  defined	  this	  culture.	  He	  recounted	  the	  
everyday	  activities	  that	  were	  determined	  by	  skin	  color,	  and	  summarized	  that	  portion	  of	  the	  
speech	  with	  a	  reference	  to	  education,	  the	  institution	  where	  “children	  were	  instructed	  early	  
in	  the	  customs	  of	  racial	  division”	  (FDCH).	  In	  his	  clearest	  reference,	  Bush	  stated	  clearly	  that	  
“segregation	  dulled	  the	  conscience	  of	  people	  who	  knew	  better.	  It	  fed	  the	  violence	  of	  people	  
with	  malice	  in	  their	  hearts.	  And	  however	  it	  was	  defended,	  segregation	  could	  never	  be	  
squared	  with	  the	  ideals	  of	  America”	  (FDCH).	  	  
Having	  clearly	  established	  this	  distinction	  between	  that	  history	  that	  created	  
segregation	  and	  America’s	  ideals,	  Bush	  moved	  into	  he	  significance	  of	  the	  Brown	  decision	  
and	  those	  who	  worked	  to	  create	  it.	  He	  referred	  to	  Charles	  Hamilton	  Houston	  and	  “young	  
Thurgood	  Marshall”	  traveling	  throughout	  the	  South	  “in	  a	  1929	  Ford”	  with	  Marshall	  “typing	  
briefs	  in	  the	  car”	  (FDCH).	  This	  portrayal	  honored	  Houston	  and	  Marshall	  not	  for	  their	  
Supreme	  Court	  arguments	  or	  successes,	  but	  for	  the	  day	  to	  day	  efforts	  in	  the	  early	  years	  to	  
push	  for	  change,	  going	  “courthouse	  to	  courthouse”	  as	  citizen-­‐lawyers	  working	  to	  bring	  
justice	  to	  those	  areas.	  Bush	  highlighted	  the	  research	  they	  did	  “document[ing]	  the	  often	  
poor	  conditions”	  and	  “pursu[ing]	  a	  strategy	  to	  bring	  down	  the	  whole	  sorry	  structure”	  
(FDCH).	  The	  individuals	  in	  the	  audience	  are	  thus	  invited	  to	  see	  themselves	  working	  for	  
important	  causes	  in	  a	  similar	  way,	  to	  document	  a	  wrong	  and	  pursue	  a	  strategy	  to	  make	  it	  
right.	  	  
Toward	  the	  end	  of	  his	  speech,	  Bush	  moved	  from	  the	  presentation	  of	  past	  events	  to	  
the	  needs	  of	  the	  future	  and	  the	  obligations	  of	  his	  audience.	  After	  telling	  the	  story	  of	  Melba	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Patillo,	  Bush	  reminded	  the	  audience	  that	  “it	  was	  a	  child	  that	  had	  to	  walk	  the	  gauntlet	  of	  
slurs	  and	  jeers	  into	  a	  school,”	  and	  acknowledged	  that	  “America	  is	  still	  grateful	  to	  every	  
child	  who	  make	  that	  walk”	  (FDCH).	  Again	  there	  is	  the	  unifying	  reference	  to	  America,	  and	  at	  
the	  same	  time	  a	  gloss	  over	  a	  history	  of	  conflict	  and	  controversy	  about	  what	  should	  be	  true	  
in	  how	  children	  are	  educated.	  Absent	  are	  references	  to	  the	  violence	  in	  Boston	  in	  responses	  
to	  mandatory	  bussing	  programs,	  or	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  repudiation	  of	  combining	  urban	  
and	  suburban	  school	  districts	  for	  purposes	  of	  achieving	  true	  equality	  and	  diversity	  
(Milliken	  v.	  Bradley).	  	  By	  presenting	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  decision	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  individuals	  
who	  suffered	  for	  efforts	  to	  implement	  it,	  the	  speech	  served	  to	  call	  the	  audience	  to	  identify	  
with	  those	  trying	  to	  achieve	  Brown	  and	  to	  dismiss	  any	  sense	  of	  identification	  with	  those	  
who	  opposed	  any	  aspect	  of	  the	  integrative	  efforts.	  In	  Bush’s	  remarks,	  to	  think	  that	  the	  
schools	  should	  not	  have	  been	  integrated,	  that	  these	  children	  should	  not	  have	  made	  that	  
walk,	  was	  to	  be	  un-­‐American.	  	  
Having	  established	  the	  right	  way	  to	  think	  about	  past	  events,	  Bush	  brought	  that	  past	  
forward,	  reminding	  those	  present	  that	  “segregation	  is	  a	  living	  memory,	  and	  many	  still	  carry	  
its	  scars,”	  and	  that	  “the	  habits	  of	  racism	  in	  America	  have	  not	  all	  been	  broken”	  (FDCH).	  
Therefore,	  “the	  habits	  of	  respect	  must	  be	  taught	  to	  every	  generation,”	  and	  “laws	  against	  
racial	  discrimination	  must	  be	  vigorously	  enforced”	  (FDCH).	  But	  rather	  than	  leave	  these	  
needs	  at	  the	  level	  of	  government	  or	  other	  officials,	  Bush	  returned	  to	  the	  individuals,	  and	  
concluded	  his	  speech	  with	  a	  combination	  salute	  to	  the	  past	  and	  call	  to	  the	  present.	  He	  
acknowledged	  here,	  at	  the	  end,	  that	  “America	  has	  yet	  to	  reach	  the	  high	  calling	  of	  its	  own	  
ideals,”	  but	  immediately	  diminished	  that	  shortcoming	  by	  invoking	  the	  effort	  and	  the	  
ongoing	  attempts	  to	  do	  better	  as	  “a	  nation	  that	  strives	  to	  do	  right”	  (FDCH).	  Because	  the	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effort	  and	  the	  striving	  are	  the	  important	  elements,	  “we	  honor	  those	  who	  expose	  our	  
failures,	  correct	  our	  course,	  and	  make	  us	  a	  better	  people”	  (FDCH).	  Looking	  again	  at	  the	  
ideals	  presented	  in	  the	  oration,	  rebuke	  and	  correction	  are	  to	  be	  valued.	  As	  Bush	  returned	  to	  
the	  event	  of	  that	  day	  he	  invoked	  one	  more	  set	  of	  behaviors	  that	  are	  honorable,	  as	  “on	  this	  
day,	  in	  this	  place,	  we	  remember	  with	  gratitude	  the	  good	  souls	  who	  saw	  a	  great	  wrong,	  and	  
stood	  their	  ground,	  and	  won	  their	  case”	  (FDCH).	  To	  be	  a	  “good	  soul”	  as	  an	  American	  is	  to	  be	  
on	  the	  lookout	  for	  social	  injustice	  and	  other	  “great	  wrongs,”	  to	  take	  up	  these	  causes	  and	  see	  
them	  through	  to	  a	  satisfactory	  conclusion,	  but	  to	  do	  so	  in	  the	  appropriate	  ways,	  in	  order	  to	  
“win	  [the]	  case”	  (FDCH).	  	  
Bush’s	  speech	  had	  the	  clearest	  delineation	  of	  Brown	  as	  symbolic	  of	  the	  best	  of	  
American	  idealism	  and	  provides	  the	  most	  direct	  contrast	  of	  individuals	  acting	  honorably	  or	  
not	  in	  their	  place	  as	  Americans.	  But	  even	  with	  their	  differing	  foci,	  the	  similarities	  in	  all	  the	  
speeches	  concerning	  America	  and	  its	  values	  as	  reflected	  in	  this	  one	  decision	  are	  striking,	  
almost	  as	  if	  that	  part	  of	  each	  speech	  had	  been	  scripted	  by	  the	  same	  author.	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  
and	  taken	  as	  a	  group,	  the	  speeches	  in	  Topeka	  transcend	  the	  political	  and	  partisan	  
differences	  between	  the	  speakers.	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  America,	  the	  whole,	  these	  speeches	  all	  
functioned	  to	  build	  a	  sense	  of	  community	  around	  the	  values	  that	  Brown	  represents,	  
whether	  or	  not	  those	  values	  are	  articulated	  in	  the	  particular	  speech.	  The	  speeches	  indicate	  
that	  whatever	  divides	  us	  on	  the	  Brown	  issue,	  what	  we	  have	  in	  common	  is	  respect	  for	  the	  
rule	  of	  law.	  They	  carry	  a	  common	  theme	  that	  Brown	  was	  and	  is	  good	  for	  the	  country.	  The	  
question	  is	  no	  longer	  whether	  Brown	  was	  good	  law	  or	  not,	  or	  whether	  the	  arguments	  were	  
sound	  or	  not,	  but	  rather	  how	  each	  individual	  and	  the	  collective	  “we”	  of	  each	  community	  of	  
hearers	  will	  work	  to	  achieve	  the	  ideal	  represented	  in	  the	  decision.	  This	  works	  in	  part	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because	  the	  audience	  already	  buys	  in	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  Brown	  was	  good,	  and	  so	  the	  speeches	  
present	  amplifying	  examples	  and	  summative	  statements	  to	  increase	  the	  adherence	  to	  the	  
values	  represented	  and	  future	  policy	  decision	  based	  on	  the	  presumption	  of	  Brown	  as	  right.	  
The	  messages	  remind	  the	  hearers	  that	  it	  is	  up	  to	  them,	  or	  in	  the	  plural	  associative	  voice	  of	  
the	  speakers,	  up	  to	  “we”	  and	  “us”	  to	  uphold	  the	  ideals	  of	  our	  own	  country,	  ideals	  that	  Brown	  
reinscribed	  to	  us	  and	  the	  world.	  	  
In	  these	  speeches,	  the	  state	  (America)	  is	  cast	  as	  honorable	  and	  virtuous	  because	  it	  
has	  Brown,	  this	  law	  that	  had	  its	  beginning	  in	  this	  place	  (Topeka)	  and	  here	  will	  stand	  the	  
monument	  to	  the	  law	  and	  those	  who	  worked	  to	  achieve	  it.	  This	  state-­‐crafting	  message	  
appears	  across	  the	  Topeka	  speeches,	  appealing	  to	  the	  audience’s	  presumed	  shared	  sense	  of	  
moral	  rightness.	  Brown’s	  staying	  power	  has	  been	  in	  its	  appeal	  to	  moral	  rightness,	  a	  pathetic	  
appeal	  backed	  by	  a	  strong	  ethical	  appeal	  to	  being	  an	  American.	  The	  Brown	  decision	  is	  the	  
representative	  figure	  for	  that	  which	  is	  honorable,	  and	  insofar	  as	  the	  whole	  civil	  rights	  
movement	  is	  identified	  as	  beginning	  with	  Brown,	  it	  follows	  that	  those	  who	  put	  their	  minds	  
and	  bodies	  into	  the	  struggle	  to	  bring	  about	  the	  reality	  of	  that	  decision	  are	  also	  honorable.	  
To	  have	  physical	  scars	  from	  the	  efforts	  is	  to	  carry	  the	  emblems	  of	  courage.	  To	  have	  died	  in	  
the	  struggle	  is	  to	  have	  become	  the	  sacrifice	  for	  which	  the	  present	  generation	  must	  take	  the	  
actions	  and	  exercise	  the	  rights	  that	  the	  slain	  died	  for.	  To	  work	  against	  the	  tools	  designed	  to	  
facilitate	  implementation	  of	  the	  Brown	  decision	  (the	  affirmative	  action	  programs,	  
mentioned	  in	  Kerry’s	  speech,	  for	  example),	  is	  to	  work	  against	  American	  ideals.	  To	  be	  
American	  requires	  a	  recommitment	  to	  seeing	  the	  promise	  of	  Brown	  fulfilled,	  as	  all	  of	  the	  
speakers	  called	  for.	  The	  dedication	  speeches	  function	  to	  frame	  the	  acceptable	  discourse	  
about	  Brown,	  its	  legacy,	  and	  the	  way(s)	  to	  achieve	  its	  promise.	  The	  speeches,	  with	  their	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overlapping	  and	  thus	  amplified	  messages,	  provide	  the	  “vocabulary	  for	  expressing”	  the	  
“public	  issue…”	  that	  Brown	  still	  comprises	  (Hauser	  6).	  That	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  they	  shut	  
down	  all	  discussion	  about	  what	  Brown	  means	  or	  how	  to	  achieve	  its	  promises.	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  
exactly	  at	  this	  point,	  the	  point	  of	  identifying	  solutions	  to	  the	  under-­‐achievement	  so	  often	  
noted	  in	  the	  anniversary	  discourse,	  that	  Brown	  frames	  a	  national	  dialogue.	  Although	  this	  
dialogue	  doesn’t	  play	  out	  in	  one-­‐to-­‐one	  conversations	  or	  debates,	  it	  does	  have	  a	  dialectical	  
quality	  as	  many	  speakers	  engage	  with	  the	  claims	  of	  others—mostly	  as	  represented	  in	  mass	  
media—in	  a	  search	  for	  how	  to	  construct	  the	  just	  society	  with	  equal	  opportunity	  that	  is	  
Brown’s	  promise.	  This	  dialogue	  will	  be	  the	  subject	  of	  chapter	  four.	  	  
However	  various	  communities	  discuss	  issues	  of	  equality	  in	  education	  or	  other	  social	  
structures,	  the	  language	  of	  the	  Brown	  decision	  and	  a	  presumption	  of	  its	  rightness	  will	  guide	  
the	  discourse.	  	  Sebelius	  put	  Kansas	  as	  the	  lead	  example,	  challenging	  Kansans	  to	  continue	  to	  
uphold	  that	  leadership	  role	  in	  the	  struggle	  for	  equality	  and	  freedom,	  while	  as	  the	  same	  time	  
calling	  on	  America	  to	  follow	  the	  Kansas	  example.	  Kerry’s	  remarks	  challenged	  policies	  of	  the	  
Bush	  administration,	  particularly	  countering	  the	  “teach	  every	  child”	  claim	  in	  Bush’s	  speech	  
by	  referring	  to	  money	  (funding	  for	  schools).	  The	  statistics	  he	  cited	  further	  amplified	  the	  
focus	  on	  economic	  differences.	  Jackson	  called	  for	  civic	  engagement	  first,	  and	  then	  also	  
critiqued	  the	  Bush	  administration	  efforts.	  Bush’s	  remarks	  were	  carefully	  crafted	  in	  the	  
voice	  of	  all	  America,	  the	  voice	  of	  “we,	  the	  people,”	  that	  called	  with	  whole	  audience	  into	  
identification	  with	  the	  nation	  as	  a	  whole	  throughout	  time,	  with	  no	  specifically	  identifiable	  
target	  for	  the	  shortcomings	  or	  errors	  of	  history	  he	  identified.	  These	  differences	  point	  to	  the	  
challenges	  of	  living	  up	  to	  the	  ideal,	  and	  serve	  as	  calls	  to	  the	  differing	  audiences	  to	  
participate	  in	  ways	  that	  those	  separate	  audiences	  can	  imagine	  being	  both	  engaged	  and	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successful.	  Each	  audience	  was	  a	  predisposition	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  speaker,	  and	  each	  speaker	  
gave	  a	  means	  for	  effecting	  change	  that	  those	  in	  the	  audience	  could	  imagine	  being	  part	  of.	  
They	  could,	  for	  example,	  participate	  in	  the	  voting	  process,	  as	  Jackson	  called	  his	  follower’s	  to	  
do.	  Or	  they	  could	  identity	  with	  the	  values	  extolled	  in	  Bush’s	  speech,	  and	  participate	  in	  
praising	  examples	  of	  those	  virtues	  in	  their	  own	  communities.	  They	  could	  identify	  areas	  of	  
shortcoming	  identified	  by	  Senator	  Kerry	  and	  work	  to	  correct	  them	  as	  a	  means	  of	  service	  to	  
the	  state.	  In	  each	  of	  these	  cases,	  the	  individual	  could	  demonstrate	  adherence	  to	  the	  ideas	  
presented	  to	  them	  by	  acting.	  
Brown	  provides,	  as	  Hauser	  argues,	  the	  “story	  of	  lived	  virtue”	  and	  demonstrates	  “a	  
larger	  commitment	  to	  ethical	  bonds	  and	  moral	  rectitude”	  within	  the	  structures	  of	  America	  
that	  made	  it	  unique	  in	  the	  world	  at	  the	  point	  of	  its	  founding	  –	  democracy	  and	  the	  rule	  of	  
law	  (14,	  16).	  More	  significantly,	  the	  decision	  “inculcates	  a	  common	  vocabulary	  of	  
excellence	  among	  its	  witnesses”	  (Hauser	  19).	  These	  witnesses,	  who	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  
hearing	  these	  speeches	  were	  not	  asked	  to	  make	  any	  decision	  or	  judgment	  about	  them,	  are	  
still	  members	  of	  the	  society	  who	  will	  make	  future	  policy	  decisions	  respecting	  education	  
and	  equality	  more	  generally.	  Jackson	  called	  out	  this	  civic	  function	  directly	  in	  his	  opening	  
remarks,	  and	  so	  his	  approach	  was	  more	  directive.	  The	  effects	  of	  the	  epideictic	  forms,	  
however,	  just	  as	  Perelman	  and	  Olbrechts-­‐Tyteca	  argued,	  influence	  the	  minds	  of	  the	  hearers,	  
shaping	  future	  thinking	  and	  decision	  making	  by	  them.	  The	  repetition	  throughout	  the	  day	  
on	  the	  key	  themes	  of	  America	  being	  changed	  by	  Brown,	  being	  a	  better	  place	  because	  of	  
Brown,	  that	  the	  conditions	  prior	  to	  Brown	  “could	  never	  be	  squared	  with	  the	  ideals	  of	  
America,”	  that	  our	  lives	  –	  all	  our	  lives	  –	  were	  changed,	  that	  we	  as	  a	  nation	  have	  achieved	  
“remarkable	  advances,”	  all	  service	  to	  increasing	  adherence	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  the	  audience	  to	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the	  idea	  of	  Brown	  being	  a	  good	  decision,	  brought	  about	  from	  the	  best	  of	  individual	  moral	  
effort.	  The	  stories	  embedded	  in	  each	  speech,	  whether	  tales	  of	  individual	  contributors	  to	  the	  
decision	  or	  tales	  of	  departures	  from	  its	  vision	  in	  statistics	  or	  other	  measures,	  “provide	  
insight	  into	  how	  a	  public	  sphere	  may	  serve	  as	  the	  crucible	  in	  which	  a	  people	  constitute	  and	  
validate	  their	  tradition”	  (Hauser	  18).	  	  Perelman	  and	  Olbrechts-­‐Tyteca	  argue	  that	  epideictic	  
oratory	  is	  practiced	  by	  those	  who	  “defend	  the	  traditional	  and	  accepted	  values”	  of	  a	  society,	  
and	  that	  such	  speeches	  tend	  to	  “appeal	  to	  a	  universal	  order,	  to	  a	  nature,	  or	  a	  god	  that	  would	  
vouch	  for	  the	  unquestioned,	  and	  supposedly	  unquestionable,	  values”	  (52).	  Values	  such	  as	  
freedom,	  opportunity,	  and	  equality	  are	  the	  kinds	  of	  universal	  terms	  these	  scholars	  had	  in	  
mind,	  and	  these	  speeches	  all	  emphasize	  those	  values.	  
The	  speeches	  in	  Topeka	  helped	  the	  audience	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  and	  justify	  the	  
violence	  associated	  with	  the	  struggle	  for	  civil	  rights,	  both	  before	  and	  after	  the	  Brown	  
decision.	  This	  was	  accomplished	  in	  several	  different	  elements,	  from	  Jackson’s	  
admonishment	  to	  his	  parishioners	  to	  register	  to	  vote	  in	  honor	  of	  those	  who	  died	  to	  attain	  
that	  right	  for	  them,	  to	  Bush’s	  salute	  to	  the	  courage	  of	  the	  children	  who	  were	  the	  front-­‐line	  
integrators	  of	  their	  schools.	  This	  is	  one	  way	  that	  the	  speeches	  combine	  to	  “connect	  the	  
participants	  to	  the	  cosmos	  or	  to	  a	  transcendent	  principle”	  (Carter	  220).	  The	  principle	  at	  
work	  is	  the	  struggle	  for	  that	  most	  cherished	  of	  American	  ideals:	  freedom,	  and	  with	  it	  the	  
attendant	  values	  of	  equality	  and	  justice.	  The	  participants	  in	  the	  events	  were	  connected	  by	  
their	  participation	  and	  support	  of	  the	  new	  historic	  site	  to	  that	  struggle,	  they	  assumed	  the	  
side	  of	  the	  victors	  and	  took	  on	  the	  moral	  authority	  of	  those	  being	  honored	  as	  they	  gave	  
agreement	  that	  the	  struggle	  is	  not	  over,	  that	  the	  ideals	  have	  not	  been	  realized,	  but	  that	  the	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efforts	  would	  continue	  and	  that	  all,	  each	  participant	  as	  well	  as	  the	  whole,	  would	  be	  better	  
people	  for	  engaging	  it.	  
The	  speeches	  work	  together	  to	  build	  communitas,	  or	  community,	  around	  these	  
universal	  terms.	  Linking	  Brown	  directly	  and	  repeatedly	  with	  these	  terms	  increases	  the	  
audiences’	  acceptance	  of	  the	  decision	  as	  facilitating,	  if	  not	  accomplishing,	  these	  goals.	  
Perelman	  and	  Olbrechts-­‐Tyteca	  argue	  that	  community	  is	  built	  through	  the	  increased	  
adherence	  to	  shared,	  or	  communal	  values.	  Carter	  argues	  that	  this	  comes	  about	  through	  the	  
praise	  that	  is	  often	  main	  focus	  of	  an	  epideictic	  performance,	  and	  that	  this	  is	  “the	  anti-­‐
structure	  that	  breaks	  down	  societal	  divisions	  and	  defines	  a	  sense	  of	  community”	  (225).	  In	  
Topeka,	  the	  audience	  in	  any	  of	  the	  formal	  events	  of	  the	  weekend	  were	  among	  the	  
“Athenians”	  –	  those	  who	  already	  believed	  in	  the	  significance	  of	  Brown	  and	  the	  importance	  
of	  this	  commemorative	  event.	  The	  protestors,	  and	  there	  were	  some	  protest	  groups	  out	  
during	  these	  events,	  were	  kept	  away	  from	  the	  main	  events	  and	  were	  barely	  acknowledged	  
by	  the	  press.	  The	  speakers,	  therefore,	  were	  praising	  Brown	  and	  those	  who	  worked	  to	  bring	  
it	  and	  the	  entire	  civil	  rights	  movement	  about	  to	  a	  group	  of	  listeners	  who	  already	  identified	  
with	  those	  ideas	  and	  already	  shared	  in	  that	  set	  of	  values.	  The	  Topeka	  speeches	  underscore	  
that	  whatever	  our	  differing	  alliances,	  whether	  state	  residence,	  political	  party	  affiliation	  or	  
denominational	  preference,	  we	  are	  all	  Americans,	  and	  the	  ideals	  and	  values	  of	  America	  
unite	  us	  despite	  our	  differences.	  The	  continued	  reference	  to	  “America’s	  ideals”	  is	  the	  
binding	  concept	  that	  gives	  Brown	  its	  power.	  The	  link	  to	  the	  Constitution	  and	  the	  ideology	  of	  
our	  founding,	  these	  ideals	  unite	  the	  entire	  country	  even	  though	  we	  have	  difference	  in	  its	  
interpretation.	  But	  all	  the	  references	  to	  the	  ideals	  presume	  a	  language	  one	  must	  agree	  to	  in	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order	  to	  be	  part	  of	  this	  community	  that	  the	  language	  itself	  builds.	  We	  all	  believe	  in	  freedom,	  
equality	  and	  justice,	  even	  if	  we	  still	  debate	  openly	  the	  policies	  that	  best	  bring	  these	  about.	  	  
Perelman	  and	  Olbrechts-­‐Tyteca	  argue	  that	  epideictic	  and	  education	  are	  linked,	  that	  
epideictic	  rhetoric	  has	  an	  educative	  function	  and	  education	  is	  often	  an	  epideictic	  
performance.	  Hauser	  builds	  on	  this	  and	  argues	  that	  those	  who	  become	  the	  examples	  of	  
virtue	  “are	  not	  themselves	  the	  teachers	  of	  society”	  (15).	  Instead,	  it	  is	  the	  epideictic	  function	  
that	  teaches	  by	  their	  example	  what	  noble	  qualities	  are	  to	  be	  pursued.	  This	  is	  exactly	  what	  
appears	  in	  the	  praises	  offered	  in	  Topeka,	  for	  the	  tenacity	  of	  the	  lawyers,	  for	  the	  courage	  of	  
the	  students,	  for	  the	  pursuit	  of	  justice	  for	  all	  citizens.	  The	  speeches	  validate	  the	  
establishment	  of	  the	  Brown	  v	  Board	  of	  Education	  National	  Historic	  Site	  and	  National	  Park	  
as	  fitting	  and	  proper,	  as	  a	  tribute	  to	  the	  “good	  souls”	  who	  fought,	  argued,	  and	  decided	  the	  
case.	  Those	  who	  were	  the	  objects	  of	  this	  praise	  were	  simply	  working	  toward	  a	  cause,	  
“heroes	  caught	  up	  in	  the	  forward	  press	  of	  their	  actions,”	  who	  did	  what	  they	  needed	  to	  do,	  
and	  whose	  acts	  gain	  stature	  “in	  the	  storyteller’s	  province	  of	  how	  their	  deeds	  are	  narrated”	  
(Hauser	  15).	  The	  education	  function	  comes	  from	  telling	  those	  parts	  of	  the	  story	  that	  best	  
direct	  the	  desired	  behavior	  within	  the	  community.	  In	  Topeka,	  the	  audience	  is	  educated	  by	  
references	  to	  deeds	  of	  the	  past,	  but	  also	  by	  reminders	  that	  although	  the	  ideals	  are	  not	  yet	  
achieved,	  it	  is	  the	  continued	  efforts,	  the	  “striv[ing]	  to	  do	  right”	  that	  is	  the	  most	  important	  
quality.	  	  
Striving	  allows	  for	  difference,	  and	  the	  “vibrant	  public	  realm”	  envisioned	  by	  Hauser	  
requires	  apparatus	  for	  working	  out	  differences,	  for	  open	  discourse	  on	  challenging	  and	  
polarizing	  issues.	  In	  this	  sense,	  Brown	  is	  the	  grounding	  framework	  for	  discourse	  on	  issues	  
of	  racial	  or	  educational	  equality.	  Nearly	  all	  public	  discourse	  about	  race	  and	  equality	  after	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the	  fiftieth	  anniversary	  is	  framed	  in	  terms	  defined	  by	  Brown.	  While	  this	  did	  not	  begin	  with	  
the	  fiftieth	  anniversary,	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  National	  Historic	  Site	  began	  a	  renewed	  
attention	  to	  and	  discourse	  about	  the	  decision	  and	  its	  meaning,	  broadening	  both	  the	  scope	  
and	  scale	  of	  the	  discussion	  until	  the	  term	  Brown	  became	  central	  to	  those	  discussions.	  
Earlier	  debates	  over	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  decision,	  as	  Wechsler’s	  famous	  argument	  that	  the	  
decision	  violated	  the	  neutral	  principles	  standard	  for	  judicial	  propriety,	  are	  gone.	  The	  
acceptable	  discourse	  now	  presumes	  Brown’s	  rightness	  and	  the	  moral	  imperative	  of	  an	  
integrated	  social	  system.	  Even	  in	  law,	  where	  a	  series	  of	  cases	  have	  tested	  the	  extent	  to	  
which	  states	  can	  decide	  what	  is	  and	  is	  not	  equal	  treatment	  and	  how	  far	  equality	  can	  be	  
reverse-­‐engineered	  through	  affirmative	  action	  programs,	  no	  one,	  other	  than	  Derrick	  Bell,	  
whose	  objection	  will	  be	  discussed	  further	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  has	  argued	  that	  Brown	  was	  
wrongly	  decided	  or	  that	  it	  should	  be	  reversed.	  	  
What	  the	  speeches	  in	  Topeka	  show	  in	  their	  clear	  lines	  of	  demarcation	  between	  the	  
better	  America	  Brown	  created	  and	  the	  many	  areas	  where	  the	  promise	  of	  that	  decision	  
remain	  unfulfilled	  is	  the	  line	  of	  demarcation	  between	  the	  limits	  of	  law	  and	  the	  public	  realm.	  
Where	  the	  state’s	  limits	  are	  set,	  societal	  obligation	  begins,	  the	  ability	  to	  negotiate	  that	  
obligation	  within	  the	  bounds	  of	  the	  law	  is	  one	  of	  the	  central	  points	  of	  praise	  in	  the	  Topeka	  
speeches.	  The	  obligation	  is	  to	  determine	  what	  will	  and	  will	  not	  reflect	  accepted	  communal	  
values	  in	  practice.	  This	  is	  the	  differential	  point	  in	  the	  ongoing	  dialogue	  about	  the	  Brown	  
decision.	  From	  the	  declaration	  of	  Brown	  II,	  in	  May	  1955,	  the	  lofty	  goals	  of	  the	  Brown	  I	  
decision	  have	  been	  left	  up	  to	  local	  constituencies	  to	  enact.	  	  The	  history	  of	  Brown’s	  
enactment,	  or	  in	  some	  cases	  the	  various	  forms	  of	  rebellion	  against	  it,	  have	  been	  
documented	  in	  many	  places,	  including	  now	  the	  Brown	  v	  Board	  of	  Education	  National	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Historic	  Site.	  Even	  after	  the	  fiftieth	  anniversary,	  many	  of	  the	  conditions	  outlined	  in	  the	  
various	  speeches	  exist,	  because	  Brown	  is	  only	  one	  of	  several	  competing	  narratives	  and,	  as	  
Perelman	  and	  Olbrechts-­‐Tyteca	  argue,	  some	  values	  “which	  might	  not	  be	  contested	  when	  
considered	  on	  their	  own…may	  nevertheless	  not	  prevail	  against	  other	  values	  that	  might	  
come	  into	  conflict	  with	  them”	  (51).	  The	  next	  chapter	  presents	  some	  of	  these	  other	  
conflicting	  values	  and	  analyzes	  the	  effects	  of	  praising	  Athens	  among	  Peloponnesians,	  or	  




Of	  Folkways	  and	  Stateways:	  Brown	  as	  Dialectic	  
The	  50th	  anniversary	  of	  Brown	  v	  Board	  of	  Education	  generated	  an	  enormous	  body	  of	  
writing,	  including	  hundreds	  of	  articles	  in	  newspapers	  throughout	  the	  country.	  Many	  of	  
these	  articles	  reported	  on	  the	  National	  Law	  Day	  events	  in	  their	  areas,	  some	  gave	  histories	  
of	  their	  local	  school’s	  efforts	  to	  comply	  with	  Brown,	  many	  offered	  assessments	  of	  how	  the	  
promise	  of	  Brown	  was	  (or	  was	  not)	  being	  fulfilled,	  and	  several	  focused	  on	  the	  new	  Brown	  v	  
Board	  of	  Education	  National	  Historic	  site	  and	  the	  dedication	  events	  in	  Topeka	  over	  the	  
weekend	  of	  May	  15-­‐17,	  2004.	  The	  speeches	  offered	  at	  the	  dedication	  ceremonies	  presented	  
Brown	  as	  a	  public	  good,	  a	  decision	  that	  had	  changed	  America	  for	  the	  better,	  and	  one	  that	  
embodied	  the	  highest	  of	  American	  ideals.	  This	  theme	  can	  also	  be	  found	  in	  many	  of	  the	  
articles	  written	  at	  that	  time,	  suggesting	  that	  by	  the	  time	  it	  had	  reached	  its	  fiftieth	  
anniversary	  mark,	  the	  Brown	  decision	  was	  universally	  accepted	  as	  transformational.	  
Compared	  to	  the	  conditions	  outlined	  in	  many	  of	  the	  articles	  and	  even	  in	  some	  of	  the	  
dedication	  speeches,	  however,	  this	  transformational	  quality	  is	  less	  clear.	  In	  fact,	  all	  of	  the	  
speeches	  seemed	  to	  share	  the	  common	  acknowledgment	  that	  America	  had	  not	  achieved	  the	  
ideals	  or	  promises	  of	  the	  Brown	  decision,	  with	  a	  range	  of	  different	  conditions	  and	  statistics	  
provided	  in	  support	  of	  that	  claim.	  Public	  memory	  is,	  according	  to	  Kendall	  Phillips,	  mutable,	  
and	  subject	  to	  contestation.	  But,	  as	  Chapter	  2	  discussed,	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Brown	  v	  
Board	  of	  Education	  National	  Historic	  Site	  encountered	  little	  or	  no	  resistance	  once	  its	  
proposal	  intersected	  with	  federal	  government	  interests	  and	  funding.	  Further,	  Chapter	  3	  
showed	  some	  of	  the	  remarkable	  similarities	  in	  the	  speeches	  of	  four	  racially	  and	  politically	  
different	  speakers	  at	  the	  dedication	  of	  that	  site.	  In	  both	  the	  site	  and	  the	  speeches,	  there	  is	  a	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notable	  absence	  of	  the	  contestation	  one	  should	  expect	  from	  the	  recounting	  of	  such	  a	  
publicly	  memorable	  and	  originally	  controversial	  event.	  
President	  Bush	  offered	  one	  possible	  reason	  for	  this,	  that	  the	  issues	  of	  segregation	  
and	  discrimination	  from	  which	  Brown	  was	  the	  turning	  point	  happened	  long	  ago.	  Americans	  
not	  old	  enough	  to	  have	  been	  part	  of	  the	  Brown	  era	  or	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Movement	  
understand	  the	  decision	  differently	  than	  do	  those	  who	  were	  part	  of	  these	  events.	  It’s	  
difficult	  in	  the	  21st	  century	  to	  imagine	  living	  under	  Jim	  Crow	  segregation.	  And	  that	  leads	  to	  
the	  danger	  of	  forgetting	  that	  these	  conditions	  were	  real,	  to	  dismiss	  contemporary	  concerns	  
about	  recurring	  segregationist	  patterns	  or	  inequalities	  in	  society.	  The	  epideictic	  occasion	  
re-­‐invigorates	  discussion,	  and	  efforts	  like	  the	  Voices	  of	  Civil	  Rights	  project	  sponsored	  by	  
AARP	  and	  the	  Library	  of	  Congress,	  or	  the	  Tunnel	  of	  Courage	  in	  the	  Brown	  v	  Board	  of	  
Education	  National	  Historic	  Site,	  attempt	  to	  make	  those	  conditions	  more	  real	  and	  
provocative	  for	  current	  discussants.	  
Gerald	  Hauser	  argues	  that	  epideictic	  rhetoric	  provides	  the	  means	  for	  a	  “vibrant	  
public	  sphere,”	  where	  participants	  can	  imagine	  democracy	  as	  more	  than	  just	  a	  possibility.	  
The	  Brown	  decision	  has	  arguably	  impacted	  American	  social	  and	  political	  life	  more	  than	  any	  
other	  Supreme	  Court	  decision.	  But	  its	  ongoing	  value	  may	  not	  be	  in	  its	  power	  as	  law	  or	  in	  its	  
transformational	  properties.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I’ll	  argue	  that	  the	  ongoing	  function	  of	  the	  
Brown	  decision,	  and	  its	  most	  significant	  value	  for	  its	  next	  fifty	  years,	  lies	  in	  its	  dialectical	  
function,	  in	  the	  way	  it	  continues	  to	  provoke	  national	  thought,	  conversation	  and	  dialogue	  on	  
issues	  of	  equality	  in	  education	  and	  racial	  equality	  more	  generally.	  I	  begin	  with	  a	  brief	  
discussion	  on	  dialectical	  reasoning,	  starting	  with	  Plato’s	  concerns	  about	  rhetoric	  and	  his	  
preference	  for	  dialectical	  engagement,	  followed	  by	  discussion	  of	  Aristotle’s	  definition	  and	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explanation	  of	  this	  term,	  and	  then	  a	  clarification	  of	  how	  I	  use	  modify	  the	  classical	  notion	  of	  
dialectical	  engagement	  to	  examine	  a	  national	  asynchronous	  conversation.	  In	  the	  next	  
section,	  I	  return	  to	  the	  dedication	  speeches	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3	  and	  read	  them	  against	  
the	  grain,	  examining	  what	  is	  missing	  from	  the	  narrative	  they	  present	  to	  show	  how	  Brown	  
has	  been	  reconstructed.	  From	  there,	  I	  move	  on	  to	  examine	  the	  anniversary	  discourse	  
around	  the	  country	  as	  expressed	  in	  newspapers	  and	  other	  media,	  away	  from	  the	  center	  of	  
focus	  on	  Topeka	  and	  the	  new	  historical	  site,	  looking	  at	  four	  major	  themes	  that	  constitute	  
the	  dialectic.	  Finally,	  I	  return	  to	  the	  contemporary	  scholarship	  on	  epideictic’s	  civic	  and	  
public	  function,	  as	  well	  as	  public	  memory	  scholarship,	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  ongoing	  function	  
and	  value	  of	  the	  Brown	  decision	  is	  to	  prevent	  the	  “fatal	  consequences”	  of	  forgetting	  how	  
things	  were,	  and	  to	  ensure	  that	  future	  policy	  deliberations	  continue	  to	  work	  toward	  full	  
achievement	  of	  America’s	  own	  founding	  ideals.	  	  
Brown	  emerged	  from	  a	  long	  history	  of	  attempts	  to	  achieve	  racial	  equality	  through	  
legal	  means.	  The	  NAACP’s	  efforts	  included	  housing,	  transportation,	  and	  voting	  rights,	  as	  
well	  as	  education.	  Within	  their	  efforts	  related	  to	  education,	  there	  were	  competing	  ideas	  
about	  the	  best	  strategy.	  Once	  Brown	  was	  decided,	  there	  was	  considerable	  public	  debate	  as	  
different	  strategies	  were	  employed	  to	  implement	  the	  decision	  (see	  Cottrol,	  Diamond,	  and	  
Ware;	  Jackson;	  Klarman;	  Kluger;	  Patterson;	  Tushnet;	  and	  Wasby,	  D’Amato	  and	  Metrailer	  
for	  detailed	  historical	  accounts	  of	  the	  public	  discussions	  and	  legal	  cases	  related	  to	  
desegregation	  following	  Brown).	  Those	  years	  of	  resistance	  and	  violence	  were	  markedly	  
different	  than	  any	  contentions	  displayed	  at	  the	  anniversary,	  but	  the	  claims	  that	  were	  made,	  
about	  what	  Brown	  did	  or	  did	  not	  accomplish,	  about	  what	  should	  or	  should	  not	  be	  true	  
about	  education,	  and	  about	  who	  had	  the	  responsibility	  for	  achieving	  the	  ideals	  of	  Brown,	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show	  how	  firmly	  Brown	  has	  become	  entrenched	  in	  both	  the	  American	  lexicon	  and	  the	  
minds	  of	  policy	  makers	  throughout	  the	  nation.	  	  
While	  there	  was	  a	  marked	  tendency	  toward	  a	  unified	  message	  about	  the	  Brown	  
decision	  at	  the	  anniversary,	  this	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  there	  was	  no	  contest	  over	  the	  claims	  of	  
Brown’s	  achievement.	  John	  Kerry’s	  speech	  in	  Topeka	  provided	  the	  most	  specific	  challenges	  
to	  the	  idea	  that	  Brown	  had	  truly	  transformed	  American	  society,	  but	  when	  he	  turned	  to	  his	  
solution,	  he	  said	  “let	  America	  be	  America	  –	  by	  reaffirming	  the	  value	  of	  inclusion,	  equality,	  
and	  diversity	  in	  our	  schools	  and	  across	  the	  life	  of	  our	  nation.”	  It	  is	  laudable	  to	  “reaffirm	  the	  
value,”	  but	  that	  by	  itself	  can	  only	  move	  the	  individual,	  and	  perhaps	  the	  collective,	  toward	  
action,	  or	  a	  disposition	  to	  act.	  By	  itself,	  it	  does	  not	  bring	  about	  change.	  It	  can,	  however,	  
spark	  public	  discussion.	  Robert	  J.	  Grey,	  Jr.	  then	  the	  incoming	  president	  of	  the	  American	  Bar	  
Association,	  said	  public	  discussion	  of	  the	  issues	  involved	  in	  Brown	  was	  a	  key	  characteristic	  
of	  the	  fiftieth	  anniversary.	  "We	  have	  the	  (Brown	  v.	  Board)	  decision,	  now	  50	  years	  later	  we	  
have	  a	  second	  decision,	  basically	  to	  talk	  to	  this	  issue	  of	  education	  and	  diversity,"	  he	  said.	  
"We	  haven't	  solved	  the	  problem,	  we're	  still	  working	  on	  it,	  and	  that's	  part	  of	  the	  solution."	  
(Bulkeley).	  Grey’s	  words	  are	  indicative	  of	  the	  Presumption4	  Brown	  had	  come	  to	  enjoy,	  a	  
status	  made	  more	  clear	  in	  the	  recognition	  that	  no	  serious	  discussion	  on	  equality,	  justice,	  or	  
race	  can	  take	  place	  in	  America	  without	  including	  Brown,	  or	  at	  least	  citing	  Brown	  as	  a	  
referent.	  	  Kweisi	  Mfume,	  then	  president	  of	  the	  NAACP,	  found	  the	  discussion	  valuable	  as	  
well.	  "We	  have	  to	  talk	  about	  it	  as	  a	  nation	  [because]	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  discussion,	  it	  gets	  
worse,"	  Mfume	  said.	  "If	  we	  don't	  deal	  with	  it,	  civil	  rights	  will	  not	  be	  civil	  rights	  as	  we	  know	  
it,	  if	  we	  know	  it	  at	  all"	  (Massie).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Capitalization	  added	  to	  present	  the	  term	  as	  Dr.	  Whately	  did.	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As	  has	  already	  been	  noted,	  the	  year	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  fiftieth	  anniversary	  saw	  the	  
publication	  of	  several	  books	  and	  hundreds	  of	  magazine	  and	  newspaper	  articles,	  but	  this	  
chapter	  will	  focus	  on	  just	  those	  articles	  published	  in	  the	  two	  weeks	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  
anniversary	  and	  archived	  in	  the	  LexisNexis	  Academic	  database.	  The	  epideictic	  quality	  of	  
some	  anniversary	  editorials	  and	  columns	  echoes	  themes	  presented	  in	  the	  ceremonial	  
speeches	  offered	  in	  Topeka	  at	  the	  Brown	  v	  Board	  of	  Education	  National	  Historic	  Site’s	  
dedication.	  Epideictic	  rhetoric	  has	  been	  called	  the	  most	  poetic	  of	  the	  three	  branches	  in	  
Aristotle’s	  classification,	  and	  epideictic	  speeches	  often	  feature	  highly	  memorable	  phrases,	  
cadences	  or	  narratives.	  This	  is	  in	  part	  why	  they	  are	  effective	  at	  reinforcing	  communal	  
values.	  But	  it	  is	  also	  the	  reason	  why	  epideictic	  rhetoric	  has	  long	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  
skepticism,	  if	  not	  downright	  criticism.	  Some	  of	  the	  earliest	  criticism	  came	  from	  Plato,	  who	  
feared	  that	  without	  regard	  for	  truth	  such	  persuasive	  ability	  would	  work	  against	  the	  efforts	  
toward	  a	  just	  society.	  Some	  of	  these	  concerns,	  as	  expressed	  in	  the	  Menexenus	  and	  the	  
Gorgias	  dialogues,	  were	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  three.	  	  
Plato’s	  particular	  concern	  about	  rhetoric	  was	  its	  ability	  to	  energize	  or	  move	  an	  
audience’s	  interest	  without	  regard	  for	  the	  pursuit	  of	  truth	  or	  civic	  order,	  that	  the	  
“rhetorician’s	  business	  is	  not	  to	  instruct	  a	  law	  court	  or	  public	  meeting	  in	  matters	  of	  right	  
and	  wrong,	  but	  only	  to	  make	  them	  believe”	  (92).	  His	  preferred	  form	  of	  discourse	  was	  
dialectic,	  a	  more	  philosophical	  approach	  where	  the	  interlocutors	  engage	  a	  series	  of	  
questions	  and	  answers	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  arrive	  at	  truth.	  Aristotle	  further	  defined	  dialectical	  
reasoning	  as	  reasoning	  “from	  opinions	  that	  are	  generally	  accepted”	  (“Topics”	  143).	  
Socrates	  exercises	  this	  principle	  by	  beginning	  his	  dialogues	  with	  question	  to	  which	  his	  
interlocutor	  should	  agree.	  Epideictic	  speeches,	  though	  not	  a	  dialogue,	  also	  tend	  to	  present	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positions	  with	  which	  the	  audience	  can	  agree,	  building	  a	  common	  ground	  between	  the	  
speaker	  and	  the	  audience.	  The	  difference,	  of	  course,	  is	  that	  Socrates	  continued	  questioning,	  
searching	  within	  that	  agreed	  upon	  topic	  to	  find	  its	  applications,	  the	  individual	  points	  of	  
practice	  where	  the	  idea	  would	  either	  hold	  up	  or	  break	  down.	  	  
When	  Aristotle	  worked	  to	  recover	  rhetoric	  and	  set	  it	  as	  the	  companion	  of	  dialectic,	  
he	  set	  epideictic	  apart	  from	  forensic	  and	  deliberative	  rhetoric	  and	  characterized	  it	  as	  
having	  less	  value	  than	  the	  others	  in	  civic	  life.	  Epideictic	  speeches,	  he	  argues,	  “take	  up	  
actions	  that	  are	  agreed	  upon,	  so	  that	  what	  remains	  is	  to	  clothe	  the	  actions	  with	  greatness	  
and	  beauty”	  (Rhetoric	  87).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  he	  argues	  that	  the	  praise	  and	  blame	  cast	  on	  
the	  subjects	  of	  such	  speeches	  provided	  a	  means	  for	  individuals	  to	  understand	  what	  
constituted	  right	  living	  in	  a	  particular	  society	  (Hauser	  15).	  In	  either	  case,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  
audience	  was	  only	  to	  witness,	  not	  to	  deliberate	  or	  otherwise	  come	  to	  any	  decision	  or	  
action.	  Chaim	  Perelman	  and	  Lucie	  Olbrechts-­‐Tyteca	  worked	  to	  recover	  epideictic	  from	  this	  
path	  in	  The	  New	  Rhetoric,	  and	  showed	  that	  the	  value	  of	  epideictic	  comes	  in	  large	  measure	  
from	  its	  ability	  to	  build	  communitas,	  a	  sense	  of	  common	  values	  and	  understanding	  that	  
bind	  an	  audience	  together	  and	  provide	  a	  foundation	  for	  future	  policy	  deliberations	  and	  
decisions,	  and	  by	  fostering	  a	  disposition	  to	  act,	  to	  be	  a	  motivating	  force.	  Plato’s	  warning	  is	  
not	  lost	  in	  their	  work,	  however.	  The	  concern	  over	  pursuit	  of	  the	  truth,	  and	  for	  the	  value	  of	  
rhetoric	  being	  the	  achievement	  of	  a	  just	  society	  is	  at	  the	  foundation	  of	  their	  argument.	  
Richard	  Graff	  and	  Wendy	  Winn	  argue	  that	  the	  “idea	  of	  communion	  is	  a	  vital”	  part	  of	  
the	  new	  rhetoric	  and	  that	  “epideictic	  ceremonies	  provide	  opportunities	  for	  the	  inculcation	  
and	  periodic	  reaffirmation	  of	  communal	  values”	  (48).	  The	  dedication	  ceremony	  for	  the	  new	  
Brown	  v	  Board	  of	  Education	  National	  Historic	  Site	  was	  clearly	  one	  such	  occasion,	  and	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President	  Bush’s	  speech	  clearly	  worked	  toward	  re-­‐affirming	  communal	  values	  for	  the	  “we”	  
that	  is	  America.	  His	  speech	  also	  linked	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  Brown	  decision	  plaintiffs	  and	  the	  
other	  “heroes”	  of	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  movement	  in	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  these	  values,	  what	  he	  called	  
America’s	  “own	  ideals.”	  Bush	  claimed	  that	  we—America—“strives	  to	  do	  right,”	  and	  the	  
context	  here	  is	  that	  what	  is	  right	  goes	  beyond	  what	  is	  legal.	  There	  is	  a	  moral	  element	  at	  
work	  in	  his	  speech,	  carried	  most	  clearly	  in	  the	  phrase	  “the	  good	  souls	  who	  saw	  a	  great	  
wrong”	  and	  worked	  to	  change	  it.	  Graff	  and	  Winn	  argue	  that	  shared	  values	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  
“means	  to	  an	  end”	  in	  “deliberative	  and	  legal	  discourse,”	  but	  “strengthening	  the	  adherence	  
to	  shared	  values—the	  creation	  or	  strengthening	  of	  communion—is	  an	  end	  in	  itself”	  for	  
epideictic	  discourse	  (51).	  
The	  pursuit	  of	  a	  just	  society	  and	  the	  dialogic	  processes	  that	  lead	  to	  the	  laws	  and	  
other	  structures	  that	  create	  and	  sustain	  such	  a	  society	  emerge	  not	  only	  from	  common	  
understanding	  and	  shared	  values,	  but	  also	  from	  a	  legal	  and	  social	  structure	  that	  permits	  the	  
testing	  of	  ideas	  and	  the	  competition	  of	  one	  idea	  with	  another	  in	  both	  formal	  and	  informal	  
forums.	  Many	  of	  these	  “conversations”	  in	  the	  contemporary	  world	  take	  place	  in	  the	  media,	  
whether	  print	  media	  such	  as	  newspapers	  and	  magazines,	  or	  broadcast	  media,	  especially	  
television.	  These	  conversations	  sometimes	  begin	  when	  a	  writer,	  or	  a	  speaker,	  presents	  a	  
set	  of	  ideas	  or	  claims	  that	  others	  discuss.	  This	  isn’t	  the	  classical	  form	  of	  dialectical	  
engagement,	  because	  it	  doesn’t	  follow	  a	  one-­‐to-­‐one	  question	  and	  answer	  format.	  But	  these	  
writings,	  like	  the	  speeches	  in	  chapter	  three,	  are	  messages	  to	  be	  considered,	  to	  be	  debated	  
and	  discussed	  and	  to	  be	  answered	  in	  other	  media,	  or	  even	  in	  proposed	  new	  laws.	  It	  is	  an	  
asynchronous	  engagement	  that	  ultimately	  asks	  how	  “we,	  the	  people”	  want	  to	  construct	  our	  
community,	  and	  how	  we	  wish	  to	  achieve	  a	  sense	  of	  right	  living	  within	  that	  community.	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These	  discussions	  are	  built	  on	  historical	  foundations,	  whether	  recorded	  history,	  
actual	  history,	  or	  public	  memory.	  Interpretations	  of	  what	  came	  before,	  or	  what	  reasoning	  
was	  involved,	  or	  who	  thought	  what	  at	  a	  particular	  point	  in	  history,	  are	  frequently	  
contested,	  which	  is	  why	  public	  memory	  scholars	  argue	  that	  public	  memory	  is	  “living”	  and	  
“open	  to	  contest,	  revision	  and	  rejection”	  (Phillips	  2).	  	  As	  a	  society	  tells	  its	  histories,	  and	  as	  
memories	  are	  contested	  in	  the	  public	  realm,	  common	  narratives	  emerge	  and	  become	  part	  
of	  the	  foundation	  upon	  which	  future	  actions	  and	  judgments	  are	  based.	  These	  processes	  are	  
largely	  rhetorical,	  as	  Phillips	  reminds	  us.	  	  And	  ultimately	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  narrative	  
that	  gets	  adopted	  for	  a	  particular	  event	  or	  historical	  process	  is	  the	  one	  that	  most	  suits	  the	  
interests	  and	  needs	  of	  the	  society’s	  current	  members	  –	  hence	  the	  ongoing	  revision	  and	  
rejection.	  The	  similarities	  in	  the	  narratives	  presented	  in	  Topeka	  and	  throughout	  the	  
national	  media	  at	  the	  anniversary	  serve	  such	  a	  purpose.	  
In	  Topeka,	  four	  politically	  and	  racially	  diverse	  speakers	  who	  oppose	  one	  another	  on	  
many	  other	  issues	  offered	  very	  similar	  descriptions	  of	  what	  Brown	  accomplished,	  and	  these	  
claims	  passed	  largely	  without	  challenge	  or	  even	  questioning.	  The	  overall	  effect	  of	  the	  
speeches,	  and	  the	  many	  articles	  that	  appeared	  throughout	  the	  country,	  was	  to	  establish	  
that	  Brown	  changed	  America	  for	  the	  better,	  and	  that	  whatever	  had	  not	  been	  accomplished	  
in	  terms	  of	  its	  promise	  was	  due	  to	  factors	  other	  than	  Brown	  itself.	  	  In	  at	  least	  one	  significant	  
way,	  no	  one	  would	  disagree.	  No	  serious	  person,	  and	  certainly	  no	  reasonable	  public	  figure,	  
would	  now	  argue	  that	  the	  state	  should	  be	  in	  the	  business	  of	  segregating	  citizens	  by	  race.	  
But	  beyond	  that,	  the	  claims	  that	  America	  was	  changed	  for	  the	  better	  seem	  less	  credible	  
when	  measured	  by	  the	  statistics	  and	  challenges	  presented	  in	  many	  of	  the	  same	  news	  
articles.	  The	  speakers	  weren’t	  simply	  showing	  off	  or	  seeking	  public	  approval	  of	  their	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oratorical	  skills,	  so	  it’s	  clear	  there	  was	  a	  purpose.	  And	  while	  not	  a	  deliberate	  attempt	  to	  
mislead	  the	  audiences,	  the	  speakers	  all	  had	  a	  vested	  political	  interest	  in	  reinforcing	  the	  
emerging	  common	  narrative	  of	  Brown	  as	  national,	  common	  good	  with	  significant	  
transformational	  qualities,	  a	  state-­‐building	  function	  explored	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  But	  
this	  function	  also	  marginalized	  some	  of	  the	  real	  issues	  remaining	  in	  achieving	  Brown’s	  
promise.	  This	  not	  only	  shows	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  Brown	  is	  still	  contested	  in	  public	  
discourse,	  it	  reflects	  Plato’s	  concerns	  about	  rhetoric,	  and	  epideictic	  rhetoric	  in	  general,	  for	  
presenting	  what	  is	  pleasant	  rather	  than	  striving	  to	  find	  what	  it	  true.	  	  It	  also	  highlights	  some	  
reasons	  a	  national	  dialectical	  engagement	  about	  Brown	  and	  the	  achievement	  of	  its	  
promises,	  specifically	  with	  regard	  to	  education	  and	  equality,	  are	  important.	  Two	  examples	  
from	  claims	  the	  speeches	  have	  in	  common	  particularly	  demonstrate	  this	  point:	  that	  the	  
case	  and	  its	  legacy	  all	  began	  in	  Topeka;	  and	  that	  the	  decision	  changed	  America.	  	  
In	  the	  first	  example,	  President	  Bush,	  would-­‐be	  president	  John	  Kerry,	  and	  Kansas	  
governor	  Kathleen	  Sebilius	  all	  claimed	  that	  the	  Brown	  decision	  began	  in	  Topeka,	  and	  thus	  
Topeka	  was	  the	  launch	  point	  for	  all	  of	  the	  civil	  rights	  efforts	  that	  followed	  it.	  This	  is	  in	  some	  
ways	  true.	  Brown	  was	  a	  synthesis	  of	  all	  the	  work	  that	  came	  before	  it	  to	  achieve	  some	  
measure	  of	  justice	  through	  legal	  means,	  the	  Kansas	  case	  did	  begin	  in	  Topeka,	  and	  it	  is	  for	  
that	  case	  that	  the	  consolidated	  cases	  were	  named	  in	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  decision.	  But	  in	  
three	  notable	  ways,	  this	  claim	  is	  not	  true.	  First,	  Brown	  was	  not	  the	  point	  of	  origin,	  but	  a	  
culmination	  of	  a	  long	  series	  of	  efforts	  in	  many	  arenas.	  Omitting	  this	  history	  and	  the	  work	  of	  
important	  figures	  like	  W.E.B.	  DuBois,	  whose	  Niagara	  Movement	  called	  for	  racial	  equality	  in	  
the	  early	  1900s,	  diminishes	  the	  value	  of	  those	  efforts.	  The	  omission	  also	  diminishes	  the	  
significance	  of	  the	  victory	  by	  erasing	  the	  many	  hollow	  successes	  and	  even	  failures	  in	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several	  efforts	  that	  had	  come	  before	  it.5	  	  Secondly,	  the	  Kansas	  case	  was	  not	  the	  first	  of	  the	  
school	  desegregation	  cases	  to	  reach	  the	  federal	  or	  Supreme	  Court.	  The	  first	  case	  to	  be	  filed,	  
in	  the	  summer	  of	  1951,	  was	  Briggs	  v.	  Elliott,	  the	  case	  from	  Clarendon,	  South	  Carolina.	  
Similarly,	  Thurgood	  Marshall	  was	  not	  the	  plaintiff’s	  attorney	  in	  the	  Kansas	  case.	  Marshall	  
led	  the	  arguments	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Briggs	  v.	  Elliott,	  and	  subsequently	  led	  the	  entire	  
consolidated	  case	  when	  it	  was	  argued	  in	  the	  Supreme	  Court.	  	  The	  consolidated	  decision	  did	  
not	  end	  up	  being	  named	  for	  Briggs	  because	  it	  was	  returned	  to	  the	  lower	  court	  when	  the	  
school	  district	  administration	  claimed	  they	  had	  a	  plan	  to	  equalize	  the	  schools	  in	  their	  
district	  and	  were	  implementing	  it.	  In	  the	  six-­‐month	  period	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  gave	  them	  
before	  further	  review,	  the	  Brown	  case	  arrived	  and	  became	  the	  lead.	  	  
This	  distinction	  is	  important	  to	  the	  way	  Brown	  is	  both	  commemorated	  and	  
remembered.	  Topeka	  was	  unique	  among	  the	  school	  districts	  represented	  in	  the	  
consolidated	  cases	  in	  two	  ways.	  First,	  Kansas	  law	  permitted	  but	  did	  not	  require	  segregation	  
in	  its	  schools.	  Second,	  the	  segregated	  schools	  in	  Topeka	  did	  meet	  the	  “substantially	  equal”	  
test	  in	  terms	  of	  physical	  conditions,	  quality	  of	  education,	  and	  teaching	  staff.	  This	  latter	  
element	  was	  crucial	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  ruling	  because	  it	  was	  the	  only	  avenue	  through	  
which	  a	  decision	  could	  emerge	  that	  did	  not	  involve	  ordering	  compliance	  with	  the	  existing	  
“equal”	  portion	  of	  the	  earlier	  Plessey	  case.	  Rhetorically,	  then,	  prominence	  of	  the	  Kansas	  case	  
is	  necessary	  to	  the	  narrative	  of	  the	  moral	  authority	  exercised	  by	  the	  Court	  and	  heroic	  
achievement	  of	  the	  plaintiffs	  and	  their	  attorneys.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  These	  efforts	  included	  NAACP	  efforts	  to	  achieve	  equality	  in	  segregated	  schools	  
throughout	  the	  south	  through	  lawsuits	  involving	  local	  school	  districts,	  efforts	  to	  achieve	  
presidential	  support	  for	  an	  anti-­‐lynching	  law,	  and	  legal	  efforts	  to	  undo	  segregation	  and	  
discrimination	  in	  other	  arenas	  besides	  education.	  They	  also	  include	  efforts	  to	  persuade	  the	  
black	  community	  to	  provide	  its	  own	  quality	  education	  and	  community	  support.	  See	  
especially	  Klarman	  for	  discussion	  of	  these	  efforts.	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Even	  if	  the	  decision	  were	  not	  named	  for	  the	  Kansas	  case,	  it	  could	  not	  have	  been	  the	  
decision	  it	  is	  without	  that	  case,	  and	  none	  of	  the	  anniversary	  discourse	  could	  have	  
constructed	  it	  to	  be	  so.	  And	  supposing	  the	  Court	  could	  have	  reached	  the	  same	  decision	  with	  
the	  Briggs	  case	  in	  the	  lead	  position,	  it’s	  difficult	  to	  imagine	  how	  a	  national	  monument	  could	  
have	  been	  created	  in	  the	  town	  where	  Briggs	  began.	  An	  article	  published	  in	  the	  Atlanta	  
Constitution	  showed	  that	  Summerton,	  the	  seat	  of	  Clarendon	  County,	  remains	  divided	  to	  this	  
day	  on	  the	  legacy	  of	  the	  decision,	  and	  Stephen	  Phillips	  wrote	  of	  “a	  sad	  footnote”	  to	  the	  
anniversary,	  the	  lingering	  South	  Carolina	  case	  of	  Abbeville	  County	  School	  District	  et	  al	  v.	  the	  
State	  of	  South	  Carolina,	  a	  case	  also	  called	  “today’s	  Brown	  v.	  Board,”	  where	  a	  predominantly	  
black	  school	  district	  was	  pleading	  for	  funds	  to	  equalize	  their	  schools	  to	  the	  level	  of	  their	  
predominantly	  white	  counterparts	  (Phillips).	  Joe	  Elliott,	  grandson	  of	  the	  school	  district	  
administrator	  named	  in	  the	  Briggs	  v	  Elliott	  case,	  and	  a	  former	  headmaster	  of	  one	  of	  the	  
private	  academies	  that	  attracted	  white	  families	  after	  the	  Brown	  decision,	  had	  mixed	  
feelings	  about	  the	  case	  that	  carries	  his	  name.	  Unwilling	  to	  cast	  his	  grandfather	  as	  the	  “cruel	  
and	  petty”	  man	  President	  Bush	  referred	  to,	  he	  was	  further	  reluctant	  to	  classify	  his	  fellow	  
Summerton	  residents	  as	  racists,	  saying	  that	  all	  of	  them	  “had	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  legacy	  they	  
inherited”	  (Hamilton).	  Both	  he	  and	  Leola	  Parks,	  one	  of	  the	  first	  black	  students	  to	  integrate	  
Clarendon’s	  schools,	  agreed	  that	  their	  town	  remained	  divided.	  Mr.	  Elliott	  said	  he	  found	  it	  
“counterproductive	  to	  demonize	  the	  defendants,”	  showing	  that	  this	  was	  happening,	  at	  least	  
in	  Summerton.	  He	  further	  described	  how	  people	  shied	  away	  from	  familiarity	  with	  him,	  
even	  people	  he	  had	  known	  for	  years,	  because	  of	  his	  attachment	  by	  name	  to	  the	  case.	  Ms.	  
Parks	  also	  shied	  away	  from	  the	  idea	  of	  celebrating	  Brown	  as	  that	  point.	  She	  acknowledged	  
some	  transformation	  in	  the	  town,	  but	  said	  it	  wasn’t	  enough	  yet,	  “so	  we	  really	  don’t	  have	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anything	  to	  celebrate	  right	  now”	  (Larrabee).	  Memorial	  sites	  do	  not	  emerge	  from	  this	  level	  
of	  ambivalence.	  
The	  Briggs	  family	  had	  been	  forced	  to	  leave	  Summerton	  when	  several	  family	  
members	  were	  fired	  from	  their	  jobs	  in	  retaliation	  for	  participating	  in	  the	  case	  (Irvine).	  So,	  
unlike	  Topeka,	  there	  simply	  wasn’t	  anyone	  to	  lay	  the	  groundwork	  and	  make	  the	  case	  for	  
either	  the	  historic	  site	  or	  the	  commemorative	  actions	  in	  this	  community.	  The	  same	  may	  be	  
said	  of	  the	  other	  cities	  involved	  in	  the	  decision,	  though	  in	  Virginia	  some	  attempts	  were	  
being	  made	  to	  establish	  a	  memorial	  site	  for	  Oliver	  Hill	  in	  recognition	  of	  his	  role	  in	  the	  case,	  
and	  the	  state	  government	  did	  issue	  an	  apology	  to	  its	  citizens	  who	  had	  their	  education	  
disrupted	  or	  terminated	  when	  the	  state	  closed	  all	  its	  public	  schools	  for	  five	  years	  rather	  
than	  comply	  with	  Brown’s	  terms.	  The	  Hill	  memorial	  was	  yet	  unsuccessful	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  
anniversary,	  and	  the	  tone	  of	  apology	  in	  Virginia	  is	  far	  from	  the	  kind	  of	  laudatory	  
environment	  that	  was	  created	  in	  Kansas.	  So	  while	  the	  case	  did	  not	  actually	  begin	  in	  Kansas,	  
and	  these	  claims	  are	  made	  to	  elide	  the	  details	  of	  the	  actual	  history,	  they	  are	  also	  necessary	  
to	  establish	  and	  confirm	  the	  site	  and	  its	  importance,	  its	  presence	  and	  presumption,	  in	  the	  
ongoing	  narrative	  of	  what	  Brown	  means	  to	  the	  country.	  They	  serve	  more	  in	  the	  manner	  
Perelman	  and	  Olbrechts-­‐Tyteca	  claimed,	  to	  increase	  the	  adherence	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  the	  
audience	  to	  the	  values	  being	  presented,	  than	  as	  the	  damaging	  or	  misleading	  kind	  of	  
persuasion	  Plato	  feared.	  
The	  third	  point	  of	  historical	  inaccuracy	  in	  the	  claim	  that	  “it	  all	  began”	  in	  Topeka	  is	  
that	  Brown	  wasn’t	  the	  first	  case	  to	  establish	  14th	  Amendment	  protections	  for	  minority	  
citizens,	  nor	  was	  it	  the	  first	  to	  disallow	  segregated	  schools.	  Two	  weeks	  before	  the	  Supreme	  
Court	  ruled	  in	  Brown,	  it	  ruled	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Hernandez	  v.	  Texas	  that	  an	  all-­‐white	  jury	  did	  not	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constitute	  a	  jury	  of	  peers	  for	  a	  Mexican-­‐American	  defendant.	  According	  to	  Ignacio	  Garcia,	  
that	  ruling	  gave	  “a	  confirmation	  that	  [Latinos}	  were	  American	  citizens”	  (Bingham).	  The	  
ruling,	  written	  by	  Chief	  Justice	  Warren,	  held	  that	  “systematic	  exclusion	  of	  Mexican-­‐
Americans	  from	  juries	  [was]	  unconstitutional	  under	  the	  equal	  protection	  guaranteed	  by	  the	  
14th	  Amendment,	  and	  further	  stated	  ‘the	  constitutional	  guarantee	  of	  equal	  protection	  of	  the	  
laws	  is	  not	  directly	  solely	  against	  discrimination	  between	  whites	  and	  Negroes’”	  (Bingham).	  
This	  was	  a	  significant	  ruling,	  and	  yet	  it	  was	  so	  eclipsed	  by	  the	  Brown	  decision	  that	  it	  is	  
seldom	  discussed	  or	  remembered	  in	  national	  discourse.	  Another	  case,	  Mendez	  v.	  
Westminster	  School	  District,	  was	  the	  first	  case	  in	  which	  school	  segregation	  was	  challenged	  
in	  federal	  court.	  Like	  the	  Hernandez	  case,	  Mendez	  focused	  on	  Mexican-­‐Americans,	  and	  like	  
Brown,	  it	  focused	  on	  education.	  The	  ruling	  in	  that	  case	  ended	  so	  called	  “Mexican	  schools”	  
and	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  more	  segregation	  law	  repeals	  in	  the	  state	  of	  California.	  (Jennings).	  	  
The	  second	  example	  of	  a	  common	  claim	  to	  emerge	  from	  Topeka	  about	  the	  decision	  
is	  that	  it	  changed	  America,	  a	  claim	  echoed	  throughout	  the	  articles	  from	  around	  the	  country,	  
as	  many	  leaders	  commented	  on	  the	  transformational	  quality	  of	  the	  decision.	  The	  historical	  
factors	  for	  this	  claim	  are	  a	  bit	  more	  complex,	  and	  the	  distinction	  may	  be	  less	  significant	  
here,	  but	  it	  still	  points	  to	  the	  ways	  “memories	  attain	  meaning	  [and]	  compel	  others	  to	  accept	  
them”	  (Phillips	  2).	  Brown	  has	  become	  so	  symbolic	  of	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Movement	  and	  the	  end	  
of	  segregation	  that	  the	  nuances	  of	  how	  that	  came	  about	  got	  lost.	  This	  is	  part	  of	  what	  Cheryl	  
Brown	  Henderson	  and	  her	  colleagues	  wanted	  to	  change	  by	  creating	  The	  Brown	  
Foundation.	  The	  first	  part	  of	  the	  decision,	  the	  one	  commemorated	  in	  2004,	  changed	  only	  
one	  thing:	  the	  legality	  of	  states	  requiring	  segregated	  public	  schools.	  This	  is	  demonstrated	  
succinctly	  in	  the	  opening	  paragraph	  of	  the	  decision’s	  second	  part,	  issued	  May	  31,	  1955.	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Chief	  Justice	  Warren	  summarized	  the	  first	  opinion	  as	  “declaring	  the	  fundamental	  principle	  
that	  racial	  discrimination	  in	  public	  education	  is	  unconstitutional”	  and	  that	  “all	  provisions	  of	  
federal,	  state,	  or	  local	  law	  requiring	  or	  permitting	  such	  discrimination	  must	  yield	  to	  this	  
principle”	  (Brown	  II).	  The	  key	  points	  are	  that	  public	  education	  was	  the	  only	  target	  of	  this	  
ruling,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  the	  laws	  that	  must	  yield	  to	  the	  principle	  it	  declared.	  Yet	  the	  claims	  of	  
the	  speeches	  made	  it	  appear	  that	  Brown	  changed	  not	  only	  the	  schools,	  but	  all	  of	  American	  
society.	  That	  claim	  glosses	  over	  the	  several	  Court	  cases	  that	  followed	  Brown,	  cases	  that	  
cited	  Brown	  as	  precedent,	  and	  overturned	  segregation	  in	  nearly	  all	  public	  facilities.	  
There	  was	  also	  direct	  opposition	  to	  this	  claim	  in	  articles	  that	  talked	  about	  the	  
violence	  and	  resistance	  the	  followed	  the	  ruling	  as	  school	  districts	  tried	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  
desegregation	  directive.	  Ralph	  Shaffer	  argued	  that	  “whatever	  else	  Brown	  may	  have	  done	  
for	  race	  relations,	  it	  must	  stand	  accountable	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  opposition	  it	  engendered	  
became	  a	  major	  factor	  in	  the	  demise	  of	  America’s	  public	  schools.”	  Shaffer,	  like	  some	  other	  
writers,	  was	  focused	  on	  schools	  outside	  the	  formerly	  segregated	  South.	  His	  focus	  was	  
California,	  but	  others	  focused	  on	  the	  violence	  in	  Boston	  and	  other	  cities	  that	  up	  to	  the	  
Brown	  decision	  had	  not	  come	  under	  federal	  scrutiny	  for	  the	  racial	  divisions	  of	  their	  schools.	  
What	  had	  been	  a	  southern	  problem	  became	  a	  national	  implementation	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  
Supreme	  Court’s	  decision.	  The	  dialectical	  element	  of	  this	  expansion	  is	  discussed	  further	  
below.	  
The	  problems	  caused	  by	  the	  backlash	  Brown	  created	  are	  significant	  and	  ongoing.	  
But	  consider	  the	  number	  of	  claims	  that	  are	  made	  in	  the	  anniversary	  discourse	  about	  what	  
Brown	  did.	  Anthony	  Miles	  called	  the	  decision	  “a	  touchstone	  in	  the	  ongoing	  effort	  to	  define	  
the	  meaning	  of	  equality	  in	  American	  life	  and	  citizenship.”	  Theodore	  M.	  Shaw,	  president	  and	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director-­‐counsel	  of	  the	  NAACP	  Legal	  Defense	  and	  Educational	  Fund	  Education	  said	  the	  
decision	  “	  redefined	  what	  American	  values	  are,	  what	  our	  core	  beliefs	  are”	  and	  said	  the	  
decision	  “stands	  as	  one	  of	  our	  shining	  moments	  and	  gives	  us	  something	  to	  reach	  for"	  
(Frahm).	  	  Dennis	  Courtland	  Hayes,	  NAACP	  general	  counsel,	  said	  the	  decision	  “remains	  the	  
pinnacle	  of	  jurisprudence”	  and	  claimed	  there	  was	  “no	  single	  case	  in	  this	  country	  that’s	  
increased	  the	  expectations	  for	  this	  country	  and	  the	  hopes	  of	  Americans”	  as	  Brown	  did	  
(quoted	  in	  Wetterich).	  Secretary	  Rod	  Paige	  said	  the	  decision	  “‘changed	  everything.’	  Before	  
Brown,	  the	  U.S.	  Constitution	  was	  ‘an	  empty	  promise	  as	  far	  as	  I	  was	  concerned.	  The	  
American	  ideal	  did	  not	  include	  us.	  Now	  it	  does’”	  (Dobbs).	  John	  Avlon	  expressed	  a	  similar	  
sentiment	  when	  he	  described	  “an	  America	  so	  completely	  transformed	  by	  the	  decision	  that	  
it	  is	  easy	  to	  forget	  how	  rigid	  opposition	  to	  change	  made	  resolution	  and	  reconciliation	  seem	  
impossible.”	  Secretary	  Colin	  Powell,	  speaking	  at	  the	  Wake	  Forest	  University	  
commencement	  ceremony	  said	  the	  law	  “changed	  America	  for	  the	  better,”	  adding	  that	  if	  not	  
for	  the	  decision	  “I	  wouldn’t	  be	  here;	  and	  I	  wouldn’t	  even	  be	  sitting	  here.”	  Congressman	  
Meeks	  offered,	  “Brown	  is	  the	  basis	  of	  indisputable	  civil	  rights	  progress,	  …	  largely	  because	  of	  
the	  letter	  and	  spirit	  of	  the	  Brown	  decision,	  America	  of	  2004,	  thank	  goodness,	  is	  not	  the	  
America	  of	  1954.”	  Meeks	  amplifies	  this	  observation	  and	  equates	  the	  decision	  to	  two	  
significant	  value	  points:	  “Upon	  the	  momentous	  decision,	  America	  turned	  away	  from	  its	  own	  
brand	  of	  apartheid,	  turned	  toward	  making	  real	  the	  promise	  of	  the	  Declaration	  of	  
Independence	  that	  ‘all	  men	  (and	  women)	  are	  created	  equal,’	  and	  turned	  out	  the	  notorious	  
Plessy	  v	  Ferguson	  decision.”	  Miles	  wrote,	  “Fifty	  years	  later,	  we	  rightly	  commemorate	  Brown	  
v.	  Board	  of	  Education	  as	  both	  a	  heroic	  episode	  in	  the	  nation’s	  history	  and	  an	  expression	  of	  
the	  power	  and	  possibility	  of	  the	  nation’s	  ideals.”	  This	  possibility,	  the	  sense	  of	  what	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American	  “should”	  be	  about,	  also	  appeared	  in	  Phil	  Yost’s	  column	  about	  Earl	  Warren.	  He	  
wrote,	  “…	  as	  a	  crystallization	  of	  what	  America	  ought	  to	  stand	  for,	  Brown	  was	  just	  about	  as	  
good	  as	  "all	  men	  are	  created	  equal."	  (Yost).	  These	  themes,	  and	  the	  sense	  of	  “should”	  that	  
accompanies	  them,	  is	  a	  clear	  indication	  of	  the	  quest	  for	  moral	  justice	  along	  with	  legal	  
justice.	  	  
The	  Brown	  decision,	  then,	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  having	  been	  amplified	  in	  public	  discourse	  
over	  its	  first	  fifty	  years,	  and	  arguably	  more	  so	  in	  last	  of	  the	  last	  ten	  of	  those	  years	  than	  any	  
before	  it.	  Regardless	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  had	  taken	  many	  other	  Court	  rulings	  over	  many	  years	  
to	  undo	  segregation	  laws	  governing	  other	  parts	  of	  society	  or	  even	  giving	  teeth	  to	  the	  initial	  
Brown	  ruling,	  the	  Brown	  ruling	  had	  come	  to	  symbolize	  the	  whole	  effort,	  had	  become	  an	  
ideograph,	  to	  use	  Michael	  Calvin	  McGee’s	  term	  for	  the	  one	  word	  that	  encapsulates	  the	  
whole	  set	  of	  values	  and	  ideals	  rolled	  up	  in	  the	  decision.	  McGee	  claims	  the	  "vocabulary	  of	  
ideographs"	  has	  the	  "capacity	  to	  dictate	  decision	  and	  control	  public	  belief	  and	  behavior,"	  to	  
persuade	  through	  discourse,	  rather	  than	  state-­‐imposed	  directive	  (427).	  Invoking	  Brown	  in	  
a	  public	  ceremony	  or	  policy	  conversation	  is	  conditions	  the	  nature	  of	  discussion,	  brings	  the	  
entire	  Civil	  Rights	  history	  and	  the	  affirmation	  of	  the	  Court’s	  ruling	  into	  that	  discussion.	  At	  
the	  same	  time,	  the	  repetition	  on	  “the	  promise	  of	  Brown”	  in	  the	  anniversary	  discourse	  
indicates	  that	  what	  is	  rolled	  up	  in	  that	  ideographic	  term	  has	  also	  grown,	  as	  the	  references	  
extend	  beyond	  the	  realm	  of	  public	  education.	  
The	  repetition	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  there	  was	  a	  singular	  “promise”	  within	  the	  Brown	  
decision	  suggests	  that	  defining	  that	  promise	  should	  be	  a	  fairly	  straightforward	  matter.	  But	  
the	  many	  claims	  about	  the	  different	  ways	  that	  promise	  has	  not	  been	  realized	  show	  how	  
much	  weight	  has	  been	  added	  on	  to	  the	  initial	  ruling.	  The	  variations	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  Brown’s	  
	  116	  
promise	  begin	  in	  the	  Topeka	  speeches.	  Governor	  Sebilius	  claimed	  that	  the	  promise	  was	  
“equal	  opportunity	  for	  all	  through	  a	  quality	  education	  for	  all.”	  She	  also	  claimed	  that	  “equal	  
access	  to	  the	  transforming	  power	  of	  education”	  equated	  to	  “equal	  access	  to	  the	  promise	  of	  
America,”	  which	  is	  the	  power	  to	  become	  anything	  one	  wishes	  to	  be.	  Senator	  Kerry	  
illuminated	  his	  notion	  of	  the	  promise	  with	  a	  list	  of	  the	  conditions	  that	  indicate	  it	  has	  not	  
been	  realized,	  including	  	  
one-­‐third	  of	  all	  African-­‐American	  children…living	  in	  poverty….only	  fifty	  
percent	  of	  African-­‐American	  men	  in	  New	  York	  City	  have	  a	  job…twenty	  
million	  black	  and	  Hispanic	  Americans	  don’t	  have	  basic	  health	  insurance…a	  
fourth-­‐grade	  Hispanic	  student	  is	  only	  one	  third	  as	  likely	  to	  read	  at	  the	  same	  
level	  as	  a	  fourth	  grade	  white	  child…in	  too	  many	  parts	  of	  the	  country	  our	  
school	  systems	  are	  not	  separate	  but	  equal—but…separate	  and	  unequal.	  
Kerry	  thus	  defines	  the	  promise	  as	  living	  above	  the	  poverty	  level,	  having	  a	  job,	  having	  
basic	  health	  insurance,	  reading	  at	  the	  same	  (appropriate)	  grade	  level	  regardless	  of	  race,	  
and	  having	  equal	  schools.	  These	  are	  the	  points	  of	  dialectic	  proposition,	  elements	  within	  the	  
general	  accepted	  idea	  that	  American	  is	  a	  just	  society	  and	  values	  equality,	  freedom,	  and	  
opportunity	  that	  look	  for	  particular	  application	  of	  that	  general	  principle.	  For	  President	  
Bush,	  the	  promise	  is	  “reach[ing]	  the	  high	  calling	  of	  [America’s]	  own	  ideals,”	  and	  specifically	  
to	  break	  “the	  habits	  of	  racism,”	  to	  provide	  African-­‐Americans	  with	  	  “access	  to	  capital	  and	  
the	  chance	  to	  own	  and	  build	  for	  the	  future,”	  and	  to	  make	  our	  schools	  “equal	  in	  opportunity	  
and	  excellence.”	  For	  Rev.	  Jackson,	  the	  promise	  involved	  achieving	  true	  “equal	  protection	  
under	  the	  law,”	  protection	  that	  would	  change	  his	  assessment	  that	  African-­‐Americans	  “work	  
harder,	  make	  less,	  pay	  more,	  earn	  less,	  live	  under	  stress	  and	  don’t	  live	  as	  long”	  as	  their	  
	  117	  
white	  counterparts	  (Anderson	  and	  Carpenter).	  Even	  within	  these	  four	  speakers’	  comments,	  
one	  sees	  the	  enormity	  of	  the	  weight	  placed	  on	  the	  shoulders	  of	  a	  decision	  that	  technically	  
only	  removed	  formal	  state	  segregation	  from	  schools	  in	  segregated	  states.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  
diminish	  the	  value	  of	  that	  one	  element	  or	  the	  value	  of	  targeting	  that	  element	  in	  the	  
NAACP’s	  legal	  efforts.	  Education	  has	  been	  understood	  to	  be	  the	  turning	  point	  for	  individual	  
opportunity	  and	  well	  as	  social	  progress	  for	  decades,	  and	  Thurgood	  Marshall	  firmly	  believed	  
that	  if	  children	  of	  different	  races	  went	  to	  school	  together	  they	  would	  grow	  up	  to	  live	  in	  an	  
integrated	  and	  equal	  society.	  But	  even	  that	  weight	  on	  the	  original	  effort	  has	  been	  amplified	  
over	  the	  years	  as	  “the	  promise	  of	  Brown”	  has	  included	  more	  and	  more	  forms	  of	  social	  
inequity.	  Justice	  Stephen	  G.	  Breyer,	  who	  was	  also	  present	  in	  Topeka,	  expressed	  the	  promise	  
as	  a	  goal	  “that	  many	  millions	  of	  Americans	  of	  different	  races,	  religions	  and	  points	  of	  view	  
can	  come	  together	  to	  create	  one	  nation.”	  Breyer	  claimed	  this	  was	  the	  hope	  that	  Thurgood	  
Marshall	  “expressed	  in	  his	  argument	  to	  the	  court	  in	  Brown…a	  hope	  about	  the	  Constitution,	  
one	  Constitution;	  about	  the	  people,	  one	  people;	  and	  about	  the	  nation;	  one	  nation.”	  This	  was	  
goal	  toward	  which	  he	  said	  “we	  have	  made	  progress”	  and	  “aspire	  to	  do	  more.”	  Lynn	  Huntley,	  
president	  of	  the	  Southern	  Education	  Foundation,	  looked	  at	  the	  promise	  a	  bit	  differently,	  
saying,	  “the	  promise	  of	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  was	  that	  parents	  would	  all	  join	  together	  to	  create	  a	  
first-­‐class	  public	  system	  for	  everyone”	  (“Private”).	  	  She	  also	  observed	  that	  this	  hasn’t	  
happened.	  
These	  varying	  assessments	  show	  the	  difficulty	  in	  reaching	  agreement	  on	  when,	  or	  if,	  
Brown	  will	  have	  succeeded.	  As	  William	  Raspberry	  of	  the	  Washington	  Post	  quipped,	  “you	  
can’t	  hope	  to	  reach	  consensus	  on	  an	  answer	  unless	  you	  can	  agree	  on	  what	  the	  question	  is.”	  
The	  question	  of	  what	  Brown’s	  promise	  was	  is	  not	  the	  only	  question	  lingering	  the	  public	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discourse	  after	  its	  first	  fifty	  years.	  Sheard	  argues	  that	  epideictic	  occasions	  in	  our	  culture	  
give	  occasion	  for	  re-­‐examining	  and	  sometimes	  “shuffling”	  values.	  The	  questions	  raised	  
throughout	  the	  many	  published	  articles	  show	  both	  the	  reconsideration	  of	  past	  efforts	  and	  
some	  encouragement	  toward	  thinking	  differently	  in	  the	  future.	  The	  articles	  shows	  dialectic	  
engagement	  on	  four	  themes:	  the	  idea	  of	  courage,	  both	  in	  the	  plaintiffs	  and	  in	  the	  Court’s	  
actions;	  the	  idea	  of	  integration	  as	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  equality	  in	  education;	  the	  idea	  
that	  justice	  can	  be	  obtained	  through	  the	  courts;	  and	  the	  companion	  idea	  that	  Brown	  should	  
be	  celebrated.	  
The	  theme	  of	  courage	  is	  consistent	  both	  in	  Topeka	  and	  the	  more	  generally	  across	  
the	  range	  of	  published	  articles	  from	  the	  anniversary	  month.	  President	  Bush	  identified	  the	  
courage	  of	  the	  plaintiffs	  and	  their	  attorneys	  in	  his	  speech,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  courage	  of	  the	  
Supreme	  Court	  justices	  who	  made	  the	  Brown	  decision.	  On	  the	  first	  point,	  there	  is	  little	  
disagreement.	  There	  is	  nearly	  universal	  agreement	  on	  the	  courage	  of	  the	  plaintiffs	  and	  
their	  attorneys.6	  	  But	  there	  is	  pointed	  contention	  over	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  Court.	  While	  some	  
argued	  that	  the	  Court	  acted	  courageously	  and	  exercised	  its	  moral	  authority	  in	  a	  valuable	  
and	  necessary	  way,	  others	  claimed	  that	  the	  Court	  overstepped	  its	  authority,	  and	  
established	  a	  bad	  precedent	  for	  Court	  action	  in	  the	  future.	  If	  we	  imagine	  Socrates	  raising	  
the	  dialectic	  question	  for	  this	  topic,	  it	  might	  begin	  with	  a	  general	  “what	  is	  the	  role	  of	  the	  
Court?”	  The	  range	  of	  answers	  in	  the	  media	  is,	  of	  course,	  unguided	  by	  a	  single	  wise	  
philosopher,	  but	  they	  do	  indicate	  a	  functioning	  public	  engagement	  over	  this	  element	  of	  
society.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  The	  histories	  of	  individual	  plaintiffs	  in	  the	  several	  cases	  and	  the	  many	  threats,	  challenges	  
and	  hardships	  they	  faced	  for	  their	  participation	  are	  covered	  in	  many	  books,	  but	  the	  most	  
detailed	  history	  to	  date	  is	  provided	  in	  Simple	  Justice,	  by	  Richard	  Kluger.	  Kluger	  updated	  the	  
book	  with	  a	  new	  chapter	  for	  the	  fiftieth	  anniversary	  of	  the	  decision.	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The	  distinction	  between	  those	  who	  bring	  the	  cases	  and	  those	  who	  decide	  them	  
begins	  with	  this	  sweeping	  comment	  from	  Ron	  Walters:	  
Ultimately,	  it	  was	  not	  just	  the	  law	  which	  made	  it	  possible,	  it	  was	  courage.	  It	  
was	  the	  courage	  of	  black	  lawyers	  such	  as	  Thurgood	  Marshall	  and	  his	  team	  of	  
NAACP	  legal	  eagles;	  it	  was	  the	  courage	  of	  Supreme	  Court	  Justices	  and	  
especially	  Chief	  Justice	  Earl	  Warren.	  And	  yes,	  it	  was	  the	  courage	  of	  white	  
administrators	  and	  community	  leaders	  who	  saw	  the	  justice	  in	  the	  claim	  of	  
blacks	  to	  the	  equal	  high	  equality	  [sic]	  education	  that	  had	  been	  denied	  them.	  
Anthony	  Miles,	  writing	  for	  The	  Seattle	  Post-­‐Intelligencer,	  claimed,	  “Brown	  is	  an	  ‘American	  
Triumph.’	  Brown	  triumphs	  in	  part	  because	  it	  tells	  a	  story	  of	  right	  overcoming	  might—the	  
story	  of	  how,	  through	  clear	  thinking	  and	  unflagging	  effort,	  a	  heroic	  group	  of	  lawyers	  and	  
litigants	  helped	  America	  overcome	  itself.”	  Hin-­‐son	  Phillips,	  the	  white	  woman	  mayor	  of	  
Summerton	  at	  the	  anniversary,	  cited	  her	  respect	  for	  the	  plaintiffs,	  and	  said	  “others	  would	  
share	  her	  respect…if	  they	  knew	  of	  their	  courage”	  (Larrabee).	  Bush	  referred	  to	  “the	  courage	  
of	  children,”	  and	  referred	  to	  the	  scars	  carried	  by	  Melba	  Patillo.	  Her	  classmate,	  Terrence	  
Roberts,	  described	  his	  first	  year	  at	  Central	  High	  as	  “horrific,”	  saying	  “I	  learned	  about	  fear	  
that	  year”	  (Reed).	  	  Congressman	  Gregory	  W.	  Meeks	  cited	  “the	  courage	  of	  the	  African	  
American	  litigants,”	  and	  Nancy	  Pelosi	  referred	  to	  “the	  courageous,	  7-­‐year	  old	  Linda	  Brown,”	  
as	  if	  the	  young	  girl	  had	  filed	  the	  claim	  for	  herself	  	  (“Pelosi”).	  The	  emphasis	  on	  this	  quality	  
clearly	  demonstrates	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  courage	  in	  the	  face	  of	  oppression	  and	  struggle	  is	  
a	  deeply	  felt	  American	  value.	  Even	  Joe	  Elliott	  asked,	  “are	  we	  going	  to	  wait	  another	  50	  years	  
to	  admit	  that	  these	  blacks,	  these	  petitioners,	  had	  courage	  that	  I	  can	  hardly	  imagine?”	  
(quoted	  in	  Larrabee).	  No	  one	  contests	  the	  courage	  it	  took	  to	  be	  a	  part	  of	  the	  Brown	  cases.	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When	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  courage	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  and	  the	  nine	  justices	  
on	  it,	  there	  is	  more	  discord.	  While	  some,	  including	  President	  Bush,	  argued	  that	  the	  Warren	  
court	  acted	  courageously,	  and	  showed	  	  “an	  unusually	  bold	  assertion	  of	  the	  court’s	  moral	  
authority,”	  others	  argued	  that	  they	  exceeded	  their	  authority	  and	  redefined	  the	  role	  of	  the	  
court	  to	  “set	  a	  pattern	  for	  judicial	  activism	  that	  has	  put	  American	  law	  in	  disarray	  on	  all	  
sorts	  of	  issues”	  (Henderson,	  Sowell).	  Sowell’s	  remarks	  were	  strongly	  rebutted	  by	  Peter	  
Ivan	  Armstrong,	  III	  of	  Atlanta,	  who	  wrote,	  “For	  millions	  of	  Americans	  like	  me,	  whose	  
educational	  opportunities	  expanded	  tremendously	  because	  of	  the	  Brown	  ruling,	  it	  
continues	  to	  embody	  a	  concept	  central	  to	  our	  constitutional	  ideal”	  (Tokasz).	  For	  
Armstrong,	  the	  Court	  was	  right	  to	  exercise	  that	  moral	  authority.	  But	  Michael	  Klarman	  
offered	  a	  more	  reserved	  view	  of	  their	  courage	  in	  the	  matter,	  arguing	  that	  the	  Court	  didn’t	  
act	  on	  segregation	  until	  they	  were	  certain	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  country	  was	  in	  favor	  of	  it,	  that	  
the	  decision	  “reflected	  a	  social	  and	  political	  sea	  change	  at	  least	  as	  much	  as	  it	  caused	  one”	  
(“Better”).	  Klarman	  further	  argued	  that	  the	  Court	  “declined	  to	  enforce	  Brown	  aggressively	  
until	  the	  civil	  rights	  movement	  had	  made	  Northern	  whites	  as	  keen	  to	  eliminate	  Jim	  Crow	  as	  
Southern	  whites	  were	  to	  preserve	  it”	  (“Better”).	  Erwin	  Chemerinsky,	  law	  professor	  at	  USC,	  
argued	  more	  on	  the	  moral	  authority	  side,	  saying	  that	  “Brown	  is	  a	  symbol	  of	  the	  courts	  at	  
their	  very	  best,”	  as	  they	  did	  “what	  Congress	  and	  other	  institutions	  could	  not	  or	  even	  would	  
not	  do”	  (Gearan).	  	  Columnist	  George	  Will	  wrote,	  “the	  decision	  also	  encouraged	  the	  
abandonment	  of	  constitutional	  reasoning—of	  constitutional	  law.	  It	  invested	  the	  judiciary	  
with	  a	  prestige	  that	  begot	  arrogance.”	  Thomas	  Tyron	  agreed,	  in	  part,	  that	  the	  ruling	  
provided	  an	  example	  of	  “how	  courts	  can	  effect	  sweeping,	  beneficial	  social	  changes	  by	  
scrutinizing	  laws	  according	  to	  constitutional	  principles	  that	  are	  placed	  in	  a	  modern	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context”	  and	  that	  “sometimes…the	  outcome	  of	  such	  analysis….require[s]	  courts	  to	  overrule	  
the	  will	  of	  the	  majority	  as	  expressed	  by	  their	  elected	  legislators,”	  which	  is	  what	  critics	  
mean	  when	  they	  employ	  the	  phrase	  “activist	  judges”	  in	  a	  derisive	  way.	  
A	  few	  comments	  raise	  a	  critical	  eye	  at	  the	  decision	  itself.	  Thomas	  Sowell,	  writing	  in	  
The	  Wall	  Street	  Journal,	  argued	  that	  the	  1954	  decision	  “relied	  on	  emotional	  rhetoric	  and	  
political	  spin…without	  showing	  how	  the	  1896	  [Plessy]	  decision	  was	  constitutionally	  
incorrect”	  and	  that	  the	  Brown	  decision	  “made	  judicial	  activism	  the	  law	  of	  the	  land”	  
(“Where”).	  In	  a	  more	  biting	  commentary,	  Peter	  McKnight	  of	  the	  Vancouver	  Sun	  [B.C.]	  called	  
Bush’s	  comments	  ironic	  since	  they	  came	  on	  the	  heels	  of	  a	  statement	  from	  his	  press	  
secretary	  decrying	  the	  actions	  of	  “a	  few	  activist	  judges”	  in	  reference	  to	  the	  Massachusetts	  
Supreme	  Court	  ruling	  on	  gay	  marriage.	  He	  went	  on	  to	  criticize	  the	  Court	  in	  the	  Brown	  
decision,	  saying	  	  
Bush	  is	  surely	  right	  that	  Brown	  precipitated	  profound	  changes	  in	  American	  
society,	  and	  that	  it	  crossed	  a	  line	  in	  American	  history.	  But	  the	  line	  it	  crossed	  
was	  the	  one	  that	  says	  judges	  should	  make	  decisions	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  law,	  
not	  their	  own	  personal	  values….since	  the	  law	  still	  came	  down	  on	  the	  side	  of	  
the	  segregationists,	  the	  court	  abandoned	  the	  law	  and	  made	  its	  decision	  on	  
the	  basis	  of	  psychology	  and	  sociology.	  	  
McKnight’s	  comments	  echo	  early	  criticisms	  of	  the	  decision,	  when	  legal	  scholars	  made	  
similar	  claims	  about	  the	  “neutral	  principles”	  that	  seemed	  missing	  in	  the	  decision	  and	  the	  
arguments	  questioning	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  evidence	  on	  which	  the	  decision	  was	  based.	  	  
No	  other	  decision	  has	  generated	  so	  much	  debate	  over	  the	  proper	  role	  of	  the	  Court,	  
no	  even	  the	  famous	  Marbury	  v.	  Madison	  ruling	  that	  established	  judicial	  review,	  wherein	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Chief	  Justice	  John	  Marshall	  wrote,	  “it	  is	  emphatically	  the	  duty	  of	  the	  Judicial	  Department	  to	  
say	  what	  the	  law	  is.”	  The	  value	  of	  an	  independent	  judiciary	  is	  hard	  to	  overstate,	  particularly	  
in	  the	  construction	  of	  America’s	  federal	  government	  system.	  The	  Brown	  decision	  keeps	  this	  
topic	  lively	  not	  just	  among	  lawyers	  and	  legal	  scholars,	  but	  among	  ordinary	  people	  whose	  
opinions	  and	  mindsets	  help	  shape	  the	  environment	  in	  which	  judges	  do	  their	  work.	  Erasing	  
the	  controversy	  over	  the	  Brown	  decision	  and	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  Court	  in	  making	  it,	  as	  the	  
speeches	  in	  Topeka	  seem	  to	  do,	  also	  forecloses	  public	  discussion	  of	  courts	  and	  how	  they	  
function.	  The	  value	  in	  repeating	  the	  history	  and	  challenging	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  Court’s	  courage	  
allows	  for	  continued	  vibrant	  debate	  over	  the	  proper	  role	  of	  the	  courts	  in	  the	  future.	  It	  also	  
keeps	  alive	  the	  idea	  that	  justice	  can	  be	  obtained	  through	  the	  courts,	  another	  of	  the	  key	  
points	  of	  dialectic	  engagement	  emerging	  in	  the	  anniversary	  discourse.	  
Most	  speakers,	  articles,	  or	  books	  presented	  at	  Brown’s	  anniversary	  made	  some	  form	  
of	  observation	  of	  how	  Brown	  has	  not	  been	  fulfilled	  or	  realized.	  Many	  of	  these	  take-­‐backs	  
from	  claims	  about	  Brown’s	  achievement	  are	  based	  on	  conditions	  of	  inequality	  in	  schools,	  
income	  disparity	  between	  racial	  groups,	  and	  other	  socio-­‐economic	  factors.	  Yet	  Coretta	  
Scott	  King,	  speaking	  to	  the	  AARP	  Life@50	  meeting	  in	  Las	  Vegas,	  said	  the	  decision	  
“energized	  the	  hopes	  of	  Americans	  for	  equality…that	  justice	  could	  be	  obtained	  through	  the	  
courts.”	  Thurgood	  Marshall	  clearly	  believed	  this	  was	  the	  case,	  that	  once	  the	  law	  was	  in	  
place,	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  the	  centrality	  of	  law	  to	  our	  entire	  political	  and	  social	  structure	  
would	  lead	  to	  the	  changes	  needed	  to	  ensure	  equality	  in	  every	  arena	  for	  all	  Americans.	  Does	  
this	  mean	  that	  the	  reason	  Brown	  hasn’t	  resulted	  in	  that	  equality	  is	  because	  of	  the	  Court	  
overreaching	  its	  authority?	  Or	  does	  it	  mean	  that	  the	  Court	  simply	  can’t	  be	  expected	  to	  solve	  
socio-­‐economic	  problems?	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In	  their	  essay	  for	  the	  50th	  anniversary	  commemorative	  events	  at	  Syracuse	  
University,	  Professors	  Linda	  Carty	  and	  Paula	  Johnson	  argued,	  “for	  Brown	  to	  have	  worked	  in	  
its	  broadest	  sense	  necessitated	  government	  policy	  addressing	  inequality	  in	  housing,	  
employment,	  social	  welfare,	  health	  care,	  the	  legal	  system,	  and	  many	  other	  realms	  of	  
society.”	  They	  argue	  that	  Brown	  “cannot	  be	  viewed	  in	  isolation	  from	  the	  other	  necessary	  
measure	  to	  address	  inequality.”	  They	  observed	  that	  “while	  African	  Americans	  made	  some	  
immediate	  gains	  in	  education	  as	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  Brown…we	  not	  that	  on	  closer	  
examination	  many	  of	  those	  education	  gains	  have	  recently	  been	  lost.”	  	  They	  review	  
conditions,	  similar	  to	  the	  points	  Kerry	  made	  in	  his	  speech,	  about	  economic	  and	  other	  
inequalities	  and	  come	  away	  being	  “less	  inclined	  to	  celebrate	  this	  50th	  anniversary	  of	  the	  
decision,	  than	  to	  commemorate	  the	  significance	  of	  what	  it	  could	  still	  mean…”	  if	  real	  change,	  
“more	  reality	  than	  rhetoric”	  came	  about.	  This	  perspective	  reflects	  the	  lessons	  learned	  from	  
the	  years	  of	  attempts	  to	  implement	  Brown	  and	  to	  bring	  about	  the	  desired	  conditions	  of	  
equality	  and	  opportunity,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  perspectives	  of	  their	  own	  fields	  of	  law	  (Johnson)	  
and	  African	  American	  studies	  (Carty).	  In	  their	  analysis,	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  Court	  to	  provide	  
the	  needed	  changes	  falls	  decidedly	  on	  the	  negative.	  	  
In	  Massachusetts,	  Justice	  Robert	  Cordy	  argued	  that	  the	  courts	  alone	  are	  not	  
sufficient,	  that	  “progress	  in	  civil	  rights	  is	  a	  byproduct	  of	  the	  three	  branches	  of	  government	  
working	  together.”	  	  Robert	  Hilldrup	  set	  the	  responsibility	  outside	  of	  government	  entirely,	  
saying,	  “the	  true	  test	  of	  education	  and	  racial	  cooperation	  is	  something	  that	  society	  has	  to	  
reach	  through	  evolution”	  (McKelway).	  	  Similarly,	  Barbara	  Harvey,	  a	  black	  teacher	  working	  
in	  a	  white	  school,	  argued	  that	  “people	  haven’t	  bought	  into	  it….that’s	  not	  the	  schools,	  it’s	  the	  
people”	  (Hackett).	  Derrick	  Bell	  argued	  that	  grassroots	  efforts	  were	  more	  effective,	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becoming	  one	  of	  the	  only	  public	  voices	  to	  argue	  that	  Brown	  was	  wrongly	  decided.	  But	  
others	  said	  “Bell	  is	  mistaken	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  government	  could	  have	  enforced	  equality	  
without	  integration,”	  and	  more	  specifically	  that	  he	  “doesn’t	  understand	  the	  nature	  of	  
government-­‐sponsored	  education”	  (Gershman).	  	  Terrence	  Roberts	  also	  argued	  that	  the	  
route	  through	  the	  courts	  was	  insufficient.	  He	  claimed,	  “we	  are	  a	  country	  that	  believes	  in	  
mythology…the	  myth	  is	  that	  the	  issue	  has	  been	  settled	  because	  Brown	  versus	  Board	  of	  
Education	  was	  passed”	  (Reed).	  This	  claim	  is	  similar	  to	  one	  Bell	  made	  in	  a	  speech	  at	  
Syracuse	  University	  in	  2003,	  where	  he	  said	  the	  problem	  with	  significant	  cases	  like	  Brown	  
was	  their	  “mesmerizing	  effects,”	  the	  way	  they	  led	  people	  to	  believe	  a	  problem	  was	  solved	  
because	  of	  a	  court	  ruling,	  which	  in	  turn	  caused	  them	  to	  cease	  any	  efforts	  they	  were	  making	  
toward	  solving	  that	  problem.	  Bell	  believed	  that	  if	  the	  Court	  had	  ruled	  for	  equality	  in	  the	  
segregated	  schools,	  and	  really	  enforced	  that	  provision,	  the	  states	  themselves	  would	  realize	  
that	  it	  was	  too	  expensive	  to	  maintain	  separate	  systems,	  and	  the	  segregation	  factor	  would	  
wither	  under	  that	  economic	  pressure.	  The	  argument	  for	  economic	  equality	  between	  school	  
systems	  is	  still	  an	  active	  part	  of	  the	  national	  conversation	  on	  education.	  	  	  	  	  
This	  discourse	  shows	  that	  ongoing	  efforts	  are	  a	  key	  part	  of	  achieving	  justice,	  and	  
several	  writers	  expressed	  concern	  about	  the	  lack	  of	  interest	  or	  outrage	  at	  the	  continuing	  
resegregation	  occurring	  throughout	  America.	  In	  Atlanta,	  for	  example,	  the	  Journal-­‐
Constitution	  editors	  claimed	  that,	  “except	  for	  researchers,	  Georgians	  don’t	  seem	  
particularly	  interested	  in	  the	  increasing	  resegregation	  of	  schools.	  Few	  parents	  of	  either	  
race	  feel	  strongly	  enough	  about	  diversity	  to	  put	  their	  child	  on	  a	  bus	  for	  an	  hour	  to	  travel	  
across	  town”	  (“Our”).	  An	  Austin	  editorial	  claimed	  “the	  passion,	  the	  anger	  and,	  most	  of	  all,	  
the	  hope	  that	  Brown	  evoked	  have	  faded”	  (Alford).	  	  In	  Buffalo,	  Leslie	  Foschio,	  “encouraged	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young	  people	  to	  ‘step	  up	  to	  the	  plate’	  and	  reverse	  the	  mistakes	  of	  the	  past”	  precisely	  to	  
avoid	  “lawsuit,	  after	  lawsuit,	  after	  lawsuit”	  (Tokasz).	  Leonard	  Pitts,	  Jr.	  wrote	  that	  “the	  
moral	  of	  Brown,	  then,	  is	  that	  the	  law	  has	  limits”	  and	  that	  because	  of	  this	  “Brown	  is…a	  
reminder	  that	  battles	  that	  once	  were	  waged	  in	  courtrooms	  are	  now	  waged	  in	  the	  hearts	  
and	  minds	  of	  a	  nation	  that	  still	  isn’t	  sure	  it	  can,	  or	  even	  wants	  to,	  live	  up	  to	  its	  highest	  
ideals.”	  Pitts’s	  comments	  evoke	  Bush’s	  words	  in	  Topeka,	  where	  he	  expressed	  with	  certainty	  
that	  Americans	  do	  want	  to	  live	  up	  to	  these	  ideals.	  This	  difference	  of	  perspective	  shows	  the	  
opportunity	  for	  rhetoric	  to	  function,	  for	  occasions	  such	  as	  the	  anniversary	  to	  provide	  the	  
epideictic	  occasion	  and	  the	  speeches	  or	  writings	  that	  reaffirm	  communal	  values	  and	  help	  
motivate	  audiences	  to	  adhere	  to	  those	  values.	  The	  law	  is	  an	  idea	  that	  works	  when	  
individuals	  adhere	  to	  it,	  and	  sometimes	  the	  general	  idea	  of	  being	  a	  law-­‐abiding	  citizen	  
needs	  additional	  persuasion	  to	  conform	  to	  a	  particular	  law.	  The	  law,	  as	  Klarman	  observes,	  
is	  not	  self-­‐executing	  (From	  48).	  Earl	  Pollock,	  the	  clerk	  who	  assisted	  Warren	  in	  drafting	  the	  
opinion,	  stated	  simply	  “people	  tend	  to	  misunderstand	  what	  law	  can	  accomplish.”	  
Responding	  to	  an	  interview	  for	  a	  documentary	  that	  “seemed	  premised	  on	  the	  idea	  ‘that	  
Brown	  has	  not	  succeeded	  because	  there’s	  tremendous	  black	  poverty’”,	  Pollock	  said:	  
That’s	  a	  very	  nagging	  problem,	  but	  I	  don’t	  think	  anybody	  could	  reasonably 
have expected Brown was going to solve the problem of poverty, nor could 
anybody have reasonably believed it would solve the problem of racism," Pollock 
said. "I don't think it could be regarded as a failure of Brown that we still have 
those problems….Law	  can	  accomplish	  a	  lot,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  always	  the	  answer	  to	  
every	  social	  or	  economic	  problem	  we	  have—that’s	  why	  we	  have	  legislatures	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and	  executives	  and	  social-­‐service	  agencies	  and	  philanthropy	  and	  a	  lot	  of	  
things	  that	  have	  to	  function	  effectively	  outside	  the	  courtroom.	  (Richman).	  
These	  limits	  to	  what	  law	  can	  do	  have	  a	  corollary	  in	  what	  cannot	  be	  done	  until	  or	  unless	  law	  
acts.	  A	  Washington	  Post	  editorial	  eloquently	  covered	  this	  point	  in	  its	  summary	  of	  Brown’s	  
accomplishment:	  
No	  longer	  do	  Americans	  have	  to	  petition	  the	  federal	  courts,	  as	  did	  the	  
plaintiffs	  50	  years	  ago,	  to	  prevent	  states	  from	  denying	  the	  most	  basic	  racial	  
equality	  under	  law.	  No	  longer	  does	  any	  group	  of	  people,	  on	  account	  of	  their	  
race,	  have	  to	  seek	  from	  the	  courts	  what	  the	  Brown	  briefs	  movingly	  called	  
"the	  most	  important	  secular	  claims	  that	  can	  be	  put	  forward	  by	  children,	  the	  
claim	  to	  their	  full	  measure	  of	  the	  chance	  to	  learn	  and	  grow,	  and	  the	  
inseparably	  connected	  but	  even	  more	  important	  claim	  to	  be	  treated	  as	  entire	  
citizens	  of	  the	  society	  into	  which	  they	  have	  been	  born.’	  (“50”)	  
Some	  were	  able	  to	  shift	  this	  question	  to	  a	  future	  point	  of	  view.	  Wilhelmina	  Delco	  from	  
Austin	  summarized	  it	  as	  a	  lesson	  “that	  it’s	  not	  enough	  to	  change	  the	  law”	  (Alford).	  Marc	  
Morial,	  the	  president	  and	  CEO	  of	  the	  National	  Urban	  League,	  observed	  that	  Brown’s	  
“greatest	  importance”	  is	  to	  be	  “a	  source	  of	  inspiration	  for	  us	  to	  continue	  to	  do	  the	  work	  that	  
must	  be	  done	  to	  provide	  equal	  educational	  opportunity	  for	  all	  Americans.”	  Brian	  Jones,	  
then	  general	  counsel	  for	  the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Education,	  said	  the	  decision	  was	  “critically	  
important….but	  it	  has	  limits.	  It’s	  one	  thing	  to	  say	  you	  can’t	  segregate	  your	  schools	  by	  law.	  
But	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  can’t	  mandate	  where	  people	  choose	  to	  live”	  (“Newspaper”).	  The	  
Court	  itself	  agreed	  with	  this	  observation.	  In	  a	  2002	  Supreme	  Court	  ruling,	  Justice	  Anthony	  
Kennedy	  wrote,	  "Where	  resegregation	  is	  a	  product	  not	  of	  state	  action	  but	  of	  private	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choices,	  it	  does	  not	  have	  constitutional	  implications"	  (Hackett).	  All	  of	  this	  makes	  clear	  that	  
the	  courts	  play	  a	  necessary	  role	  in	  establishing	  racial	  justice,	  but	  getting	  the	  buy-­‐in	  needed	  
at	  the	  people	  level	  requires	  the	  work	  of	  persuasion,	  the	  rhetorical	  work,	  to	  pick	  up	  where	  
the	  court	  leaves	  off.	  	  And	  not	  just	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  policy	  debate	  or	  judicial	  reasoning,	  but	  the	  
communitas	  building	  effects	  of	  epideictic	  rhetoric,	  and	  the	  persistent	  willingness	  to	  both	  
create	  and	  exercise	  the	  occasions	  for	  moving	  minds	  to	  act	  on	  the	  values	  being	  celebrated.	  
But	  remembering	  Noel	  Coward’s	  claim	  that	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  build	  consensus,	  or	  
communitas,	  without	  agreeing	  on	  the	  question	  leads	  to	  the	  next	  dialectical	  point	  from	  the	  
Brown	  decision,	  and	  that	  is	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  schools	  have	  to	  be	  integrated	  to	  
provide	  opportunity	  and	  equality.	  The	  language	  of	  the	  initial	  decision	  emphasized	  the	  role	  
of	  education	  in	  creating	  both	  of	  these	  benefits.	  But	  Carty	  and	  Johnson,	  along	  with	  many	  
others,	  observe	  that	  the	  Court	  may	  have	  done	  a	  disservice	  to	  African-­‐American	  students	  
and	  teachers	  by	  linking	  both	  benefits	  to	  sharing	  classrooms	  with	  white	  students.	  The	  legacy	  
of	  trying	  to	  integrate,	  rather	  than	  just	  desegregate,	  schools,	  is	  well	  known.	  The	  fiftieth	  
anniversary	  provided	  the	  opportunity	  to	  re-­‐examine	  this	  question:	  the	  role	  of	  integration	  in	  
education	  in	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century,	  and	  what	  values	  are	  currently	  assigned	  to	  public	  
education	  more	  generally.	  	  
The	  tension	  exists	  between	  the	  two	  concepts	  of	  (racial)	  justice	  and	  equal	  
educational	  opportunity,	  and	  it	  manifests	  mostly	  in	  comments	  made	  about	  the	  reasons	  for	  
the	  ongoing	  achievement	  gap	  between	  whites	  and	  other	  racial	  groups.	  Some,	  like	  Jim	  
Vandermillen,	  senior	  analyst	  for	  the	  Providence	  Plan,	  and	  Gary	  Orfield	  at	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  
Project	  at	  Harvard,	  argue	  that	  the	  root	  cause	  of	  unequal	  education	  systems	  is	  the	  
resegregation	  factor	  (Borg).	  Others,	  such	  as	  John	  Logan	  at	  the	  Mumford	  Center,	  James	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Wilson	  at	  Orlando’s	  Jones	  High	  School,	  or	  reporter	  Joe	  Rodriquez,	  argue	  that	  integration,	  or	  
lack	  of	  it,	  isn’t	  the	  cause	  at	  all,	  but	  poverty,	  parental	  involvement,	  and	  other	  factors	  are	  the	  
difference	  makers	  (Alford,	  Brewington,	  Rodriguez).	  Beyond	  the	  achievement	  gap,	  there	  is	  
division	  as	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  integrated	  schools	  to	  preparing	  children	  for	  the	  future	  in	  a	  
global	  society.	  As	  with	  the	  other	  discursive	  elements	  of	  the	  Brown	  anniversary,	  there	  are	  
gradations	  of	  thought	  on	  these	  ideas.	  Secretary	  of	  Education	  Rod	  Paige,	  for	  example,	  
claimed	  that	  “integration	  is	  a	  necessary	  condition”	  for	  quality	  education	  (Lerner).	  The	  
Supreme	  Court,	  ruling	  in	  the	  Michigan	  Affirmative	  Action	  cases,	  argued	  that	  “diversity	  was	  
a	  compelling	  state	  interest”	  (Bulkeley).	  	  	  But	  Cheryl	  Brown	  Henderson	  acknowledged	  “the	  
likelihood	  that	  every	  school	  in	  this	  country	  would	  be	  numerically	  racially	  balanced	  is	  not	  
going	  to	  happen”	  and	  that	  the	  most	  important	  thing	  is	  to	  be	  able	  to	  say	  “children	  are	  getting	  
a	  quality	  education…a	  world	  class	  education”	  (Lerner).	  The	  importance	  of	  a	  quality	  
education	  far	  outweighed	  the	  idea	  of	  getting	  an	  integrated	  one	  in	  surveys	  and	  general	  
comments	  captured	  in	  the	  media.	  Rose	  Williams,	  a	  mother	  of	  two	  from	  Illinois,	  said	  
“diversity	  is	  important	  because	  when	  they	  go	  out	  into	  the	  world	  it’s	  not	  just	  going	  to	  be	  
people	  like	  them.	  But	  No.	  1	  is	  quality	  of	  education”	  (“Newspaper”).	  Ms.	  Williams’	  comment	  
is	  representative	  of	  many	  similar	  comments	  offered	  by	  parents	  and	  school	  administrators.	  	  
An	  Associated	  Press	  poll	  revealed	  that	  “eighty	  percent	  of	  adults	  would	  prefer	  that	  their	  
child	  attend	  a	  racially	  mixed	  school,	  but	  not	  if	  it	  means	  their	  children	  must	  attend	  schools	  
farther	  from	  home	  (Farmer).	  The	  ongoing	  dialectical	  question	  here	  is	  how	  to	  achieve	  a	  
quality	  education	  for	  all	  students	  despite	  the	  resegregation	  of	  schools	  that	  follows	  freely	  
chosen,	  at	  least	  in	  legal	  terms,	  housing	  patterns.	  Clarke	  Rountree	  noted	  that	  among	  the	  
many	  things	  Brown	  could	  not	  accomplish	  was	  the	  prevention	  of	  “white	  flight”	  from	  major	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cities	  and	  the	  resegregation	  it	  caused	  (Brown	  xi).	  Charles	  Clotfelter	  believed	  school	  districts	  
should	  take	  the	  lead	  in	  providing	  attractive	  opportunities,	  like	  “attractive	  magnet-­‐school	  
offerings,	  school	  assignments	  that	  limit	  the	  proportion	  of	  low-­‐income	  students	  in	  any	  one	  
school,	  and	  voluntary	  transfers	  across	  district	  lines	  to	  enhance	  racial	  diversity”	  (emphasis	  
added).	  Cross	  –district	  measures	  were	  denied	  under	  Milliken	  v.	  Bradley,	  but	  a	  voluntary	  
program	  such	  as	  Clotfelter	  described	  would	  fall	  under	  the	  private	  actors	  exemption	  Justice	  
Kennedy	  asserted.	  	  
Many	  black	  educators	  and	  community	  leaders	  lamented	  the	  loss	  of	  community	  that	  
followed	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  Brown,	  and	  argued	  that	  quality	  education	  required	  that	  
community.	  	  The	  Rev.	  E.	  Bernard	  Hurd	  in	  Topeka	  said	  “I	  would	  prefer	  that	  it	  was	  just	  the	  
way	  it	  was.	  You	  had	  your	  community.	  You	  had	  a	  group	  of	  dedicated	  teachers.	  You	  had	  a	  lot	  
of	  parental	  assistance.	  Now	  we’re	  doing	  what	  we	  were	  trying	  to	  avoid	  in	  the	  first	  place	  –	  
busing”	  (Freedman).	  	  Topeka	  High	  Principal	  Clardy	  Vinson	  made	  a	  similar	  claim,	  that	  “black	  
students	  had	  a	  built-­‐in	  support	  system.	  They	  were	  in	  constant	  contact	  with	  people	  they	  
could	  identify	  with—teachers,	  parents,	  pastors—who	  were	  working	  together	  to	  help	  them	  
succeed”	  (Dobbs	  “Progress”).	  In	  Wisconsin,	  Lynn	  Gilchrist	  acknowledged	  that	  schools	  are	  
part	  of	  a	  neighborhood,	  part	  of	  a	  community,	  and	  having	  your	  child	  walk	  to	  school	  is	  ideal,	  
“but	  it’s	  not	  always	  possible”	  (Weier	  and	  Der).	  The	  question	  circles	  around,	  in	  part	  because	  
court	  decisions	  that	  followed	  Brown	  commanded	  specific	  efforts	  not	  just	  to	  desegregate,	  
but	  to	  deliberately	  integrate	  schools	  and	  took	  supervision	  of	  districts	  to	  ensure	  compliance,	  
establishing	  the	  idea	  of	  integration	  as	  a	  necessary	  condition	  to	  find	  Brown	  had	  been	  
successful.	  Observations	  that	  resegregation	  is	  occurring,	  such	  as	  those	  discussed	  above,	  
seem	  to	  indicate	  that	  Brown	  is	  not	  succeeding	  but	  lament	  the	  lack	  of	  concern	  or	  outrage	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without	  seeming	  to	  recognize	  the	  differences	  from	  the	  Brown	  era	  of	  state-­‐imposed	  
segregation	  and	  voluntary	  choices,	  including	  those	  made	  by	  students.	  For	  example,	  an	  
experiment	  in	  a	  Buffalo	  area	  high	  school	  showed	  that	  even	  when	  the	  school	  had	  a	  diverse	  
student	  body,	  the	  students	  self-­‐segregated	  by	  race	  in	  the	  lunchroom.	  Efforts	  to	  deliberately	  
mix	  the	  students	  worked	  for	  a	  time,	  but	  when	  the	  researchers	  left,	  the	  students	  returned	  to	  
where	  they	  felt	  comfortable	  (Thompson).	  It	  may	  be	  the	  case	  that	  the	  link	  between	  Brown	  
and	  directed	  integration	  is	  an	  example	  of	  a	  value	  undergoing	  a	  “shuffle,”	  as	  Sheard	  calls	  it,	  a	  
need	  for	  civic	  discussion	  to	  which	  rhetoric	  can	  positively	  contribute.	  The	  central	  question	  
of	  Brown	  was	  whether	  segregated	  schools	  could	  be	  equal,	  and	  the	  Court	  answered	  in	  the	  
negative.	  Now,	  the	  dialectical	  proposition	  that	  enjoys	  general	  agreement	  is	  that	  the	  state	  
should	  not	  require	  segregated	  facilities	  for	  its	  citizens.	  The	  more	  particular	  dialectical	  
points	  of	  engagement	  now	  concern	  whether	  forced	  integration	  is	  a	  proper	  function	  of	  the	  
state,	  and	  how	  schools	  can	  prepare	  students	  for	  participation	  in	  a	  diverse	  world,	  and	  how	  
to	  provide	  equal	  education	  despite	  resegregation	  and	  differing	  economic	  conditions	  among	  
school	  districts.	  The	  dialectical	  process	  would,	  in	  theory,	  push	  through	  to	  an	  answer	  for	  
each	  of	  these	  questions.	  
The	  question	  of	  Brown’s	  success	  is	  the	  final	  point	  of	  the	  dialectical	  engagement,	  and	  
the	  fiftieth	  anniversary	  itself	  renders	  this	  discussion	  somewhat	  moot.	  Brown	  was	  
celebrated	  at	  its	  fiftieth	  anniversary	  at	  all	  levels	  of	  society	  from	  the	  law	  to	  education	  
settings	  to	  museums	  to	  the	  arts.	  But	  that	  didn’t	  keep	  a	  number	  of	  commentators	  from	  
seeking	  different	  verbs	  for	  the	  events.	  Professors	  Carty	  and	  Johnson	  claimed	  they	  were	  
“less	  inclined	  to	  celebrate…than	  to	  commemorate	  the	  significance	  of	  what	  it	  could	  still	  
mean	  for	  this	  society.”	  Other	  writers	  took	  a	  more	  critical	  approach,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  verb	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chosen	  didn’t	  change	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  events,	  and	  the	  events	  themselves	  were	  not	  yet	  
called	  for.	  Errol	  Louis,	  for	  example,	  reviewed	  several	  of	  the	  anniversary	  books	  and	  articles,	  
and	  found	  that	  although	  these	  writers	  were	  “armed	  with	  far	  more	  powerful	  tools	  than	  the	  
NAACP	  lawyers	  had	  decades	  ago”	  the	  conclusion	  many	  of	  them	  reached	  about	  the	  decision	  
and	  “what	  it	  did	  and	  didn’t	  achieve	  are	  troubling	  and	  often	  devastatingly	  pessimistic”	  
(Louis).	  The	  Houston	  Chronicle	  shared	  his	  perspective	  as	  they	  wrote,	  “rather	  than	  celebrate	  
this	  far-­‐reaching	  victory	  for	  freedom	  and	  equality,	  a	  surprisingly	  large	  and	  diverse	  
contingent	  of	  Americans	  questions	  the	  value	  of	  the	  landmark	  decision”	  (“Commemorate”).	  
For	  Leonard	  Pitt,	  a	  black	  columnist,	  writing	  the	  anniversary	  column	  was	  a	  chore,	  something	  
he	  felt	  “obligated”	  to	  do	  but	  not	  a	  column	  he	  looked	  forward	  to.	  “My	  problem,”	  he	  wrote,	  “is	  
that	  an	  anniversary	  is	  usually	  a	  time	  for	  celebration,	  the	  record	  is	  so	  mixed	  that	  little	  about	  
it	  inspires	  rejoicing”	  (Pitts).	  The	  South	  Bend	  Tribune	  concluded,	  “there	  is	  ample	  reason	  to	  
raise	  a	  glass	  to	  Brown’s	  golden	  anniversary.	  Remember,	  though,	  that	  the	  glass	  is	  only	  half-­‐
full”	  (“Brown”).	  
Michael	  Paul	  Williams,	  writing	  for	  the	  Richmond	  Times	  Dispatch,	  marked	  a	  lack	  of	  
caring	  both	  about	  the	  decision	  and	  the	  ongoing	  state	  of	  black	  student	  achievement,	  
observing	  that	  “rarely	  does	  a	  celebration	  produce	  as	  much	  ambivalence	  as	  today’s	  golden	  
anniversary	  of	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education,”	  an	  observation	  that	  indicates	  the	  recognition	  
happening	  in	  Topeka	  was	  not	  being	  duplicated	  in	  other	  cities	  with	  significant	  ties	  to	  the	  
decision.	  In	  South	  Carolina,	  for	  example,	  home	  of	  the	  Briggs	  v.	  Elliott	  case,	  there	  was	  little	  
recognition	  of	  the	  anniversary	  in	  terms	  of	  events,	  though	  The	  Post	  and	  Courier	  in	  
Charleston	  published	  a	  four-­‐day	  series	  titled	  “Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education,	  50	  Years	  Later:	  
A	  Dream	  Unfulfilled.”	  In	  one	  of	  those	  articles,	  staff	  writers	  interviewed	  Millicent	  E.	  Brown,	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who	  in	  1963	  “broke	  the	  racial	  barrier	  in	  Charleston’s	  public	  schools”	  and	  was	  at	  the	  time	  of	  
the	  article	  a	  history	  professor	  at	  North	  Carolina	  Agricultural	  and	  Technical	  State	  University.	  
Professor	  Brown’s	  observation	  of	  the	  decision	  was	  in	  the	  same	  spirit	  of	  praise	  and	  caution:	  
"1954	  is	  a	  year	  to	  be	  remembered	  and	  Brown	  is	  a	  decision	  to	  be	  respected,	  but	  more	  for	  its	  
success	  in	  removing	  race	  as	  an	  acceptable,	  governmentally	  condoned	  measure	  of	  worth.	  
What	  it	  has	  had	  to	  say	  about	  the	  granting	  of	  equal	  educational	  opportunity	  for	  black	  and	  
poor	  children	  is	  an	  entirely	  different	  dilemma”	  (“Integration”).	  	  
Many	  writers	  focused	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  equal	  educational	  opportunity	  and	  for	  most	  this	  
was	  the	  reason	  for	  the	  take-­‐back	  comments	  about	  Brown.	  Author	  David	  L.	  Chappell	  said	  
Brown	  “made	  only	  a	  glancing	  blow”	  at	  inequality,	  and	  therefore,	  “the	  50th	  anniversary	  of	  
the	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education	  decision	  this	  month	  is	  a	  well-­‐deserved	  feel-­‐good	  moment	  
for	  civil	  rights	  strategists,	  but	  it	  is	  only	  a	  temporary	  distraction	  from	  the	  deep	  conflicts	  that	  
remain.”	  Chris	  Satullo	  argued	  that	  Brown	  “dealt	  with	  a	  set	  of	  facts	  unique	  in	  history,”	  but	  
cautioned	  “Brown	  v.	  Board,	  while	  a	  watershed,	  was	  not	  by	  itself	  very	  effective.	  It	  took	  a	  
decade	  for	  the	  dismantling	  of	  ‘separate	  but	  equal’	  to	  occur,	  only	  after	  much	  pain,	  bravery	  
and	  blood	  that	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  did	  more	  to	  provoke	  than	  prevent.”	  William	  Corrigan,	  
president	  of	  The	  Missouri	  Bar,	  linked	  Brown	  and	  the	  1964	  Civil	  Rights	  Act,	  claimed	  that	  
“the	  promise”	  of	  both	  “has	  not	  been	  fully	  realized”.	  But	  he	  concluded	  that	  “there	  have	  been	  
dramatic	  improvements	  in	  civil	  rights	  in	  the	  past	  50	  years.	  Because	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  our	  
society	  is	  much	  closer	  now	  than	  50	  years	  ago	  to	  offering	  equal	  opportunities	  to	  all	  citizens,	  
and	  that	  is	  worth	  celebrating.”	  Robert	  Dunwell,	  chair	  of	  The	  Brown	  Foundation	  was	  among	  
those	  questioning	  the	  actual	  achievement	  since	  Brown,	  asking,	  "Are	  we	  celebrating	  the	  
decision?	  If	  so,	  what	  do	  we	  have	  to	  celebrate?	  We've	  got	  nothing	  to	  celebrate.	  We	  went	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from	  segregation	  to	  desegregation	  to	  resegregation.	  We	  have	  not	  achieved	  integration.	  We	  
have	  not	  achieved	  racial	  tolerance"	  (Biles).	  Dunwell’s	  remarks	  focus	  on	  the	  social	  structure	  
rather	  than	  educational	  equality,	  and	  this	  theme	  echoes	  through	  many	  of	  the	  sentiments	  on	  
the	  decision	  itself	  and	  the	  points	  of	  divergence	  in	  opinion	  in	  the	  categories	  discussed	  above.	  
Taken	  together,	  all	  these	  articles	  show	  the	  enormity	  of	  the	  change	  Brown	  set	  in	  
motion,	  and	  hint	  at	  the	  degree	  of	  sustained	  effort	  needed	  to	  propel	  society	  toward	  that	  
change.	  Brown	  had	  become	  more	  than	  just	  the	  shorthand	  name	  for	  the	  decision.	  It	  had	  
become	  a	  symbol	  provoking	  a	  national	  conscience	  and	  a	  renewed	  national	  dialogue	  on	  how	  
“we”	  want	  our	  society	  to	  function.	  This	  symbolic	  Brown	  created	  a	  sense	  of	  duty	  or	  
obligation	  to	  it	  and	  what	  it	  represented.	  Sheard	  argues	  this	  is	  one	  of	  epideictic	  rhetoric’s	  
important	  civic	  functions,	  where	  “disparity	  between	  existing	  and	  desired	  conditions	  
becomes	  the	  subject	  of	  critique…the	  critique	  leads	  to	  a	  vision	  that	  the	  audience	  is	  not	  only	  
invited	  to	  share	  but	  exhorted	  to	  help	  actualize”	  (779,	  776).	  Several	  writers	  make	  this	  
exhortation.	  Dennis	  Hayes,	  for	  example,	  wrote	  about	  the	  need	  for	  self-­‐reflection	  and	  soul-­‐
searching	  where	  the	  decision’s	  promise	  was	  concerned,	  saying	  “if	  we	  are	  honest	  with	  
ourselves,	  we	  must	  feel	  compelled	  to	  ponder	  as	  well	  the	  challenges	  still	  before	  us	  and	  our	  
failure	  to	  satisfy	  the	  rising	  expectations	  borne	  out	  of	  the	  great	  court	  decision”	  (“Quotes”).	  
Anthony	  Miles	  emphasized	  this	  sense	  of	  duty	  more	  pointedly	  when	  he	  wrote	  of	  the	  
commemorative	  events	  that	  “memory	  in	  this	  sense	  is	  both	  a	  boon	  and	  a	  burden,	  and	  if	  we	  
let	  our	  celebration	  of	  the	  triumph	  of	  Brown’s	  moment	  eclipse	  our	  responsibility	  to	  shoulder	  
the	  burden	  of	  Brown’s	  legacy,	  we	  will	  have	  both	  missed	  an	  opportunity	  and	  failed	  to	  meet	  
an	  obligation.”	  Judge	  Robert	  J.	  Cordy,	  who	  praised	  the	  Court	  for	  “[standing]	  up	  when	  others	  
would	  not”	  also	  reminded	  his	  listeners	  that	  equality	  is	  ‘ultimately	  up	  to	  us—how	  we	  as	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citizens	  value	  and	  understand	  equality,’”	  (Gawen).	  These	  leaders	  are	  in	  some	  ways	  pointing	  
blaming	  fingers	  back	  in	  time,	  but	  are	  mostly	  calling	  on	  contemporary	  Americans,	  those	  
reading	  the	  papers	  and	  attending	  the	  events	  of	  the	  50th	  anniversary,	  to	  take	  up	  the	  promise	  
of	  the	  decision	  as	  an	  obligation,	  as	  a	  duty	  to	  the	  Court,	  to	  the	  students	  who	  shouldered	  the	  
burden	  of	  integration,	  of	  the	  lawyers	  and	  the	  families	  who	  fought	  to	  achieve	  the	  decision.	  	  
Aristotle	  taught	  that	  the	  role	  of	  the	  audience	  in	  epideictic	  rhetoric	  is	  that	  of	  a	  
witness,	  more	  than	  a	  judge.	  Hauser,	  however,	  argues	  that	  this	  role	  of	  witness,	  the	  
observation	  of	  epideictic	  performance,	  provides	  a	  means	  for	  citizens	  to	  “participate	  
responsibly”	  in	  the	  decision	  making	  or	  judging	  processes	  “whose	  very	  proofs	  require	  
shared	  assumptions	  of	  civic	  norms”	  (17).	  The	  virtues	  that	  seem	  in	  evidence	  and	  in	  general	  
agreement	  in	  the	  articles	  surrounding	  the	  50th	  anniversary	  of	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  include	  
courage,	  determination,	  and	  perseverance	  toward	  a	  worthy	  objective.	  Additionally,	  the	  
ideals	  reaffirmed	  by	  the	  decision	  include	  the	  key	  American	  foundational	  ideals	  of	  justice,	  
equality,	  and	  freedom.	  But	  the	  most	  important	  value	  for	  the	  future	  may	  lie	  just	  in	  the	  
continuing	  of	  the	  conversation,	  the	  kinds	  of	  discussion	  and	  asynchronous	  dialectical	  
engagement	  reviewed	  here,	  to	  get	  people	  talking	  about	  the	  decision	  and	  what	  it	  meant,	  
what	  the	  expectations	  were	  and	  what	  they	  should	  be	  in	  the	  future.	  As	  long	  as	  there	  are	  
those	  who	  believe	  the	  decision	  should	  be	  celebrated,	  the	  conversation	  can	  continue.	  If	  there	  
were	  only	  the	  naysayers,	  the	  conversation	  would	  fade	  from	  the	  media	  and	  arguably	  from	  
public	  discourse.	  News	  follows	  events,	  and	  events	  keep	  the	  discussion	  going.	  And	  this	  is	  the	  
reason	  why	  societies	  need	  to	  actively	  seek	  the	  epideictic	  occasion	  to	  provide	  the	  means	  for	  
presenting	  their	  values	  to	  their	  members	  for	  continued	  discussion	  and	  assent.	  The	  events	  
of	  the	  past	  must	  be	  kept	  in	  memory	  to	  be	  able	  to	  build	  for	  the	  future.	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This	  is	  the	  point	  Stephen	  Browne	  stressed	  in	  his	  analysis	  of	  Hannah	  Arendt’s	  work.	  
Browne	  argues	  that	  she	  “reconstituted	  the	  conditions	  of	  remembrance	  essential	  to	  
democratic	  polity”	  (62).	  Arendt	  argued	  that	  the	  success	  of	  the	  polis	  was	  dependent	  on	  the	  
ability	  to	  remember,	  to	  recognize	  the	  works	  and	  deeds	  of	  the	  past	  as	  building	  blocks	  to	  the	  
present	  moment,	  and	  to	  recognize	  that	  “we	  exist	  in	  the	  world	  with	  and	  through	  others”	  and	  
the	  “political	  judgment…operates	  under	  conditions	  of	  plurality”	  (Browne	  50).	  According	  to	  
Browne,	  Arendt	  drew	  heavily	  from	  Greek	  antiquity	  and	  made	  a	  special	  point	  of	  the	  value	  of	  
the	  poets	  due	  to	  “the	  immortal	  fame	  which	  [they]	  could	  bestow	  upon	  word	  and	  deed	  to	  
make	  them	  outlast	  not	  only	  the	  futile	  moment	  of	  speech	  and	  action	  but	  even	  the	  mortal	  life	  
of	  their	  agent”	  (qtd.	  in	  Browne	  51).	  The	  lasting	  words	  and	  deeds	  provide	  hope	  for	  
meaningful	  action,	  and	  that	  hope	  allows	  for	  “being-­‐with-­‐others”	  in	  the	  world	  (Browne	  49).	  	  
Arendt’s	  work	  focuses	  on	  the	  value	  of	  remembrance,	  and	  also	  on	  its	  opposite,	  the	  
“persistent	  and	  fatal	  capacity	  of	  human	  beings	  to	  forget,”	  a	  capacity	  “marked	  most	  
conspicuously	  by	  a	  failure	  of	  judgment,”	  and	  especially	  judgment	  concerning	  being-­‐with-­‐
others	  (Browne	  50).	  Being-­‐with-­‐others	  requires	  negotiating	  multiple	  points	  of	  view	  and	  
positions	  within	  the	  political	  process.	  This	  negotiation	  requires	  freedom	  in	  general,	  and	  a	  
place	  for	  people	  to	  come	  together.	  It	  is,	  according	  to	  Arendt,	  “through	  speech	  and	  action,	  
words	  and	  deeds,	  that	  humans	  enact	  and	  affirm	  their	  collective	  identify	  as	  political	  
creatures”	  and	  it	  is	  the	  memory	  of	  past	  words	  and	  deeds	  that	  fuels	  ongoing	  words	  and	  
deeds	  (Browne	  51).	  	  That	  memory	  is	  reinforced	  and	  reinscribed	  through	  many	  means,	  from	  
formal	  education	  to	  public	  rituals	  and	  ceremonies,	  occasions	  that	  provide	  for	  epideictic	  
rhetoric	  and	  the	  poetic	  forms	  it	  can	  offer.	  The	  elements	  of	  praise	  and	  blame	  along	  with	  
stylistic	  qualities	  such	  as	  amplification	  give	  epideictic	  rhetoric	  the	  ability	  to	  stir	  the	  soul	  in	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ways	  that	  pure	  reason	  or	  logic	  cannot,	  the	  kind	  of	  soul-­‐stirring	  that	  is	  needed	  to	  move	  
toward	  action	  on	  agreed-­‐upon	  principles.	  	  	  
Ritual,	  Michael	  Carter	  argues,	  gives	  epideictic	  rhetoric	  its	  most	  successful	  moment,	  
and	  one	  critical	  function	  of	  ritual	  is	  “enhancing	  a	  sense	  of	  community	  among	  its	  
participants,”	  thus	  “breaking	  down	  the	  boundaries	  that	  separate	  people”	  (216).	  Sheard	  
observes	  that	  these	  effects	  of	  epideictic	  rhetoric	  help	  bring	  about	  change	  in	  both	  the	  
personal	  and	  socio-­‐political	  realms	  (768).	  Both	  of	  these	  arguments	  help	  explain	  the	  value	  
of	  establishing	  a	  common	  narrative	  about	  the	  Brown	  decision,	  such	  as	  was	  presented	  at	  the	  
fiftieth	  anniversary.	  It	  helps	  to	  focus	  the	  audience	  on	  the	  key	  values	  and	  principles	  being	  
celebrated	  and	  provides	  for	  a	  common	  understanding	  on	  which	  to	  approach	  policy	  
decisions	  for	  the	  future.	  But	  the	  dialectical	  process	  is	  equally	  important,	  to	  work	  within	  the	  
generally	  accepted	  values	  of	  that	  society	  to	  particular	  opportunities	  to	  live	  rightly.	  
The	  significance	  of	  this	  anniversary,	  a	  fiftieth	  anniversary,	  sparked	  the	  kind	  of	  
“vibrant	  public	  realm”	  that	  Gerald	  Hauser	  claimed	  epideictic	  could	  produce.	  This,	  combined	  
with	  the	  state	  of	  Presumption	  held	  by	  Brown	  provides	  an	  ongoing	  opportunity	  to	  consider	  
the	  ideals,	  values	  and	  goals	  of	  Brown	  as	  social	  conditions	  to	  be	  resolved	  through	  public	  
debate	  without	  the	  intervention	  of	  the	  formal	  legal	  structure.	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  look	  at	  the	  
speeches	  made	  in	  Topeka	  and	  even	  the	  many	  similar	  speeches	  made	  at	  various	  events	  
around	  the	  country	  and	  say	  that	  they	  were	  merely	  ceremonial,	  merely	  the	  flattery	  that	  
Socrates	  described	  in	  the	  Gorgias.	  And	  it	  would	  be	  easy	  to	  say	  that	  the	  state	  leaders	  had	  an	  
obligation	  to	  shower	  these	  words	  of	  praise	  on	  the	  decision	  because	  it	  was	  fitting	  for	  the	  
fiftieth	  anniversary,	  particularly	  since	  the	  National	  Historic	  Site	  had	  been	  approved,	  and	  
built,	  and	  adopted	  into	  the	  National	  Park	  system.	  It	  would	  be	  easy	  to	  argue	  that	  these	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speeches	  were	  of	  the	  “feel-­‐good”	  variety,	  designed	  to	  satisfy	  the	  expectations	  of	  an	  
American	  audience	  already	  determined	  to	  see	  itself	  as	  constituting	  a	  great	  nation,	  and	  that	  
the	  mild	  reminders	  that	  we	  have	  not	  lived	  up	  to	  these	  ideals	  were	  lightly	  played	  to	  avoid	  
disrupting	  that	  sensibility.	  But	  that	  reading,	  plausible	  as	  it	  is,	  fails	  to	  account	  for	  the	  
Brown’s	  lingering	  presence	  not	  only	  in	  the	  Court,	  but	  also	  in	  the	  many	  avenues	  of	  civic	  
discourse.	  Mfume	  said,	  “we	  have	  to	  talk	  about	  it	  as	  a	  nation,”	  and	  we	  ought	  to,	  to	  avoid	  
forgetting,	  to	  learn	  from	  the	  lessons	  of	  the	  past	  (Massie).	  The	  next	  chapter	  will	  present	  the	  
means	  by	  which	  rhetoric,	  as	  a	  field	  of	  study	  and	  practice,	  can	  facilitate	  that	  conversation.	  	  




The	  Available	  Means:	  Brown	  as	  Agency	  
	  
In	  her	  address	  to	  the	  AARP	  Life@50+	  convention	  in	  Las	  Vegas	  in	  October	  2004,	  
Coretta	  Scott	  King	  called	  the	  decision	  in	  Brown	  v	  Board	  of	  Education	  a	  “lightning	  bolt	  that	  
energized	  the	  hopes	  of	  Americans	  for	  equality…the	  hope	  that	  justice	  could	  be	  obtained	  
through	  the	  courts.”	  She	  cited	  several	  familiar	  incidents	  from	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  era,	  including	  
the	  march	  from	  Selma	  to	  Montgomery,	  and	  the	  bombing	  of	  the	  16th	  Street	  Baptist	  Church,	  
which	  she	  recognized	  as	  part	  of	  the	  “increase	  in	  racist	  terrorism”	  that	  followed	  the	  
decision.	  In	  contrast	  to	  that	  terrorism,	  she	  cited	  Brown	  as	  the	  catalyst	  for	  a	  “prairie	  fire	  of	  
non-­‐violent	  movements	  that	  swept	  the	  southern	  states,”	  and	  the	  “explosion	  of	  human	  
rights	  movements	  in	  the	  last	  three	  decades.”	  Mrs.	  King’s	  remarks	  highlight	  some	  of	  the	  
moral	  and	  ethical	  challenges	  that	  contributed	  to	  the	  shift	  in	  public	  acceptance	  of	  the	  Brown	  
decision.	  	  
History	  scholars	  studying	  this	  shift	  in	  the	  period	  from	  the	  1950s	  through	  the	  1970s	  
have	  argued	  that	  the	  violence	  of	  the	  civil	  rights	  movement	  years,	  especially	  the	  16th	  Street	  
Baptist	  Church	  bombing,	  presented	  segregation	  as	  “great	  evil	  that	  had	  to	  be	  eradicated,”	  
and	  that	  Brown	  and	  the	  subsequent	  desegregation	  rulings	  citing	  it	  as	  precedent	  gained	  
acceptance	  as	  the	  way	  to	  eradicate	  the	  evil	  (Cottrol,	  Diamond,	  and	  Ware	  231).	  Even	  then,	  
however,	  Brown	  did	  not	  take	  the	  kind	  of	  center	  stage	  it	  occupied	  at	  the	  point	  of	  its	  fiftieth	  
anniversary.	  Outside	  of	  Topeka,	  where	  the	  international	  spotlight	  was	  most	  focused,	  the	  
response	  to	  Brown’s	  fiftieth	  varied.	  Although	  the	  two	  main	  themes	  of	  achievement	  and	  lack	  
of	  achievement	  run	  throughout	  the	  comments,	  the	  specific	  responses	  echo	  the	  very	  
dilemma	  of	  the	  initial	  decision.	  It	  was	  necessary	  for	  the	  country	  to	  end	  formal	  segregation,	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but	  how	  to	  move	  past	  that,	  to	  achieve	  educational	  or	  racial	  quality,	  proved	  a	  more	  elusive	  
question.	  
The	  hope	  Mrs.	  King	  cited,	  that	  justice	  could	  be	  obtained	  through	  the	  courts,	  was	  the	  
achievement	  President	  Bush	  claimed	  for	  Brown	  in	  declaring	  the	  theme	  for	  National	  Law	  
Day	  2004	  as	  “To	  Win	  Equality	  by	  Law:	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education	  at	  50.”	  Racial	  equality	  
and	  racial	  justice	  are	  linked	  in	  the	  legacy	  of	  the	  Brown	  decision,	  perpetuating	  the	  notion	  
that	  equality	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  law	  and	  the	  courts	  are	  the	  means	  for	  achieving	  it.	  Richard	  Kluger	  
quipped	  that	  “American	  society	  …	  reduces	  its	  most	  troubling	  controversies	  to	  the	  scope—
and	  translates	  them	  into	  the	  language—of	  a	  lawsuit”	  (x).	  Indeed,	  American	  national	  
identity	  prominently	  features	  reliance	  on	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  Thurgood	  Marshall	  believed	  so	  
strongly	  in	  the	  court	  and	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  that	  he	  believed	  the	  Brown	  decision	  would	  lead	  to	  
full	  equality	  for	  African-­‐Americans	  by	  1963,	  in	  part	  because	  he	  believed	  lawyers	  and	  
political	  representatives	  would	  take	  the	  necessary	  steps	  to	  follow	  the	  law	  once	  it	  was	  
declared.	  The	  rule	  of	  law	  concept	  is	  built	  into	  our	  foundational	  documents,	  and	  the	  great	  
celebration	  of	  Brown	  at	  its	  fiftieth	  anniversary	  was	  based	  on	  Brown’s	  reaffirmation	  of	  those	  
founding	  ideals.	  	  
Remembering	  that	  argument	  is	  about	  adherence	  to	  ideas	  –	  the	  “stickiness”	  factor	  
that	  Malcolm	  Gladwell	  finds	  both	  valuable	  and	  necessary	  to	  bring	  about	  social	  change,	  we	  
might	  do	  well	  to	  consider	  that	  the	  Plessy	  decision	  was	  received	  positively	  in	  part	  because	  it	  
sanctioned	  already	  existing	  social	  attitudes	  and	  offered	  a	  means	  for	  formalizing	  those	  
attitudes	  in	  social	  structures.	  Michael	  Klarman	  remarks	  that	  it	  is	  not	  “that	  Court	  opinions	  
ought	  to	  reflect	  popular	  opinion,	  only	  that	  they	  usually	  do”	  (From	  6).	  So	  in	  the	  Plessy	  case,	  
the	  Court	  functioned	  to	  maintain	  current	  dominant	  values,	  as	  many	  would	  argue	  is	  the	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Court’s	  proper	  function.	  As	  the	  “least	  dangerous”,	  and	  least	  democratic,	  branch	  of	  
government,	  the	  Court	  chooses	  the	  cases	  it	  will	  hear,	  and	  by	  its	  rulings	  determines	  what	  the	  
law	  of	  the	  land	  is,	  particularly	  and	  especially	  in	  matter	  of	  Constitutional	  interpretation.	  
However,	  as	  having	  “neither	  purse	  nor	  sword,”	  the	  Court	  acting	  alone	  can	  do	  very	  little,	  
especially	  to	  bring	  about	  social	  change.	  Thus,	  however	  minded	  the	  Justices	  might	  have	  been	  
to	  overturn	  the	  Plessy	  doctrine,	  they	  also	  knew	  that	  they	  had	  to	  have	  a	  decision	  that	  could	  
be	  accepted	  –	  one	  that	  the	  segregated	  South	  would	  willingly	  take	  on.	  Brown	  gave	  them	  that	  
case.	  But	  after	  they	  ruled,	  the	  rest	  was	  up	  to	  the	  public.	  The	  anniversary	  speeches	  given	  in	  
Topeka	  indicate	  this	  point.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  many	  of	  the	  books	  and	  articles	  published	  as	  
part	  of	  that	  anniversary	  recognition	  offer	  Brown	  as	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  the	  limitations	  of	  
formal	  legal	  systems	  to	  bring	  about	  social	  change,	  to	  foster	  social	  justice,	  or	  to	  resolve	  the	  
conflicts	  and	  inequities	  that	  exist	  across	  the	  social	  board.	  	  
While	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  possible	  reasons	  why	  this	  is	  true,	  in	  this	  chapter	  I	  will	  
argue	  that	  it	  is	  a	  question	  of	  agency,	  as	  described	  in	  Kenneth	  Burke’s	  dramatistic	  pentad,	  
and	  the	  result	  of	  the	  distinction	  between	  legal	  justice	  and	  tribal	  justice	  as	  Burke	  describes	  
them.	  I’ll	  further	  argue	  that	  state	  institutional	  actors,	  such	  as	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  lack	  the	  
agency	  to	  bring	  about	  the	  change	  in	  “folkways”	  needed	  to	  resolve	  social	  problems;	  that	  this	  
gap	  is	  one	  of	  the	  civic	  needs	  that	  rhetoric	  can	  fill,	  and	  that	  broader	  study	  of	  judicial	  
opinions	  both	  as	  text	  and	  in	  context	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  both	  scholarship	  and	  teaching	  by	  
composition	  and	  rhetoric	  scholars	  not	  only	  provides	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  law	  as	  one	  
among	  many	  means	  for	  solving	  social	  problems,	  but	  also	  helps	  us	  prepare	  our	  students	  to	  
become	  active	  and	  engaged	  citizens	  who	  can	  meaningfully	  contribute	  to	  shaping	  the	  kind	  of	  
society	  they	  want	  to	  live	  in.	  In	  making	  this	  argument,	  I	  extend	  earlier	  work	  by	  John	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Lucaites,	  Clarke	  Rountree,	  and	  others	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  rhetoric	  scholars	  taking	  up	  
judicial	  opinions	  as	  a	  focus	  of	  study	  and	  analysis.	  	  I	  begin	  with	  one	  more	  look	  at	  the	  Brown	  
decision,	  a	  pentadic	  analysis	  that	  reconsiders	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  that	  drama.	  
After	  that,	  I	  examine	  the	  idea	  of	  justice	  as	  Burke	  described	  it	  alongside	  James	  Boyd	  White’s	  
theory	  of	  law	  as	  	  “culture	  of	  argument”	  (Justice	  xii),	  Walter	  Fischer’s	  Narrative	  Paradigm,	  
and	  the	  argument	  by	  Marouf	  Hasian,	  Celeste	  Condit	  and	  John	  Lucaites	  that	  law	  is	  the	  
“consensual	  product	  of	  the	  rhetorical	  efforts	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  public	  agents	  acting	  in	  concert	  
and	  contest	  with	  one	  another	  in	  an	  uneven	  dialectic	  of	  unity	  and	  division”	  (338).	  Finally,	  I	  
discuss	  how	  this	  extended	  study	  of	  the	  Brown	  decision	  and	  its	  function	  at	  its	  fiftieth	  
anniversary,	  along	  with	  the	  earlier	  scholarship	  in	  the	  rhetoric	  field	  on	  the	  decision	  and	  the	  
several	  ways	  it	  had	  been	  studied	  in	  that	  scholarship,	  provide	  models	  for	  the	  study	  of	  other	  
judicial	  opinions	  and	  the	  role	  of	  such	  opinions	  in	  creating	  the	  society	  in	  which	  we	  live	  and	  
function.	  
In	  the	  Grammar	  of	  Motives,	  Kenneth	  Burke	  argues	  that	  “any	  complete	  statement	  
about	  motives”	  will	  answer	  the	  questions	  of	  what,	  when	  or	  where,	  why,	  how	  and	  by	  whom	  
something	  was	  done	  (xv).	  He	  labels	  these	  elements	  act	  (what),	  scene	  (when	  or	  where),	  
agency	  (how),	  purpose	  (why),	  and	  agent	  (who),	  and	  constructs	  them	  under	  the	  heading	  of	  
“dramatism,”	  because	  they	  were	  developed	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  drama	  (Burke	  Grammar	  xv,	  
xvii).	  It’s	  not	  a	  stretch	  of	  mind	  to	  see	  Brown	  as	  a	  drama,	  one	  that	  begins	  years	  before	  the	  
decision,	  involves	  many	  actors	  and	  scenes,	  reaches	  a	  pinnacle	  as	  the	  first	  Opinion	  of	  the	  
Court	  is	  read,	  falls	  away	  as	  the	  second	  Opinion	  comes	  year	  later,	  and	  follows	  with	  a	  
continued	  sequence	  of	  action	  and	  response	  up	  to,	  including,	  and	  even	  following	  the	  fiftieth	  
anniversary	  of	  the	  first	  Opinion.	  If	  the	  drama	  focuses	  on	  the	  Opinion,	  then	  the	  Opinion	  or	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decision	  can	  be	  characterized	  as	  the	  act,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  becomes	  the	  scene	  where	  the	  
act	  took	  place,	  the	  judicial	  process	  as	  a	  whole,	  culminating	  in	  the	  deliberations	  of	  the	  nine	  
justices	  of	  the	  Court,	  is	  the	  agency,	  resolving	  a	  Constitutional	  question	  becomes	  the	  
purpose,	  and	  agents	  are	  the	  attorneys	  on	  each	  side	  of	  the	  cases	  involved.	  This	  framing	  
would	  be	  a	  logical	  classification	  for	  any	  decision	  issued	  from	  the	  Supreme	  Court.	  	  	  
But	  this	  framing	  also	  limits	  the	  focus	  to	  the	  text	  produced	  (the	  decision)	  and	  the	  
elements	  present	  in	  the	  Court	  from	  which	  the	  case	  is	  considered.	  These	  include	  the	  briefs,	  
and	  the	  oral	  arguments	  of	  the	  attorneys,	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  case	  and	  the	  remedies	  desired.	  The	  
context	  of	  that	  case,	  the	  conditions,	  circumstances,	  interests	  and	  individuals	  that	  led	  to	  the	  
case,	  are	  not	  prominently	  featured	  in	  those	  documents.	  Consider,	  for	  example,	  the	  decision	  
in	  the	  case	  of	  Grutter	  v.	  Bollinger,	  one	  of	  the	  two	  cases	  that	  became	  known	  as	  the	  Michigan	  
Affirmative	  Action	  cases	  in	  2003.	  In	  the	  opinion	  written	  by	  Justice	  Sandra	  Day	  O’Connor,	  
Ms.	  Grutter	  is	  described	  in	  terms	  of	  her	  race	  (white),	  her	  GPA,	  and	  her	  LSAT	  scores,	  but	  did	  
not	  describe	  her	  in	  any	  other	  terms,	  not	  did	  it	  mention	  that	  the	  case	  was	  filed	  on	  her	  behalf	  
by	  The	  Center	  for	  Individual	  Rights	  (CIR),	  a	  “public	  interest	  law	  firm”	  in	  Washington,	  D.C.	  
that	  “seeks	  to	  enforce	  constitutional	  limits	  on	  state	  and	  federal	  power”	  by	  “aggressively	  
litigat[ing]	  and	  publiciz[ing]	  a	  handful	  of	  carefully	  selected	  cases	  that	  advance	  the	  right	  of	  
individuals	  to	  govern	  themselves	  according	  to	  the	  natural	  exercise	  of	  their	  own	  reason”	  
(Becker,	  CIR).	  As	  the	  CIR	  mission	  statement	  indicates,	  they	  seek	  cases	  that	  put	  social	  justice	  
questions	  through	  the	  judicial	  process.	  Other	  organizations	  follow	  similar	  strategies,	  
seeking	  legal	  remedies	  without	  engaging	  other	  kinds	  of	  public	  dialogue	  on	  the	  issues	  that	  
concern	  them.	  The	  NAACP’s	  efforts	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  this	  same	  light,	  but	  for	  them,	  the	  
particular	  judicial	  path	  they	  chose	  with	  respect	  to	  ending	  segregation	  and/or	  creating	  true	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equality	  for	  African	  American	  citizens	  was	  one	  of	  several	  efforts	  on	  several	  different	  fronts,	  
from	  lobbying	  Congress,	  to	  conversations	  with	  the	  President	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  to	  
bringing	  a	  series	  of	  individual	  court	  cases	  focused	  on	  equalizing	  schools	  in	  segregated	  
schools	  across	  the	  South.	  In	  either	  case,	  the	  NAACP	  or	  the	  CIR	  or	  any	  similar	  advocacy	  
group,	  the	  analytical	  question	  comes	  down	  to	  one	  of	  options,	  of	  means	  for	  achieving	  the	  
goal	  or	  resolving	  the	  issue	  in	  question.	  And	  it	  is	  this	  question	  of	  means	  calls	  for	  a	  different	  
pentadic	  perspective	  on	  the	  Brown	  decision.	  
In	  this	  framing,	  one	  derived	  from	  analyses	  of	  the	  decision	  by	  Mary	  Dudziak	  and	  
Derrick	  Bell,	  analyses	  picked	  up	  by	  Catherine	  Pendergrast	  and	  commented	  on	  by	  Ann	  Gill,	  
the	  focus	  is	  on	  the	  agency	  element.	  By	  recasting	  the	  agency,	  the	  entire	  pentad	  also	  shifts.	  
The	  scene	  broadens,	  and	  features	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  in	  its	  international	  spotlight	  
as	  the	  victor	  over	  facism,	  Nazism,	  and	  imperialism	  in	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  The	  scene	  also	  
includes	  the	  United	  States	  in	  a	  Cold	  War	  with	  the	  recently	  formed	  communist	  Soviet	  Union	  
for	  the	  political	  allegiance	  of	  nations	  around	  the	  globe,	  some	  newly	  independent,	  and	  many	  
filled	  with	  citizens	  whose	  skin	  color	  was	  brown	  or	  black	  and	  who	  were	  being	  fed	  
propaganda	  about	  America’s	  ongoing	  racial	  discrimination	  to	  undermine	  America’s	  claims	  
about	  democracy	  and	  freedom.	  The	  agent	  in	  this	  alternative	  view	  is	  the	  NAACP,	  working	  on	  
multiple	  levels	  to	  achieve	  their	  goals.	  The	  purpose	  is	  to	  achieve	  equality	  for	  African	  
American	  citizens.	  The	  act	  is	  what	  Rountree	  called	  the	  progressive	  argument	  authored	  
primarily	  by	  Thurgood	  Marshall	  as	  he	  focused	  his	  efforts	  on	  a	  particular	  means	  of	  achieving	  
the	  purpose,	  the	  Supreme	  Court.	  For	  the	  NAACP,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  became	  the	  agency,	  or	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means,	  of	  choice	  when	  other	  methods,	  including	  the	  pursuit	  through	  the	  judicial	  system	  of	  
true	  equality	  under	  the	  “separate	  but	  equal”	  doctrine,	  stalled7.	  	  
The	  difference	  here	  is	  a	  question	  of	  recognized	  authority.	  The	  Brown	  decision	  called	  
a	  Constitutional	  question,	  asserting	  that	  the	  Fourteenth	  Amendment	  to	  the	  Constitution	  of	  
the	  United	  States	  did	  not	  allow	  for	  the	  “separate	  but	  equal”	  treatment	  of	  African	  American	  
citizens.	  In	  the	  American	  legal	  system,	  the	  means	  for	  determining	  a	  Constitutional	  question	  
is	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  and	  from	  this	  viewpoint,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  was	  the	  appropriate	  
means	  for	  the	  NAACP	  legal	  team	  as	  agents	  to	  accomplish	  the	  purpose	  of	  reshaping	  the	  
conditions	  of	  those	  they	  represented.	  For	  many	  of	  the	  segregated	  states,	  or	  more	  
specifically	  the	  leaders	  of	  those	  states,	  only	  Congress	  had	  the	  authority	  to	  overturn	  their	  
state	  laws,	  and	  they	  rejected	  the	  Court’s	  authority	  to	  make	  the	  ruling	  that	  they	  did.	  Ann	  Gill	  
argues	  that	  when	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  “renders	  a	  decision	  upsetting	  the	  actions	  of	  a	  
democratically	  elected	  legislative	  body,”	  it	  must	  “assert	  its	  authority	  to	  do	  so,”	  as	  “any	  
rhetorical	  text	  must	  establish	  its	  authority	  to	  speak”	  (143).	  For	  whom	  does	  this	  authority	  
need	  to	  be	  established?	  For	  those	  who	  are	  called	  on	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  law	  as	  the	  Court	  gives	  
it.	  Even	  the	  stature	  of	  nation’s	  highest	  Court	  does	  not	  make	  its	  authority	  automatic	  or	  its	  
decisions	  self-­‐executing.	  They	  work	  only	  when	  those	  governed	  by	  them	  willingly	  assent	  to	  
their	  terms	  and	  conduct	  their	  lives	  accordingly,	  and	  when	  there	  is	  a	  formal	  structure	  in	  
place	  to	  separate	  and	  punish	  those	  who	  do	  not.	  So	  in	  the	  Brown	  decision,	  the	  Court	  needed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  The	  NAACP	  retained	  Nathan	  Margold,	  a	  lawyer	  from	  New	  York	  to	  frame	  their	  legal	  
strategy	  for	  trying	  to	  enforce	  equalization	  in	  segregated	  school	  districts	  throughout	  the	  
South.	  Margold	  concluded	  that	  this	  strategy	  was	  like	  “emptying	  a	  swimming	  pool	  with	  a	  
eyedropper”	  (Kluger	  133).	  The	  Margold	  strategy,	  as	  it	  came	  to	  be	  known,	  was	  the	  first	  
proposal	  to	  take	  on	  segregation	  as	  practiced	  and	  boldly	  challenge	  the	  constitutional	  validity	  
of	  segregation	  if	  and	  when	  accompanied	  irremediably	  by	  discrimination,”	  and	  became	  the	  
foundation	  for	  Marshall’s	  decision	  to	  pursue	  ending	  segregation	  rather	  than	  continuing	  to	  
fight	  for	  equalization	  (Kluger	  134).	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to	  assert	  its	  authority	  to	  overturn	  the	  laws	  of	  several	  states,	  laws	  enacted	  through	  the	  
democratic	  process	  in	  those	  states,	  and	  law	  that	  the	  Court	  itself	  had	  earlier	  given	  its	  assent	  
to.	  In	  the	  first	  Brown	  opinion,	  and	  for	  several	  cases	  after	  that,	  the	  Court	  did	  not	  adequately	  
establish	  their	  authority.	  Gill’s	  analysis	  shows	  how	  the	  Court,	  in	  the	  face	  of	  resistance	  from	  
the	  Southern	  states	  affected	  by	  its	  initial	  Brown	  decision,	  moved	  from	  a	  rhetoric	  of	  
appeasement	  to	  a	  rhetoric	  of	  legitimation	  to	  establish	  its	  authority	  to	  make	  and	  to	  compel	  
compliance	  with	  the	  decision	  it	  made.	  This	  was	  necessary	  because	  the	  resistance	  to	  the	  
Brown	  decision	  imperiled	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  Court	  and	  thus	  imperiled	  the	  judicial	  system	  
as	  a	  whole.	  	  When	  Congress	  later	  acted	  by	  passing	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Act,	  its	  authority	  was	  not	  
questioned	  because	  it	  was	  the	  “democratically	  elected	  legislative	  body”	  (Gill	  143).	  
Burke	  argues	  that	  the	  American	  Constitution	  is	  different	  from	  its	  English	  
counterpart	  in	  a	  significant	  way,	  where	  the	  English	  version	  presents	  law	  a	  “mere	  
codification	  of	  custom”	  and	  the	  American	  version	  presents	  law	  as	  “a	  device	  for	  the	  
transformation	  of	  customs”	  (Grammar	  342).	  I	  have	  argued	  earlier	  that	  the	  Plessy	  decision	  
that	  established	  the	  separate	  but	  equal	  doctrine	  was	  quickly	  accepted	  and	  applied	  to	  all	  
levels	  of	  social	  interaction	  because	  it	  codified	  an	  existing	  custom	  and	  mindset	  in	  the	  
dominant	  social	  group.	  The	  Brown	  decision,	  by	  contrast,	  intervened	  in	  that	  tradition,	  and	  in	  
so	  doing	  it	  provided	  a	  “new	  motive	  for	  action”	  that	  broke	  with	  established	  custom	  
(Grammar	  421).	  	  The	  need	  for	  the	  Court	  to	  asset	  its	  authority	  is	  a	  reflection	  both	  of	  the	  
nature	  of	  law	  as	  a	  branch	  of	  rhetoric,	  as	  James	  Boyd	  White	  classifies	  it,	  and	  of	  the	  shift	  in	  
the	  nature	  of	  justice	  in	  ancient	  Greece	  as	  Burke	  described	  it.	  	  
Burke	  traces	  the	  shift	  in	  the	  ancient	  notion	  of	  justice	  ancient	  Athens	  and	  the	  
transformation	  from	  “the	  homogeneous	  tribal	  pattern	  of	  Greek	  life”	  to	  the	  political	  state.	  He	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argues	  that	  in	  pre-­‐Homeric	  times,	  the	  Greek	  word	  for	  justice,	  dike,	  originally	  meant	  
“custom,	  usage,	  manner,	  fashion”	  and	  “right,”	  and	  referred	  to	  a	  way	  of	  being,	  represented	  in	  
the	  expression	  “that	  sort	  of	  thing	  just	  isn’t	  done”	  or	  “that’s	  not	  the	  way	  we	  are”	  (Grammar	  
15).	  Burke	  associates	  this	  definition	  of	  justice	  with	  the	  tribal	  state	  of	  Greece,	  where	  the	  
“way	  of	  acting”	  or	  “law	  of	  being”	  was	  imposed	  by	  a	  group	  with	  common	  understanding	  and	  
expectations	  of	  behavior	  and	  action.	  This	  is	  the	  type	  of	  justice	  relates	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  
folkways,	  the	  behavioral	  expectations	  imposed	  by	  a	  social	  group	  on	  its	  members.	  It	  
contrasts	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  stateways,	  which	  Burke	  would	  describe	  as	  the	  result	  of	  the	  political	  
state,	  the	  shift	  where	  dike	  came	  to	  be	  “a	  word	  of	  the	  law	  Courts”	  and	  subsequently	  to	  refer	  
to	  “legal	  justice,	  the	  right	  which	  is	  presumed	  to	  be	  the	  object	  of	  law”	  (Grammar	  15).	  This	  
latter	  notion	  is	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  American	  system	  of	  justice,	  the	  commitment	  to	  being	  
ruled	  by	  law,	  rather	  than	  by	  the	  will	  of	  men	  (or	  tyrants).	  	  
Burke	  argues	  that	  in	  this	  form,	  justice	  “could	  represent	  a	  Platonic	  ideal	  that	  might	  
prevail	  over	  and	  above	  the	  real	  ways	  of	  the	  different	  social	  classes”	  (Grammar	  15).	  
Similarly,	  James	  Boyd	  White	  argues	  that	  the	  judicial	  opinion,	  one	  of	  the	  instruments	  of	  
justice	  in	  the	  American	  system,	  might	  be	  better	  understood	  if	  it	  were	  seen	  as	  “an	  individual	  
mind	  or	  group	  of	  individual	  minds	  exercising	  their	  responsibility	  to	  decide	  a	  case	  as	  well	  as	  
they	  can	  and	  to	  determine	  what	  it	  shall	  mean	  in	  the	  language	  of	  the	  culture”	  (Heracles	  41).	  
In	  the	  Brown	  decision,	  the	  language	  the	  Court	  offered	  was	  one	  of	  concession	  to	  the	  
plaintiffs,	  that	  segregation	  was	  not	  equal	  and	  not	  Constitutional,	  and	  also	  a	  concession	  to	  
the	  entrenched	  “folkways”	  of	  the	  segregated	  states,	  allowing	  for	  them	  to	  determine	  the	  
path	  by	  which	  they	  would	  comply.	  The	  ideal	  would	  have	  been	  for	  the	  conditions	  to	  change	  
quickly	  and	  for	  all	  citizens	  regardless	  of	  race	  to	  participate	  fully	  and	  equally	  in	  all	  aspects	  of	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American	  society.	  The	  conflict,	  already	  inherent	  in	  the	  system	  of	  Jim	  Crow	  segregation,	  
erupted	  over	  questions	  of	  authority.	  
Both	  of	  these	  elements,	  the	  ideal	  and	  the	  conflict,	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  discourse	  of	  
Brown’s	  fiftieth	  anniversary.	  One	  can	  hear	  the	  voice	  of	  President	  Bush	  in	  Topeka	  as	  he	  
invoked	  the	  “ideals	  of	  America”	  to	  which	  “segregation	  could	  never	  be	  squared.”	  Brown’s	  
promise	  was	  that	  the	  law	  could	  carry	  the	  American	  ideal	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  overcome	  the	  
“real	  ways”	  of	  the	  different	  racial	  groups,	  particularly	  in	  the	  segregated	  South.	  But	  one	  also	  
sees	  the	  words	  of	  many	  writers	  and	  some	  of	  the	  speakers	  in	  Topeka,	  noting	  a	  range	  of	  
economic	  inequalities,	  including	  disproportionate	  poverty	  rates,	  funding	  differentials	  in	  
school	  systems,	  and	  questions	  of	  whether	  more	  money	  for	  education	  could	  overcome	  less	  
money	  is	  the	  overall	  community.	  This	  type	  of	  question	  is	  a	  variation	  on	  the	  ancient	  
question	  of	  property	  interests.	  Burke	  claims	  that	  “’Justice,’	  under	  conditions	  of	  economic	  
inequality	  necessarily	  gravitates	  between	  an	  ‘ideal’	  and	  a	  rhetorical	  compensation,	  since	  it	  
is	  not	  ‘substantiated’	  or	  grounded	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  scene”	  (Grammar	  124).	  He	  employs	  
the	  scene-­‐act	  ratio	  here	  in	  two	  ways,	  “deterministically	  in	  statements	  that	  a	  certain	  policy	  
had	  to	  be	  adopted	  in	  a	  certain	  situation,”	  an	  argument	  that	  Mary	  Dudziak	  and	  others	  have	  
made	  about	  the	  Brown	  decision;	  or	  “in	  hortatory	  statements	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  a	  certain	  
policy	  should	  be	  adopted	  in	  conformity	  with	  the	  situation”	  (Grammar	  13).	  The	  scene-­‐act	  
ratio	  is	  a	  useful	  way	  to	  examine	  the	  Brown	  decision	  where	  the	  question	  of	  “justice”	  is	  
concerned,	  in	  part	  because	  the	  theory	  of	  dialectic	  materialism	  holds	  that	  the	  “material	  
situation	  (‘economic	  conditions’)	  [provides]	  the	  scene	  in	  which	  justice	  is	  to	  be	  enacted”	  
(Grammar	  13).	  Burke	  cites	  Marx’s	  assertion	  that	  “‘justice	  can	  never	  rise	  superior	  to	  the	  
economic	  conditions	  of	  society	  and	  the	  cultural	  development	  conditioned	  by	  them.’”	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(Grammar	  13).	  In	  civil	  rights	  terms,	  the	  scene	  of	  a	  systemically	  racist	  society	  limits	  the	  
ability	  of	  non-­‐white	  citizens	  to	  rise	  in	  power	  or	  economic	  status	  despite	  their	  abilities,	  
skills,	  or	  education.	  Once	  again,	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  law	  and	  the	  mindset	  of	  the	  
people	  subject	  to	  the	  law	  becomes	  apparent,	  as	  those	  minds	  must	  become	  conditioned	  to	  
the	  new	  motive	  for	  action,	  the	  new	  measure	  of	  the	  right	  way	  of	  being	  in	  that	  society.	  
Burke	  describes	  a	  legal	  constitution	  in	  terms	  of	  his	  dramatistic	  pentad,	  arguing	  that	  
it	  “is	  an	  act	  or	  body	  of	  acts	  (or	  enactments),	  done	  by	  agents	  (such	  as	  rulers,	  magistrates,	  or	  
other	  representative	  persons),	  and	  designed	  (purpose)	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  motivational	  ground	  
(scene)	  of	  subsequent	  actions,	  it	  being	  thus	  an	  instrument	  (agency)	  for	  the	  shaping	  of	  
human	  relations”	  (341).	  White	  describes	  the	  United	  States	  Constitution	  as	  “a	  rhetorical	  
text:	  as	  establishing	  a	  set	  of	  speakers,	  roles,	  topics,	  and	  occasions	  for	  speech”	  (Heracles	  41).	  
Both	  of	  these	  are	  consistent	  with	  one	  of	  White’s	  three	  images	  of	  law,	  one	  in	  which	  law	  is	  “a	  
set	  of	  rules	  issuing	  from	  a	  political	  sovereign…the	  rules	  passed	  by	  the	  legislature	  or	  
articulated	  in	  judicial	  opinions”	  (Justice	  xii).	  White	  suggests	  the	  value	  of	  thinking	  of	  the	  law	  
“as	  a	  culture…as	  a	  set	  of	  ways	  of	  making	  sense	  of	  things	  and	  acting	  in	  the	  world”	  (Justice	  
xiii).	  The	  key	  part	  of	  Burke’s	  pentadic	  view	  then	  is	  the	  agency,	  the	  role	  of	  a	  constitution	  in	  
shaping	  human	  relations,	  or	  as	  he	  said	  of	  the	  American	  Constitution,	  a	  means	  of	  
transforming	  custom.	  This	  is	  rhetorical	  process,	  as	  individual	  members	  of	  a	  community	  are	  
encouraged	  to	  follow	  established	  law	  and	  custom,	  but	  when	  other	  means	  of	  persuading	  
others	  to	  change	  customs	  fail,	  the	  legislative	  and	  judicial	  processes	  provide	  a	  means	  of	  
transformation,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  community	  members	  respect	  the	  authority	  of	  those	  
processes	  and	  outcomes.	  Epideictic	  rhetoric	  helps	  provide	  that	  respect,	  helps	  increase	  the	  
	  149	  
mental	  adherence	  to	  the	  values	  of	  the	  community	  so	  that	  they	  emerge	  in	  democratic	  
processes	  such	  as	  voting,	  and	  is	  therefore	  a	  valuable	  part	  of	  life	  in	  the	  democratic	  polis.	  	  
Epideictic	  events	  provide	  stories,	  the	  stories	  a	  community	  tells	  about	  itself,	  and	  
Brown	  has	  proven	  central	  to	  America’s	  story	  of	  itself.	  Jack	  Balkin	  referred	  to	  this	  story	  as	  
the	  Great	  Progressive	  Narrative,	  a	  story	  in	  which	  America	  is	  “continually	  striving	  for	  
democratic	  ideals	  from	  its	  founding	  and	  eventually	  realizing	  democracy	  through	  its	  
historical	  development”	  (5).	  In	  this	  narrative,	  “the	  Constitution	  reflects	  America’s	  deepest	  
ideals,	  which	  are	  gradually	  realized	  through	  historical	  struggle	  and	  acts	  of	  great	  political	  
courage”	  (Balkin	  5).	  	  Although	  written	  well	  before	  President	  Bush’s	  speech	  in	  Topeka,	  the	  
narrative	  Balkin	  describes	  is	  clearly	  present	  in	  that	  speech,	  and	  Brown	  is	  one	  of	  the	  acts	  
leading	  to	  the	  realization	  of	  those	  ideals.	  Ann	  Gill	  argues	  that	  the	  Brown	  decision	  is	  the	  star	  
of	  this	  narrative,	  that	  “the	  stature	  of	  the	  case	  grows	  with	  each	  passing	  decade”	  and	  that	  
“like	  all	  good	  stories,	  this	  narrative	  improves	  with	  each	  telling”	  (163).	  Brown	  is	  an	  example	  
of	  law	  that	  shapes	  human	  relations;	  it	  tells	  us	  how	  to	  be,	  or	  more	  specifically	  how	  not	  to	  be,	  
within	  our	  civic	  lives.	  It	  is	  a	  story	  easily	  understood	  by	  the	  average	  citizen,	  just	  as	  the	  
original	  Brown	  opinion	  was	  written	  to	  be	  read	  by	  a	  wide	  lay	  audience.	  
White’s	  first	  image	  of	  law,	  that	  of	  a	  set	  of	  rules,	  supports	  the	  belief	  in	  law	  as	  neutral,	  
as	  a	  rational	  mechanism	  for	  sorting	  out	  facts	  and	  logically	  applying	  relevant	  case	  or	  
statutory	  law	  to	  the	  issues.	  Justice	  in	  this	  belief	  exists	  when	  similar	  rulings	  are	  consistently	  
given	  in	  similar	  conditions	  (like	  cases	  produce	  like	  results).	  This	  belief	  formed	  the	  basis	  of	  
Wechsler’s	  complaint	  against	  the	  Brown	  decision,	  that	  it	  violated	  the	  spirit	  of	  neutral	  
principles.	  The	  second	  view	  White	  offers,	  one	  identified	  with	  the	  Critical	  Legal	  Studies	  
movement,	  aims	  to	  pierce	  the	  veil	  of	  seeming	  neutrality	  to	  explore	  the	  “real”	  power	  issues	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behind	  the	  decision.	  This	  view	  informs	  analyses	  such	  as	  Dudziak’s	  and	  Bell’s.	  The	  third	  
view,	  that	  of	  law	  as	  a	  way	  of	  making	  sense	  of	  the	  world	  and	  understanding	  how	  to	  be	  in	  
that	  world,	  fits	  more	  consistently	  with	  Aristotle’s	  ideas	  about	  the	  value	  of	  epideictic	  
rhetoric.	  The	  epideictic	  speech,	  through	  praise	  and	  blame,	  showed	  citizens	  how	  to	  behave,	  
and	  what	  it	  took	  to	  be	  virtuous	  in	  their	  community.	  For	  Perelman	  and	  Olbrechts-­‐Tyteca,	  
such	  speeches	  served	  to	  increase	  communion	  among	  the	  hearers,	  to	  increase	  their	  
identification	  with	  the	  values	  of	  the	  community	  and	  to	  move	  them	  to	  live	  by	  those	  values.	  
As	  individuals	  move	  toward	  shared	  values,	  they	  become,	  in	  Burke’s	  term,	  consubstantial,	  
acting	  together	  in	  their	  shared	  world	  while	  retaining	  their	  individuality	  and	  independent	  
motives	  for	  action	  (Rhetoric	  21).	  The	  narratives	  provided	  in	  epideictic	  rhetoric	  help	  foster	  
this	  sense	  of	  sharing,	  as	  they	  invite	  the	  audience	  to	  identify	  with	  the	  narrative	  and	  its	  
characters.	  
In	  Walter	  Fisher’s	  work,	  this	  is	  a	  paradigm	  for	  understanding	  the	  world,	  a	  narrative	  
paradigm	  that	  subsumes	  the	  rational	  world	  model.	  Fisher	  characterized	  humans	  as	  being	  
"as	  much	  valuing	  as	  they	  are	  reasoning	  animals."	  In	  Fisher’s	  construction,	  narration	  is	  "a	  
theory	  of	  symbolic	  actions—words	  and/or	  deeds—that	  have	  sequence	  and	  meaning	  for	  
those	  who	  live,	  create,	  or	  interpret	  them"	  (266).	  Following	  this	  description,	  the	  narrative	  
paradigm	  views	  human	  communication	  as	  "stories	  competing	  with	  other	  stories	  
constituted	  by	  good	  reasons"	  in	  which	  argumentative	  discourse	  can	  be	  one	  form,	  but	  where	  
rationality	  can	  also	  exist	  when	  the	  demands	  of	  narrative	  probability	  and	  narrative	  fidelity	  
are	  satisfied	  (Fisher	  266).	  	  	  
Fisher	  classifies	  the	  rational	  world	  paradigm	  as	  the	  reigning	  one,	  dating	  back	  to	  
Aristotle	  and	  beginning	  with	  the	  presupposition	  that	  humans	  as	  "essentially	  rational	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beings"	  (268).	  In	  this	  model,	  the	  mode	  of	  communication	  is	  argument,	  the	  conduct	  of	  which	  
is	  ruled	  by	  the	  situation,	  with	  rationality	  measured	  by	  knowledge	  of	  the	  subject	  matter,	  of	  
argumentation,	  and	  the	  rules	  of	  advocacy,	  and	  the	  world	  constructed	  as	  a	  set	  of	  logical	  
puzzles	  to	  be	  solved.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  model	  Burke	  and	  White	  establish	  as	  views	  of	  
constitutional	  law.	  This	  model	  carries	  with	  it	  certain	  requirements,	  including	  a	  society	  that	  
permits	  participation	  in	  decision-­‐making,	  a	  common	  language,	  a	  general	  adherence	  to	  
values	  of	  the	  state,	  information	  about	  the	  issues	  and	  an	  understanding	  of	  argument	  forms.	  
These	  requirements,	  along	  with	  the	  general	  requirement	  of	  that	  being	  rational	  "must	  be	  
learned"	  (269)	  make	  this	  model	  the	  basis	  for	  education	  in	  the	  West.	  	  
In	  contrast	  to	  the	  reigning	  model,	  the	  narrative	  paradigm	  begins	  with	  the	  
presupposition	  that	  "humans	  are	  essentially	  storytellers."	  Decision-­‐making	  and	  
communication	  proceed	  from	  "good	  reasons"	  which	  vary	  in	  form	  between	  situations,	  
genres,	  and	  media,	  and	  are	  governed	  by	  history,	  biography,	  culture,	  character,	  and	  the	  
forces	  of	  the	  "language	  act".	  Humans	  in	  this	  model	  determine	  rationality	  based	  on	  an	  
"inherent	  awareness	  of	  narrative	  probability"	  and	  the	  habit	  of	  "testing	  narrative	  fidelity"	  
(272).	  The	  world,	  then,	  is	  a	  set	  of	  stories,	  competing	  stories,	  and	  men	  choose	  among	  them	  
to	  live	  the	  good	  life.	  The	  narrative	  paradigm	  subsumes	  the	  features	  of	  traditional	  
rationality	  in	  part	  because	  it	  is	  a	  capacity	  all	  humans	  share.	  This	  leads	  Fisher	  back	  to	  Burke	  
in	  his	  claim	  that	  "the	  operative	  principle	  of	  narrative	  rationality	  is	  identification	  rather	  
than	  deliberation"	  (273).	  
Fisher	  claims	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  rational	  world	  and	  narrative	  paradigms	  
are	  structural	  rather	  than	  substantive,	  since	  both	  are	  modes	  of	  "expressing	  good	  reasons"	  
(279).	  	  When	  the	  metaphor	  of	  homo	  narrans,	  the	  metaphor	  of	  narration,	  is	  taken	  as	  the	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master	  metaphor,	  it	  subsumes	  other	  metaphors	  such	  as	  "rational	  man."	  Thus,	  analyzing	  
Brown	  or	  any	  other	  judicial	  decision	  as	  one	  story	  among	  other	  competing	  stories	  places	  
Brown	  in	  the	  literature	  of	  social	  reform,	  not	  separate	  from	  its	  role	  in	  law,	  but	  enfolding	  or	  
subsuming	  that	  role.	  White	  argues	  that	  this	  is	  a	  valid	  was	  to	  think	  about	  law,	  not	  law	  and	  
economics,	  or	  law	  and	  sociology	  or	  literature,	  but	  law	  as	  economics,	  law	  as	  sociology,	  or	  
law	  as	  literature.	  This	  view	  would	  return	  law	  to	  a	  more	  central	  part	  not	  only	  of	  education,	  
but	  of	  public	  discourse	  more	  generally.	  
Burke	  argues	  that	  the	  dramatistic	  element	  of	  agency	  finds	  its	  philosophical	  
counterpart	  in	  pragmatism	  (Grammar	  129).	  The	  means	  for	  achieving	  a	  legal	  sense	  of	  
equality	  in	  Brown	  became	  judicial	  rather	  than	  the	  legislative	  or	  executive	  avenues	  of	  
government	  because	  the	  latter	  avenues	  weren’t	  progressing,	  weren’t	  working	  to	  achieve	  
the	  goal.	  In	  turning	  to	  the	  courts,	  and	  especially	  to	  the	  focus	  on	  eradicating	  segregation	  
rather	  than	  providing	  for	  true	  equality,	  the	  NAACP	  took	  a	  pragmatic	  approach	  and	  
appealed	  to	  the	  fundamental	  American	  value	  of	  “all	  men	  are	  created	  equal”.	  In	  the	  Brown	  
decision,	  the	  path	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  followed	  a	  series	  of	  legal	  cases	  that	  focused	  on	  
ending	  the	  separate	  part	  of	  the	  separate	  but	  equal	  doctrine.	  Clark	  Rountree	  analyzed	  this	  
path	  as	  a	  form	  of	  prospective	  argument,	  one	  in	  which	  every	  step	  was	  calculated	  to	  lead	  to	  
the	  next	  without	  creating	  any	  obstacles	  (50).	  The	  histories	  of	  the	  Brown	  decision8	  reveal	  
the	  many	  options	  the	  NAACP	  legal	  team	  considered	  in	  their	  efforts	  to	  achieve	  racial	  
equality,	  including	  early	  lawsuits	  focused	  on	  enforcing	  the	  equal	  part	  of	  the	  separate	  but	  
equal	  doctrine	  in	  education.	  The	  records	  show	  that	  ultimately	  it	  was	  Thurgood	  Marshall	  
who	  shifted	  the	  entire	  effort	  to	  ending	  segregation	  rather	  than	  continuing	  to	  work	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Kluger	  is	  the	  best	  known	  and	  most	  detailed	  of	  the	  histories,	  but	  see	  also	  Klarman;	  
Tushnet;	  Cottrol,	  Diamond	  and	  Ware;	  Cobb,	  and	  Ward	  and	  Badger,	  as	  examples.	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equality	  enforcement	  in	  individual	  cases	  (Kluger	  284,	  294).	  Rountree	  explains	  how	  the	  
cases	  that	  followed	  represent	  a	  unique	  form	  of	  argument	  suited	  to	  social	  problems:	  
Prospective	  argument	  looks	  to	  social	  movements,	  not	  just	  as	  events	  or	  
phenomena,	  but	  as	  context	  for	  shaping	  future	  arguments.	  It	  looks	  to	  
individual	  court	  decisions,	  not	  as	  completed	  arguments,	  but	  as	  strategically	  
anticipated	  stepping	  stones	  toward	  future	  arguments.	  And	  it	  considers	  how	  
material	  interventions	  can	  be	  undertaken	  specifically	  for	  subsequent	  
incorporation	  into	  rhetorical	  strategy	  (50).	  
The	  link	  to	  rhetorical	  strategy	  is	  significant	  here.	  Individual	  court	  decisions,	  or	  even	  the	  
entire	  sequence	  of	  court	  decisions,	  are	  not	  a	  complete	  effort.	  Other	  “material	  interventions”	  
are	  required.	  As	  Leonard	  Pitts,	  Jr.	  observed	  in	  the	  anniversary	  column	  he	  didn’t	  really	  want	  
to	  write,	  “the	  moral	  of	  Brown,	  then,	  is	  that	  the	  law	  has	  limits.	  It	  could	  ensure	  black	  kids	  the	  
right	  to	  attend	  the	  school	  nearest	  their	  homes.	  It	  could	  not	  ensure	  that	  white	  kids	  would	  
still	  be	  there	  when	  they	  arrived.” These	  interventions	  took	  many	  forms	  after	  the	  Brown	  
decision,	  mobilizing	  both	  the	  resistance	  efforts	  of	  the	  southern	  states	  and	  the	  liberating	  
campaigns	  of	  such	  groups	  as	  the	  Freedom	  Riders.	  Michael	  Klarman	  argues	  that	  reactions	  to	  
a	  court	  decision	  show	  its	  efficacy	  through	  such	  factors	  as	  the	  intensity	  of	  opposition,	  or	  the	  
success	  at	  capitalizing	  on	  the	  decision	  (7).	  Klarman	  also	  argues	  that	  studying	  only	  the	  
direct	  effects	  of	  a	  Court	  decision	  doesn’t	  provide	  the	  whole	  story,	  and	  that’s	  its	  equally	  
important	  to	  study	  the	  indirect	  consequences	  (7).	  I	  argue	  that	  it’s	  important	  to	  study	  Court	  
decisions	  as	  consequences	  as	  well,	  consequences	  that	  result	  from	  what	  Klarman	  calls	  “a	  
method	  of	  social	  protest	  that	  is	  distinct	  from	  alternative	  methods,	  such	  as	  political	  
mobilization,	  economic	  pressure,	  street	  demonstrations,	  and	  physical	  resistance”	  (7).	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Litigation	  is	  one	  method	  of	  using	  language	  to	  achieve	  results,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  the	  only	  method,	  
and	  the	  alternatives	  Klarman	  describes	  are	  all	  influenced	  by	  language	  in	  action,	  and	  can	  be	  
enhanced	  through	  application	  of	  rhetorical	  theories	  and	  practices.	  
In	  the	  epideictic	  addresses	  of	  the	  fiftieth	  anniversary,	  and	  particularly	  those	  in	  
Topeka,	  individual	  citizens	  are	  called	  back	  into	  participation	  in	  and	  responsibility	  for	  
Brown’s	  legacy.	  The	  claims	  about	  doing	  more,	  or	  committing	  or	  recommitting	  to	  the	  
promise	  or	  the	  hope	  or	  the	  obligation	  to	  the	  promise,	  are	  all	  voiced	  in	  the	  “we,”	  the	  
presumed	  agreement	  that	  all	  who	  hear	  (or	  read)	  are	  in	  agreement	  that	  these	  are	  our	  goals	  
as	  a	  society.	  The	  fiftieth	  anniversary	  thus	  provided	  an	  epideictic	  occasion	  for	  re-­‐presenting	  
the	  core	  values	  of	  equality,	  education	  and	  opportunity	  to	  a	  wide	  audience.	  The	  dedication	  
ceremony	  timed	  almost	  exactly	  to	  the	  moment	  of	  the	  decision’s	  announcement	  fifty	  years	  
earlier,	  the	  theme	  for	  National	  Law	  Day,	  the	  sheer	  number	  of	  dignitaries	  in	  attendance	  in	  
Topeka	  and	  making	  appearances	  at	  event	  around	  the	  country,	  all	  served	  to	  reinforce	  the	  
value	  of	  Brown	  and	  to	  re-­‐connect	  it	  to	  foundational	  American	  ideals.	  The	  honor	  given	  to	  the	  
Court	  in	  these	  speeches	  and	  articles	  and	  events	  was	  necessary	  to	  overcome	  the	  observation	  
that	  the	  agency,	  the	  means	  for	  achieving	  the	  action,	  the	  Court,	  had	  not	  successfully	  
accomplished	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  action.	  
The	  discourse	  of	  the	  fiftieth	  anniversary	  shows	  the	  shift	  in	  the	  agency	  for	  achieving	  
Brown’s	  promise	  going	  forward.	  The	  speeches,	  articles,	  and	  events	  asked	  the	  public	  to	  
analyze	  Brown,	  to	  think	  about	  it,	  discuss	  it,	  to	  commemorate	  it,	  to	  find	  meaning	  in	  it	  and	  
define	  that	  meaning.	  Many	  writers	  indicated	  that	  the	  courts	  were	  not	  the	  place	  for	  
continuing	  this	  discussion,	  and,	  as	  Kweisi	  Mfume	  claimed	  in	  his	  remarks,	  Americans	  have	  
to	  talk	  about	  it	  as	  a	  nation.	  And	  part	  of	  what	  Americans	  have	  to	  talk	  about	  as	  a	  nation	  is	  the	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role	  of	  the	  courts	  and	  the	  many	  decisions	  that	  have	  been	  handed	  down	  regarding	  the	  
various	  methods	  attempted	  for	  achieving	  equality	  in	  education.	  We	  have	  to	  be	  able	  to	  talk	  
about	  the	  law,	  to	  have	  a	  framework	  for	  discussing	  social	  problems	  in	  both	  legal	  and	  extra-­‐
legal	  ways.	  And	  to	  do	  that,	  the	  discourses	  and	  texts	  of	  law	  need	  to	  be	  recovered	  from	  the	  
segregated	  realm	  of	  the	  lawyers.	  In	  the	  early	  1990s,	  John	  Lucaites	  called	  on	  rhetoric	  
scholars	  to	  do	  just	  that,	  to	  take	  up	  the	  texts	  of	  the	  law	  as	  a	  field	  to	  study	  and	  to	  “actively	  
engage	  the	  full	  range	  of	  formal	  and	  functional	  relationships	  between	  rhetoric	  and	  ‘the	  law’”	  
(447).	  	  Lucaites	  argues	  that	  rhetoric	  scholars	  have	  a	  “particular	  responsibility”	  to	  shape	  the	  
kind	  of	  society	  we	  want	  to	  live	  in,	  and	  that	  engaging	  the	  law	  is	  part	  of	  that	  responsibility.	  	  In	  
2004,	  when	  Rountree’s	  edited	  collection	  titled	  Brown	  v	  Board	  of	  Education	  at	  Fifty:	  A	  
Rhetorical	  Perspective	  appeared,	  he	  argued	  that	  rhetoric	  scholars	  were	  answering	  this	  call,	  
in	  growing	  numbers	  since	  the	  1980s.	  He	  also	  noted	  that	  many	  of	  the	  scholars	  who	  have	  
contributed	  to	  this	  field	  of	  study	  hold	  law	  degrees,	  and	  that	  indicates	  that	  there	  is	  more	  
work	  to	  do	  to	  open	  up	  this	  avenue	  of	  study	  for	  the	  larger	  rhetoric	  and	  composition	  field.	  
Rountree	  didn’t	  even	  mention	  composition	  and	  rhetoric	  programs	  in	  his	  listing	  of	  places	  
where	  “those	  who	  study	  rhetoric	  find	  their	  homes”	  (xii).	  Judicial	  opinions	  are	  composed	  
texts	  and	  can	  be	  studied	  and	  taught	  as	  such	  even	  without	  specialized	  training	  in	  the	  law.	  	  
The	  Brown	  decision	  is	  an	  excellent	  case	  for	  introducing	  rhetorical	  study	  of	  judicial	  
opinion	  for	  three	  main	  reasons.	  First,	  Chief	  Justice	  Warren	  and	  his	  clerk,	  Earl	  Pollock,	  wrote	  
the	  opinion	  in	  language	  accessible	  to	  the	  average	  newspaper	  reader.	  The	  opinion	  is	  
comparatively	  short	  and	  easy	  to	  understand.	  There	  are	  minimal	  footnotes	  and	  few	  citations	  
for	  other	  cases.	  The	  claims	  are	  direct	  and	  clear.9	  This	  makes	  the	  opinion	  a	  suitable	  text	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  See	  Bellman	  for	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  opinion’s	  structure.	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classroom	  use	  in	  undergraduate	  studies	  as	  well	  as	  for	  graduate	  work.	  Secondly,	  the	  fiftieth	  
anniversary	  made	  it	  possible	  to	  examine	  the	  role	  of	  the	  decision	  years	  later	  not	  by	  noting	  
the	  number	  of	  times	  it	  had	  been	  cited	  in	  legal	  cases	  or	  by	  reviewing	  legal	  analyses,	  but	  by	  
being	  able	  to	  see,	  consider,	  and	  analyze	  public	  reaction	  to	  it,	  to	  see	  it	  discussed	  and	  
reconsidered	  and	  assessed	  in	  the	  public	  sphere.	  There	  are	  certainly	  many	  invitations	  
within	  that	  anniversary	  discourse	  to	  go	  into	  further	  research	  on	  the	  history	  of	  the	  cases	  or	  
the	  legal	  citations	  or	  subsequent	  opinions	  and	  their	  rationale,	  and	  this	  offers	  the	  third	  
reason	  the	  case	  an	  excellent	  beginning,	  precisely	  because	  so	  much	  has	  been	  written	  about	  
it	  for	  so	  long,	  including	  the	  rich	  and	  history	  Kluger	  provided.	  Scholarship	  on	  Brown	  covers	  a	  
range	  of	  academic	  disciplines—law,	  certainly,	  but	  also	  education,	  political	  science,	  history,	  
and	  sociology.	  The	  1992	  legislation	  authorizing	  the	  National	  Historic	  Site,	  itself	  a	  valuable	  
and	  instructive	  text	  for	  analysis,	  provided	  a	  timeline	  and	  a	  foundation	  for	  others	  to	  build	  
on,	  so	  that	  what	  might	  have	  been	  one	  more	  national	  monument	  came	  to	  carry	  with	  it	  a	  host	  
of	  writings	  and	  events	  that	  built	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  Brown	  decision	  to	  new	  heights.	  The	  
Brown	  v	  Board	  of	  Education	  National	  Historic	  Site	  provides	  a	  place	  for	  additional	  kinds	  of	  
analysis,	  including	  archival	  research	  this	  researcher	  hopes	  to	  be	  able	  to	  conduct	  in	  the	  near	  
future.	  The	  Library	  of	  Congress	  holding	  provide	  hundreds	  of	  artifacts	  for	  consideration	  and	  
analysis,	  and	  the	  Voices	  of	  Civil	  Rights	  project	  offers	  oral	  testimonies	  that	  can	  be	  studied	  
and	  analyzed	  by	  scholars	  of	  rhetoric.	  This	  particular	  case	  offers	  enormous	  possibilities	  and	  
options	  for	  study	  beyond	  the	  study	  of	  the	  opinion	  itself.	  And	  while	  it	  is	  a	  unique	  case	  for	  
this	  kind	  of	  study,	  Brown	  is	  not	  the	  only	  case	  that	  can	  be	  so	  analyzed	  or	  discussed;	  there	  are	  
many	  significant	  legal	  cases	  that	  address	  social	  challenges	  and	  questions	  of	  personal	  rights	  
that	  followed	  Brown	  that	  will	  have	  anniversaries	  in	  the	  future,	  that	  may	  have	  public	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reaction	  to	  their	  anniversaries,	  or	  that	  may	  be	  the	  topic	  of	  ongoing	  public	  debate,	  as	  Roe	  v	  
Wade	  continues	  to	  be,	  or	  may	  just	  be	  the	  subject	  of	  an	  ongoing	  public	  debate	  over	  issues	  of	  
social	  justice,	  equality	  or	  opportunity.	  Any	  of	  these	  cases	  provided	  a	  means	  for	  engaging	  
the	  intersections	  of	  rhetoric,	  the	  law,	  and	  social	  interests.	  	  
In	  his	  1990	  article,	  Lucaites	  invoked	  the	  fictional	  contract	  law	  professor	  Charles	  
Kingsfield	  from	  the	  1973	  movie	  The	  Paper	  Chase.	  Kingsfield,	  brilliantly	  portrayed	  by	  actor	  
John	  Houseman,	  invoked	  what	  has	  become	  a	  commonplace	  in	  legal	  studies.	  Explaining	  to	  
his	  class	  the	  reasons	  for	  his	  use	  of	  the	  Socratic	  method,	  he	  concluded,	  “you	  teach	  yourselves	  
the	  law,	  but	  I	  train	  your	  minds.	  You	  come	  in	  here	  with	  a	  skull	  full	  of	  mush,	  and	  you	  leave	  
thinking	  like	  a	  lawyer.”	  This	  phrase	  indicates	  that	  one	  must	  “think	  like	  a	  lawyer”	  to	  be	  able	  
to	  discuss	  and	  learn	  the	  law.	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  is	  not	  true.	  The	  law,	  and	  analysis	  of	  the	  law	  
and	  its	  effects,	  need	  not	  be	  restricted	  only	  to	  those	  having	  specialized	  training	  as	  lawyers.	  
Like	  White,	  I	  believe	  law	  is	  best	  seen	  as	  a	  branch	  of	  rhetoric,	  and	  that	  those	  trained	  in	  
rhetoric	  are	  as	  able	  to	  interpret	  and	  analyze	  law	  as	  law	  scholars.	  White	  argues	  “the	  
rhetorician,	  like	  the	  lawyer,	  is…engaged	  in	  a	  process	  of	  meaning-­‐making	  and	  community-­‐
building	  of	  which	  he	  or	  she	  is	  in	  part	  the	  subject”	  (Heracles	  40).	  Rhetoric	  scholars	  are	  
uniquely	  qualified	  to	  engage	  this	  material	  because	  our	  field	  of	  study	  is	  all	  the	  texts	  and	  
contexts	  that	  comprise	  the	  world	  we	  inhabit,	  historical	  and	  contemporary,	  academic	  and	  
popular,	  generalized	  or	  specialized.	  Burke,	  for	  example,	  argued	  that	  rhetoric	  is	  “precisely	  
what	  is	  needed	  to	  understand…all	  forms	  of	  discourse”	  (Bizzell	  and	  Hirshberg	  1295).	  Legal	  
texts	  and	  contexts	  are	  a	  part	  of	  society,	  emerging	  from	  streams	  of	  discourse,	  concerns	  and	  
causes	  that	  motivate	  individuals	  to	  act,	  to	  garner	  support	  for	  a	  position	  and	  find	  advocates	  
in	  positions	  of	  authority	  to	  take	  up	  that	  position,	  sometimes	  proposing	  legislation,	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sometimes	  challenging	  existing	  legislation.	  We	  can	  become	  the	  exemplars	  of	  engaged	  
citizenry	  by	  studying	  and	  analyzing	  judicial	  texts,	  as	  well	  as	  discussing	  them	  in	  relation	  to	  
other	  available	  means	  of	  advocacy	  or	  political	  action	  for	  a	  given	  cause.	  
The	  judicial	  opinion	  itself	  makes	  a	  good	  starting	  point,	  and	  previous	  analyses	  of	  the	  
Brown	  decision	  by	  rhetoric	  scholars	  offer	  a	  series	  of	  methods	  for	  beginning	  the	  work.	  These	  
methods	  can	  be	  classified	  into	  four	  general	  categories:	  analysis	  of	  the	  arguments	  leading	  to	  
the	  text;	  analysis	  of	  the	  text	  itself,	  both	  stand-­‐alone	  and	  as	  part	  of	  a	  continuum	  of	  judicial	  
opinion;	  analysis	  of	  the	  text	  as	  an	  example	  of	  a	  rhetorical	  practice;	  analysis	  as	  a	  case	  study	  
in	  a	  larger	  field	  of	  analysis;	  and	  analysis	  as	  the	  basis	  text	  for	  responses.	  One	  of	  the	  earliest	  
of	  these	  entries	  is	  a	  1963	  article	  by	  David	  B.	  Strother	  that	  focused	  on	  the	  rhetorical	  use	  of	  
social-­‐science	  evidence	  in	  the	  case.	  The	  use	  of	  social	  science	  evidence	  in	  the	  Opinion	  was	  
one	  of	  its	  most	  controversial	  elements,	  and	  forty	  years	  after	  Strother’s	  essay,	  David	  Droge	  
re-­‐examined	  that	  evidence	  and	  the	  criticisms	  of	  Warren’s	  reliance	  on	  it	  in	  the	  Opinion.	  
Droge	  argues	  that	  the	  legal	  team	  worked	  within	  the	  constraints	  of	  their	  rhetorical	  situation,	  
as	  did	  Warren.	  This	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  claim	  Hasian,	  Condit	  and	  Lucaites	  made	  about	  Supreme	  
Court	  opinions	  generally,	  and	  all	  are	  example	  of	  analyzing	  the	  reasons	  offered	  in	  support	  of	  
an	  argument.,	  and	  the	  quality	  of	  those	  reasons.	  This	  basic	  rhetorical	  analysis	  process	  can	  be	  
applied	  to	  virtually	  any	  Court	  decision,	  such	  as	  Justice	  O’Connor’s	  Opinion	  in	  the	  Grutter	  
case	  described	  above.	  But	  it	  could	  apply	  equally	  well	  to	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  reasoning	  in	  
the	  2000	  case	  Bush	  v.	  Gore,	  which	  determined	  the	  shape	  of	  national	  leadership	  with	  
consequences	  that	  continue	  to	  affect	  the	  nation	  on	  multiple	  levels	  today.	  
While	  Strother	  looked	  at	  the	  case	  for	  the	  use	  of	  evidence	  and	  how	  it	  appeared	  in	  the	  
opinion,	  Milton	  Dickens	  and	  Ruth	  E.	  Schwartz	  analyzed	  the	  oral	  arguments	  made	  by	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Thurgood	  Marshall	  and	  his	  direct	  opponent,	  John	  W.	  Davis,	  before	  the	  Court.	  This	  was	  both	  
an	  analysis	  of	  the	  specific	  arguments,	  and	  of	  those	  arguments	  as	  indicators	  of	  the	  
“distinctive	  characteristics	  of	  oral	  argument	  in	  major	  cases	  before	  the	  Supreme	  Court”	  (33).	  
Their	  study	  was	  quantitative,	  examining	  and	  coding	  transcripts	  and	  comparing	  actual	  with	  
reported	  acts.	  The	  article	  contrasts	  the	  argument	  styles	  of	  these	  two	  attorneys	  and	  shows	  
how	  each	  responded	  to	  the	  unique	  environment	  of	  the	  Court.	  They	  note	  the	  formal,	  elegant	  
manner	  of	  Mr.	  Davis	  against	  the	  more	  folksy	  style	  of	  Mr.	  Marshall,	  an	  observation	  made	  by	  
legal	  scholars	  and	  historians	  as	  well.	  Dickens	  and	  Schwartz	  do	  not	  comment	  on	  Brown	  as	  a	  
decision,	  except	  to	  note	  that	  “Marshall’s	  strategical	  choices	  coincided	  much	  more	  closely	  
with	  the	  Court’s	  verdict	  than	  did	  Davis’	  choices”	  (41).	  This	  article	  is	  useful	  not	  only	  as	  a	  way	  
of	  analyzing	  language	  in	  a	  particular	  situation,	  but	  for	  its	  method	  of	  coding	  and	  comparison.	  	  
Judith	  Diamondstone	  made	  observations	  similar	  to	  those	  of	  Dickens	  and	  Schwartz	  
about	  the	  rhetorical	  styles	  of	  Marshall	  and	  Davis	  in	  her	  1997	  work	  comparing	  the	  
arguments	  of	  seventh	  graders	  in	  a	  classroom	  re-­‐enactment	  with	  the	  actual	  historical	  
records	  from	  the	  Brown	  decision.	  In	  her	  discussion	  of	  the	  historical	  argument,	  she	  not	  only	  
notes	  the	  differences	  in	  style	  between	  the	  two	  attorneys,	  Davis’s	  “eloquence	  that	  harked	  
back	  to	  an	  aristocratic	  South”	  and	  Marshall’s	  “disregard[…]	  [of]	  formal	  syntax”	  and	  
“inconsistent…use	  of	  tense	  and	  perspective,”	  Diamondstone	  focuses	  on	  register,	  and	  the	  
several	  ways	  that	  Marshall’s	  demeanor	  demonstrates	  Bakhtin’s	  notion	  of	  “double-­‐voiced	  
discourse”	  (210).	  She	  observes	  further	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  register	  can	  help	  teach	  
schoolchildren	  that	  “meanings	  are	  made	  on	  different	  dimensions	  of	  social	  life	  
simultaneously”	  (216).	  This	  concept	  also	  helps	  to	  explain	  how	  Brown	  came	  to	  mean	  in	  
different	  ways	  to	  different	  social	  groups	  both	  during	  and	  after	  its	  issuance.	  More	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importantly,	  Diamondstone’s	  work	  shows	  how	  easily	  this	  particular	  decision	  can	  be	  taught	  
and	  understood	  by	  non-­‐lawyers.	  Her	  re-­‐enactment	  with	  seventh	  graders	  is	  similar	  to	  David	  
Fleming’s	  undergraduate	  class	  called	  “Writing	  and	  Reasoning:	  The	  Jury	  Project,”	  w	  writing	  
course	  in	  which	  students	  examined	  the	  documents	  related	  to	  a	  current	  Supreme	  Court	  case	  
(2003-­‐04	  term)	  to	  make	  their	  own	  arguments	  about	  how	  the	  case	  should	  be	  decided.	  This	  
model	  could	  be	  duplicated	  to	  introduce	  students	  to	  both	  the	  workings	  and	  written	  
documents	  of	  the	  Court	  and	  to	  judicial	  responsibilities	  of	  citizens,	  including	  their	  potential	  
role	  as	  jurors.	  	  
Like	  Dickens	  and	  Schwartz,	  Martin	  Bartness	  also	  focused	  on	  difference	  in	  his	  
rhetorical	  analysis	  of	  the	  Brown	  decision.	  Bartness	  examined	  how	  the	  Justices,	  coming	  as	  
they	  did	  from	  different	  schools	  of	  legal	  philosophical	  thought	  came	  together	  to	  produce	  a	  
unanimous	  decision.	  Bartness	  employed	  genre	  analysis	  to	  show	  that	  three	  schools	  of	  
thought,	  naturalism,	  realism	  and	  positivism,	  rather	  than	  being	  mutually	  exclusive,	  can	  have	  
a	  “dyadic	  combination	  or	  fusion”	  that	  makes	  unanimity	  possible	  even	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  
differences	  (55).	  This	  article	  offers	  a	  model	  for	  a	  more	  theoretical	  and	  philosophical	  
approach	  to	  reading	  judicial	  opinion,	  one	  that	  might	  require	  additional	  reading	  and	  might	  
therefore	  be	  best	  suited	  to	  graduate	  or	  post-­‐doctoral	  study.	  
Kathryn	  Bellman	  examined	  the	  controversial	  nature	  of	  the	  decision	  in	  her	  1990	  
dissertation	  (English)	  that	  featured	  a	  line-­‐by-­‐line	  analysis	  of	  the	  language	  in	  the	  decision,	  
after	  which	  she	  concluded	  that	  it	  “was	  neither	  carelessly	  nor	  hastily	  written,”	  as	  some	  had	  
claimed.	  This	  detailed	  textual	  analysis	  “reveal[ed]	  the	  purposefulness	  of	  [the	  Opinion’s]	  
logic	  and	  rhetoric”	  (195-­‐196).	  Her	  initial	  question	  (similar	  to	  that	  motivating	  this	  project)	  
had	  been	  about	  the	  controversy	  surrounding	  the	  Brown	  decision,	  a	  decision	  whose	  time,	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she	  argued,	  had	  clearly	  come.	  Her	  analysis	  responded	  to	  claims	  that	  the	  Opinion	  itself	  was	  
at	  fault	  for	  not	  having	  been	  written	  in	  a	  way	  to	  accomplish	  its	  task.	  While	  acknowledging	  
some	  “communicative	  problems,”	  Bellman	  argues	  that	  the	  reasoning	  in	  the	  Opinion	  fell	  
“within	  the	  range	  of	  acceptable	  interpretations	  of	  the	  Constitution”	  and	  that	  criticisms	  of	  
the	  decision	  came	  from	  political	  value	  or	  disagreement	  with	  the	  decision.	  Her	  project,	  
perhaps	  more	  than	  any	  of	  the	  others	  here,	  shows	  that	  standard	  tools	  of	  rhetorical	  analysis	  
can	  lead	  to	  clear	  and	  appropriate	  claims	  about	  judicial	  opinion	  regardless	  of	  the	  
researcher’s	  primary	  academic	  affiliation.	  
Political	  values	  and	  disagreements	  figure	  heavily	  in	  other	  studies	  of	  the	  Brown	  
decision,	  particularly	  studies	  that	  examine	  the	  precedent	  case,	  Plessy	  v.	  Ferguson,	  as	  Marouf	  
Hasian,	  Jr.	  did,	  or	  those	  that	  examine	  the	  political	  acts	  of	  resistance	  that	  came	  after	  the	  
decision,	  as	  Ann	  Burnette	  did.	  Burnette	  analyzed	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  massive	  resistance	  
movement	  that	  followed	  the	  Brown	  decision,	  arguing	  that	  the	  claims	  of	  states’	  rights	  
underlying	  the	  resistance	  were	  diminished	  and	  the	  motives	  suspect	  because	  of	  the	  
inclusion	  of	  arguments	  about	  race.	  “If	  the	  states’	  rights	  argument	  were	  truly	  transcendent,”	  
she	  argues,	  “the	  race	  argument	  would	  not	  be	  necessary”	  (138).	  Hasian’s	  examination	  of	  the	  
Plessy	  decision	  challenges	  the	  traditional	  presentation	  of	  this	  decision	  as	  a	  dichotomy	  
between	  the	  majority	  opinion	  and	  sole	  dissenter,	  Justice	  John	  Marshall	  Harlan,	  and	  looks	  to	  
the	  social,	  political	  and	  economic	  contexts	  within	  which	  Plessy	  was	  decided.	  Hasian	  argues	  
that	  there	  were	  many	  views	  to	  consider	  in	  the	  discourses	  about	  race	  in	  Louisiana	  at	  that	  
time,	  and	  that	  “communication	  scholars	  have	  the	  obligation	  of	  illustrating	  some	  of	  the	  
complexities”	  of	  such	  a	  case	  (17).	  Daniel	  Mangis	  examines	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  Justice	  Harlan’s	  
dissent	  as	  prophesy,	  and	  as	  a	  way	  of	  illuminating	  a	  decision	  by	  casting	  different	  light	  on	  its	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circumstances,	  while	  Ann	  Gill	  shows	  how	  the	  language	  of	  Supreme	  Court	  opinion	  in	  cases	  
that	  followed	  Brown,	  specifically	  Cooper	  v.	  Aaron,	  moved	  from	  that	  of	  appeasement	  and	  
gradualism	  to	  one	  of	  authority	  and	  duty	  to	  comply	  as	  the	  political	  resistance	  amplified.	  
Each	  of	  these	  provides	  a	  way	  of	  examining	  the	  contextual	  elements	  of	  a	  judicial	  opinion	  and	  
analyzing	  the	  effects	  of	  that	  opinion	  through	  both	  legal	  and	  social	  paths.	  
A	  slightly	  different	  approach	  to	  the	  opinion	  itself	  is	  to	  examine	  key	  phrases,	  
particularly	  those	  that	  seem	  to	  take	  on	  a	  life	  of	  their	  own,	  such	  as	  “you	  have	  the	  right	  to	  
remain	  silent”	  that	  has	  come	  to	  represent	  the	  1966	  ruling	  in	  Miranda	  v.	  Arizona,	  the	  
“hanging	  chad”	  that	  stand	  in	  for	  Bush	  v.	  Gore	  or	  the	  separate	  but	  equal	  phrase	  the	  underlies	  
the	  entire	  Brown	  sequence	  from	  Roberts	  v.	  City	  of	  Boston	  through	  Plessy	  and	  up	  to	  the	  
Michigan	  cases.	  Hasian	  and	  Geoffrey	  D.	  Klinger	  traced	  the	  two	  terms,	  “separate”	  and	  
“equal.”	  back	  through	  the	  pertinent	  decisions	  to	  shows	  how	  a	  series	  of	  competing	  
discourses	  about	  the	  meaning	  of	  “equality”	  led	  to	  a	  particular	  view	  being	  inducted	  as	  law,	  
thus	  limiting	  the	  choices	  available	  to	  future	  litigants	  and	  judges.	  The	  authors	  examine	  the	  
rhetorical	  groundwork	  laid	  in	  the	  1849	  Roberts	  decision,	  and	  argue	  that	  “America’s	  
dominant	  tales	  about	  the	  ‘separate	  but	  equal’	  doctrine	  are	  filled	  with	  irony	  and	  tragedy	  at	  
multiple	  levels”	  (270).	  The	  article	  draws	  on	  Northup	  Frye’s	  work	  that	  constructs	  irony	  as	  
one	  of	  the	  four	  central	  narratives	  in	  literary	  tradition	  and	  on	  Kenneth	  Burke’s	  work	  on	  the	  
tragic	  frame,	  both	  of	  which	  offer	  “more	  realistic	  way	  to	  look	  at	  the	  power	  of	  America’s	  
infatuation	  with	  the	  ‘rule	  of	  law’”	  (271).	  	  
In	  the	  anchor	  essay	  to	  the	  collection	  he	  edited,	  Clarke	  Rountree	  discusses	  Brown	  as	  
an	  example	  of	  a	  rhetorical	  practice,	  in	  this	  case	  of	  prospective	  argument,	  a	  process	  not	  only	  
of	  arguing	  the	  present	  case,	  but	  also	  building	  the	  grounds	  for	  successful	  future	  arguments	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(49).	  Rountree	  shows	  how	  the	  team	  had	  to	  establish	  the	  speaker,	  prepare	  the	  audience,	  fix	  
the	  message,	  find	  the	  occasion,	  and	  most	  importantly,	  find	  the	  timing,	  and	  to	  do	  all	  of	  this	  at	  
each	  successive	  step	  while	  simultaneously	  building	  the	  courts	  files	  from	  which	  the	  
Supreme	  Court	  would	  base	  its	  Opinion	  and	  not	  creating	  any	  situation	  that	  would	  give	  the	  
Court	  a	  place	  to	  rule	  against	  them.	  Rountree’s	  theory	  is	  of	  his	  own	  marking,	  but	  other	  
opinions	  might	  reveal	  different	  argument	  structures	  (such	  as	  a	  Toulmin	  form,	  or	  a	  Rogerian	  
form,	  which	  is	  one	  way	  to	  look	  at	  Droge’s	  article,	  or	  a	  formal	  syllogistic	  argument),	  and	  can	  
present	  opportunities	  to	  examine	  appeals	  and	  audiences	  as	  well	  as	  types	  of	  argument.	  
In	  another	  article	  that	  focused	  on	  Brown	  as	  an	  example,	  David	  Hunsacker	  offered	  
one	  of	  the	  first	  studies	  to	  show	  how	  the	  Brown	  decision	  functioned	  in	  society.	  In	  his	  1978	  
article,	  Hunsaker	  argued	  that	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  Brown	  “was	  and	  is	  paradigmatic	  of	  the	  rhetoric	  
of	  social	  protest”	  in	  the	  twenty-­‐five	  years	  between	  Brown	  and	  the	  article’s	  publication	  (93).	  
His	  analysis	  focuses	  on	  the	  “potential	  and	  actual	  reality	  change	  of	  the	  rhetorical	  situation	  in	  
Brown”	  and	  argues	  that	  “the	  rhetoric	  in	  Brown…provide[s]	  the	  topoi	  and	  commonplaces	  for	  
future	  litigants”	  in	  other	  discrimination	  cases	  (94).	  Significantly,	  Hunsaker	  demonstrates	  
that	  litigation	  is	  always	  “polarized,”	  an	  adversarial	  exchange	  without	  middle	  ground,	  and	  
that	  civil	  rights	  litigation	  involved	  many	  opposites,	  “equality-­‐inequality,	  black-­‐white,	  
rights-­‐duties,”	  etc.	  Hunsacker	  claims	  that	  “justice	  may	  be	  the	  ‘god-­‐term’”	  for	  social	  protest	  
groups,	  that	  the	  central	  meaning	  of	  the	  term	  in	  such	  protest	  is	  “equality	  before	  the	  law,”	  
and	  that	  “justice	  as	  equality	  has	  permeated	  protest	  rhetoric	  since	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  
Education”	  (104).	  Hunsacker’s	  theory	  of	  justice	  as	  god-­‐term	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  social	  protest	  
rhetoric	  since	  his	  article’s	  publication,	  a	  study	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  project,	  and	  also	  to	  
the	  more	  recent	  analyses	  and	  legal	  arguments	  surrounding	  cases	  involving	  race	  and	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education.	  It	  also	  provides	  a	  useful	  starting	  point	  for	  examining	  other	  ways	  that	  rhetoric	  
figures	  into	  social	  movements,	  a	  comparative	  point	  on	  how	  a	  judicial	  opinion	  proved	  
foundational	  to	  other	  rhetorical	  strategies.	  Charles	  J.	  Stewart,	  Craig	  Allen	  Smith,	  and	  Robert	  
E.	  Denton,	  Jr.	  provided	  an	  excellent	  companion	  book	  for	  this	  type	  of	  analysis	  with	  their	  
Persuasion	  and	  Social	  Movements,	  where	  they	  argue	  that	  social	  movements	  “exist	  and	  
operate	  primarily	  from	  outside	  established	  institutions”	  (6).	  Their	  analysis	  of	  how	  social	  
movements	  work	  and	  how	  persuasion	  figures	  into	  them	  offers	  the	  potential	  alternative	  
discourses	  available	  to	  social	  justice	  advocates	  that	  function	  outside	  the	  limiting	  language	  
of	  a	  lawsuit.	  	  
Some	  of	  these	  limitations	  provide	  the	  foundation	  for	  Catherine	  Prendergast’s	  
award-­‐winning	  book	  in	  which	  she	  examines	  how	  Brown	  functioned	  in	  society	  with	  respect	  
to	  literacy.	  Titled	  Literacy	  and	  Racial	  Justice:	  The	  Politics	  of	  Learning	  after	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  
Education,	  Prendergast’s	  work	  examines	  Brown	  as	  part	  of	  a	  continuum	  of	  judicial	  opinion,	  
covering	  the	  specific	  period	  from	  Brown	  in	  1954	  through	  the	  Bakke	  decision	  in	  1978.	  
Prendergast	  argues	  that	  since	  Brown,	  “literacy	  and	  racial	  justice	  have	  become	  intertwined	  
in	  the	  American	  imagination”	  and	  that	  it	  was	  the	  Brown	  decision	  that	  “fixed	  the	  notion	  of	  
education	  as	  the	  path	  to	  equal	  opportunity”	  (1,	  2).	  Drawing	  from	  Critical	  Race	  Theory,	  
Prendergast	  reviews	  the	  history	  of	  Brown	  with	  a	  specific	  view	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  
literacy	  as	  White	  property,	  and	  argues	  that	  the	  Brown	  decision	  served	  to	  reinforce	  that	  
concept	  (11).	  Prendergast	  also	  looks	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  decisions	  on	  education	  that	  
came	  after	  Brown	  to	  show	  that	  the	  “economy	  of	  literacy	  as	  White	  property”	  has	  been	  the	  
dominant	  focus	  of	  the	  debates	  over	  racial	  justice	  since	  the	  Bakke	  decision	  in	  1978.	  Guided	  
by	  Critical	  Race	  Theory	  scholarship,	  Prendergast	  argues	  that	  judges	  are	  influenced	  by	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culture,	  sometimes	  more	  so	  than	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  precedent.	  Her	  claim	  is	  supported	  by	  
Anthony	  Amsterdam	  and	  Jerome	  Bruner,	  whom	  she	  cites,	  and	  also	  by	  legal	  scholars	  such	  as	  
Michael	  Klarman	  and	  Mark	  Tushnet	  (whom	  she	  does	  not).	  This	  assessment	  of	  judicial	  
reasoning	  questions	  such	  principles	  as	  legal	  racial	  neutrality	  or	  colorblindness	  and	  argues	  
that	  racism	  is	  a	  norm	  rather	  than	  an	  aberration	  in	  the	  United	  States	  (12).	  Her	  analysis	  ties	  
back	  to	  the	  ways	  of	  examining	  the	  law	  James	  Boyd	  White	  gave	  us,	  and	  makes	  a	  supporting	  
case	  for	  examining	  judicial	  opinion	  as	  part	  of	  a	  culture	  of	  argument.	  	  	  
Rhetorical	  analysis	  of	  judicial	  opinion	  can	  produce	  meaningful	  scholarship	  about	  the	  
nature	  of	  justice	  in	  our	  country.	  As	  Jack	  Balkin	  argues,	  "whether	  we	  realize	  it	  or	  not,	  each	  of	  
us	  is	  always	  rewriting	  the	  central	  texts	  of	  our	  political	  heritage.	  In	  each	  generation	  we	  add	  
new	  meanings	  and	  glosses	  to	  those	  texts	  based	  on	  our	  own	  experiences	  and	  
understandings"	  (71).	  Justice	  Breyer	  wrote,	  “Brown’s	  simple	  affirmation	  helped	  us	  to	  
understand	  that	  our	  Constitution	  was	  meant	  to	  create	  a	  democracy	  that	  worked	  not	  just	  on	  
paper	  but	  in	  practice.”	  To	  accomplish	  that,	  citizens	  needs	  to	  be	  able	  to	  understand	  the	  
Constitution,	  and	  the	  reasoning	  the	  advocates	  and	  judges	  use	  when	  making	  arguments	  that	  
involve	  its	  terms.	  	  We,	  the	  people,	  by	  our	  shared	  values	  and	  the	  celebration	  thereof	  –	  
epideictic	  occasions—create	  the	  framework	  for	  judicial	  opinion.	  But	  we	  also	  create	  the	  
public	  discourse	  that	  offers	  alternatives	  to	  the	  judicial	  process	  for	  realizing	  social	  goals.	  	  
The	  Justices	  in	  the	  Brown	  decision	  stepped	  into	  what	  Kluger	  called	  a	  “moral	  void”	  to	  
make	  the	  decision	  they	  did.	  Maybe	  in	  their	  time,	  there	  really	  was	  no	  other	  solution.	  But	  
recognizing	  that	  the	  law	  is	  only	  one	  arena	  in	  which	  solutions	  to	  social	  concerns/issues	  are	  
negotiated	  allows	  comparative	  of	  legal	  processes	  alongside	  studies	  of	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  social	  
movements	  and	  persuasive	  advocacy	  that	  focus	  on	  efforts	  outside	  of	  the	  courtroom,	  efforts	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that	  attempt	  to	  move	  minds	  to	  action	  by	  linking	  causes	  with	  ideas	  and	  values.	  The	  law	  is	  
also	  a	  product	  of	  advocacy,	  which	  is	  why	  law	  students	  study	  rhetoric,	  to	  be	  able	  to	  form	  and	  
support	  arguments	  that	  win	  the	  day.	  By	  reclaiming	  the	  discourse	  of	  law	  (judicial	  rhetoric)	  
the	  discipline	  of	  rhetoric	  can	  position	  itself	  as	  not	  just	  an	  academic	  specialty,	  but	  as	  a	  
central	  part	  of	  education	  where	  students	  are	  provided	  with	  the	  tools	  and	  the	  
understanding	  to	  engage	  in	  public	  discussion	  about	  the	  laws	  that	  govern	  them	  as	  well	  as	  
about	  the	  social	  issues	  of	  their	  time,	  and	  about	  alternatives	  to	  lawsuits,	  or	  the	  means	  to	  
create	  the	  social	  climate	  under	  which	  laws	  can	  be	  changed.	  Law	  is	  a	  public	  good,	  and	  is	  vital	  
to	  democracy,	  but	  talking	  about	  law	  in	  abstract	  terms,	  rather	  than	  actually	  reading	  and	  
analyzing	  law,	  leads	  to	  mythologizing	  about	  law,	  producing	  the	  kinds	  of	  myths	  about	  what	  
a	  particular	  decision	  did	  or	  didn’t	  do,	  or	  what	  the	  justices	  were	  or	  were	  not	  thinking,	  that	  
Cheryl	  Brown	  Henderson	  and	  her	  colleagues	  hoped	  to	  dispel	  in	  their	  creation	  of	  the	  Brown	  
Foundation	  and	  the	  Brown	  v	  Board	  of	  Education	  National	  Historic	  Site.	  	  
The	  challenge	  for	  us,	  now,	  in	  the	  twenty	  first	  century,	  is	  to	  reclaim	  legal	  discourse	  
and	  to	  return	  the	  discussion	  of	  what	  is	  just	  and	  what	  is	  a	  good	  society	  into	  the	  public	  realm,	  
rather	  than	  allowing	  such	  matters	  to	  be	  crafted	  in	  the	  language	  of	  a	  lawsuit	  and	  left	  to	  the	  
realm	  of	  legal	  initiates.	  What	  is	  needed,	  as	  Lucaites	  argued,	  is	  to	  think	  “about	  ‘the	  law’	  as	  a	  
rhetoric,”	  as	  “language-­‐in-­‐action”	  (446),	  and	  thus	  understand	  that	  it	  is	  malleable,	  that	  it	  can	  
be	  changed	  and	  adapted	  as	  social	  conditions	  and	  needs	  change.	  We	  must	  claim	  Brown	  and	  
other	  judicial	  opinions	  as	  rhetorical	  events,	  to	  analyze	  them	  textually	  and	  contextually	  as	  
we	  might	  any	  other	  text,	  to	  demystify	  the	  texts	  that	  are	  “the	  law”	  and	  see	  them	  as	  artifacts,	  
albeit	  artifacts	  deeply	  imbued	  with	  authority.	  We	  must	  examine	  them	  as	  “a	  stage	  in	  a	  
conversation”	  (White	  Justice	  101)	  and	  we	  must	  ask	  of	  this	  conversation	  if	  it	  will	  lead	  to	  the	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kind	  of	  society	  we	  want,	  if	  it	  will	  lead	  to	  the	  kinds	  of	  diversity	  and	  full	  participation	  we	  
imagine	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  a	  just	  society.	  We	  must	  be	  able	  to	  find	  the	  ground	  upon	  which	  we,	  
collectively	  as	  citizens	  of	  a	  free	  and	  democratic	  society,	  can	  reason	  our	  way	  into	  a	  common	  
sense	  of	  what	  is	  just,	  to	  find	  a	  shared	  vocabulary	  to	  discuss	  social	  problems	  and	  injustices	  
without	  resorting	  to	  the	  limiting	  language	  of	  a	  lawsuit.	  To	  persuade	  folks	  to	  change	  their	  
ways	  in	  daily	  life,	  to	  persuade	  individual	  people	  to	  accept	  a	  change	  in	  their	  social	  order	  and	  
practices,	  requires	  more	  than	  a	  declaration	  of	  change,	  no	  matter	  where	  that	  declaration	  
comes	  from.	  Rhetoric	  provides	  us	  with	  the	  most	  promising	  means	  to	  accomplish	  that	  goal.	  	  
Understanding	  the	  persuasive	  value	  of	  epideictic,	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  epideictic	  events	  
shape	  communal	  values	  that	  lead	  to	  deliberative	  and	  forensic	  rhetorical	  practices	  is	  one	  
way	  of	  making	  the	  specialized	  language	  of	  law	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  legal	  decisions	  more	  
accessible	  to	  both	  the	  students	  we	  educate	  and	  the	  society	  to	  which	  Lucaites	  argued	  we	  
owe	  a	  “particular	  responsibility.”	  Taking	  up	  judicial	  opinion	  as	  texts	  of	  inquiry	  for	  both	  
scholarship	  and	  teaching	  is	  another,	  a	  means	  for	  reclaiming	  law	  as	  a	  branch	  of	  rhetoric,	  and	  
reestablishing	  rhetoric	  as	  a	  valuable	  and	  central	  part	  of	  life	  in	  a	  democracy.	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  2008	  and	  2009	  
	  
ETS,	  AP	  English	  Course	  Auditor	  -­‐	  2007	  
	  
Syracuse	  University,	  CCR	  Intern	  (administrative)	  
	  
Syracuse	  University,	  Professional	  Development	  Seminar,	  “Writing, Rhetoric, and the Law: 
Partnership Possibilities with the College of Law.” - 2006	  
	  
Syracuse	  University,	  Writing	  Program	  Upper	  Division	  Committee,	  member.	  2004-­‐05.	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Syracuse	  University,	  English	  Graduate	  Organization	  Facilitator.	  2003-­‐05.	  
	  
Syracuse	  University,	  Writing	  Program	  Summer	  Planning	  Team	  for	  new	  TA	  Training.	  2003.	  
	  
Honors/Awards 
Syracuse	  University,	  University	  Fellowship,	  multiple	  year	  award	  2004-­‐2008.	  
Future	  Professoriate	  Project,	  Syracuse	  University,	  2005-­‐present	  




Professional Credentials (Financial Services) 
Certified	  Employee	  Benefits	  Specialist	  (CEBS)	  
Chartered	  Financial	  Consultant	  (ChFC),	  The	  American	  College	  
Chartered	  Life	  Underwriter	  (CLU),	  The	  American	  College	  
Chartered	  Property	  Casualty	  Underwriter	  (CPCU),	  American	  Institute	  for	  Property	  &	  
Liability	  Underwriters	  
Registered	  Health	  Underwriter	  (RHU),	  The	  American	  College	  
Advanced	  Pension	  Planning	  Certificate,	  The	  American	  College	  
Associate	  in	  Management	  Certificate,	  Insurance	  Institute	  of	  America	  	  
	  
Continuing	  Education	  and	  Professional	  Development	  Presentations	  
“Holistic	  Retirement	  Planning.”	  1-­‐day	  seminar,	  University	  of	  Washington,	  2002.	  
	  
“Personal	  Financial	  Fitness.”	  5-­‐week	  series,	  University	  of	  Washington,	  2002.	  
	  
“Cyber	  Coverage.”	  Seattle	  Chapter,	  Order	  of	  the	  Gray	  Goose,	  2001.	  
	  
“Benefits	  Legislation	  Update.”	  Law	  Office	  Management	  Institute,	  Seattle,	  1999.	  
	  
	  “Broker	  License	  Preparatory	  Course,	  Property	  &	  Casualty.”	  Acordia	  Northwest,	  1998.	  
	  
“Broker	  License	  Preparatory	  Course,	  Life	  &	  Health.”	  Acordia	  Northwest,	  1998.	  
	  
“Change	  Agents.”	  American	  Society	  for	  Training	  and	  Development,	  1998.	  
	  
“Employee	  Benefits	  Issues	  1998.”	  Association	  of	  Legal	  Administrators,	  Teleseminar,	  May	  
1998.	  
	  
“Health	  Care	  Update:	  The	  Impact	  of	  Federal	  Legislation,	  Part	  I,	  HIPAA.”	  Association	  of	  Legal	  
Administrators,	  26th	  Annual	  Education	  Conference,	  Seattle,	  May	  1997.	  
	  
“Health	  Care	  Update:	  The	  Impact	  of	  Federal	  Legislation,	  Part	  II,	  SBJPA.”	  Association	  of	  Legal	  
Administrators,	  26th	  Annual	  Education	  Conference,	  Seattle,	  May	  1997.	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“The	  Large	  Print	  Giveth:	  Introduction	  to	  Insurance	  Law.”	  Seattle	  Chapter	  of	  CLU	  &	  ChFC,	  
1996.	  
	  




Employee	  Benefit	  Planning	  Association,	  Seattle,	  Past	  President	  
Seattle	  Chapter	  of	  CLU	  &	  ChFC,	  Past-­‐President	  
American	  Society	  of	  CLU	  &	  ChFC,	  National	  committee	  member	  
Washington	  Association	  of	  Insurance	  and	  Financial	  Advisors,	  Editor,	  WAIFA	  Journal	  
	  
	  
